Defic 28E.40 v.31

Contents

1. Remarks upon Shaftsbury on Enthusiasm 1708
2. Reflections upon a Lit: concerning Enthusiasm 4
3. Wotton's Inquiry after Wit: v. Shaftsbury. 1709
4. Natural History of Superstition. 1709
5. Hutcheson's Inquiry on Beauty and Virtue. 2
6. Clarke's (John) Exam: of Well Hon. 172:
7. Principal & peculiar notion of Wm, refuted. 25
8. Brief profession of Religion as founded on reason.
9. Bougeant on the Language of Beasts. 1739

THE
Natural History
OF
SUPERSTITION.

By John Trenchard.

Sic plerumq; agitat ſtultos inſcitia veri, &
Palantes error certo de tramite pellit:
Ille ſiniſtrorſum, hic deorſum abit, unus utriq;
Error, ſed variis illudit partibus omnes.

Sold by *A. Baldwin* at the *Oxford Arms*
in *Warwick Lane.* MDCCIX.

THE

Natural Hiſtory

OF

SUPERSTITION.

IF any Man ſurveys and contemplates the Viſible World, the great and glorious body of the Sun, many thouſand times bigger than the Earth, its immence diſtance from us, this Globe on which we live, and numerous other Planets moving about it, and receiving Vital warmth and Nouriſhment from its Beams; if he purſues and agrandizes this Idea, by conſidering the much greater Diſtance and Magnitude of the Fixt-Stars, in all probability ſo many Suns, with each their particular ſyſtem of Worlds, and Inhabitants, and the frequent diſcovery of new ones, by the Invention of better

Glaſſes and Teleſcopes; how muſt he admire and adore the Power of God, who has given being and motion to ſuch vaſt Machines, created them of ſuch figure and magnitude, diſpoſed them in ſuch order, placed them at ſuch diſtances, gave them ſuch proper and ſuitable motions, as oblige them to perform the regular and ordinary purpoſes of his Providence, without the conſtant and momentary interpoſition of his Power.

Nor is it leſs conſpicuous in the formation of inferiour Animals, in this little part of the World in which we live, whoſe parts are ſo adapted and diſpoſed by his all-wiſe Providence, as by the neceſſity of their own Natures to perform the functions and operations of their Beings: Hence we ſee that univerſal Harmony in all Creatures of the ſame Species; they have the ſame hopes and deſires, the ſame fears and averſions; ſome kinds have intrepid Courage, others Pannick Fears; Nature directs ſome to force and violence, others to flight and cunning; ſome prey upon Fleſh, ſome live upon Fruits and Seeds, others upon Graſs and Vegitables; Birds of the ſame kind build their Neſts with the ſame Contrivance, and the ſame Materials; all Creatures of the ſame kind defend themſelves with the ſame

ſame Addreſs and Cunning, and are caught and trapan'd by the ſame Wiles and Artifices, and generate others like them as naturally and neceſſarily as a Tree or Vegetable is produced from its Seed, with ſome little difference in individuals, owing probably to the circumſtance of ſoil, food, peculiar accidents, or ſomething perhaps particular in the formation of each Syſtem.

His partiality to Mankind has not hindred him from forming our Bodies in the ſame manner and of the ſame Materials; he has given us the ſame Springs of Vital Motion, the ſame Nerves, Tendons, Veins and Arteries, the like diſpoſition and organization of our Brains, and conſequently the like faculties of Seeing, Feeling, Hearing, Taſting and Smelling, the ſame ſenſations of Pleaſure and Pain, alike Deſires and Averſions, alike Hopes and Fears; we have the ſame way of coming into the World, and the ſame ways of going out of it. Nor can it be denied that in many reſpects we are excelled by inferiour Creatures in the organization of our Bodies, as ſome are Stronger, others more Active, ſome Bolder, others of longer Continuance; moſt kinds ſurpaſs us in the Acuteneſs of one or more of our Senſes, and ſome in all of them.

But we have ample amends made us in the Faculties of our Souls, which makes it evident we were deſigned for nobler Uſes; for whereas other Animals appear to have no thoughts or deſires above their quotidian Food, Eaſe, Diverſions, or Luſts, Men have viſibly larger and more extenſive views, as not only from the ordinary and regular Syſtem of the Univerſe to carry their Minds to the great Creator, but to infer from thence the Duty and Obedience owing to him, and the Juſtice, Compaſſion, Love and Aſſiſtance owing to one another. And ſince the defect and narrowneſs of our natural Capacities has left us in the Dark about a Future State, his abundant goodneſs has amply ſupplyed the ſhortneſs of our knowledge with Divine Revelation, and has diſcovered and annex'd a ſtate of immortal Happineſs to the natural rewards attending a Juſt and Virtuous Life.

But as there is no perfection in this frail State, nor any excellency without ſome defect accompanying it, ſo theſe noble faculties of the Mind have miſled and betrayed us into Superſtition, as appears in that notwithſtanding we are abundantly cautioned not to miſtake the Impoſtures of pretended Prophets, the Frauds of Prieſts, and the Dreams and Viſions of Enthuſiaſts for

for Heavenly Revelations, and our own infirmities and pannick fears for Divine Impulſes, yet the Fables of the Heathens, the Alchoran of *Mahomet*, the more groſs and impious Forgeries of the Papiſts, and the Frauds and Follies of ſome who call themſelves Proteſtants, have ſo far prevailed over genuine Chriſtianity, that the Righteous and Faithful are but like *the Gold to the Earth*, which could not have thus happened in all Ages, unleſs ſomething innate in our Conſtitutions made us eaſily to be ſuſceptible of wrong Impreſſions, ſubject to Pannick Fears, and prone to Superſtition and Error, and therefore it is incumbent upon us, firſt of all to examine into the frame and conſtitution of our own Bodies, and ſearch into the cauſes of our Paſſions and Infirmities, for till we know from what Source or Principle we are ſo apt to be deceived by others, and by our ſelves, we can never be capable of true Knowledge, much leſs of true Religion, which is the perfection of it.

I take this wholly to proceed from our ignorance of Cauſes, and yet curioſity to know them, it being impoſſible for any Man ſo far to diveſt himſelf of concern for his own Happineſs, as not to endeavour to promote it, and conſequently to avoid what he thinks may hurt him; and ſince there

there must be causes in Nature for every thing that does or will happen, either here or hereafter, it is hard to avoid sollicitude till we think we know them, and therefore since the Divine Providence has for the most part hid the Causes of Things which chiefly concern us from our View, we must either entirely abandon the enquiry, or substitute such in their room, as our own Imaginations or Prejudices suggest to us, or take the Words of others whom we think Wiser than our selves, and as we believe have no intent to deceive us.

To these Weaknesses of our own, and Frauds of others, we owe the Heathen Gods and Goddesses, Oracles and Prophets, Nimphs and Satyrs, Fawns and Tritons, Furies and Demons, most of the Stories of Conjurers and Witches, Spirits and Apparitions, Fairies and Hobgoblins, the Doctrine of Prognosticks, the numerous ways of Divination, *viz.* Oniromancy, Sideromancy, Tephranomancy, Botonomancy, Crommyomancy, Cleromancy, Aeromancy, Onomatomancy, Arithmomancy, Geomancy, Alectryomancy, Cephalomancy, Axinomancy, Coscinomancy, Hydromancy, Onychomancy, Dactylomancy, Christallomancy, Cataptromancy, Gastromancy, Lecanomancy, Alphitomancy, Chiromancy, Orneomancy and Necro-

Necromancy, Horoſcopy, Aſtrology and Augury, Metopoſcopy and Palmiſtry, the fear of Eclipſes, Comets, Meteors, Earthquakes, Inundations, and any uncommon Appearances, though ever ſo much depending upon Natural and Neceſſary Cauſes, nor are there wanting People otherwiſe of good underſtanding, who are affected with the falling of a Salt-Seller, croſſing of a Hare, croaking of a Raven, howling of Dogs, ſcreaching of Owls, the motion of Worms in a Bedſteed, miſtaken for Death-Watches, and other as ſenſles and trifling Accidents.

'Tis this Ignorance of Cauſes, *&c.* ſubjects us to miſtake the Phantaſms and Images of our own Brains (which have no exiſtence any where elſe) for real Beings, and ſubſiſting without us, as in Dreams where we ſee Perſons and Things, feel Pain and Pleaſure, form Deſigns, hear and make Diſcourſes, and ſometimes the Objects are repreſented ſo Lively to our Fancies, and the Impreſſions ſo Strong, that it would be hard to diſtinguiſh them from Realities, if we did not find our ſelves in Bed.

But if a Melancholy Man ſitting by himſelf in a doleful Mood, with his Brains brooding upon Viſions and Revelations, ſhould careleſly nod himſelf half a Sleep, and his Imagination having received a vigorous

vigorous repreſentation of an Angel delivering a Meſſage to him, ſhould Wake in a Surprize, without having obſerved his own Sleeping (as often happens) I cannot ſee how he ſhould diſtinguiſh it from a Divine Viſion.

There have been ſurpriſing Inſtances of this kind in extatick Fits and Trances, which are but Sounder Sleeps, that cauſe more lively and intenſe Dreams: ſome in theſe Delirium's have fancied their Souls to have been tranſported to Heaven or Hell, to have had perſonal Communication with God and the Holy Trinity, have given deſcriptions of the Angels and their Habitations, and brought back Meſſages, Propheſies and Inſtructions to Mankind, which Phœnomena's, however ſtrange at firſt ſight, are eaſily to be accounted for by natural cauſes, for the ideas and operations of our Minds being evidently produced, by the agitations and motions of the internal parts of our own Bodies, and impreſſions heretofore made on them, as well as the actions of Objects without us (which will be made appear in the ſequel of this Diſcourſe.) It muſt neceſſarily happen when the Organs of Sence (which are the Avenues and Doors to let in external Objects)

are

are ſhut and locked up by Sleep, Diſtempers, or ſtrong Prejudices, that the imaginations produced from inward Cauſes muſt reign without any Rival, for the Images within us ſtriking ſtrongly upon, and affecting the Brain, Spirits, or Organ, where the imaginative Faculty reſides, and all Objects from without, being wholly, or in a great meaſure ſhut out and excluded, ſo as to give no information or aſſiſtance, we muſt unavoidably ſubmit to an evidence which meets with no contradiction, and take things to be as they appear.

I conceive that *Ignis Fatuus* of the Mind, which the Viſionaries in all Ages have called the Inward Light, and leads all that have followed it into Pools and Ditches, to be like what is before deſcribed: for by their own deſcription it is only to be attained by renouncing the Senſes, and all the Intellectual Faculties, and wholly ſequeſtring their Thoughts from Worldly and material Objects, by which elevation of Mind, they arrive to a more cloſe and intimate union with God, have internal communication with him, and by immediate Motions and Inſpirations learn all Truths, and whatever is neceſſary to be done. This is what Men of vulgar Notions call *ſending their Wits for a Venture*,

Venture, and indeed is but a waking Dream, for they alike lock up all their outward Senſes, which are the only Conduits of Knowledge, and deliver themſelves up to the guidance of wild Fancy, and conſequently muſt be actuated wholy by their ſeveral Complexions, Conſtitutions and Diſtempers, which often make them *Ixion* like, embrace their own Clouds and Foggs for Dieties.

The ſame Viſions happen to us when our Organs are indiſpoſed by Sickneſs, and then according to the Nature of our Diſtempers, we ſee ſuch appearances as our former Prejudices and Education have rendered moſt Dreadful or Delightful to us: Sometimes we ſee Angels and Beatifick Viſions, ſometimes Divels with Inſtruments of Fear and Horrour.

The like is common amongſt Melancholy and Hypocondriack Men, who often act in the Government of themſelves and Families with Prudence enough, and ſometimes have excellent qualifications in other reſpects, and yet a particular Deluſion has got ſuch hold of their Fancies, that it is out of the Power of their Friends otherwiſe to Cure them, than by ſeeming to comply with their Imagi-

Imaginations: One thought his Nose long enough to open Gates, another thought himself a Glass Bottle, and bid People stand out of his way lest they should Break Him; Even the Reverend Dr. *Pelling* believed himself with Child, and could not be convinced to the contrary, till a Midwife pretended to deliver him of a False Conception. Some have conceited themselves to be God the Father, the Messias, the Holy Ghost, the Angel *Gabriel*, to be Monarchs, Popes and Emperours, others have fancied themselves to be Dogs, Cats and Wolves: A Gentleman now Living has given an account in Print of his Conversation with Spirits for several Years together, and closes his Account with a distrust of the reality of their Conversation with him, though he had said before *they appeared* to him *to be real.* Many instances of this kind are to be found in *Burtons Melancholy*, and more to be seen at *Bedlam.*

Beaumont *of Spirits*, p. 396.

When the Delusions are thus apparent they serve others for Mirth and Diversion, and do no harm; but if they happen to Persons, of whose Godliness and Wisdom we have conceived an Opinion, they cannot fail of making strong im-

impreſſions upon us, eſpecially if their Viſions concur with our Prejudices and natural Fears.

Though true Religion improves the Faculties, exhilerates the Spirits, makes the Mind calm and Serene, renders us uſeful to Society, and moſt active in the Affairs of the World, yet I dont know how it has happened, that in all Ages and Countries, Fanatical, Melancholly, Enthuſiaſtick, Monkiſh, Recluſe, Sequeſtred Perſons have paſſed upon the World for Religious, ſuch who lived in Cloiſters and Caves or became Pilgrims and Hermits, who ſeeming not to mind the Affairs of this World, were believed to know the more of the next.

As nothing but diſappointed Pride, indiſpoſition of Body, diſturbance of Mind, or dejection of Spirit, can work about this Strange Metamorphoſis, ſo it is impoſſible when Men have abandoned the natural calm and ſerenity of their Minds, and diſturbed their Organs with wild imaginations, but they muſt ſee Viſions both Sleeping and Waking; and when they have thus thoroughly impoſed upon themſelves, it will not be difficult to deceive others, for there are ſo many in all Countries, whom Ignorance, Pride, Conceit,

ceit, ill habit of Body, Melancholly and Splenatick Tempers, unfortunate Circumſtances, cauſeleſs and ſecret Fears, and a pannick diſpoſition of Mind have prepared for ſuch Impreſſions, that they can never want followers enough; not to mention ſuch who embrace their Opinions Fraudulently, and to ſerve their own Ambition and Profit.

Which of our Senſes does not often deceive us? Our Taſts and Smell will be quite Vitiated; ſtrong preſſures of the Ears make us hear Noiſes, of the Eyes, ſee Fire; Strangling makes the whole World appear in Flames; the *Jaundies* make every thing ſeem Yellow; *Calentures* make the Sea look like a Delightful Green Medow; things ſtrait in the Water will appear crooked; Mirrours will make Bodies appear where they are not, and magnifie, multiply, or leſſen them; Bodies by Refraction will ſeem otherwiſe then they are, and by the Reflection, and due poſition of Glaſſes, may be made to appear in different Places.

It's evident the Divine Wiſdom hath ſo formed and united our Souls and Bodies, that they mutually act upon

one another, insomuch that there is no action of the Mind that does not cause a correspondent one in the Body; nor no motion of the Body, that does not produce a suitable affection in the Mind. The different Passions of Love, Hate, Contempt, Shame, Pity, Hope, Despair, Admiration, Fear, Courage, Anger, Lust, *&c.* not only cause different Lineaments and Features in the Face, but give different motions to the Nerves, Muscles, and every part of the Body; nor on the other side, can the Body receive any impressions in which the Mind has not its share: Both come into the World together, and are afterwards joint Partners in all the emergencies of Life: Both encrease in Youth, decline in Age, are nourished with Food, enlivened with Wine, altered with Weather, refreshed with Sleep, improved by Exercise, fatigued with Labour, oppressed with Gluttony and Drunkenness, enervated with Sickness, and often all the Noble Faculties and Operations of the Mind, are quite destroyed by the accidental disturbance of the Organization of the Body, and sometimes set right again, and recovered by Physick or Surgery. Be-

Beſides every thing in Nature is in conſtant Motion, and perpetually emitting Effluviums and minute Particles of its Subſtance, which operate upon, and ſtrike other Bodies. How are we affected with Smells and imperceptible Vapours, which often cauſe Epidemical Diſtempers? Dogs will purſue their Maſters Scent through crouds of People, and will trace their Steps through a Country, and find their way Home again at a great diſtance; ſome People will turn Pale, and even Sound at a Cats being in the Room; we are often infected with Diſtempers at a diſtance, the poiſonous Particles floating in the Air are often carried about in the Cloths of Phiſitians, Nurſes and Viſitants. And as Diſtempers are thus cauſed by Noxious Effluviums, I ſee no reaſon why in ſome caſes they may not be cured by ſuch as are agreeable and Salutiferous; *Greatrix* is ſaid to have cured many Diſtempers by his Touch; The *Kings-Evil* is often cured by the Stroaking of a King *rightly Anoynted*, together with the help of a vigorous Imagination, which is as unaccountable; ſome at the point of

Death have been cured by putting a Young Vigorous Person in the same Bed; and 'tis a common observation, if a Healthy and Diseased Person lye together, one grows better and the other worse.

Since therefore both Mind and Body are visibly affected with the Actions of other Beings, and of one another, and wherever we move we are surrounded with Bodies, all which in some degree operate upon us, it cannot happen in the variety of actions and events in the World, but some must appear very extraordinary, and will not fall within common Observation, which has given opportunity to Men of Fraudulent intention, to impose upon the Ignorance and Credulity of others.

How many Nations formerly, and even at this Day, believe Eclypses and Comets to be Supernatural, and to denounce the Anger of the Gods? How many mistake the Stagnation of their own Blood for being Hag-ridden? How many Enthusiasts take their own Prejudices and Whimseys for Divine Impulses, and the struggels of their Reason for Temptations of the Devil? How

many

many the Legerdemain and Tricks of Juglers for Conjuring and Witchcraft? What Frauds may be acted with Glasses, Speaking Trumpets, Ventriloquies, Echoes, Phosphorus, Magick Lanthorns, *&c.*? Mathematicians for many Ages were thought to deal with the Devil, and in our own a Dancing Mare was Burnt in the Inquisition of *Portugal.* Formerly Madmen were thought to be Demoniacks, and in some Countries at this Day, their Persons are esteemed Sacred, and their Raving to be Prophecy. The *Americans* take Paper and Letters to be Spirits which carry Mens Thoughts from one to another, and indeed 'tis hardly conceivable by Nations who have no Notion of Writing, how Men should Converse at a distance, and know one anothers Thoughts, but by the mediation of visible or invisible Agents. If any one should have more exquisite Senses than other Men (which is not difficult to suppose) how many Discoveries would he make unaccountable to the rest of Mankind; If he could follow Men or Beasts by the Scent like Dogs, or See in the Dark like Cats; If he had the same Natural Presage of Tempests, Thunder

and Lightning, Fair and Foul Weather, as ſome Animals both at Sea and Land ſeem to have, how many People might be deceive by ſeeming Wonders and Miracles? We naturally admire what we cannot apprehend, and ſeem to do ſome ſort of credit to our Underſtandings, in believing whatever is out of our reach to be Supernatural.

Many in other reſpects prudent enough, give too much countenance to theſe Follies, in conceiving they attribute more Honour to the Divine Omnipotence, when they ſuppoſe he acts *pro re natâ*, and accommodates his Providence to each ſingle Action and Emergency, then in believing that his Eternal Wiſdom hath ſo contrived and framed the whole Syſtem of Nature, and in its Original Conſtitution implanted ſuch Cauſes, as by their own energy ſhall produce all the Events in the World, (unleſs for ſome particular Reaſons he thinks fit to interpoſe his immediate Providence) than which nothing ſeems to be more derogatory to his Power, or more contrary to the Nature of Things, which in many inſtances we all allow.

Who

Who is there that does not perceive that in Dreams, our Thoughts and Desires are the natural and necessary productions of the affections of our Bodies? If we lye Hot, we are subject to Angry and Passionate Dreams, if Cold, to Fearful ones; A Loaded Stomach raises up Apparitions of Devils, Terrors and Death; *Opium* gives to many the most agreeable Sensations; Dreaming upon our Backs inclines us to Lascivious and Wanton Thoughts, and a due temperament of Body gives Sound Sleep without any Dreams at all; and yet how few are there, that do not believe their Wakeing Thoughts are altogether in their Power, without being able to give any Reason for the difference?

Who is there that does not see that the Raving of a Man in a Feavour, the wild Discourse of one in *Bedlam*, the Extravagancies of Drunken Men, and the Visions of Distracted, are the necessary effects of Distemper, and a disordered Brain? and yet how few believe the same of the other Follies and Impertinencies of their Lives, though but lesser degrees of the same Passions?

much more if we meet with any uncommon Appearances or Phœnomena's of Nature, we immediately solve all our Doubts in recurring to the Divine Omnipotence.

Nature in many circumstances seems to work by a sort of secret Magick, and by ways unaccountable to us, and yet produces as certain, and regular events as the most obviously Mechanical Operations. Passions of the Mind, as well as Actions of the Body, are not only communicated by all the Senses, but probably by other ways indiscernable to us: Musick not only works us into variety of Passions, but is said to cure the Bite of a *Tarantula*, and makes the Person Affected Skip and Dance in spight of his raging Pain: How many can avoid being affected with the Groans or Sight of one in Misery, any unusual Tone of the Voice, the Solemnity of a Coronation, the Pomp of a Funeral, the Farce of a Procession, the Power of Eloquence, the Charmes of Poetry, the rich and splended Equipage of Great Men, or the solemn Dump of an Enthusiast? Suddain good or ill News give such violent

lent agitations to the Spirits, as sometimes kills the Patient; many are frightned into Convulsive Fits, and even into Distraction; the sight of our Friends in Joy or in Grief produce the same affections in us, before we know the cause of it in them; the Passion of Love is conveyed by wanton Glances, by the Touch, the Motion, and the Ear; and as far as appears to us, all other Passions are communicated by like means; The Frights and Longings of Women with Child stamp Images and Impressions, of the things feared or desired, on the Fætus's, which last after they are Born, and sometimes as long as they live; There was once a remarkable accident happened at the Acting of *Andromeda*, at *Abdera* a *Greek* City, upon an extream hot Day, that many of the Spectators fell into *Feavours*, and had this accident from the Heat and Tragedy together, that they did nothing but pronounce Jambiques, with the Names of *Perseus* and *Andromeda*; The Yawning of one Person infects a whole Company; the Tone, the Motions, the Gestures, and Grimaces of those we converse with steal insensibly upon us,

even

even when we endeavour to avoid them; Not only Nations and Sects, but Professions, and particular Societies of Men for the most part contract peculiar Airs, and Features, which are easily distinguishable to a nice observer, and one but of moderate skill in Phisiognomy will discover a Parson, a Quaker, or a Taylor, dress them how you please.

There is a certain Sympathy and Antypathy in Nature, or to express my self otherwise, so agreeable or contrary contexture of different Bodies, as by a sort of natural Mechanism do incline to, or avoid another, this appears not only in Phisical and Philosophical Experiments, but by many vulgar and common Observations; some bodies cannot be made to unite, others will not separate; The Loadstone draws Iron to it, Gold Quicksilver; The Sensitive Plant shrinks from your Touch; Some sorts of Vegitables, though set at a distance, attract one another and twine together, others grow farther apart; Turkicocks fly at Red; Pheasants will stare upon the Eyes of a Fox till they fall upon him; a Ratlesnake fixing his Eyes

Eyes upon a Squerril, will make him run into his Mouth.

All ſorts of Animals have their inclinations and diſguſts to others, and we our ſelves have ſecret affections and averſions to Perſons, and Things, that we can no otherwiſe give an account of, then that Effluxes of Volatile Animal Spirits flow conſtantly from us, of ſuch form and configuration as eaſily permeate and penetrate ſome Bodies, and are reſiſted by others of different textures and compoſition, and when entered, communicate the ſame paſſions and diſpoſitions to Bodies ſuitably diſpoſed, as they cauſed in the Body from whence they came, and in Bodies otherwiſe formed different Operations, as the ſame Wind or Breath blown into different Inſtruments cauſes various Muſick.

This may help to unriddle many Phænomena's and appearances of Nature, vulgarly aſcribed to Faſcination and Witchcraft; for why may not the diſagreeable effluviums of a Diſeaſed Old Woman give a Child Convulſive Fits, as well as the *Meazels* and the *Small Pox*, and the poiſonous and melancholy Vapours

Vapours ſteaming from an Enthuſiaſt, cauſe Diſtraction and Raving as well as the Bite of a Mad Dog?

We perceive in a thouſand inſtances, the actions of others by an undeſigned imitation produce the like in our ſelves; No Man is ſurprized to hear of one thrown into Convulſive Fits, with diſtorted Limbs and Countenance, at the ſight of another in the ſame condition, and yet if a poor Enthuſiaſt with his Brains intoxicated with reading the Revelations, who has made a lucky diſcovery that the laſt Day is at hand, when the reſt of Mankind are to be deſtroyed, that he and his acquaintance may enjoy Dominions, Principalities, and Powers; I ſay if ſuch uncommon agitations of the Mind ſhould produce as uncommon agitations of the Body, and cauſe the ſame in others, whoſe Intellects and Organs are wound up to the ſame pitch (as when two Violins are tuned alike, if you ſtrike upon one, the other Sounds) immediately half the World is in an uproar: Some will have theſe Fanatical Throws and Convulſions to be the workings and flowings of the Holy Ghoſt; the

the Parſons will have them to be ſome of the Devils Tricks to dumfound the Church; and even Men of good Senſe are not without apprehenſions, that they may be Jugling and confederate Knavery in order to ſome dangerous deſign, whereas they are as natural as Agues, Apoplexies, Epilepſies, or Fits of the Mother, which were formerly thought to be ſupernatural, and the Perſons affected to be poſſeſſed with Spirits and Demons. Sir *Richard Buckley* has endeavoured to prove theſe agitations always attended the true Prophets, and *the Letter of Enthuſiaſm* has fully ſhewn they always accompanied the falſe ones.

To ſtop the natural courſe of our Spirits, collect them all together, and endeavour to keep them fixt upon one ſingle Object or Opinion, is like damming up the Current of a River, and leaving part of its Channel dry, that it may overflow the adjacent Countrey. The Beams of the Sun whilſt diſperſed give vital warmth, and nouriſhment to Men, Beaſts, and Vegetables, but if contracted to one point would ſet the World on Fire; ſo the Spirits of Man, whilſt

whilſt diffuſed through the Body, give proper and ſutable Motions and Vigour to the whole Machine, but if collected all together muſt either burſt the Veins, or cauſe exceſſive Pains, Convulſions, Agitations, fits of Quaking and Trembling. A violent intention of Mind, long fixt upon the ſame Object, never fails giving Convulſive Diſtempers, or making the Perſon Diſtracted.

Some of the Quakers (if we may believe the Reverend Mr. *George Keith* in his *Magick of Quakeriſm*) have arrived to a great proficiency in this natural Magnetiſm, or Magick, having by a watchful and accurate obſervation of theſe mutual Effluxes and Emanations, which flow from one to another, attaind to a diſcernment of Spirits, that is by the Eye, the Touch, and even by being in the ſame Room, to the knowledge of their Friends from their Enemies, or thoſe of the ſame Party, Intereſt and Faction, from thoſe of another: He ſpeaks of it as an undoubted matter of Fact known amongſt them, that as betwixt the former there is an oppoſition of Spirit to Spirit, that may

be

be felt, ſo between the latter there is an Unity, Amity or Friendſhip of Spirit to Spirit, that is ſo diſcernable, that they rarely miſtake their Foe for their Friend, though all his Words, Carriage and Actions pretend it: They feel ſome ſecret Effluviums go forth from their Hearts mutually from one another, and to one another, which are received by thoſe of the ſame Spirit, like a pleaſant Oyl or Cordial that doth ſenſibly gratifie them, but by thoſe of another Spirit (if they can find room to enter) like ſo many Pinns and Needles that wound them, and penetrate the very Heart and Vital parts; and when the Patient hath ſtrength enough to reſiſt their impreſſions, he perceives only ſome ſmall impulſe or touch which is ungrateful to him.

He farther tells us, this Spirit of Quakeriſm is not only communicated by the Sight, the Touch, by Melodious and Muſical Sounds, as well without Words as with them, but ſometimes only by the ſimple feeling of a mighty Power that exerts it ſelf in their Silent Meetings, which not only overcomes little Children, but Perſons at

Age,

Age, and he gives an inſtance of many Boys and Girls at a Quakers Meeting at *Waltham*, ſeized with ſhivering Fits like an Ague, which went off and returned for ſeveral Weeks together.

This Author who was formerly one of them, and is now a Miniſter of the Church of *England*, would never in a Book written againſt the Deluſions of Quakeriſm confeſs theſe Facts, and endeavour to ſolve them by Natural cauſes, if he had not thought them to be undeniable, and though 'tis not eaſie for others to give intire credit to ſuch uncommon Relations, yet we may be ſure the firſt Propagators of this Fanaticiſm muſt have hit upon ſome ſecret in Nature to ſtrike the Paſſions, or ſo conſiderable a Sect could not on a ſuddain ſtart up from ſo inconſiderable a Founder as a poor *Shoemaker*, without Articles or Prieſts, though excluded from Honours and Offices, Reproached, Contemn'd, their Eſtates Confiſcated, their Perſons Baniſhed or thrown into noiſom Goals and Dungeons, and what is more, they continue to encreaſe though they are let alone.

It's

Its a ſevere circumſtance which attends thoſe who oppoſe received Opinions, that in Argument they muſt admit every thing ſuppoſed by their Adverſaries to be true, if it be poſſible, and often what is not ſo, if the impoſſibility be not very apparent; When once Men have imbibed ſtrong Prejudices, which ſerve their preſent Intereſt, or ſtrike forcibly upon their Hopes and Fears, every thing in Nature ſhall be made to contribute to their Syſtem; Misfortunes to their Enemies are God's Judgments for their Sins, and ſo are their Succeſſes too, becauſe they become thereby confirmed in their Errors; Good Fortune to themſelves, is God's Reward for their Piety, ill Succeſs is his Correction for their Amendment; every Thought which confirms their Opinion is a Divine Impulſe, which contradicts them, a Suggeſtion of the Devil; every accident that attends them, every good or ill Seaſon, every common as well as uncommon appearance in Nature, is made an immediate Act of God, and either a Bleſſing or Judgment; any unuſual Operation of their own Minds or Bodies is imputed to

the Holy Ghoſt, of others that are of different Sects to the Devil, ſo that 'tis impoſſible to Convert a well ſetled Enthuſiaſt; you will in vain deny any thing to be ſupernatural which he thinks ſo, unleſs you can ſhew a viſible connexion between the Cauſe and the Effect, and often that will not do neither, becauſe the weak efforts of Carnal Reaſon, are unable to ſearch into the hidden Miſteries of God.

Who would undertake to convince one of the Sect juſt before mentioned, that his Tranſports, and his Pannick Fears, his Tremblings and his Quakings are owing to Natural Cauſes, and not the immediate Spirit of God? 'Twill be in vain to tell him that the ſame were common to an Infamous Sect in Old *Rome*, to the *Pythian* Propheteſs, the *Sybills*, the *Allumbrati* in *Spain*, the Fanaticks in *Germany*, are now Acted over again by a new whimſical Sect in *England*, and indeed have accompanied almoſt every Fanaticiſm that ever appeared in the World; He has an Anſwer ready, which is proof againſt all Objections, that himſelf and thoſe of his Party are Inſpired by the Holy-Ghoſt,

Ghost, but all others are Actuated by the Devil, in order to promote Heresy: It requires less pains to believe a Miracle, than to discover it to be an Imposture, or account for it by the Powers of Nature, which notwithstanding I think may be shewn to have produced and set at work most of the Enthusiasms that ever happened, and particularly our Illuminated Sects here at Home, with all their Convulsions, Tremblings and Quakings.

It has been already observed, that many of our Passions will not only cause agitations of the Body, Convulsive Fits and Trances, but even Kill us; great excesses of Love, Fear or Joy, will make us Shake and Quiver, great veneration for the Person or Assembly we Speak before, will make many Tremble and Quake like an *Aspen Leaf*, some have been struck Silent, and others have fallen to the Ground; How then must an Enthusiast be surprized, who believes himself honoured with the extraordinary Visits of a Deity, and the Illapses of the Holy-Ghost into his Soul? What Motions, Agitations, Convulsions, Tremblings and Quakings must be caus'd

by the co-operation of the Passions of Love, Devout Fear and Awe, Joy and Veneration in so high and transcendent a degree? What agreeable Sensations must he feel? How Ravishing Joys and Transporting Raptures? Sure whoever goes about to undeceive him, would deserve the same Thanks as those who Cured the Madman in *Horace*, that before thought himself a Prince, and when he found his Mistake, cryed out in a Rage;

Pol me occidistis, Amici,
Non servatis ait, cui sic extorta voluptas,
Et demptus per vim mentis gratissimus Error.

As these and many other surprizing Appearances, are only the co-operations and united force of different, and sometimes contrary Passions, so our Passions are the Mechanical and necessary Effects of the Complexion, Constitution, and Distempers of our Bodies, which take their rise, and receive constant alteration from the Accidents of Diet, Climate, Air, Education, Phisick, Exercise, and the perpetual Actions of external Objects encompassing us on every side.

Phisi-

Phiſitians have diſcovered certain Mixtures of the Elements, and firſt Principles of the Bodies of Animals, which they have diſtinguiſhed by the Names of Sanguine, Phleme, Yellow Choler, and Black, which is alſo called Melancholy, and common experience proves that from the different mixture, a vain and variation of theſe Humours, or ſome other compounds, are owing all the Diſpoſitions and Diſtempers of the Mind and Body.

Sanguine, is a compoſition of Hot and Moiſt, and flouriſhes moſt in Youth, gives a vigorous motion to the Limbs, a Purple, Roſy, and florid Complexion to the Face, white and ſoft Skin, ſhining and reddiſh Hair on the Head, and little on the Body: It Ferments like New Wine juſt put into the Cask, makes us Thoughtleſs, Brisk and Airy, Bold, Inſolent and Wanton, Extravagant, Luxurious, and immoderately given to Mirth and Pleaſure, which *Horace* well deſcribes in the following Verſes,

Imberbis Juvenis tandem, Cuſtode remoto,
Gaudet equis, canibuſq; & aprici gramine campi.

Cereus in vitium flecti, monitoribus asper,
Utilium tardus provisor, prodigus aris,
Sublimis cupidusque, & amata relinquere pernix.

It causes in Sleep soft and gentle Vapours to rise to the Brain, which inspire agreeable and pleasant Dreams, and chiefly of such Subjects as the Mind is conversant with in the Day, as is well expressed by *Claudian.*

Omnia quæ sensu volvuntur vota diurno
Pectore sopito reddit amica quies.
Venator defessa toro jam membra reponit,
Mens tamen ad sylvas & sua lustra redit;
Judicibus lites, aurigæ somnia currus
Vanaq; nocturnis meta cavetur equis;
Furto gaudet amans, permutat navita merces,
Et vigil elapsus quærit avarus opes,
Blandaq; largitur frustra sitientibus ægris
Irriguus gelido pocula fonte sopor:
Me quoq; musarum studium sub nocte silenti,
Artibus assuetis sollicitare solet.

Lib. 3. Præ.

Fleme is a mixture of Cold and Moist, and abounds in Winter, when the Juices for want of due Warmth and Motion

tion are Crude and Indigested, like Wine in the Press before it has Fermented. The Complexion is white, the Skin soft, the Urine pale, the Body inclinable to be gross, the Muscles and Veins sunk and hid, the Hair lank and thin, and for want of Nourishment quickly grows grey; the native Heat being overcome with Moisture, the Senses become less quick, the Powers of the Mind dull, sluggish and stupid, the Speech slow, and the Memory looses its retentive Faculty, but People of this Complexion are Steady, Good-natured, hard to be Provoked, and free from all Guile, Fraud and Treachery.

In Sleep moist Vapours ascending to the Brain, make them Dream of Hail, Snow, Ice and Rain, of Rivers and Baths, and sometimes they mistake their Bed for an Urinal. This Constitution causes heavinesss, stuffings in the Head, running and dimness in the Eyes, noises and ringing in the Ears, Distillations, Coughs, Catarrs, intense Pains, if the Humour settle in particular parts, as also Scabs, Tetters, Scurvies, Leprosies, and some sorts of Feavours.

Choler is a compoſition of Hot and Dry, of a fiery Colour and Effect, and abounds moſt in the Summer Months: It makes the Complexion pale, the Body lean, ſlender and muſculous, the Skin hot and Hairy, the Hair curled, the Water high colour'd, the Pulſe ſwift and ſtrong, and the Veins prominent. People of this Complexion are Chearful, Forward and Active, have a great command of Thoughts and Words, and rowling and ready Eloquence, but are Buiſy, Imperious, Paſſionate, Variable, Uncertain, Crafty, Deſigning and Treacherous.

——— *cui Triſtia bella,*
Iraq;, inſidiæq;, & noxia crimina cordi.

In Sleep, burning Vapours flying up to the Brain, cauſe tumultuous and angry Dreams, Fury and Slaughter raging on every ſide, and Towns, Cities and Woods in Flames.

Exagitant veſana quies, ſomnique furentes
Atq; aliena premit vani terroris imago.
Lucan. l. 5.

This

This Complexion inclines to the Jaundies, to Twiſtings of the Guts, with intollerable Pains and Tortures, to Tertian and Burning Feavers, which cauſe Raving and Frenzies.

The Atra-bilis or Melancholy, is a compound of Cold and Dry, and abounds moſt in Spring and Autumn: Its a Viſcous and Sour Juice, and conſiſts of the thicker Parts and Dregs of the Blood, which 'tis the Duty of the Liver to Seperate, and as it were to Scum and Clarifie; and if this Office be duly performed the Spirits are Pure and Clear, and give an active Motion to the Brain, which cauſes profuſe Joy and Mirth; otherwiſe the Spleen and Ventricle become Obſtructed, and then ſour and poiſonous Vapours aſcending to the Brain, as it were from corrupt and ſtinking Pools, the Animal Spirits are Vitiated, from whence ariſe Swimmings in the Head, Tremblings and Palpitations of the Heart, deep Sighs, Inquietude and alienation of the Mind, Grief, Anxiety, Dejection, Abſurd Thoughts, Anxious and Pannick Fears, and a deſire of Solitude.

Miſer in ſilvis mœrens errabat opacis
Per campos ſolus latos atque avia regna,
Ipſe ſuum cor edens, hominum veſtigia vitans.

Every Noiſe frightens them, they diſtruſt every body, fear Friends and Enemies alike, are haunted with vain and cauſeleſs Terrors of Conſcience, and both ſleeping and waking ſee dreadful Images and Apparitions of Devils and Chains before their Eyes.

Perpetua anxietas, nec menſæ tempore ceſſat,
Nocte brevam ſi forte indulſit cura ſoporem,
Et toto verſata toro jam membra quieſcunt,
Continuo templum & violati numinis aras
Conſpicit in ſomno, ac mentem ſudoribus urget:
Hi ſunt qui trepidant & ad omnia fulgura pallent,
Cum tonat, examines primo quoque tempore cæli.

Juven. Satyr. 13.

In Dreams they try to run away from theſe frightful Images, but in the Attempt their Strength fails them, their Knees ſink under

under them, and their Limbs will not support the Weight of their Bodies, which *Virgil* well decribes in the following Verses.

Ac velut in somnis oculos ubi languida pressit
Nocte quies, nequicquam avidos extendere cursus
Velle videmur, & in mediis conatibus ægri
Succidimus, non lingua valet, non corpore notæ
Sufficient vires, nec vox nec verba sequuntur.

Virg. Lib. 12.

Though this sort of Cholar is in its own Nature cold, yet being very dry takes Fire like Tinder. *Aristotle* observes, when Melancholy is once heated, it is like Boiling Water, and transcends the Flame of Fire, and then Sulphurious Exhalations flying up to the Brain, fill the Mind with lively Imaginations, quicken and enlarge the Wit and Invention, and make the Tongue to Admiration fluent and eloquent, and when heated to a great degree cause Raving, Frenzy, and Madness. Problems. Sect. 30.

This

This will account for the ſudden changes in Perſons of this Complexion: When the Humour is in its Natural State they are heavy, grave, anxious, fearful, dejected and oppreſs'd with Grief and Deſpair; talk of nothing but Humility, Mortification, Diſconſolation and Deſertion; but if heated with Exerciſe, Wine, the Converſation of agreeable Men and Women, or any other accidental Cauſe on a ſudden, they will be ſurprizingly joyful, gay and wanton, full of Laughter and pleaſant Conceits, bright, and ſometimes extravagant thoughts and Expreſſions. Melancholy partakes much of the Nature of Wine, which makes ſome Men pleaſant, others quarrelſome, ſome ſilent, others noiſie, ſome laſcivious, others impotent, ſome crying, others laughing.

Quid non ebrietas deſignat? aperta recludit,
Spes jubet eſſe ratas in prælia trudit inermem,
Sollicitis animis onus eximit, & docet artes
Fecundi calices quem non fecere diſertum?
Contractâ quem non in paupertate ſolutum?
Hor. Lib. 1. Ep. 5.

There are particular Features, Viſages, Habits and Diſtempers incident to both theſe

these Conditions of Melancholy, which for brevity sake I omit; nor do I pretend to have given an exact Physical Account of the other Phœnomena's above mentioned, much less to discover the inward Frame and Constitution of Substances; which can be known to no Man till God Almighty in another State has given us new Senses and Faculties; (all the Knowledge we have in this, being some few obvious Effects and Operations Bodies have upon one another;) nor is such exactness necessary, my Purpose being only to shew in general, that the Passions and other qualities of the Mind, are the necessary Productions of these, or some other unknown Mixtures and Compositions of the Body, which as they are infinitely variable in Degree and Proportion, and receive perpetual Alteration by the Bodies emitting and receiving new Particles, as well as different Modifications of those it had before by the Actions of external Objects; so our Features, Complexions, Constitutions, Distempers, Senses, Passions, and other Affections of the Mind, must be vastly different, and probably two Men never had exactly the same, or the same Man at different times.

A cer-

A certain Organization of the Body, and Mixture of Juices in the Blood, concurring with ſuitable and correſpondent Actions of other Beings without us, produce Prudence, Temperance, Moderation, Humanity, Indolence and Complacency of Mind; different Conſtitutions produce violent and unruly Appetites: Our Virtues as well as Health conſiſt in having moderate Deſires and Averſions, or which is all one, Hopes and Fears to which all our Paſſions are reducible; in a certain degree they are neceſſary to the Preſervation of our Beings, and all the Duties of Life, in a greater, they become Vices, and at laſt Raving and Madneſs, Courage ſoon grows into Anger, and then Rage; Frugality makes an eaſy Progreſſion to Covetouſneſs, then Miſerableneſs, and that Want it wou'd avoid; there is a ready tranſition from Benevolence into Generoſity Profuſeneſs and Extravagance; from Religion not conducted by Reaſon, into Superſtition and Fanaticiſm; and of Hope into Confidence, Pride, Conceit, and Vain-Glory. All theſe in their Exceſſes are ſeveral kinds of Madneſs, which is but violent Paſſion that produces ſtrange and unuſual Behaviour, of the numerous ſorts whereof one might unroll a Legion, and perhaps no one is without

out a Tincture of one kind or other, which I am perſwaded the moſt Sober Man will acknowledge true of himſelf, if he reflects upon the vanity and extravagance of his Secret Thoughts, when he ſits or walks Muſing alone.

The Mind in its natural State is contented with common Thoughts and Conceptions, but when the Spirits are raiſed above their proper Pitch, like fermented Liquor, they endanger the Veſſel, and when elevated to a very high degree, are Fired like Gunpowder, which blows up it ſelf, and every thing elſe about it: Some Indiſpoſitions make the Body many times Stronger than in full Health, others produce a ſtrange and uncommon Energy in the Brain, which cauſes ſurprizing Diſcourſes, and Rapſodies of lofty Words and Thoughts, and a ſtrength of Imagination which is inconceivable, that can bring and cure Diſtempers, carry People in Sleep out of their Beds, and conduct them ſafe over Bridges and Precipices, where they durſt not venture when Awake, but it is in nothing more ſurpriſing then in the Power it has over the Mind, to make it miſtake it ſelf, and its own Infirmities,

ties, for the Spirit of God; This is what is called Enthusiasm, by which word is meant a strong and impetuous Motion, or extraordinary and transcendent Ardor, Fervency or Pregnancy of the Soul, Spirits or Brain, which is vulgarly thought to be Supernatural.

Mankind in their Ignorance of Causes, have been always prone to believe some special Presence of God, or a Supernatural Power to be in whatever is unusual Great or Vehement. This made the Ancients ascribe Thunder and Lightning to *Jupiter*, Wisdom to *Pallas*, Craft to *Mercury*, the lively Thoughts produced by Wine to *Bacchus*, Storms and Tempests to *Eolus*, the Rapsodies of Poetry to the Muses, Courage to *Mars*, Rage and Madness to the *Eumenides* or *Furies*, the Passions of Love to *Cupid*, the Productions of the Earth to *Ceres*, and things seemingly Accidental to *Fortune*; To these Idols of their own Fancies they built Magnificent Temples, endowed them with Priests, Lands, Officers and Revenues; and Worshipped them with Oblations, Prayers and Thanks; this disposition gave rise to the Worshipping of Heroes, Legislators and Founders of new Sects and Opini-

Opinions, for the People perceiving uncommon Wiſdom, Eloquence, Reſolution and Succeſs to attend all their Words and Actions, believed them to be Inſpired and Aſſiſted by ſome Superiour Power, and ſo intirely abandoned themſelves to their Conduct whilſt Living, and Ador'd them when Dead.

'Tis this makes a Melancholy Man miſtake the impetuous Tranſport, whereby he is Fervently and Zealouſly carried in Matters of Religion, for Divine Inſpiration, and the Power of God in him; for feeling a ſtorm of Devotion coming upon him, his Heart full of Godly affection, his Head in his own Opinion pregnant with clear and ſenſible Repreſentations, his Mouth flowing with powerful Eloquence, and not being able to obſerve from what conduct of Reaſon or other cauſes in Nature this ſudden Change proceeds, immediately concludes it to be the Power of God working Supernaturally in him; he thinks every ſudden Help or Evaſion, every lucky hint to avoid Dangers or compaſs Deliverances, to proceed immediately from God, every imagined diſcovery of an Error held by others, to be a Supernatural Revelation,

every fine and curious Thought that ſteals into his Mind, a pledge of the Divine Favour, and a ſingular Illumination, every ſtaring and rampant Fancy, every unbridled bold and confident Obſtruction of his own uncouth and ſupine Invention to be a ſpecial Truth, and the Power and Preſence of God in his Soul: He eſteems his Pride and Tumour of Mind, his ſtiff, inflexible and unyielding Temper, his ſteady and obſtinate reſolution to admit no demonſtration againſt his Opinions, and to ſuffer Torture or Martyrdom, to be the ſpecial Support and Divine Aſſiſtance of God, and his ardent Zeal, and implacable deſire of Revenge towards all who oppoſe him, to be the more than ordinary influence and impulſe of the Holy Ghoſt, for the extirpation of Hereſy, whereas the Enthuſiaſt is only intoxicated with Vapours aſcending from the lower Regions of his Body, as the *Pythian* Propheteſs of old, in her Prophetick Trances, was by the power of certain Exhalations breathing from ſubterranean Caverns, for all theſe appearances are eaſily reſolvible into the power of Melancholy, which is but a ſort of natural Inebriation, the ſame effects being produced often by Wine, and

and 'tis obſervable that ſuch highflown and bloated Expreſſions, Rapſodies of ſlight and lofty Words, and rowling and and ſtreaming Tautoligies, which fall from Enthuſiaſts, generally happen to Perſons before they are Stark Mad.

The particular diſpoſition of the Blood, which produces this temper of the Mind, ſeems to be the predominance of Aduſt Melancholy, well impregnated with Gall, the firſt gives preſumptious Confidence, and the latter Inſolence and Impatience of Contradiction, which if it prevails ſo much in ſpeculative Queſtions, which regard no Mans Profit or Power, and that both ſides agree, are to be determined by the rules of Reaſon (in ſo much that people of this Complexion can Converſe with none but of their own Opinions) what havock muſt it make in matters of Religion? Upon which Subject almoſt all Mankind ſeem to have agreed by univerſal Conſent to talk Unintelligibly, and by that means have endeavoured to deſtroy or take away the only criterion between Truth and Falſhood, Religion and Superſtition; Every ſide pretends to Viſions, Revelations, Miracles and Myſteries, expect to be believed upon their

own Authority, and purſue all who dare oppoſe them, with Vengeance and Deſtruction, as perverſe Unbelievers, Hereticks, Deiſt and Atheiſts, which charitable and polite Language is promiſcuouſly given by and to all Parties and Factions in Religion.

Though at firſt ſight it appears very abſurd, that all Mankind ſhould be concerned in the Viſions and Revelations of two or three Men, when few of the ſame Nation or Diſtrict can know their Perſons, fewer their Sincerity, and whether they are Inſpired by God, are Deceived themſelves, or intend to Deceive others; It muſt be more ſo to expect Nations diſtant in Scituation, Language and Cuſtoms, to leave their Affairs and Habitations to hunt after Prophets, Miracles, and Revelation Mongers, or give credit to the fabulous or uncertain Stories or Legends of People they know nothing of, when we can hardly believe any thing ſaid to be done in the ſame Town or Neighbourhood, and ſcarce in the ſame Houſe, or tell a Story of ever ſo ſimple Particulars, that we can know again when we hear it; It is yet more ridiculous to oblige all the World

world to rake into the Rubbiſh of Antiquity, to learn all Languages, examine all Syſtems, and thereby diſcover all Impoſtures, Forgeries, Interpolations, Errors and Miſtakes, or elſe ſubmit to the Guidance of others who are neither Honeſter nor Wiſer than themſelves, and beſides have an Intereſt to Deceive them; Yet the true Enthuſiaſt ſees none of theſe Difficulties, ſtares at no Abſurdities; very ſure he is that he has received frequent Revelations, is thoroughly ſatisfied of his own Inſpiration and Miſſion, and expects all Mankind, both now and hereafter, to be ſo to; He has given them ſufficient notice, by promulgating his Doctrine amongſt a few that he can perſwade to Hear him, and condemns all the reſt as Obſtinate Contumacious Hereticks, and wilful Tranſgreſſors againſt Demonſtration and evident Light: Averſion, Pride and Fury in the ſhape of Zeal, like a mighty Storm ruffles his Mind into Beating Billows, and Boiſterous Fluctuations; At laſt he is all in a Rage, and no Church Buckets to quench his Fiery Religion, Religion and the Glory of God drives him on: The Holy Enthuſiaſtick longs to Feaſt and Riot upon

upon humane Sacrifices, turn Cities and Nations into Shambles, and destroy with Fire and Sword such who dare thwart his Frenzy, and all the while like another *Nero*, Plays upon his Harpe, and Sings *Te Deum* at the Conflagration.

FINIS.

Hutcheson's

5

AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINAL of our IDEAS OF *BEAUTY* and *VIRTUE*;

In Two TREATISES.

IN WHICH

The Principles of the late Earl of SHAFTESBURY are Explain'd and Defended, againſt the Author of the *Fable of the Bees*:

AND THE

Ideas of *Moral Good* and *Evil* are eſtabliſh'd, according to the Sentiments of the Antient *Moraliſts*.

With an Attempt to introduce a *Mathematical Calculation* in Subjects of *Morality*.

Francis Hutcheson.

Itaque eorum ipſorum quæ aſpectu ſentiuntur, nullum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venuſtatem, convenientiam partium ſentit: Quam ſimilitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens, multo etiam magis pulchritudinem, conſtantiam, ordinem in conſiliis, factiſque conſervandum putat: Quibus ex rebus conflatur & efficitur id quod quærimus honeſtum: Quod etiamſi nobilitatum non ſit, tamen honeſtum ſit: quodque etiamſi à nullo laudetur, naturâ eſt laudabile. Formam quidem ipſam & faciem honeſti vides, quæ ſi oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores excitaret ſapientiæ. *Cic. de Off. lib.* 1. *c.* 4.

LONDON:

Printed by J. DARBY in *Bartholomew-Cloſe*, for WILL. and JOHN SMITH on the *Blind Key* in *Dublin*; and ſold by W. and J. INNYS at the Weſt-End of St. *Paul*'s Churchyard, J. OSBORN and T. LONGMAN in *Pater-Noſter-Row*, and S. CHANDLER in the *Poultry*. M. DCC. XXV.

INQUIRY

Original of our Ideas

OF

BEAUTY and VIRTUE;

In Two TREATISES.

THE PREFACE.

THERE *is no part of* Philosophy *of more importance, than a* just Knowledge *of* human Nature, *and its various Powers and Diſpoſitions. Our late Inquirys have been very much employ'd about our* Underſtanding, *and the ſeveral Methods of obtaining* Truth. *We generally acknowledge, that the Importance of any Truth is nothing elſe than its Moment, or Efficacy to make Men happy, or to give them the greateſt and moſt laſting Pleaſure; and* Wiſdom *denotes only a Capacity of purſuing this End by the beſt Means. It muſt ſurely then be of the greateſt importance to have diſtinct Conceptions of this End it ſelf, as well as of the Means neceſſary to obtain it; that we may find out which are the greateſt and moſt laſting Pleaſures, and not employ our Reaſon, after all our laborious Improvements of it, in trifling Purſuits. It is to be fear'd indeed, that moſt of our Studys without this Inquiry will be of very little uſe to us; for they ſeem to have ſcarce*

any other tendency than to lead us into speculative Knowledge *it self. Nor are we distinctly told how it is that* Knowledge *or* Truth *is pleasant to us.*

THIS Consideration set the Author *of the following Papers about inquiring into the various Pleasures which* human Nature *is capable of receiving. We shall generally find in our modern philosophic Writings, nothing further on this Head, than some bare Division of them into* Sensible, *and* Rational, *and some trite common-place Arguments to prove the* latter *to be more valuable than the* former. *Our* sensible Pleasures *are slightly pass'd over, and explain'd only by some Instances in* Tastes, Smells, Sounds, *or such like, which Men of any tolerable Reflection generally look upon as very trifling Satisfactions. Our* rational Pleasures *have had much the same kind of treatment. We are seldom taught any other Notion of rational Pleasure than that which we have upon reflecting on our Possession, or claim to those Objects, which may be occasions of Pleasure; such Objects we call* advantageous: *but* Advantage, *or* Interest, *cannot be distinctly conceiv'd till we know what these Pleasures are which advantageous Objects are apt to excite; and what Senses or Powers of Perception we have about such Objects. We may perhaps see Reason to imagine such an Inquiry*

ry of more importance in Morals, *to prove what we call the* reality of Virtue, *or that it is the* ſureſt Happineſs *of the* Agent, *than one would at firſt imagine.*

IN reflecting upon our external Senſes, *we plainly ſee, that our Perceptions of Pleaſure, or Pain, do not depend directly on our Will. Objects do not pleaſe us according as we incline they ſhould: The preſence of ſome Objects neceſſarily pleaſes us, and the preſence of others as neceſſarily diſpleaſes us; nor can we by our Will, any otherwiſe procure Pleaſure, or avoid Pain, than by procuring the former kind of Objects, and avoiding the latter: by the very* Frame *of our* Nature *the one is made the occaſion of Delight, and the other of Diſſatisfaction.*

THE ſame Obſervation will hold in all our other Pleaſures and Pains; for there are many other ſorts of Objects, which pleaſe, or diſpleaſe us as neceſſarily, as material Objects do when they operate upon our Organs of Senſe. There is ſcarcely any Object which our Minds are employ'd about, which is not thus conſtituted the neceſſary occaſion of ſome Pleaſure or Pain: Thus we ſhall find our ſelves pleas'd with a regular Form, *a piece of* Architecture, *or* Painting, *a Compoſition of* Notes, *a* Theorem, *an* Action, *an* Affection, *a* Character:

and we are conscious that this Pleasure necessarily arises from the Contemplation of the Idea, which is then present to our Minds with all its Circumstances, altho some of these Ideas have nothing of what we call sensible Perception in them; and in those which have, the Pleasure arises from some Uniformity, Order, Arrangement, Imitation; *and not from the simple Ideas of* Colour, *or* Sound, *or mode of* Extension *separately consider'd.*

THESE Determinations to be pleas'd with any Forms or Ideas which occur to our Observation, the Author *chuses to call* SENSES; *distinguishing them from the Powers which commonly go by that Name, by calling our Power of perceiving the* Beauty *of* Regularity, Order, Harmony, *an* INTERNAL SENSE; *and that Determination to be pleas'd with the Contemplation of those* Affections, Actions, *or* Characters *of* rational Agents, *which we call* virtuous, *he marks by the name of a* MORAL SENSE.

HIS principal Design is to shew, "*That* human Nature *was not left quite* "*indifferent in the affair of* Virtue, *to* "*form to it self Observations concerning* "*the* Advantage *or* Disadvantage *of Ac-*"*tions, and accordingly to regulate its* "*Conduct.*" *The weakness of our Reason, and the avocations arising from the Infirmity*

mity and Neceſſitys of our Nature, are ſo great, that very few of Mankind could have form'd thoſe long Deductions of Reaſon, which may ſhew ſome Actions to be in the whole advantageous *to the* Agent, *and their Contrarys* pernicious. *The* AUTHOR *of* Nature *has much better furniſh'd us for a virtuous Conduct, than our* Moraliſts *ſeem to imagine, by almoſt as quick and powerful Inſtructions, as we have for the preſervation of our Bodys: He has made* Virtue *a* lovely Form, *to excite our purſuit of it; and has given us* ſtrong Affections *to be the Springs of each virtuous Action.*

THIS moral Senſe *of* Beauty *in* Actions *and* Affections *may appear ſtrange at firſt View: Some of our* Moraliſts *themſelves are offended at it in my* LORD SHAFTESBURY; *ſo much they are accuſtom'd to deduce every Approbation, or Averſion, from rational Views of* Intereſt, (*except it be merely in the ſimple Ideas of the external Senſes*;) *and have ſuch a Horror at* innate Ideas, *which they imagine this borders upon. But this* moral Senſe *has no relation to innate Ideas, as will appear in the ſecond Treatiſe. Our Gentlemen of* good Taſte *can tell us of a great many* Senſes, Taſtes, *and* Reliſhes *for* Beauty, Harmony, *Imitation in* Painting *and* Poetry; *and may not we find too in*

Mankind a Reliſh *for a* Beauty *in* Characters *in* Manners? *I doubt we have made* Philoſophy, *as well as* Religion, *by our fooliſh management of it, ſo auſtere and ungainly a Form, that a Gentleman cannot eaſily bring himſelf to like it; and thoſe who are Strangers to it, can ſcarcely bear to hear our Deſcription of it: So much is it changed from what was once the delight of the fineſt Gentlemen among the* Antients, *and their Recreation after the Hurry of publick Affairs!*

IN the firſt Treatiſe, the Author *perhaps in ſome Inſtances has gone too far, in ſuppoſing a greater Agreement of Mankind in their* Senſe *of* Beauty, *than Experience perhaps will confirm; but all he is ſollicitous about is, to ſhew,* "*That there is* "*ſome* Senſe *of* Beauty natural *to Men.*" *And we find to the full as great an Agreement of Men in their Reliſhes of* Forms, *as in their external Senſes, which all agree to be* natural; *and that Pleaſure, or Pain, Delight, or Averſion are* naturally *join'd to their Perceptions. If the Reader be convinc'd of ſuch Determinations of the Mind to be pleas'd with* Forms, Proportions, Reſemblances, Theorems, *it will be no difficult matter to apprehend another* ſuperior Senſe natural *to Men, determining them to be pleas'd with* Actions, Characters, Affections. *This is the* moral Senſe

which makes the Subject of the second Treatise.

THE proper Occasions of Perception by the external Senses, occur to us as soon as we come into the World; and thence perhaps we easily look upon these Senses to be natural: *but the Objects of the superior Senses of* Beauty *and* Virtue *generally do not. It is probably some little time before Children do reflect, or at least let us know that they reflect upon* Proportion *and* Similitude; *upon* Affections, Characters, Tempers; *or come to know the external Actions which are Evidences of them: And hence we imagine that their* Sense *of* Beauty, *and their* moral Sentiments *of Actions, must be entirely owing to* Instruction *and* Education; *whereas it is full as easy to conceive, how a* Character, *a* Temper, *as soon as they are observ'd, may be constituted by* NATURE *the necessary occasion of Pleasure, or an Object of Approbation, as a* Taste *or a* Sound; *tho it be some time before these Objects present themselves to our Observation.*

WERE not the Author *diffident of his own Performance, as too inconsiderable to have any great Names mention'd in it, he would have publickly acknowledg'd his Obligations to a certain* LORD (*whose Name would have had no small Authority with*

with the learned World) for admitting him into his Acquaintance, and giving him some Remarks in Conversation, which have very much improv'd these Papers beyond what they were at first. The Author *might have found good Materials for a modern Dedication from the active parts of his Life, as well as from his Learning and Reflection; but he knows him to be one of that sort,*

Cui male si palpere, recalcitrat undique tutus *.

And therefore, when they come to his Hands again, he only repeats to him the old Dedication with which he first presented them——

——Si quid ego adjuvero, curamve levasso,
Si quæ te coquat, aut verset in pectore fixa,
Jam pretium tulerim †.——

THE same Consideration hinders the Author *from mentioning a* Clergyman, *to whom he was much oblig'd for revising these Papers, and for some valuable Remarks. That Gentleman's Character is further known for every Quality becoming*

* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 1. v. 20.
† Cicero de Senectute, in initio.

his Office, than the Author *can well presume his Papers ever shall be; and therefore he thinks he can do him no honour by mentioning him.*

WHATEVER Faults the Ingenious may find with the Author's *Performance, he hopes no body will find any thing in it contrary to* Religion *or* good Manners: *and he shall be well pleas'd if he gives the learned World an occasion of examining more thorowly these Subjects, which are, he presumes, of very considerable Importance. The chief Ground of his Assurance that his Opinions in the main are just, is this, That as he took the first Hints of them from some of the* greatest Writers *of Antiquity, so the more he has convers'd with them, he finds his Illustrations the more conformable to their Sentiments.*

THE

THE CONTENTS.

TREATISE I.

Sect. I. *Concerning some Powers of Perception distinct from what is generally understood by* Senſation. Page 1

Sect. II. *Of* original *or* abſolute Beauty. 14

Sect. III. *Of the* Beauty *of* Theorems. 27

Sect. IV. *Of* comparative *or* relative Beauty. 35

Sect. V. *Concerning our Reaſonings about* Deſign *and* Wiſdom *in the* Cauſe, *from the* Beauty *or* Regularity *of* Effects. 42

Sect. VI. *Concerning the* Univerſality *of our* Senſe *of* Beauty. 65

Sect. VII. *Concerning the Power of* Cuſtom, Education *and* Example, *as to our* internal Senſes. 79

Sect. VIII. *Of the* Importance *of the* internal Senſes *in Life, and the* final Cauſes *of them.* 88

TREA-

TREATISE II.

INTRODUCTION. Page 101

Sect. I. *Of the* moral Senſe *by which we perceive* Virtue *and* Vice, *and approve, or diſapprove them in others.* 107

Sect. II. *Concerning the* immediate Motive *to* virtuous Actions. 125

Sect. III. *The* Senſe *of* Virtue, *and the* various Opinions *about it, reducible to* one general Foundation. *The manner of computing the* Morality *of* Actions. 150

Sect. IV. *All Mankind agree in* this general Foundation *of their Approbation of* moral Actions. *The Grounds of* different Opinions *about* Morals. 179

Sect. V. *A further Confirmation that we have* practical Diſpoſitions *to* Virtue *implanted in our* Nature, *with a further Explication of our* Inſtinct *to* Benevolence *in its various Degrees; with the* additional Motives *of* Intereſt, *viz.* Honour, Shame, Pity. 195

Sect. VI. *Concerning the* Importance *of this* moral Senſe *to the preſent Happineſs of* Mankind, *and its* Influence *on human Affairs.* 221

Sect.

Sect. VII. *A Deduction of some* complex moral Ideas, viz. *of* Obligation, *and* Right, Perfect, Imperfect, *and* External; Alienable *and* Unalienable *from this* moral Sense. 249

ERRATA.

PAGE 1. l. 13. dele Comma after *Perception.*
P. 14. l. 2. of the Note, dele *as.*
P. 18. l. 20. instead of a Semicolon, put a full Stop.
P. 47. l. 8. read *met.*
P. 69. l. *ult.* for a Semicolon put a full Stop.
P. 71. l. *penult.* for a Semicolon put a full Stop.
P. 177. l. 13. read thus, *resolve to cultivate, as much as possible,*
P. 184. l. 7. read *publick.*
——l. 24. after *of* read *the.*
P. 191. l. 2. after *Sense* put a Comma.
——l. 3. after *Benevolence* put a Comma.
P. 216. l. 3. from the bottom, for *and* read *or.*

5

TREATISE I.

VIZ.

AN INQUIRY CONCERNING BEAUTY, ORDER, &c.

TREATISE

ON

INQUIRY

CONCERNING

AN INQUIRY CONCERNING BEAUTY, ORDER, &c.

SECT. I.

Concerning ſome Powers of Perception, diſtinct from what is generally underſtood by Senſation.

TO make the following Obſervations underſtood, it may be neceſſary to premiſe ſome Definitions, and Obſervations either univerſally acknowledg'd, or ſufficiently prov'd by many Writers both ancient and modern, concerning our Perceptions called Senſations, and the Actions of the Mind conſequent upon them.

Art. 1. THOSE *Ideas* that are rais'd in the Mind upon the preſence of external Ob-

Sect. 1. jects, and their acting upon our Bodys, are call'd *Senſations*. We find that the Mind in ſuch Caſes is paſſive, and has not Power directly to prevent the Perception or Idea, or to vary it at its Reception, as long as we continue our Bodys in a ſtate fit to be acted upon by the external Object.

2. When two Perceptions are entirely different from each other, or agree in nothing but the general Idea of Senſation, we call the Powers of receiving thoſe different Perceptions, *different Senſes*. Thus Seeing and Hearing denote the different Powers of receiving the Ideas of Colours and Sounds. And altho Colours have vaſt Differences among themſelves, as alſo have Sounds; yet there is a greater Agreement among the moſt oppoſite Colours, than between any Colour and a Sound: Hence we call all Colours Perceptions of the ſame Senſe. All the ſeveral Senſes ſeem to have their diſtinct Organs, except Feeling, which is in ſome degree diffus'd over the whole Body.

3. The Mind has a Power of compounding Ideas that were receiv'd ſeparately, of comparing their Objects by means of the Ideas, and of obſerving their Relations and Proportions; of enlarging and diminiſhing its Ideas at pleaſure, or in any certain Ratio,

or

or Degree; and of considering separately each of the simple Ideas, which might perhaps have been impress'd jointly in the Sensation. This last Operation we commonly call Abstraction. Sect. 1.

4. THE Ideas of Substances are compounded of the various simple Ideas jointly impress'd, when they presented themselves to our Senses. We define Substances only by enumerating these sensible Ideas: And such Definitions may raise an Idea clear enough of the Substance in the Mind of one who never immediately perceiv'd the Substance; provided he has separately receiv'd by his Senses all the simple Ideas that are in the Composition of the complex one of the Substance defin'd: But if he has not received any of these Ideas, or wants the Senses necessary for the Perception of them, no Definition can ever raise in him any Idea of that Sense in which he is deficient.

5. MANY of our sensitive Perceptions are pleasant, and many painful, immediately, and that without any knowledge of the Cause of this Pleasure or Pain, or how the Objects excite it, or are the Occasions of it; or without seeing to what further Advantage or Detriment the Use of such Objects might tend: Nor would the most accurate Knowledge of these things vary either the Pleasure or Pain of the Perception,

Sect. 1. however it might give a rational Pleasure distinct from the sensible; or might raise a distinct Joy, from prospect of further Advantage in the Object, or Aversion, from apprehension of Evil.

6. HENCE it follows, that when Instruction, Education, or Prejudice of any kind, raise any Desire or Aversion toward an Object, this Desire or Aversion must be founded upon an Opinion of some Perfection, or of some Deficiency in those Qualitys for Perception, of which we have the proper Senses. Thus if Beauty be desir'd by one who has not the Sense of Sight, the Desire must be rais'd by some apprehended Regularity of Figure, Sweetness of Voice, Smoothness or Softness, or some other Quality perceivable by the other Senses, without relation to the Ideas of Colour.

7. THE Ideas raised in different Persons by the same Object, are probably different, when they disagree in their Approbation or Dislike; and in the same Person, when his Fancy at one time differs from what it was at another. This will appear from reflecting on those Objects, to which we have now an Aversion, tho they were formerly agreeable: And we shall generally find that there is some accidental Conjunction of a disagreeable Idea, which always recurs with the Object; as in those Wines which Men

ac-

acquire an Averſion to, after they have taken them in an Emetick Preparation: In this caſe we are conſcious that the Idea is alter'd from what it was when that Wine was agreeable, by the Conjunction of the Ideas of Loathing and Sickneſs of Stomach. The like Change of Idea may be inſenſibly made by the Change of our Bodys as we advance in Years, which may occaſion an Indifference towards Meats we were fond of in our Childhood. Sect. 1.

WE ſhall not find it perhaps ſo eaſy to account for the Diverſity of Fancy in our Dreſs, and ſome other Affairs; and yet this may ariſe from a like accidental Conjunction of Ideas: as for inſtance, if either from any thing in Nature, or from the Opinion of our Country or Acquaintance, the fancying of glaring Colours be look'd upon as an evidence of Levity, or of any other evil Quality of Mind; or if any Colour or Faſhion be commonly us'd by Ruſticks, or by Men of any diſagreeable Profeſſion, Employment, or Temper; theſe additional Ideas may recur conſtantly with that of the Colour or Faſhion, and cauſe a conſtant Diſlike to them in thoſe who join the additional Ideas, altho the Colour or Form be no way diſagreeable of themſelves, and actually do pleaſe others who join no ſuch Ideas to them. But there does not ſeem to be any Ground to believe ſuch a Diverſity

Sect. 1. in human Minds, as that the same Idea or Perception should give pleasure to one and pain to another, or to the same Person at different Times; not to say that it seems a Contradiction, that the same Idea should do so.

8. THE only Pleasure of Sense, that our Philosophers seem to consider, is that which accompanys the simple Ideas of Sensation: But there are vastly greater Pleasures in those complex Ideas of Objects, which obtain the Names of Beautiful, Regular, Harmonious. Thus every one acknowledges he is more delighted with a fine Face, a just Picture, than with the View of any one Colour, were it as strong and lively as possible; and more pleas'd with a Prospect of the Sun rising among settled Clouds, and colouring their Edges, with a starry Hemisphere, a fine Landskip, a regular Building; than with a clear blue Sky, a smooth Sea, or a large open Plain, not diversify'd by Woods, Hills, Waters, Buildings: And yet even these latter Appearances are not quite simple. So in Musick, the Pleasure of fine Composition is incomparably greater than that of any one Note, how sweet, full, or swelling soever.

9. LET it be observ'd, that in the following Papers, the word Beauty is taken for the Idea rais'd in us, and a Sense of Beauty

ty for our Power of receiving this Idea. Sect. 1.
Harmony also denotes our pleasant Ideas arising from composition of Sounds, and a good Ear (as it is generally taken) a Power of perceiving this Pleasure. In the following Sections, an Attempt is made to discover what is the immediate Occasion of these pleasant Ideas, or what real Quality in the Objects ordinarily excites them.

10. IT is of no consequence whether we call these Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, Perceptions of the External Senses of Seeing and Hearing, or not. I should rather chuse to call our Power of perceiving these Ideas, an *Internal Sense*, were it only for the Convenience of distinguishing them from other Sensations of Seeing and Hearing, which men may have without Perception of Beauty and Harmony. It is plain from Experience, that many Men have, in the common meaning, the Senses of Seeing and Hearing perfect enough; they perceive all the simple Ideas separately, and have their Pleasures; they distinguish them from each other, such as one Colour from another, either quite different, or the stronger or fainter of the same Colour; they can tell in separate Notes, the higher, lower, sharper or flatter, when separately sounded; in Figures they discern the Length, Breadth, Wideness, of each Line, Surface, Angle; and may be as capable of hearing and see-

Sect. 1. ing at great distances as any men whatsoever: And yet perhaps they shall relish no pleasure in Musical Compositions, in Painting, Architecture, natural Landskip; or but a very weak one in comparison of what others enjoy from the same Objects. This greater Capacity of receiving such pleasant Ideas we commonly call a fine Genius or Taste: In Musick we seem universally to acknowledge something like a distinct Sense from the External one of Hearing, and call it a *good Ear*; and the like distinction we wou'd probably acknowledge in other Affairs, had we also got distinct Names to denote these Powers of Perception by.

11. THERE will appear another Reason perhaps afterwards, for calling this Power of perceiving the Ideas of Beauty, an *Internal Sense*, from this, that in some other Affairs, where our External Senses are not much concern'd, we discern a sort of Beauty, very like, in many respects, to that observ'd in sensible Objects, and accompany'd with like pleasure: Such is that Beauty perceiv'd in Theorems, or universal Truths, in general Causes, and in some extensive Principles of Action.

12. LET every one here consider, how different we must suppose the Perception to be, with which a Poet is transported upon the Prospect of any of those Objects of

of natural Beauty, which raviſh us even in his Deſcription; from that cold lifeleſs Conception which we imagine to be in a dull Critick, or one of the Virtuoſi, without what we call a fine Taſte. This latter Claſs of Men may have greater Perfection in that Knowledge, which is deriv'd from external Senſation; they can tell all the ſpecifick Differences of Trees, Herbs, Minerals, Metals; they know the Form of every Leaf, Stalk, Root, Flower, and Seed of all the Species, about which the Poet is often very ignorant: And yet the Poet ſhall have a vaſtly more delightful Perception of the Whole; and not only the Poet, but any man of a fine Taſte. Our External Senſe may by Meaſuring teach us all the Proportions of Architecture to the Tenth of an Inch, and the Situation of every Muſcle in the human Body; and a good Memory may retain theſe; and yet there is ſtill ſomething further neceſſary, not only to make a compleat Maſter in Architecture, Painting, or Statuary, but even a tolerable Judge in theſe Works; or to receive the higheſt pleaſure in contemplating them. Since then there are ſuch different Powers of Perception, where what are commonly called the External Senſes are the ſame; ſince the moſt accurate Knowledge of what the External Senſes diſcover, often does not give the pleaſure of Beauty or Harmony, which yet one of a good Taſte will enjoy Sect. 1.

joy

Sect. 1. joy at once without much Knowledge; we may justly use another Name for these higher and more delightful Perceptions of Beauty and Harmony, and call the Power of receiving such Impressions, an *Internal Sense*. The Difference of the Perceptions seems sufficient to vindicate the Use of a different Name.

13. THIS superior Power of Perception is justly called *a Sense*, because of its Affinity to the other Senses in this, that the Pleasure does not arise from any Knowledge of Principles, Proportions, Causes, or of the Usefulness of the Object; but strikes us at first with the Idea of Beauty: nor does the most accurate Knowledge increase this Pleasure of Beauty, however it * may super-add a distinct rational Pleasure from prospects of Advantage, or from the Increase of Knowledge.

14. AND further, the Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, like other sensible Ideas, are necessarily pleasant to us, as well as immediately so; neither can any Resolution of our own, nor any Prospect of Advantage or Disadvantage, vary the Beauty or Deformity of an Object: For as in the external Sensations, no View of Interest will make an Object grateful, nor Detriment, distinct

* See above, *Art.* 5.

from

from immediate Pain in the Perception, Sect. 1.
make it disagreeable to the Sense; so propose the whole World as a Reward, or threaten the greatest Evil, to make us approve a deform'd Object, or disapprove a beautiful one; Dissimulation may be procur'd by Rewards or Threatnings, or we may in external Conduct abstain from any pursuit of the Beautiful, and pursue the Deform'd; but our Sentiments of the Forms, and our Perceptions, would continue invariably the same.

15. HENCE it plainly appears, that some Objects are immediately the Occasions of this Pleasure of Beauty, and that we have Senses fitted for perceiving it; and that it is distinct from that Joy which arises from Self-love upon prospect of Advantage: Nay, do not we often see Conveniency and Use neglected to obtain Beauty, without any other prospect of Advantage in the Beautiful Form, than the suggesting the pleasant Ideas of Beauty? Now this shews us, that however we may pursue beautiful Objects from Self-love, with a view to obtain the Pleasures of Beauty, as in Architecture, Gardening, and many other Affairs; yet there must be a Sense of Beauty, antecedent to Prospects of even this Advantage, without which Sense, these Objects would not be thus advantageous, nor excite in us this pleasure which constitutes them advantageous. Our Sense

Sect. 1. Senſe of Beauty from Objects, by which they are conſtituted good to us, is very diſtinct from our Deſire of them when they are thus conſtituted: Our Deſire of Beauty may be counter-ballanc'd by Rewards or Threatnings, but never our Senſe of it; even as Fear of Death, or Love of Life, may make us chuſe and deſire a bitter Potion, or neglect thoſe Meats which the Senſe of Taſte would recommend as pleaſant; and yet no proſpect of Advantage, or Fear of Evil, can make that Potion agreeable to the Senſe, or Meats diſagreeable to it, that were not ſo antecedently to this Proſpect. Juſt in the ſame manner as to the Senſe of Beauty and Harmony; that the purſuit of ſuch Objects is frequently neglected, from proſpects of Advantage, Averſion to Labour, or any other Motive of Self-love, does not prove that we have no Senſe of Beauty, but only that our Deſire of it may be counter-ballanced by a ſtronger Deſire: So Gold out-weighing Silver, is never adduc'd as a proof that the latter is void of Gravity.

16. HAD we no ſuch Senſe of Beauty and Harmony; Houſes, Gardens, Dreſs, Equipage might have been recommended to us as convenient, fruitful, warm, eaſy; but never as beautiful: And in Faces I ſee nothing that could pleaſe us, but Livelineſs of Colour, and Smoothneſs of Surface: And yet no-

nothing is more certain, than that all these Objects are recommended under quite different views on many occasions: And no Custom, Education, or Example could ever give us Perceptions distinct from those of the Senses which we had the use of before, or recommend Objects under another Conception than grateful to * them. But of the Influence of Custom, Education, Example, upon the Sense of Beauty, we shall treat below †. Sect. 1.

17. BEAUTY is either Original, or Comparative; or if any like the Terms better, Absolute, or Relative: Only let it be noted, that by Absolute or Original Beauty, is not understood any Quality suppos'd to be in the Object, that should of itself be beautiful, without relation to any Mind which perceives it: For Beauty, like other Names of sensible Ideas, properly denotes the Perception of some Mind; so Cold, Heat, Sweet, Bitter, denote the Sensations in our Minds, to which perhaps there is no resemblance in the Objects that excite these Ideas in us, however we generally imagine that there is something in the Object just like our Perception. The Ideas of Beauty and Harmony being excited upon our Perception of some primary Quality, and having relation to Figure and Time, may indeed have

* See *Art.* 6. † *Sect.* 7.

Sect. 2. a nearer resemblance to Objects, than these Sensations that seem not so much any Pictures of Objects, as Modifications of the perceiving Mind; and yet were there no Mind with a Sense of Beauty to contemplate Objects, I see not how they could be call'd beautiful. We therefore by * Absolute Beauty understand only that Beauty, which we perceive in Objects without comparison to any thing external, of which the Object is suppos'd an Imitation, or Picture; such as that Beauty perceiv'd from the Works of Nature, artificial Forms, Figures, Theorems. Comparative or Relative Beauty is that which we perceive in Objects, commonly considered as Imitations or Resemblances of something else. These two Kinds of Beauty employ the three following Sections.

SECT. II.

Of Original or Absolute Beauty.

1. SINCE it is certain that we have Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, let us examine what Quality in Objects ex-

* *This division of Beauty is taken from the different Foundations of Pleasure as to our Sense of it, rather than from the Objects themselves: for most of the following Instances of relative Beauty have also absolute Beauty; and many of the Instances of absolute Beauty, have also relative Beauty in some respect or other. But we may distinctly consider these two Fountains of Pleasure, Uniformity in the Object it self, and Resemblance to some Original.*

cites

cites these Ideas, or is the occasion of them. Sect. 2.
And let it be here observ'd, that our Inquiry is only about the Qualitys that are beautiful to Men, or about the Foundation of their Sense of Beauty; for, as was above hinted, Beauty has always relation to the Sense of some Mind; and when we afterwards shew how generally the Objects that occur to us, are beautiful, we mean agreeable to the Sense of Men: for as there are not a few Objects, which seem no way beautiful to Men, so we see a variety of other Animals who seem delighted with them; they may have Senses otherwise constituted than those of Men, and may have the Ideas of Beauty excited by Objects of a quite different Form. We see Animals fitted for every Place; and what to Men appears rude and shapeless, or loathsom, may be to them a Paradise.

2. THAT we may more distinctly discover the general Foundation or Occasion of the Ideas of Beauty among Men, it will be necessary to consider it first in its simpler Kinds, such as occurs to us in regular Figures; and we may perhaps find that the same Foundation extends to all the more complex Species of it.

3. THE Figures that excite in us the Ideas of Beauty, seem to be those in which there is *Uniformity amidst Variety*. There

are

Sect. 2. are many Conceptions of Objects that are agreeable upon other accounts, such as Grandeur, Novelty, Sanctity, and some others, that shall be touched at * afterwards. But what we call Beautiful in Objects, to speak in the Mathematical Style, seems to be in a compound Ratio of Uniformity and Variety; so that where the Uniformity of Bodys is equal, the Beauty is as the Variety; and where the Variety is equal, the Beauty is as the Uniformity. This will be plain from Examples.

First, The Variety increases the Beauty in equal Uniformity. The Beauty of an equilateral Triangle is less than that of the Square; which is less than that of a Pentagon; and this again is surpass'd by the Hexagon. When indeed the Number of Sides is much increas'd, the Proportion of them to the Radius, or Diameter of the Figure, is so much lost to our Observation, that the Beauty does not always increase with the Number of Sides; and the want of Parallelism in the Sides of Heptagons, and other Figures of odd Numbers, may also diminish their Beauty. So in Solids, the Eicosiedron surpasses the Dodecaedron, and this the Octaedron, which is still more beautiful than the Cube; and this again surpasses the regular Pyramid: The obvious

* See *Sect.* 6. *Art.* 11, 12, 13.

Ground

Ground of this, is greater *Variety* with equal *Uniformity*. Sect. 2.

THE greater *Uniformity* increaſes the *Beauty* amidſt equal *Variety*, in theſe Inſtances: An Equilateral *Triangle*, or even an *Iſoſceles*, ſurpaſſes the *Scalenum*: A *Square* ſurpaſſes the *Rhombus* or Lozenge, and this again the *Rhomboides*, which yet is ſtill more beautiful than the *Trapezium*, or any Figure with irregularly curve Sides. So the regular Solids vaſtly ſurpaſs all other Solids of equal number of plain Surfaces: And the ſame is obſervable not only in the Five perfectly regular Solids, but in all thoſe which have any conſiderable *Uniformity*, as *Cylinders*, *Priſms*, *Pyramids*, *Obelisks*; which pleaſe every Eye more than any rude Figures, where there is no *Unity* or Reſemblance among the Parts.

INSTANCES of the compound *Ratio* we have in comparing *Circles* or *Spheres*, with *Ellipſes* or *Spheroids* not very eccentric; and in comparing the compound Solids, the *Exoctaedron*, and *Eikoſidodecaedron*, with the perfectly regular ones of which they are compounded: and we ſhall find, that the Want of that moſt perfect *Uniformity* obſervable in the latter, is compenſated by the greater *Variety* in the others, ſo that the *Beauty* is nearly equal.

Sect. 2.

4. THESE Obſervations would probably hold true for the moſt part, and might be confirm'd by the Judgment of Children in the ſimpler Figures, where the *Variety* is not too great for their Comprehenſion. And however uncertain ſome of the particular aforeſaid Inſtances may ſeem, yet this is perpetually to be obſerv'd, that Children are fond of all regular Figures in their little Diverſions, altho they be no more convenient, or uſeful for them, than the Figures of our common Pebbles: We ſee how early they diſcover a *Taſte* or Senſe of *Beauty*, in deſiring to ſee Buildings, regular Gardens, or even Repreſentations of them in Pictures of any kind.

5. IT is the ſame Foundation which we have for our Senſe of *Beauty* in the Works of NATURE; in every part of the World which we call *Beautiful*, there is vaſt *Uniformity* amidſt almoſt infinite *Variety*. Many Parts of the Univerſe ſeem not at all deſign'd for the uſe of Man; nay, it is but a very ſmall Spot with which we have any acquaintance. The Figures and Motions of the great Bodys are not obvious to our Senſes, but found out by Reaſoning and Reflection, upon many long Obſervations: and yet as far as we can by Senſe diſcover, or by Reaſoning enlarge our Knowledge, and extend our Imagination, we generally find the Struc-

Structure, and Order, and Motion, agreeable to our Senſe of *Beauty*. Every particular Object in *Nature* does not indeed appear *beautiful* to us; but there is a vaſt Profuſion of *Beauty* over moſt of the Objects which occur either to our Senſes, or Reaſonings upon Obſervation: For not to mention the apparent Situation of the heavenly Bodys in the Circumference of a great Sphere, which is wholly occaſion'd by the Imperfection of our Sight, in diſcerning Diſtances; the Forms of all the great Bodys in the Univerſe are nearly Spherical; the Orbits of their Revolutions generally Elliptick, and without great Eccentricity in thoſe which continually occur to our Obſervation: and theſe are Figures of great *Uniformity*, and therefore pleaſing to us. Further, to paſs by the leſs obvious *Uniformity* in the Proportion of their Quantitys of Matter, Diſtances, Times of revolving, to each other; what can exhibit a greater Inſtance of *Uniformity amidſt Variety*, than the conſtant Tenour of Revolutions in nearly equal Times, in each *Planet*, around its Axis, and the central Fire or SUN, thro all the Ages of which we have any Records, and in nearly the ſame Orbit? by which, after certain Periods, all the ſame Appearances are again renew'd; the alternate Succeſſions of *Light* and *Shade*, or *Day* and *Night*, conſtantly purſuing each other around each *Planet*, with an agreeable and regular Diverſity in the Sect. 2.

Sect. 2. Times they poſſeſs the various Hemiſpheres, in the *Summer*, *Harveſt*, *Winter*, and *Spring*; and the various *Phaſes*, *Aſpects*, and *Situations*, of the *Planets*, to each other, their *Conjunctions* and *Oppoſitions*, in which they ſuddenly darken each other with their Conick Shades in Eclipſes, are repeated to us at their fixed Periods with invariable Conſtancy: Theſe are the *Beautys* which charm the *Aſtronomer*, and make his tedious Calculations pleaſant.

Molliter auſterum ſtudio fallente laborem *.

6. AGAIN, as to the dry Part of the Surface of our Globe, a great Part of which is cover'd with a very pleaſant inoffenſive Colour, how *beautifully* is it diverſify'd with various Degrees of *Light* and *Shade*, according to the different Situations of the Parts of its Surface, in *Mountains*, *Valleys*, *Hills*, and open *Plains*, which are variouſly inclin'd toward the great LUMINARY!

7. IF we deſcend to the minuter Works of NATURE, what vaſt *Uniformity* among all the Species of *Plants* and *Vegetables* in the manner of their Growth and Propagation! what exact Reſemblance among all the Plants of the ſame Species, whoſe Numbers ſurpaſs our Imagination! And this *Uni-*

* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 2. v. 12.

formity

formity is not only obſervable in the Form in groſs; nay, in this it is not ſo very exact in all Inſtances, but in the Structure of their minuteſt Parts, which no Eye unaſſiſted with Glaſſes can diſcern. In the almoſt infinite Multitude of *Leaves*, *Fruit*, *Seed*, *Flowers* of any one Species, we ſee an exact *Uniformity* in the Structure and Situation of the ſmalleſt Fibres. This is the *Beauty* which charms an ingenious *Botaniſt*. Nay, what vaſt *Uniformity* and Regularity of Figure is found in each particular *Plant*, or *Leaf*, or *Flower!* In all Trees and moſt ſmaller Plants, the Stalks or Trunks are either *Cylinders* nearly, or regular *Priſms*; the Branches ſimilar to their ſeveral Trunks, ariſing at nearly regular Diſtances, when no Accidents retard their natural Growth: In one *Species* the Branches ariſe in Pairs on the oppoſite Sides; the perpendicular Plain of Direction of the immediately ſuperior Pair, interſecting the Plain of Direction of the inferior, nearly at right Angles: In another *Species*, the Branches ſhall ſpring ſingly, and alternately, all around in nearly equal Diſtances: And the Branches in other *Species* ſhall ſprout all in Knots around the Trunk, one for each Year. And in every *Species*, all the Branches in the firſt Shoots preſerve the ſame Angles with their Trunk; and they again ſprout out into ſmaller Branches exactly after the Manner of their Trunks. Nor ought we to Sect. 2.

Sect. 2. paſs over that great *Unity* of Colours in all the Flowers of the ſame Plant or Tree, and often of a whole Species; and their exact Agreement in many ſhaded Tranſitions into oppoſite Colours, in which all the Flowers of the ſame Plant generally agree, nay often all the Flowers of a Species.

8. AGAIN, as to the *Beauty* of *Animals*, either in their inward Structure, which we come to the Knowledge of by Experiment and long Obſervation, or their outward Form, we ſhall find vaſt *Uniformity* among all the Species which are known to us, in the Structure of thoſe Parts, upon which Life depends more immediately. And how amazing is the *Unity* of Mechaniſm, when we ſhall find that almoſt infinite diverſity of Motions, all their Actions in *walking*, *running*, *flying*, *ſwimming*; all their ſerious Efforts for *Self-preſervation*, all their freakiſh *Contortions* when they are gay and ſportful, in all their various Limbs, perform'd by one ſimple Contrivance of a contracting *Muſcle*, apply'd with inconceivable Diverſitys to anſwer all theſe Ends! Various Engines might have obtain'd the ſame Ends; but then there had been leſs *Uniformity*, and the *Beauty* of our Animal Syſtems, and of particular Animals, had been much leſs, when this ſurprizing *Unity* of Mechaniſm had been remov'd from them.

9. AMONG

Sect. 2.

9. AMONG Animals of the ſame Species, the *Unity* is very obvious, and this Reſemblance is the very Ground of our ranking them in ſuch Claſſes or Species, notwithſtanding the great Diverſitys in Bulk, Colour, Shape, which are obſerv'd even in thoſe call'd of the ſame Species. And then in each Individual, what vaſt *Beauty* ariſes from the exact Reſemblance of all the external double Members to each other, which ſeems the univerſal Intention of NATURE, when no Accident prevents it! We ſee the Want of this Reſemblance never fails to paſs for an Imperfection, and Want of *Beauty*, tho no other Inconvenience enſues; as when the Eyes are not exactly like, or one Arm or Leg is a little ſhorter or ſmaller than its fellow.

10. THERE is a further *Beauty* in Animals, ariſing from a certain Proportion of the various Parts to each other, which ſtill pleaſes the ſenſe of Spectators, tho they cannot calculate it with the Accuracy of a *Statuary*. The *Statuary* knows what Proportion of each Part of the Face to the whole Face is moſt agreeable, and can tell us the ſame of the Proportion of the Face to the Body, or any Parts of it; and between the Diameters and Lengths of each Limb: When this Proportion of the Head to the Body is remarkably alter'd, we ſhall have a

Sect. 2. *Giant* or a *Dwarf*. And hence it is, that either the one or the other may be repreſented to us even in *Miniature*, without Relation to any external Object, by obſerving how the Body ſurpaſſes the Proportion it ſhould have to the Head in *Giants*, and falls below it in *Dwarfs*. There is a further *Beauty* ariſing from that Figure, which is a natural Indication of *Strength*; but this may be paſs'd over, becauſe probably it may be alledg'd, that our Approbation of this Shape flows from opinion of *Advantage*, and not from the Form it ſelf.

THE *Beauty* ariſing from Mechaniſm, apparently adapted to the Neceſſitys and Advantages of any Animal; which pleaſes us, even tho there be no Advantage to our ſelves enſuing from it; will be conſider'd under the Head of *Relative Beauty*, or *Deſign* *.

II. THE peculiar *Beauty* of *Fowls* can ſcarce be omitted, which ariſes from the vaſt *Variety* of Feathers, a curious Sort of Machines adapted to many admirable Uſes, which retain a vaſt Reſemblance in their Structure among all the Species, and a perfect *Uniformity* in thoſe of the ſame Species in the correſponding Parts, and in the two Sides of each Individual; beſides all the *Beauty* of lively Colours and gradual Shades, not

* See *Sect.* 4. *Art.* 7.

only

only in the external Appearance of the Fowl, resulting from an artful Combination of shaded Feathers, but often visible even in one Feather separately. Sect. 2.

12. IF our Reasonings about the *Nature* of *Fluids* be just, the vast Stores of *Water* will give us an Instance of *Uniformity* in *Nature* above Imagination, when we reflect upon the almost infinite Multitude of small, polish'd, smooth Spheres, which must be suppos'd form'd in all the parts of this Globe. The same *Uniformity* there is probably among the Parts of other *Fluids* as well as Water; and the like must be observ'd in several other natural Bodys, as *Salts*, *Sulphurs*, and such like; whose uniform Properties do probably depend upon an *Uniformity* in the Figures of their Parts.

13. UNDER *Original Beauty* we may include *Harmony*, or *Beauty of Sound*, if that Expression can be allow'd, because *Harmony* is not usually conceiv'd as an Imitation of any thing else. *Harmony* often raises Pleasure in those who know not what is the Occasion of it: And yet the Foundation of this Pleasure is known to be a sort of *Uniformity*. When the several Vibrations of one Note regularly coincide with the Vibrations of another, they make an agreeable Composition; and such Notes are call'd *Chords*. Thus the Vibrations of a-

ny

Sect. 2. ny one Note coincide in Time with every second Vibration of its *Octave*; and two Vibrations of any Note coincide with three of its *Fifth*; and so on in the rest of the *Chords*. Now good Compositions, beside the Frequency of these *Chords*, must retain a general *Unity* of Key, an *Uniformity* among the Parts in *Bars*, *Risings*, *Fallings*, *Closes*. The Necessity of this will appear, by observing the *Dissonance* which would arise from tacking Parts of different Tunes together as one, altho both were separately agreeable. A greater *Uniformity* is also observable among the *Bases*, *Tenors*, *Trebles* of the same Tune. Some other Powers of *Musick* may be consider'd afterwards *.

14. But in all these Instances of *Beauty* let it be observ'd, That the Pleasure is communicated to those who never reflected on this general Foundation; and that all here alledg'd is this, That the pleasant Sensation arises only from Objects, in which there is *Uniformity amidst Variety:* We may have the Sensation without knowing what is the Occasion of it; as a Man's Taste may suggest Ideas of Sweets, Acids, Bitters, tho he be ignorant of the Forms of the small Bodys, or their Motions, which excite these Perceptions in him.

---

* See *Sect. 6. Art.* 12.

SECT.

Sect. 3.

SECT. III.

Of the Beauty of Theorems.

1. THE Beauty of *Theorems*, or univerſal Truths demonſtrated, deſerves a diſtinct Conſideration, becauſe of a Nature pretty different from the former kinds of *Beauty*; and yet there is none in which we ſhall ſee ſuch an amazing *Variety* with *Uniformity*: and hence ariſes a very great Pleaſure diſtinct from Proſpects of any further Advantage.

2. FOR in one *Theorem* we may find included, with the moſt exact Agreement, an infinite Multitude of particular Truths; nay, often an Infinity of Infinites: ſo that altho the Neceſſity of forming abſtract Ideas, and univerſal *Theorems*, ariſes perhaps from the Limitation of our Minds, which cannot admit an infinite Multitude of ſingular Ideas or Judgments at once, yet this Power gives us an Evidence of the Largeneſs of the human Capacity above our Imagination. Thus for inſtance, the 47*th* Propoſition of the firſt Book of EUCLID's Elements contains an infinite Multitude of Truths, concerning the infinite poſſible Sizes of right-angled *Triangles*, as you make the Area greater or leſs; and in each of theſe Sizes you may find an infinite Multitude of diſſimilar *Triangles*, as you

vary

Sect. 3. vary the Proportion of the *Baſe* to the *Perpendicular*; all which Infinitys of Infinites agree in the general *Theorem*. Thus alſo one *Fluxional Calculation* ſhall determine the *Tangents* of all Algebraick *Curves*; of theſe *Curves* there are infinite Orders and Species poſſible, of each Species infinite Sizes, or Magnitudes of Areas, of each Size infinite Individuals, of each Individual *Curve* an Infinity of Points, from which *Tangents* may be drawn. But all theſe Infinitys of Infinites are exactly comprehended in the general *Theorem*, which fixes the Lengths of the *Subtangents*, or their Proportion to the *Abſciſſa*.

3. THAT we may the better diſcern this Agreement, or *Unity* of an Infinity of Objects in the general *Theorem*, to be the Foundation of the *Beauty* or Pleaſure attending their Diſcovery, let us compare our Satisfaction in ſuch Diſcoverys, with the uneaſy ſtate of Mind which we are in, when we can only meaſure Lines, or Surfaces, by a Scale, or are making Experiments which we can reduce to no general Canon, but only heaping up a Multitude of particular incoherent Obſervations. Now each of theſe Trials diſcovers a new Truth, but with no Pleaſure or *Beauty*, notwithſtanding the *Variety*, till we can diſcover ſome ſort of *Unity*, or reduce them to ſome general Canon.

4. AGAIN,

4. AGAIN, let us take a Metaphyſical Axiom, ſuch as this, *Every Whole is greater than its Part*; and we ſhall find no *Beauty* in the Contemplation: Becauſe however this Propoſition does contain many Infinitys of particular Truths; yet the *Unity* is inconſiderable, ſince they all agree only in a vague, undetermin'd Conception of Whole and Part, and in an indefinite Exceſs of the former above the latter, which is ſometimes great and ſometimes ſmall. So, ſhould we hear that the *Cylinder* is greater than the inſcrib'd *Sphere*, and this again greater than the *Cone* of the ſame Altitude and Diameter of the Baſe, we ſhall find no pleaſure in this Knowledge of a general Relation of greater and leſs, without any preciſe Difference or Proportion: But when we ſee the univerſal exact Agreement of all poſſible Sizes of ſuch Syſtems of Solids, that they preſerve to each other the conſtant *Ratio* of 3, 2, 1; how beautiful is the *Theorem*, and how are we raviſh'd with its firſt Diſcovery!

5. THERE is another *Beauty* in Propoſitions, which cannot be omitted; which is this, When one *Theorem* ſhall contain a vaſt Multitude of Corollarys eaſily deducible from it. Thus that *Theorem* which gives us the Equation of a *Curve*, whence perhaps moſt of its Propertys may be deduc'd,

Sect. 3. duc'd, does some way please and satisfy our Mind above any other Proposition: Such a *Theorem* also is the 35th of the 1st Book of EUCLID, from which the whole Art of measuring right-lin'd Areas is deduc'd, by Resolution into *Triangles*, which are the halfs of so many *Parallelograms*; and these are each respectively equal to so many *Rectangles* of the *Base* into the perpendicular *Altitude*: The 47th of the 1st is another of like *Beauty*, and so are many others. In the search of *Nature* there is the like *Beauty* in the Knowledge of some great Principles, or universal Forces, from which innumerable Effects do flow. Such is *Gravitation*, in Sir ISAAC NEWTON's Scheme; such also is the Knowledge of the Original of *Rights*, *perfect* and *imperfect*, and *external*; *alienable* and *unalienable*, with their manner of *Translations*; from whence the greatest Part of moral Dutys may be deduc'd in the various Relations of human Life.

IT is easy to see how Men are charm'd with the *Beauty* of such Knowledge, besides its Usefulness; and how this sets them upon deducing the Propertys of each Figure from one *Genesis*, and demonstrating the mechanick Forces from one *Theorem* of the Composition of Motion; even after they have sufficient Knowledge and Certainty in all these Truths from distinct independent Demonstrations. And this Pleasure we enjoy

even

even when we have no Prospect of obtaining any other Advantage in Life from such Manner of Deduction, besides the immediate Pleasure of contemplating the *Beauty*: nor could Love of *Fame* excite us to such regular Methods of Deduction, were we not conscious that Mankind are pleas'd with them immediately by this *internal Sense* of their *Beauty*. Sect. 3.

IT is no less easy to see into what absurd Whimsys Men have been led by this Sense of *Beauty*, and a silly Affectation of obtaining it in the other Sciences as well as the *Mathematicks*. 'Twas this probably which set DESCARTES on that hopeful Project of deducing all human Knowledge from one Proposition, *viz. Cogito, ergo sum*; while others with as little Sense contended, that *Impossibile est idem simul esse & non esse*, had much fairer Pretensions to the Style and Title of *Principium humanæ Cognitionis absolutè primum*. Mr. LEIBNITZ had an equal Affection for his favourite Principle of a *sufficient Reason* for every thing in *Nature*, and brags to Dr. CLARKE of the Wonders he had wrought in the intellectual World by its Assistance; but his learned Antagonist seems to think he had not sufficient Reason for his Boasting. If we look into particular Sciences, we may see in the Systems learned Men have given us of them, the Inconveniences of this Love of *Uniformity*.

Sect. 3. *formity*. Dr. CUMBERLAND has taken a great deal of needleſs Pains to reduce the *Laws of Nature* to one general practical *Propoſition*; and how aukardly is PUFFENDORF forc'd to deduce the ſeveral Dutys of Men to *God*, *themſelves*, and their *Neighbours*, from his ſingle fundamental Principle of *Sociableneſs to the whole Race of Mankind*? As if they had not been better drawn, each reſpectively, from their immediate Sources, *viz. Religion*, *Self-Love*, and *Sociableneſs*. This Obſervation might eaſily be extended farther, were it neceſſary, and is a ſtrong Proof that Men have a Senſe of *Beauty in Uniformity* in the Sciences, notwithſtanding the Contortions of common Senſe they may be led into by purſuing it.

6. THIS Delight which accompanys Sciences, or univerſal *Theorems*, may really be call'd a kind of *Senſation*; ſince it neceſſarily accompanys the Diſcovery of any Propoſition, and is diſtinct from bare Knowledge it ſelf, being moſt violent at firſt, whereas the Knowledge is uniformly the ſame. And however Knowledge enlarges the *Mind*, and makes us more capable of comprehenſive Views and Projects in ſome kinds of Buſineſs, whence Advantage may alſo ariſe to us; yet we may leave it in the Breaſt of every Student to determine, whether he has not often felt this Pleaſure without

out any such prospect of Advantage from the Discovery of his *Theorem*. All that can thence be infer'd is only this, that as in our external Senses, so in our *internal* ones, the pleasant Sensations generally arise from those Objects which calm Reason would have recommended, had we understood their Use, and which might have engag'd our pursuits from *Self-interest*. Sect. 3.

6. As to the Works of ART, were we to run thro the various artificial Contrivances or Structures, we should find the Foundation of the *Beauty* which appears in them, to be constantly some kind of *Uniformity*, or *Unity* of Proportion among the Parts, and of each Part to the Whole. As there is a vast Diversity of Proportions possible, and different Kinds of *Uniformity*, so there is room enough for that Diversity of Fancys observable in *Architecture*, *Gardening*, and such like Arts in different *Nations*; they all may have *Uniformity*, tho the Parts in one may differ from those in another: The *Chinese* or *Persian* Buildings are not like the *Grecian* and *Roman*, and yet the former has its *Uniformity* of the various Parts to each other, and to the Whole, as well as the latter. In that kind of Architecture which the EUROPEANS call *Regular*, the *Uniformity* of Parts is very obvious, the several Parts are *regular Figures*, and either *equal* or *similar* at least

Sect. 3. in the same Range; the Pedestals are *Parallelepipedons* or square *Prisms*; the Pillars, *Cylinders* nearly; the Arches *Circular*, and all those in the same Row *equal*; there is the same Proportion every where observ'd in the same Range between the *Diameters* of Pillars and their *Heights*, their *Capitals*, the *Diameters* of *Arches*, the *Heights* of the *Pedestals*, the *Projections* of the *Cornice*, and all Ornaments in each of our *five Orders*. And tho other Countrys do not follow the *Grecian* or *Roman* Proportions; yet there is even among them a Proportion retain'd, a *Uniformity*, and Resemblance of corresponding Figures; and every Deviation in one part from that Proportion which is observ'd in the rest of the Building, is displeasing to every Eye, and destroys or diminishes at least the *Beauty* of the Whole.

7. The same might be observ'd thro all other Works of *Art* even to the meanest *Utensil*, the *Beauty* of every one of which we shall always find to have the same Foundation of *Uniformity amidst Variety*, without which they shall appear mean, irregular and deform'd.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

Of Relative or Comparative Beauty.

1. IF the preceding Thoughts concerning the Foundation of *abſolute Beauty* be juſt, we may eaſily underſtand wherein *relative Beauty* conſiſts. All *Beauty* is relative to the Senſe of ſome Mind perceiving it; but what we call *relative* is that which is apprehended in any *Object*, commonly conſider'd as an *Imitation* of ſome Original: And this *Beauty* is founded on a *Conformity*, or a kind of *Unity* between the Original and the Copy. The Original may be either ſome Object in *Nature*, or ſome *eſtabliſh'd Idea*; for if there be any known *Idea* as a Standard, and Rules to fix this Image or *Idea* by, we may make a *beautiful Imitation*. Thus a *Statuary*, *Painter*, or *Poet*, may pleaſe us with an HERCULES, if his Piece retains that *Grandeur*, and thoſe marks of *Strength*, and *Courage*, which we imagine in that Hero. And farther, to obtain *comparative Beauty* alone, it is not neceſſary that there be any Beauty in the Original; the Imitation of *abſolute Beauty* may indeed in the whole make a more lovely Piece, and yet an exact Imitation ſhall ſtill be *beautiful*, tho the Original were intirely void of it: Thus the *Deformitys* of old Age in a Picture, the *rudeſt*

Sect. 4. *Rocks* or *Mountains* in a *Landskip*, if well represented, shall have abundant *Beauty*, tho perhaps not so great as if the Original were *absolutely beautiful*, and as well represented.

2. The same Observation holds true in the Descriptions of the Poets either of *natural* Objects or Persons; and this *relative Beauty* is what they shou'd principally endeavour to obtain, as the peculiar *Beauty* of their Works. By the *Moratæ Fabulæ*, or the ἤθη of Aristotle, we are not to understand *virtuous Manners* in a moral Sense, but a *just Representation* of Manners or Characters as they are in *Nature*; and that the *Actions* and *Sentiments* be suited to the Characters of the *Persons* to whom they are ascrib'd in *epick* and *dramatick* Poetry. Perhaps very good Reasons may be suggested from the Nature of our *Passions*, to prove that a Poet should not out of choice draw the *finest Characters* possible for *Virtue*; these Characters indeed abstractly consider'd might give more Pleasure, and have more *Beauty* than the *imperfect* ones which occur in Life with a mixture of Good and Evil: But it may suffice at present to suggest against this Choice, that we have more lively Ideas of *imperfect Men* with all their Passions, than of *morally perfect Heroes*, such as really never occur to our Observation; and of which consequently we cannot judg exactly

actly as to their Agreement with the Copy. Sect 4.
And further, thro Conſciouſneſs of our own State, we are more nearly touch'd and affected by the *imperfect Characters*; ſince in them we ſee repreſented, in the Perſons of others, the *Contraſts* of Inclinations, and the *Struggles* between the Paſſions of *Self-Love* and thoſe of *Honour* and *Virtue*, which we often feel in our own Breaſts. This is the Perfection of *Beauty* for which HOMER is juſtly admir'd, as well as for the *Variety* of his *Characters*.

3. MANY other Beautys of Poetry may be reduc'd under this Claſs of *relative Beauty*: The *Probability* is abſolutely neceſſary to make us imagine *Reſemblance*; it is by Reſemblance that the *Similitudes*, *Metaphors* and *Allegorys* are made *beautiful*, whether either the Subject or the Thing compar'd to it have *Beauty* or not; the Beauty indeed is greater, when both have ſome *original Beauty* or Dignity as well as *Reſemblance:* and this is the foundation of the Rule of ſtudying *Decency* in *Metaphors* and *Similys* as well as *Likeneſs*. The *Meaſures* and *Cadence* are inſtances of *Harmony*, and come under the head of *abſolute Beauty*.

4. WE may here obſerve a ſtrange Proneneſs in our Minds to make *perpetual Compariſons* of all things which occur to our Ob-

Sect. 4. servation, even those which would seem very remote: there are certain *Resemblances* in the Motions of all Animals upon like Passions, which easily found a *Comparison*; but this does not serve to entertain our Fancy: *Inanimate Objects* have often such Positions as resemble those of the *human Body* in various Circumstances; these Airs or Gestures of the *Body* are Indications of Dispositions in the *Mind*, so that our very *Passions* and *Affections* as well as other Circumstances obtain a Resemblance to *natural inanimate Objects*. Thus a *Tempest* at Sea is often an Emblem of *Wrath*; a *Plant* or *Tree* drooping under the Rain, of a Person in *Sorrow*; a *Poppy* bending its Stalk, or a *Flower* withering when cut by the Plow, resembles the Death of a *blooming Hero*; an *aged Oak* in the Mountains shall represent an *old Empire*, a *Flame* seizing a Wood shall represent a *War*. In short, every thing in *Nature*, by our strange inclination to *Resemblance*, shall be brought to represent other things, even the most remote, especially the Passions and Circumstances of human Nature in which we are more nearly concern'd; and to confirm this, and furnish Instances of it, one need only look into HOMER or VIRGIL. A fruitful Fancy would find in a *Grove* or a *Wood*, an Emblem for every *Character in a Commonwealth*, and every turn of *Temper*, or *Station in Life*.

5. CON-

Sect. 4.

5. CONCERNING that kind of *comparative Beauty* which has a neceſſary relation to ſome eſtabliſh'd Idea, we may obſerve, that ſome Works of *Art* acquire a *diſtinct Beauty* by their Correſpondence to ſome univerſally ſuppos'd *Intention* in the Artificer, or the Perſons who employ'd him: And to obtain this *Beauty*, ſometimes they do not form their Works ſo as to attain the higheſt Perfection of *original Beauty* ſeparately conſider'd; becauſe a Compoſition of this *relative Beauty*, along with ſome degree of the *original* Kind, may give more Pleaſure, than a more *perfect original Beauty* ſeparately. Thus we ſee that ſtrict *Regularity* in laying out of Gardens in *Parterres*, *Viſta's*, *parallel Walks*, is often neglected to obtain an Imitation of *Nature* even in ſome of its *Wildneſſes*. And we are more pleas'd with this *Imitation*, eſpecially when the Scene is large and ſpacious, than with the more confin'd Exactneſs of *regular Work*. So likewiſe in the *Monuments* erected in honour of deceaſed *Heroes*, altho a *Cylinder*, or *Priſm*, or *regular Solid*, may have more *original Beauty* than a very acute *Pyramid* or *Obelisk*, yet the latter pleaſes more, by anſwering better the ſuppos'd Intentions of *Stability*, and being *conſpicuous*. For the ſame reaſon *Cubes*, or ſquare *Priſms*, are generally choſen for the *Pedeſtals* of *Statues*, and not

Sect. 4. any of the more *beautiful Solids*, which do not seem so secure from rolling. This may be the reason too why *Columns* or *Pillars* look best when made a little taper from the middle, or a third from the bottom, that they may not seem top-heavy and in danger of falling.

6. THE like reason may influence Artists, in many other Instances, to depart from the Rules of *original Beauty*, as above laid down. And yet this is no Argument against our Sense of *Beauty* being founded, as was above explain'd, on *Uniformity amidst Variety*, but only an Evidence that our Sense of *Beauty* of the *Original* Kind may be vary'd and overballanc'd by another kind of *Beauty*.

7. THIS *Beauty* arising from Correspondence to *Intention*, would open to curious Observers a new Scene of *Beauty* in the Works of NATURE, by considering how the *Mechanism* of the various Parts known to us seems adapted to the Perfection of that Part, and yet in Subordination to the Good of some *System* or *Whole*. We generally suppose the Good of the *greatest Whole*, or of *all Beings*, to have been the *Intention* of the AUTHOR of *Nature*; and cannot avoid being pleas'd when we see any part of this *Design* executed in the *Systems* we are acquainted with.

with. The Obſervations already made on this Subject are in every one's hand, in the Treatiſes of our late Improvers of *mechanical Philoſophy*. We may only here obſerve the Pleaſure which any one ſhall receive from ſeeing any Deſign well executed by curious *Machiniſm*, even when his own Advantage is no way concern'd; as alſo that pleaſant Senſation he ſhall have in diſcovering the Deſign to which any complex *Machine* is adapted, when he has perhaps had a general Knowledge of the *Machine* before, without ſeeing its Correſpondence or Aptneſs to execute any Deſign. Sect. 4.

THE Arguments by which we prove *Reaſon* and *Deſign* in any *Cauſe* from the *Beauty* of the *Effects*, are ſo frequently us'd in ſome of the higheſt Subjects, that it may be neceſſary to enquire a little more particularly into them, to ſee how far they will hold, and with what degree of Evidence.

SECT.

SECT. V.

Concerning our Reasonings about Design *and* Wisdom *in the* Cause, *from the* Beauty *or* Regularity *of* Effects.

1. THERE seems to be no necessary Connection of our pleasing Ideas of *Beauty* with the *Uniformity* or *Regularity* of the Objects, from the *Nature* of things, antecedently to some *Constitution* of the AUTHOR of our Nature, which has made such Forms pleasant to us. Other *Minds* may possibly be so fram'd as to receive no Pleasure from *Uniformity*; and we actually find that the same regular Forms do not seem equally to please all the Animals known to us, as shall probably appear afterwards. Therefore let us make what is the most unfavourable Supposition to the present Argument possible; That the Constitution of our Sense so as to approve *Uniformity*, is merely arbitrary in the AUTHOR of our Nature; and that there are an infinity of *Tastes* or *Relishes* of *Beauty* possible; so that it would be impossible to throw together fifty or a hundred Pebbles, which should not make an agreeable Habitation for some Animal or other, and appear *beautiful* to it. And then it is plain, that from the Perception of *Beauty*

in

in any one Effect, we ſhould have no reaſon to conclude *Deſign* in the *Cauſe*: for a Senſe might be ſo conſtituted as to be pleas'd with ſuch *Irregularity* as may be the effect of an * *undirected Force*. But then, as there are an Infinity of *Forms* poſſible into which any Syſtem may be reduc'd, an Infinity of *Places* in which Animals may be ſituated, and an Infinity of *Reliſhes* or *Senſes* is ſuppos'd poſſible; that in the immenſe Spaces any one Animal ſhould by Chance be plac'd in a Syſtem agreeable to its Taſte, muſt be improbable as *infinite* to *one* at leaſt: And much more unreaſonable is it to expect from Chance, that a multitude of Animals agreeing in their Senſe of *Beauty* ſhould obtain *agreeable Places*. Sect. 5.

2. IT is alſo certain that there is the ſame Probability that in any one Syſtem of Matter an *Undirected Force* may produce a *regular Form*, as any one given *irregular*

* *This Expreſſion is taken from the* Carteſian Scheme, *in which the* Author of Nature *is ſuppoſed to have deſignedly impreſs'd* a general Force *or* Conatus ad motum *upon the Maſs of Matter, without any* Direction *whatſoever. This nonſenſical Notion did ſo much prevail, and men have ſo many confuſed Conceptions of* Nature *and* Chance, *as* real Beings *operating without* Wiſdom *or* Deſign, *that it may be uſeful to ſhew that their very abſurd* Poſtulatum *is wholly inſufficient, tho it were granted them, to anſwer the Appearances in the* Regularity *of the* World. *And this is what is attempted in the firſt fourteen Articles of this Section.*

one,

Sect. 5. one, of the same degree of Complication: But still the *irregular Forms* into which any System may be rang'd, surpass in multitude the *Regular*, as *Infinite* does *Unity*; for what holds in *one* small System will hold in a *Thousand*, a *Million*, a *Universe*, with more Advantage, *viz.* that the *irregular Forms* possible infinitely surpass the *Regular*; for Instance, the *Area* of an Inch *Square* is capable of an Infinity of *regular Forms*, the *Equilateral Triangle*, the *Square*, the *Pentagon*, *Hexagon*, *Heptagon*, &c. but for each one regular Form, there are an Infinity of Irregular, as an Infinity of *Scalena* for the one equilateral Triangle, an Infinity of *Trapezia* for the one Square, of irregular *Pentagons* for the one Regular, and so on: and therefore supposing any one System agitated by *undesigning Force*, it shall be infinitely more probable that it shall resolve it self into an *irregular Form* than a *regular*; thus, that a System of *six* Parts upon Agitation shall not obtain the Form of a regular *Hexagon*, is at least *infinite* to *Unity*; and the more complex we make the System, the greater is the hazard, from a very obvious Reason. We see this confirm'd by our constant Experience, that *Regularity* never arises from any *undesign'd Force* of ours; and from this we conclude, that wherever there is any *Regularity* in the disposition of a System capable of many other Positions, there must have been *Design* in the *Cause*;

and

and the Force of this Evidence increaſes, according to the Multiplicity of Parts imploy'd. Sect. 5.

BUT this Concluſion is too raſh, unleſs ſome further Proof be introduc'd; and what leads us into it is this. Men who have a Senſe of *Beauty* in *Regularity*, are led generally in all their Arrangements of Bodys to ſtudy ſome kind of *Regularity*, and ſeldom ever deſign *Irregularity*; and hence we judge the ſame of other Beings too, that they ſtudy *Regularity*, and preſume upon *Intention* in the *Cauſe* wherever we ſee it, making *Irregularity* always a Preſumption of Want of *Deſign*: Whereas if different Senſes of *Beauty* be in other Agents, or if they have no Senſe of it at all, *Irregularity* may as well be deſign'd as *Regularity*: and then let it be obſerv'd that in this Caſe there is juſt the ſame reaſon to conclude *Deſign* in the *Cauſe* from any one irregular Effect as from a regular one; for ſince there are an Infinity of other *Forms* poſſible as well as this irregular one produc'd, and ſince to ſuch a Being * void of a Senſe of *Beauty* all Forms are as to

* *There is a great Difference between ſuch a Being as is here mention'd, and a* Being *which has no* Intention *for any reaſon whatſoever to produce one Form more than another. This latter ſort of* Being *as to the preſent Argument, would be the ſame with*

Sect. 5. to its own Reliſh indifferent, and all agitated Matter meeting muſt make ſome Form or other, and all Forms upon Suppoſition that the Force is apply'd by an Agent void of a Senſe of *Beauty*, would equally prove *Deſign*; it is plain that no one Form proves it more than another, or can prove it at all; except from a general metaphyſical Conſideration, too ſubtile to be certain, that there is no proper Agent without *Deſign* and *Intention*, and that every *Effect* flows from the *Intention* of ſome *Cauſe*.

3. THIS however follows from the above offer'd Conſiderations, that ſuppoſing a Maſs of Matter ſurpaſſing a *cubick* Inch as *infinite* of the *firſt* Power does *Unity*, and that this whole Maſs were ſome way determin'd from its own Nature without any *Deſign* in a *Cauſe* (which perhaps is ſcarce poſſible) to reſolve it ſelf into *cubick* Inches ſolid Content, and into a *priſmatick* Form

---

with Chance, *but not the former. For tho a Being has no ſenſe of* Beauty, *he may notwithſtanding be capable of* Deſign, *and of* Intention *to produce* regular Forms; *and the obſervation of greater* Regularity *in any number of Effects, than cou'd be expected from* undirected Force, *is a preſumption of* Deſign *and* Intention *in the* Cauſe, *even where the* Cauſe *is ſuppos'd to have no ſenſe of* Beauty *in ſuch Forms, ſince perhaps he may have other Reaſons moving him to chuſe ſuch Forms. Thus ſuppoſing the* DEITY *no way neceſſarily pleas'd with* Regularity, Uniformity, *or* Similarity *in Bodys, yet there may be Reaſons moving him to produce ſuch Objects, ſuch as the pleaſing his Creatures, having given them a ſenſe of* Beauty *founded on theſe* Qualitys. *See the two laſt Paragraphs of the laſt Section.*

whoſe

whoſe *Baſe* ſhould always be $\frac{1}{2}$ of a *ſquare* Inch; ſuppoſe theſe Conditions determin'd, and all others left to *undirected Force*; all that we could expect from *undirected Force* in this Caſe would be one equilateral *Priſm* or two, perhaps; becauſe there are an Infinity of irregular *Priſms* poſſible of the ſame *Baſe* and *ſolid Content*: and when we meet with many ſuch *Priſms*, we muſt probably conclude *Deſign* as producing them, ſince they are more than could have been expected by the Laws of *Hazard*. Sect. 5.

4. BUT if the *infinite* Maſs was no way determin'd to a *priſmatick* Form, ſince there are an infinity of other Forms poſſible, we could only expect from the *caſual Concourſe* of ſuch a Maſs as was ſuppos'd in the laſt Caſe, one *Priſm* of any Kind, ſince there are an Infinity of other Solids poſſible into which the Maſs might be reſolv'd; and if we found any great number of *Priſms*, we ſhould have Preſumption for *Deſign*: ſo that in a Maſs of Matter as infinite of the *firſt* Power, we could not from any *Concourſe* or *Agitation* expect with any good ground a Body of any given Dimenſions or Size, and of any given Form; ſince of any Dimenſion there are infinite Forms poſſible, and of any Form there are an Infinity of Dimenſions; and if we found ſeveral Bodys of the ſame Dimenſion

Sect. 5. mension and Form, we would have so much Presumption for *Design*.

5. THERE is one trifling Objection which may perhaps arise from the *chrystallizing* of certain Bodys, when the Fluid is evaporated in which they were swimming; for in this we frequently see *regular Forms* arising, tho there is nothing in this Affair but an *undirected Force* of *Attraction* suppos'd. But to remove this Objection, we need only consider, that we have good Reason to believe that the smallest Particles of *chrystall-liz'd* Bodys have fixed *regular Forms* given to them in the Constitution of *Nature*; and then it is easy to conceive how their *Attractions* may produce *regular Forms*: but unless we suppose some preceding *Regularity* in the Figures of *attracting* Bodys, they shall never form any regular Body at all. And hence we see how improbable it is, that the whole Mass of *Matter*, not only in this Globe, but in all the fixed Stars known to us by our Eyes or Glasses, were they a thousand times larger than our Astronomers suppose, could in any *Concourse* have produc'd any Number of *similar* Bodys *Regular* or *Irregular*.

6. AND let it be here observ'd, that there are many Compositions of Bodys which the smallest Degree of *Design* could easily effect, which yet we would in vain expect

pect from all the Powers of *Chance* or *undesigned Force*, even after an *Infinity* of Rencounters; even supposing a Dissolution of every Form except the *regular one*, that the Parts might be prepar'd for a new Agitation: Thus, supposing we could expect *one* equilateral *Prism* of any *given* Dimensions should be form'd from *undirected Force*, in an Infinity of Matter some way determin'd to resolve into Bodys of a *given* solid Content, (which is all we could expect, since it is *infinite* to *one* after the *solid Content* is obtain'd, that the Body shall not be *Prismatical*; and allowing it *Prismatical*, it is *infinite* to *one* that it shall not be *Equilateral:*) And again, supposing another Infinity of Matter determin'd to resolve it self into *Tubes*, of *Orifices* exactly equal to the *Bases* of the former *Prisms*, it is again at least as the *second* Power of *Infinite* to *Unity*, that not one of these *Tubes* shall be both *Prismatick* and *Equiangular*; and then if the *Tube* were thus form'd so as to be exactly capable of receiving one of the *Prisms* and no more, it is *infinite* to *one* that they shall never meet in *infinite Space*; and should they meet, it is *infinite* to *one* that the *Axes* of the *Prism* and *Tube* shall never happen in the same strait *Line*; and supposing they did, it is again as *infinite* to *three*, that *Angle* shall not meet *Angle*, so as to enter. We see then how infinitely improbable it is, Sect. 5.

Sect. 5. " that all the Powers of *Chance* in *infi-*
" *nite Matter* agitated thro *infinite Ages*,
" could ever effect this small Compoſition
" of a *Priſm* entring a *Priſmatick Bore*;"
and, " that all our hazard for it would
" at moſt be but as *three* is to the *third*
" Power of *Infinite*." And yet the ſmal-
leſt *Deſign* could eaſily effect it.

7. MAY we not then juſtly count it altogether abſurd, and next to an abſolute ſtrict *Impoſſibility*, " That all the Powers " of *undirected Force* could ever effect " ſuch a complex Machine as is that of " the moſt imperfect *Plant*, or the mean- " eſt *Animal*, even in *one* Inſtance?" for the *Improbability* juſt increaſes, as the Complication of Mechaniſm in theſe *natu-ral* Bodys ſurpaſſes that *ſimple* Combina-tion above mention'd.

8. LET it be here obſerv'd, " That the " preceding Reaſoning from the *Frequency* " of *regular Bodys* of one Form in the " *Univerſe*, and from the *Combinations* " of various Bodys, is intirely independent " on any Perception of *Beauty*; and " would equally prove *Deſign* in the " *Cauſe*, altho there were no *Being* which " perceived *Beauty* in any Form what- " ſoever:" for it is in ſhort this, " *That* " *the recurring of any Effect oftner than* " *the Laws of Hazard do determine,*

" *gives*

" *gives Presumption of Design*;" *and*, Sect. 5.
" *That Combinations which no undesign'd*
" *Force could give us reason to expect,*
" *must necessarily prove the same*; *and*
" *that with superior probability, as the*
" *multitude of Cases, in which the contrary*
" *might possibly happen, surpass all the*
" *Cases in which this could happen*:"
which appears to be in the simplest Cases at least as *Infinite* does *Unity*. And the frequency of *similar irregular Forms*, or *exact Combinations* of them, is an equal Argument of *Design* in the *Cause*, since the *Similarity*, or *exact Combinations* of *irregular Forms* are as little to be expected from all the Powers of *undirected Force* as any sort whatsoever.

9. To bring this nearer to something like a *Theorem*, altho the *Idea* of *Infinite* be troublesome enough to manage in Reasoning; the Powers of *Chance* with *infinite Matter* in *infinite Ages* may answer *Hazards* as the *fifth* Power of *Infinite* and no more: thus the *Quantity* of Matter may be conceiv'd as the *third* Power of *Infinite* and no more, the *various Degrees* of Force may make *another* Power of *Infinite*, and the *Number* of Rencounters may make the *fifth*. But this last only holds on Suppositon that after every Rencounter there is no *Cohesion*, but all is dissolved again for a new Concourse, except in *similar*

Sect. 5. *Forms* or *exact Combinations*; which Supposition is entirely groundless, since we see *dissimilar Bodys* cohering as strongly as any, and *rude Masses* more than any Combinations. Now to produce any *given* Body, in a *given* Place or Situation, and of *given* Dimensions, or Shape, the Hazards of the contrary are, *one* Power of *Infinite* at least to obtain the *Place* or Situation; when the *Situation* is obtain'd, the *solid Content* requires *another* Power of *Infinite* to obtain it; the *Situation* and *Solidity* obtain'd require, for accomplishing the *simplest given* Shape, at least the other *three* Powers of *Infinite*. For instance, let the Shape be a four-sided *Prism* or *Parallelipiped*; that the *Surfaces* should be *Planes* requires *one* Power, that they should be *Parallel* in this Case; or *inclin'd* in any *given Angle* in any other Case, requires *another* Power of *Infinite*; and that they should be in any *given Ratio* to each other requires at least the *third* Power: for in each of these Heads there are at least still an *Infinity* of other Cases possible beside the one *given*. So that all the Powers of *Chance* could only produce perhaps *one* Body of every simpler Shape or Size *at most*, and this is all we could expect: we might expect one *Pyramid*, or *Cube*, or *Prism* perhaps; but when we increase the Conditions required, the Prospect must grow more improbable, as in more

more *complex Figures*, and in all *Combinations* of Bodys, and in *ſimilar Species*, which we never could reaſonably hope from *Chance*, and therefore where we ſee them we muſt certainly aſcribe them to *Deſign*. Sect. 5.

10. THE Combinations of *regular Forms*, or of *irregular ones* exactly adapted to each other, require ſuch *vaſt* Powers of *Infinite* to effect them, and the Hazards of the *contrary* Forms are ſo *infinitely* numerous, that all *Probability* or *Poſſibility* of their being accompliſh'd by *Chance* ſeems quite to vaniſh. Let us apply the Caſes in Art. 6th of this Section about the *Priſm* and *Tube*, to our ſimpleſt Machines, ſuch as *a pair of Wheels* of our ordinary Carriages; each *Circular*, *Spokes* equal in *length*, *thickneſs*, *ſhape*; the *Wheels* ſet *Parallel*, the *Axle-tree* fix'd in the *Nave* of both, and ſecur'd from coming out at either End: the Caſes in which the contrary might have happen'd from *undirected Concourſes*, were there no more requir'd than what is juſt now mention'd, muſt amount in Multitude to a Power of *Infinite equal* to every Circumſtance requir'd. What ſhall we ſay then of a *Plant*, a *Tree*, an *Animal*, a *Man*, with *ſuch multitudes* of adapted Veſſels, *ſuch Articulations*, *Inſertions* of *Muſcles*, *Diffuſion* of *Veins*, *Arterys*, *Nerves*: The *Improbability* that ſuch Machines ſhould be the Effect of

Sect. 5. *Chance* must be near the *infinitesimal* Power of *Infinite* to *Unity*.

11. FURTHER, were all the former Reasoning from *Similarity* of Forms and Combinations groundless, and could *Chance* give us ground to expect such Forms, with exact Combination, yet we could only promise *one* of these Forms among an *Infinity* of others; when we see then such a *multitude* of Individuals of a Species *similar* to each other in a vast number of Parts, and when we see in each *Individual*, the corresponding Members so exactly like to each other, what possible room is there left for questioning *Design* in the *Universe*? None but the barest *Possibility* against an inconceivably great *Probability*, surpassing every thing which is not *strict Demonstration*.

12. THIS Argument, as it has been already observ'd *, is quite abstracted from any Sense of *Beauty* in any particular Form; for the *exact Similarity* of a hundred or a thousand *Trapezia* proves *Design* as well as the *Similarity* of *Squares*, since both are equally above all the Powers of *undirected Force* or *Chance*, as the *hundredth* or *thousandth* Power of *Infinite* surpasses

* See above, *Art.* 8.

Unity;

Unity; and what is above the Powers of *Chance*, must give us proportionable Presumption for *Design*. Sect. 5.

THUS, allowing that a *Leg*, or *Arm*, or *Eye*, might have been the Effect of *Chance*, (which was shewn to be *most absurd*, and next to absolutely *impossible*) that it should not have a corresponding *Leg*, *Arm*, *Eye*, exactly *similar*, must be a hazard of a Power of *Infinite* proportion'd to the Complication of Parts; for in Proportion to this is the multitude of Cases increased, in which it would not have a corresponding Member *similar*: so that allowing twenty or thirty Parts in such a Structure, it would be as the *twentieth* or *thirtieth* Power of *Infinite* to *Unity*, that the corresponding Part should not be *similar*. What shall we say then of the *similar Forms* of a whole *Species*?

12. IF it be objected, "That *natural* Bodys are not *exactly similar*, but "only *grossly so* to our Senses, as that a "*Vein*, an *Artery*, a *Bone* is not perhaps "exactly similar to its Correspondent in "the same Animal, tho it appears so to "our Senses, which only judge of the "Bulk, and do not discern the small constituent Parts; and that in the several Individuals of a Species the *Dissimilarity* is "always sensible, often in the internal

Sect. 5. " Structure, and often, nay always in the " external Appearance." To remove this Objection it will be sufficient to shew, " That the multitude of Cases wherein *sen-* " *sible Dissimilitude* could have happen'd, " are still infinitely more than all the Cases " in which *sensible Similitude* might ;" so that the same Reasoning holds from *sensible Similarity*, as from the *mathematically exact :* And again, " That the Cases of " *gross Dissimilarity* do in the same man- " ner surpass the Cases of *gross Similarity* " possible, as *infinite* does *one*."

13. To prove both these Assertions, let us consider a simple Instance ; a *Trapezium* of a foot Square in *Area* shall appear *similar* to another, while no one *side* differs, by $\frac{1}{10}$ of an Inch ; or no *Angle* in one surpasses the corresponding one in the other above ten Minutes perhaps : now this tenth of an Inch is *infinitely* divisible, as also are the ten Minutes, so that the Cases of *insensible Dissimilarity* under *apparent Similarity* are really *Infinite*. But then it is also plain that there are an *Infinity* of different sensibly dissimilar *Trapezia*, even of the same *Area*, according as we vary a *Side* by one Tenth, two Tenths, three Tenths, and so on, and varying the *Angles* and another *Side* so as to keep the *Area* equal. Now in each of these infinite Degrees of *sensible Dissimilitude* the several Tenths are *infinitely*

infinitely divisible as well as in the first Case; so that the multitude of *sensible Dissimilaritys* are to the multitude of *insensible Dissimilaritys* under apparent Resemblance, still as the *second* Power of *Infinite* to the *first*, or as *Infinite* to *Unity*. And then how vastly greater must the Multitude be, of all possible *sensible Dissimilaritys* in such complex Bodys as *Legs*, *Arms*, *Eyes*, *Arterys*, *Veins*, *Skeletons*? Sect. 5.

14. As to the *Dissimilaritys* of Animals of the same Species, it is in the same manner plain that the possible Cases of *gross Dissimilarity* are Infinite, and then every Case of *gross Dissimilarity* contains also all the Cases of *insensible Dissimilarity*. Thus, if we would count all Animals of a Species *grossly similar*, while there was no Limb which in Length or Diameter did exceed the ordinary Shape by above a third of the Head; it is plain that there are an Infinity of *gross Dissimilaritys* possible, and then in each of these Cases of *gross Dissimilarity*, there are an Infinity of Cases of *nicer Dissimilarity*, since $\frac{1}{3}$ of the Head may be infinitely divided. To take a low but easy Instance; two *Cockle-Shells* which fitted each other naturally, may have an Infinity of *insensible Differences*, but still there are an Infinity of possible *sensible Differences*, and then in any one of the *sensibly* *diffe-*

Sect. 5. *different* Forms, there may be the ſame Infinity of *inſenſible Differences* beſide the *ſenſible one:* So that ſtill the hazard for even *groſs Similarity* from *Chance* is *Infinite* to *one*, and this always increaſes by a Power of Infinite for every diſtinct Member of the Animal, in which even *groſs Similarity* is retain'd; ſince the Addition of every Member or Part to a complex Machine, makes a new Infinity of Caſes, in which *ſenſible Diſſimilarity* may happen; and this Infinity combin'd with the infinite Caſes of the former Parts, raiſes the Hazard by a Power of Infinite.

Now this may ſufficiently ſhew us the Abſurdity of the *Carteſian* or *Epicurean Hypotheſis*, even granting their *Poſtulatum* of *undirected Force* impreſſed on *infinite Matter*; and ſeems almoſt a Demonſtration of *Deſign* in the *Univerſe*.

15. LET it be here obſerv'd alſo, "That "a *rational Agent* may be capable of im- "preſſing Force when he is not intend- "ing to produce any particular Form, "and of deſignedly producing *irregu-* "*lar* or *diſſimilar Forms*, as well as "*regular* and *ſimilar*;" and hence it follows, "That altho all the *Regula-* "*rity*, *Combination* and *Similarity* in the "*Univerſe*, are Preſumptions of *Deſign*, "yet *Irregularity* is no Preſumption of the "con-

" contrary; unleſs we ſuppoſe that the Sect. 5.
" *Agent* is determined from a Senſe of
" *Beauty* always to act *regularly*, and de-
" light in *Similarity*; and that he can have
" no other inconſiſtent Motive of Action:"
Which laſt is plainly abſurd. We do not want in the *Univerſe* many Effects which ſeem to have been left to the general *Laws* of *Motion* upon ſome great *Impulſe*, and have many Inſtances where *Similarity* has been deſigned plainly in ſome reſpects, and probably neglected in others; or even *Diſſimilarity* deſigned: Thus we ſee the *general exact Reſemblance* between the two *Eyes* of moſt perſons; and yet perhaps no other third *Eye* in the world *exactly* like them. We ſee a *groſs Conformity* of ſhape in all Perſons in innumerable Parts, and yet no two *Individuals* of any Species are undiſtinguiſhable; which perhaps is intended for valuable Purpoſes to the whole Species.

16. HITHERTO the Proof amounts only to *Deſign* or *Intention* barely, in oppoſition to *blind Force* or *Chance*; and we ſee the Proof of this is independent on *the arbitrary Conſtitution of our internal Senſe of Beauty*. *Beauty* is often ſuppoſed an Argument of more than *Deſign*, to wit, *Wiſdom* and *Prudence* in the *Cauſe*. Let us enquire alſo into this.

WISDOM

Sect. 5. WISDOM denotes *the pursuing of the best Ends by the best Means*; and therefore before we can from any Effect prove the *Cause* to be *wise*, we must know what is *best* to the *Cause* or *Agent*. Among men who have pleasure in contemplating *Uniformity*, the *Beauty* of Effects is an Argument of Wisdom, because this is *Good* to them; but the same Argument would not hold as to a *Being void* of this *Sense* of *Beauty*. And therefore the *Beauty* apparent to us in *Nature* will not of it self prove *Wisdom* in the *Cause*, unless this *Cause*, or AUTHOR of *Nature* be suppos'd BENEVOLENT; and then indeed the Happiness of Mankind is desirable or *Good* to the SUPREME CAUSE; and that Form which pleases us, is an Argument of his *Wisdom*. And the Strength of this Argument is increased always in proportion to the Degree of *Beauty* produced in *Nature*, and expos'd to the View of any *rational Agent*; since upon supposition of a *Benevolent* DEITY, all the apparent *Beauty* produc'd is an Evidence of the Execution of a *Benevolent Design*, to give him the Pleasures of *Beauty*. But what more immediately proves *Wisdom* is this; when we see any Machine with a vast Complication of Parts actually obtaining an *End*, we justly conclude, "That since this could not have "been the Effect of *Chance*, it must have "been *intended* for that *End*, which is ob-

"tained

" tained by it;" and then the *Ends* or *In-* Sect. 5.
tentions, being in part known, the Com-
plication of Organs, and their nice Disposition adapted to this *End*, is an Evidence " of a *comprehensive large Understand-* " *ing* in the *Cause*, according to the Mul- " tiplicity of Parts, and the Appositeness " of their Structure, even when we do " not know the *Intention* of *the Whole*."

17. THERE is another kind of *Beauty* also which is still pleasing to our *Sense*, and from which we conclude Wisdom in the Cause as well as Design, and that is, *when we see many useful or beautiful Effects flowing from one general Cause*. There is a very good Reason for this Conclusion among Men. *Interest* must lead *Beings* of limited Powers, who are uncapable of a great diversity of Operations, and distracted by them, to chuse this *frugal Oeconomy* of their Forces, and to look upon such Management as an Evidence of *Wisdom* in other *Beings* like themselves. Nor is this speculative Reason all which influences them, for even beside this Consideration of *Interest*, they are determin'd by a *Sense of Beauty* where that Reason does not hold; as when we are judging of the Productions of other *Agents* about whose Oeconomy we are not solicitous. Thus, who does not approve of it as a Perfection in *Clock-work*, that three or four

Motions

Sect. 5. Motions of the *Hour*, *Minute*, and *Second Hands*, and *Monthly Plate*, should arise from *one Spring* or *Weight*, rather than from three, or four *Springs*, or *Weights*, in a very Compound Machine, which should perform the same Effects, and answer all the same Purposes with equal exactness? Now the Foundation of this *Beauty* plainly appears to be *Uniformity* or *Unity* of *Cause* amidst *Diversity* of Effects.

18. We may perhaps * afterwards offer some Reasons, why the Author *of Nature* may possibly chuse to operate in this manner by *General Laws* and *Universal extensive Causes*, altho the Reason just now mention'd does not hold with an *Almighty Being*. This is certain, "That we have some "of the most delightful Instances of *Uni-* "*versal Causes* in the *Works* of *Nature*, "and that the most studious men in these "Subjects are so delighted with the Obser- "vation of them, that they always look "upon them as Evidences of *Wisdom* in "the Administration of *Nature*, from a "Sense of Beauty."

19. The wonderfully simple *Mechanism* which performs all Animal Motions, was mentioned † already; nor is *that*

* See the last *Section*. † See above, *Sect.* 2. *Art.* 8.

of

of the inanimate Parts of *Nature* less admirable. How innumerable are the Effects of that one Principle of *Heat*, deriv'd to us from the *Sun*, which is not only delightful to our Sight and Feeling, and the Means of discerning Objects, but is the Cause of *Rains*, *Springs*, *Rivers*, *Winds*, and the universal Cause of *Vegetation!* The *uniform Principle of Gravity* preserves at once the *Planets* in their *Orbits*, gives *Cohesion* to the Parts of each *Globe*, and *Stability* to *Mountains*, *Hills*, and *artificial Structures*; it raises the *Sea* in Tides, and sinks them again, and restrains them in their Channels; it drains the *Earth* of its superfluous Moisture, by *Rivers*; it raises the *Vapours* by its Influence on the *Air*, and brings them down again in *Rains*; it gives an *uniform Pressure* to our *Atmosphere*, necessary to our Bodys in general, and more especially to *Inspiration* in Breathing; and furnishes us with an *universal Movement*, capable of being apply'd in innumerable Engines. How incomparably more *beautiful* is this Structure than if we suppos'd so many *distinct Volitions* in the DEITY, producing every particular Effect, and preventing some of the accidental Evils which casually flow from the *general Law!* And yet this latter manner of Operation might have been more useful to us, and would have been no distraction to *Omnipotence:* But then the great

Sect. 5.

Sect. 5. great *Beauty* had been loſt, and there had been no more Pleaſure in the Contemplation of this Scene which is now ſo delightful. One would rather chuſe to run the hazard of its *caſual Evils*, than part with that *harmonious Form* which has been the unexhauſted Source of Delight to the ſucceſſive Spectators in all Ages.

20. HENCE we ſee, "That however "*Miracles* may prove the Superintendency "of a *voluntary Agent*, and that the *Uni*"*verſe* is not guided by *Neceſſity* or *Fate*, "yet *that Mind* muſt be *weak* and *inad*"*vertent*, which needs them to confirm "the Belief of a *Wiſe* and *Good* DEITY; "ſince the deviation from *general Laws*, "unleſs upon very extraordinary Occaſi"ons, muſt be a preſumption of *Inconſtancy* "and *Weakneſs*, rather than of a *ſteddy* "*Wiſdom* and *Power*, and muſt weaken "the beſt Arguments we can have for the "*Sagacity* and *Power* of the *univerſal* "MIND."

SECT.

SECT. VI.

Of the Universality *of the* Sense of Beauty *among Men.*

1. WE before * insinuated, "That "all *Beauty* has a relation to "some *perceiving Power*;" and consequently since we know not the *variety* of Senses which may be among Animals, there is no Form in *Nature* concerning which we can pronounce, "That it has no "*Beauty*;" for it may still please some *perceiving Power.* But our *Inquiry* is confin'd to Men; and before we examine the *Universality* of this *Sense of Beauty*, or their agreement in approving *Uniformity*, it may be proper to consider, "if, "as the other *Senses* which give us Plea-"sure do also give us Pain, so this *Sense of* "*Beauty* does make some Objects disagree-"able to us, and the occasion of Pain." That many Objects give no pleasure to our *Sense* is obvious, many are certainly void of *Beauty:* But then there is no Form which seems necessarily disagreeable of it self, when we dread no other Evil from it, and compare it with nothing better of the Kind. Many Objects are naturally dis-

* See above *Sect.* 1. *Art.* 17. *Sect.* 4. *Art.* 1.

Sect. 6. pleasing, and distasteful to our *external Senses*, as well as others pleasing and agreeable; as *Smells*, *Tastes*, and some separate *Sounds*: but for our *Sense of Beauty*, no Composition of Objects which give not unpleasant simple Ideas, seems positively unpleasant or painful of it self, had we never observ'd any thing better of the Kind. *Deformity* is only *the absence of Beauty*, or *deficiency in the Beauty expected in any Species*: Thus *bad Musick* pleases *Rusticks* who never heard any better, and the *finest Ear* is not offended with *tuning* of Instruments if it be not too tedious, where no *Harmony* is expected; and yet much smaller *Dissonancy* shall offend amidst the Performance, where *Harmony* is expected. A *rude Heap* of Stones is no way offensive to one who shall be displeas'd with *Irregularity* in *Architecture*, where *Beauty* was expected. And had there been a Species of that Form which we call now *ugly* or *deform'd*, and had we never seen or expected greater *Beauty*, we should have receiv'd no disgust from it, altho the Pleasure would not have been so great in this Form as in those we now admire. Our *Sense of Beauty* seems design'd to give us positive Pleasure, but not positive Pain or Disgust, any further than what arises from disappointment.

2. THERE are indeed many Faces which at first View are apt to raise Dislike; but this is

is generally not from any positive Deformity which of it self is positively displeasing, but either from want of *expected Beauty*, or much more from their carrying some natural Indications of *morally bad Dispositions*, which we all acquire a Faculty of discerning in *Countenances*, *Airs*, and *Gestures*. That this is not occasion'd by any Form positively disgusting, will appear from this, "That if upon long Ac- "quaintance we are sure of finding *sweet-* "*ness of Temper*, *Humanity and Cheer-* "*fulness*, altho the bodily Form conti- "nues, it shall give us no Disgust or Dis- "pleasure;" whereas what were naturally disagreeable, or the occasion of Pain, or positive Distaste, would always continue so, even altho the Aversion we might have toward it were counterballanc'd by other Considerations. There are Horrors rais'd by some Objects which are only the Effect of *Fear* for our selves, or *Compassion* towards others, when either *Reason*, or some foolish *Association of Ideas*, makes us apprehend Danger, and not the Effect of any thing in the Form it self: for we find that most of these Objects which excite Horror at first, when Experience or Reason has remov'd the Fear, may become the occasions of Pleasure; as in *ravenous Beasts*, a *tempestuous Sea*, a *craggy Precipice*, a *dark shady Valley*. Sect. 6.

Sect. 6.

3. We shall see * afterwards, "That "*Associations of Ideas* make Objects plea- "sant, and delightful, which are not na- "turally apt to give any such Pleasures; "and the same way the *casual Conjunc-* "*tions of Ideas* may give a Disgust, where "there is nothing disagreeable in the Form "it self." And this is the occasion of many fantastick Aversions to Figures of some Animals, and to some other Forms: Thus *Swine*, *Serpents* of all Kinds, and some *Insects* really beautiful enough, are beheld with Aversion by many People, who have got *some accidental Ideas associated* to them. And for *Distastes* of this Kind, there is no other Account can be given.

4. But as to the *universal Agreement* of Mankind in their *Sense of Beauty* from *Uniformity amidst Variety*, we must consult Experience: and as we allow all Men Reason, since all Men are capable of understanding simple Arguments, tho few are capable of complex Demonstrations; so in this Case it must be sufficient to prove *this Sense of Beauty universal*, "if all "Men are better pleas'd with *Uniformity* "in the simpler Instances than *the con-* "*trary*, even when there is no Advantage "observ'd attending it; and likewise if all

* See below *Art.* 11, 12. of this Section.

"Men,

" Men, according as their Capacity en- Sect. 6.
" larges, ſo as to receive and compare
" more complex Ideas, do further extend
" their Delight in *Uniformity*, and are
" pleas'd with its more complex Kinds,
" both *Original* and *Relative*."

Now let us conſider if ever any Perſon was void of *this Senſe* in ſimpler Inſtances. Few Trials have been made in the ſimpleſt Inſtances of *Harmony*, becauſe as ſoon as we find an *Ear* not capable of reliſhing complex Compoſitions, ſuch as our *Tunes* are, no further Pains are employ'd about ſuch. But in *Figures*, did ever any Man make choice of a *Trapezium*, or any irregular *Curve*, for the *Ichnography* of his Houſe without Neceſſity, or ſome great Motive of Conveniency? or to make the oppoſite Walls *not parallel* or *unequal* in Height? Were ever *Trapeziums*, irregular *Polygones* or *Curves* choſen for the Forms of *Doors* or *Windows*, tho theſe Figures might have anſwer'd the Uſes as well, and would have often ſav'd a great part of the Time and Labour and Expence to Workmen, which is now employ'd in ſuiting the Stones and Timber to the *regular* Forms? Among all the fantaſtick Modes of *Dreſs*, none was ever quite void of *Uniformity*, if it were only in *the reſemblance* of the two Sides of the ſame *Robe*, and in *ſome general Aptitude* to the human Form; the

Sect. 6. *Pictish Painting* had always *relative Beauty* by resemblance to other Objects, and often those Objects were *originally beautiful:* however justly we might apply HORACE's Censure of impertinent Descriptions in *Poetry*, * *Sed non erat his locus.* But never were any so extravagant as to affect such Figures as are made by *the casual spilling* of liquid Colours. Who was ever pleas'd with an *inequality* of Heights in *Windows* of the same Range, or *dissimilar Shapes* of them? with *unequal Legs* or *Arms* or *Eyes* or *Cheeks* in *a Mistress*? It must be however acknowledg'd, "That *Interest* often may counterballance our *Sense of Beauty* in this "Affair as well as in others, and superior "good Qualitys may make us overlook "such Imperfections."

5. NAY further, it may perhaps appear, "That *Regularity* and *Uniformity* are so "copiously diffus'd thro the *Universe*, and "we are so readily determin'd to pursue "*this* as the Foundation of *Beauty* in "*Works* of *Art*, that there is scarcely "any thing ever fancy'd as *Beautiful*, "where there is not really something of "this *Uniformity* and *Regularity*." We are indeed often mistaken in imagining that there is the greatest possible *Beauty*, where

* Hor. de Arte Poet. v. 19.

it

it is but very imperfect; but ſtill it is ſome Sect. 6.
degree of *Beauty* which pleaſes, altho there
may be higher Degrees which we do not obſerve; and our *Senſe* acts with full Regularity when we are pleas'd, altho we are kept by a falſe Prejudice from purſuing Objects which would pleaſe us more. A GOTH, for inſtance, is miſtaken, when from Education he imagines the *Architecture* of his Country to be the moſt perfect; and a *Conjunction* of ſome of *the hoſtile Ideas*, may make him have an Averſion to *Roman Buildings*, and ſtudy to demoliſh them, as ſome of our *Reformers* did the *Popiſh Buildings*, not being able to ſeparate the Ideas of the ſuperſtitious Worſhip, from the Forms of the Buildings where it was practiſed: and yet it is ſtill *real Beauty* which pleaſes the GOTH, founded upon *Uniformity amidſt Variety*. For the *Gothick Pillars* are *uniform* to each other, not only in their *Sections*, which are *Lozenge-formed*; but alſo in their *Heights* and *Ornaments:* Their *Arches* are not one *uniform Curve*, but yet they are *Segments* of *ſimilar Curves*, and generally equal in the ſame Ranges. The very *Indian Buildings* have ſome kind of *Uniformity*, and many of the EASTERN NATIONS, tho they differ much from us, yet have great *Regularity* and *Beauty* in their Manner, as well as the ROMANS in theirs; our *Indian Screens*, which wonderfully ſupply the

Sect. 6. *regular* Imaginations of our *Ladys* with Ideas of Deformity, in which *Nature* is very churlish and sparing, do want indeed all the *Beauty* arising from Proportion of Parts, and Conformity to *Nature*; and yet they cannot divest themselves of all *Beauty* and *Uniformity* in the separate Parts: And this diversifying the human Body into various Contortions, may give some wild Pleasure from *Variety*, since some *Uniformity* to the human Shape is still retain'd.

6. THERE is one sort of *Beauty* which might perhaps have been better mention'd before, but will not be impertinent here, because the Taste or Relish of it is *universal* in all Nations, and with the Young as well as the Old, and that is the *Beauty* of *History*. Every one knows how dull a Study it is to read over a Collection of *Gazettes*, which shall perhaps relate all the same Events with the *Historian*: The superior Pleasure then of *History* must arise, like that of *Poetry*, from the *Manners*; as when we see a *Character* well drawn, wherein we find the secret Causes of a great Diversity of seemingly inconsistent Actions; or an *Interest of State* laid open, or an *artful View* nicely unfolded, the Execution of which influences very different and opposite Actions, as the Circumstances may alter. Now this reduces the whole

to

to an *Unity* of Design at least: And this may be observ'd in the very Fables which entertain Children, otherwise we cannot make them relish them. Sect. 6.

7. WHAT has been said will probably be assented to, if we always remember in our Inquirys into the *Universality* of the *Sense of Beauty*, "That there may be "*real Beauty*, where there is not the "*greatest*; and that there are an Infinity "of different Forms which shall all have "some *Unity*, and yet differ from each "other." So that Men may have different Fancys of *Beauty*, and yet *Uniformity* be the *universal Foundation* of our Approbation of any Form whatsoever as *Beautiful*. And we shall find that it is so in the *Architecture*, *Gardening*, *Dress*, *Equipage*, and *Furniture* of Houses, even among the most uncultivated Nations; where *Uniformity* still pleases, without any other Advantage than the Pleasure of the Contemplation of it.

8. IT will deserve our Consideration on this Subject, how, in like Cases, we form very different Judgments concerning the *internal* and *external Senses*. Nothing is more ordinary among those, who after Mr. LOCKE have shaken off the groundless Opinions about *innate Ideas*, than to alledge, "That all our Relish for *Beauty*,

"and

Sect. 6. " and *Order*, is either from *Advantage*, " or *Cuſtom*, or *Education*," for no other Reaſon but the *Variety* of *Fancys* in the World: and from this they conclude, " That our *Fancys* do not ariſe from any " *natural Power of Perception*, or *Senſe*." And yet all allow our *external Senſes* to be *Natural*, and " that the Pleaſures or " Pains of their Senſations, however they " may be increaſed, or diminiſhed, by " *Cuſtom*, or *Education*, and counter- " ballanc'd by *Intereſt*, yet are really an- " tecedent to *Cuſtom*, *Habit*, *Education*, " or Proſpect of *Intereſt*." Now it is certain, " That there is at leaſt as great a va- " riety of Fancys about their Objects, as " the Objects of *Beauty*:" Nay it is much more difficult, and perhaps impoſſible, to bring the Fancys or Reliſhes of the *external Senſes* to any general Foundation at all, or to find any Rule for the *agreeable* or *diſagreeable*: and yet we all allow " that " theſe are *natural* Powers of *Percep-* " *tion*."

9. THE Reaſon of this different Judgment can be no other than this, " That " we have got diſtinct Names for the *ex-* " *ternal Senſes*, and none, or very few, " for the *Internal*;" and by this are led, as in many other Caſes, to look upon the former as ſome way more *fix'd*, and *real* and *natural*, than the latter. The *Senſe* of

of *Harmony* has got its Name, a good Ear; and we are generally brought to acknowledge this a *natural* Power of *Perception*, or *a Senſe* ſome way diſtinct from *Hearing*: now it is certain, "That there is as "neceſſary a Perception of *Beauty* upon "the preſence of *regular Objects*, as of "*Harmony* upon hearing certain *Sounds*. Sect. 6.

10. BUT let it be obſerv'd here once for all, "That an *internal Senſe* no more pre-"ſuppoſes an *innate Idea*, or Principle of "Knowledge, than the *external*." Both are *natural* Powers of *Perception*, or *Determinations* of *the Mind* to receive neceſſarily certain Ideas from the preſence of Objects. The *internal Senſe* is, *a paſſive Power of receiving Ideas of Beauty from all Objects in which there is Uniformity amidſt Variety*. Nor does there ſeem any thing more difficult in this matter, than "that the Mind ſhould be always deter-"min'd to receive the Idea of *Sweet*, "when Particles of ſuch a Form enter the "Pores of the Tongue; or to have the "Idea of *Sound* upon any quick Undula-"tion of the Air." The one ſeems to have as little Connection with its Idea, as the other: And the ſame Power could with equal eaſe conſtitute the former the occaſion of Ideas as the latter.

11. THE

Sect. 6.

11. THE *Association* of Ideas * above hinted at, is one great Cause of the apparent Diversity of Fancys in the *Sense of Beauty*, as well as in the *external Senses*; and often makes Men have an aversion to Objects of *Beauty*, and a liking to others void of it, but under different Conceptions than those of *Beauty* or *Deformity*. And here it may not be improper to give some Instances of some of these *Associations*. The *Beauty* of *Trees*, their *cool Shades*, and their *Aptness* to conceal from Observation, have made *Groves* and *Woods* the usual Retreat to those who love *Solitude*, especially to the *Religious*, the *Pensive*, the *Melancholy*, and the *Amorous*. And do not we find that we have so join'd the Ideas of these Dispositions of Mind with those external Objects, that they always recur to us along with them? The Cunning of the *Heathen Priests* might make such obscure Places the Scene of the fictitious Appearances of their *Deitys*; and hence we join Ideas of something *Divine* to them. We know the like Effect in the Ideas of our *Churches*, from the perpetual use of them only in *religious Exercises*. The faint Light in *Gothick Buildings* has had the same Association of a very foreign

* See above *Art.* 3. of this Section.

Idea

Idea, which our *Poet* ſhews in his *Epithet.* Sect. 6.

——*A Dim religious Light.**

IN like manner it is known, "That "often all the Circumſtances of *Actions* or "*Places*, or *Dreſſes* of Perſons, or *Voice*, "or *Song*, which have occur'd at any "time together, when we were ſtrongly "affected by any Paſſion, will be ſo con-"nected that any one of theſe will make "all the reſt recur." And this is often the occaſion both of great Pleaſure and Pain, Delight and Averſion to many Objects, which of themſelves might have been perfectly indifferent to us: but theſe *Approbations*, or *Diſtaſtes* are remote from the Ideas of *Beauty*, being plainly different Ideas.

12. THERE is alſo another Charm in *Muſick* to various Perſons, which is diſtinct from the *Harmony*, and is occaſion'd by its raiſing agreeable Paſſions. The *human Voice* is obviouſly vary'd by all the ſtronger Paſſions; now when our *Ear* diſcerns any reſemblance between the *Air* of a *Tune*, whether ſung or play'd upon an Inſtrument, either in its *Time* or *Key*, or any other Circumſtance, to the ſound of the *human Voice* in any Paſſion, we ſhall be touch'd by it in a very ſenſible manner, and have *Melancholy*, *Joy*, *Gra-*

* Milt. Il Penſeroſo.

vity,

Sect. 6. *vity*, *Thoughtfulneſs* excited in us by a ſort of *Sympathy* or *Contagion*. The ſame Connection is obſervable between the very *Air* of a *Tune*, and the *Words* expreſſing any Paſſion which we have heard it fitted to, ſo that they ſhall both recur to us together, tho but one of them affects our *Senſes*. Now in ſuch a diverſity of pleaſing or diſpleaſing Ideas which may be conjoin'd with Forms of *Bodys*, or *Tunes*, when Men are of ſuch different Diſpoſitions, and prone to ſuch a variety of Paſſions, it is no wonder " that they ſhould often diſagree in " their Fancys of Objects, even altho " their *Senſe of Beauty* and *Harmony* were " *perfectly uniform*;" becauſe many other Ideas may either pleaſe or diſpleaſe, according to Perſons, Tempers, and paſt Circumſtances. We know how agreeable a very *wild Country* may be to any Perſon who has ſpent the chearful Days of his Youth in it, and how diſagreeable very *beautiful Places* may be if they were the Scenes of his Miſery. And this may help us in many Caſes to account for the Diverſitys of Fancy, without denying the *Uniformity* of our *internal Senſe of Beauty*.

13. GRANDEUR and *Novelty* are two Ideas different from *Beauty*, which often recommend Objects to us. The Reaſon of this is foreign to the preſent Subject. See *Spectator* N°. 412.

SECT.

SECT. VII.

Of the Power of Cuſtom, Education, *and* Example, *as to our* internal Senſes.

1. CUSTOM, *Education*, and *Example* are ſo often alledg'd in this Affair, as the occaſion of our Reliſh for *beautiful Objects*, and for our Approbation of, or Delight in a certain *Conduct in Life* in a *moral Senſe*, that it is neceſſary to examine theſe three particularly, to make it appear "that there is a *natural* Power "of *Perception*, or *Senſe of Beauty* in "Objects, antecedent to all *Cuſtom*, *Edu-* "*cation*, or *Example*."

2. CUSTOM, as diſtinct from the other two, operates in this manner. As to Actions, it only gives a diſpoſition to the Mind or Body more eaſily to perform thoſe Actions which have been frequently repeated, but never leads us to apprehend them under any other View than what we were capable of apprehending them under at firſt; nor gives us any new Power of Perception about them: We are naturally capable of Sentiments of *Fear*, and *Dread*, of any powerful *Preſence*; and ſo *Cuſtom* may connect the Ideas of religious

Horror

Sect. 7. *Horror* to certain Buildings: but no *Custom* could have made a *Being* naturally incapable of *Fear*, receive such Ideas. So had we no other Power of perceiving, or forming Ideas of Actions, but as they were *advantageous* or *disadvantageous*, *Custom* could only have made us more ready at perceiving the *Advantage* or *Disadvantage* of Actions. But this is not to our present Purpose.

As to our Approbation of, or Delight in external Objects, when the *Blood* or *Spirits* of which *Anatomists* talk are rous'd, quicken'd, or fermented as they call it, in any agreeable manner by Medicine or Nutriment; or any *Glands* frequently stimulated to Secretion; it is certain that to preserve the Body easy, we will delight in Objects of Taste, which of themselves are not immediately pleasant to the Taste, if they promote that agreeable State, which the Body had been *accustom'd* to. Further, *Custom* will so alter the State of the Body, that what at first rais'd uneasy Sensations will cease to do so, or perhaps raise another agreeable Idea of the same Sense; but *Custom* can never give us any Idea of a different Sense from what we had antecedent to it: It will never make the *Blind* approve Objects as *coloured*, or those who have no *Taste* approve Meats as *delicious*, however they might like such as proved *strength-*

Strengthning or *Exhilarating*: Were our *Glands* and the Parts about them void of Feeling, did we perceive no Pleasure from certain brisker Motions in the *Blood*, no *Custom* would make stimulating or intoxicating Fluids or Medicines agreeable, when they were not so to the Taste: So by like Reasoning, had we no *natural Sense* of *Beauty* from *Uniformity*, *Custom* could never have made us imagine any *Beauty* in Objects; if we had had no *Ear*, *Custom* could never have given us the Pleasures of *Harmony*. When we have these *natural Senses* antecedently, *Custom* may make us capable of extending our Views further, and of receiving more complex Ideas of *Beauty* in Bodys, or *Harmony* in Sounds, by increasing our Attention and quickness of Perception. But however *Custom* may increase our Power of receiving or comparing complex Ideas, yet it seems rather to weaken than strengthen the Ideas of *Beauty*, or the Impressions of Pleasure from regular Objects; else how were it possible that any Person could go into the open Air on a sunny Day, or clear Evening, without the most extravagant Raptures, such as MILTON * represents our *Ancestor* in upon his first Creation? For such any Person would certainly fall into, upon the first Representation of such a Scene. Sect. 7.

* See *Paradise Lost*, Book 8.

Sect. 7.

CUSTOM in like manner could make it easier for any Person to discern the Use of a complex Machine, and approve it as advantageous; but he would never have imagin'd it *Beautiful*, had he no *natural Sense* of *Beauty*. *Custom* may make us quicker in apprehending the Truth of complex *Theorems*, but we all find the Pleasure or *Beauty* of *Theorems* as strong at first as ever: *Custom* makes us more capable of retaining and comparing complex Ideas, so as to discern more complicated *Uniformity*, which escapes the Observation of *Novices* in any Art; but all this presupposes a *natural Sense* of *Beauty* in *Uniformity*: for had there been nothing in Forms which was constituted necessarily the occasion of Pleasure to our Senses, no Repetition of indifferent Ideas as to Pleasure or Pain, *Beauty* or *Deformity*, could ever have made them grow pleasing or displeasing.

3. THE Effect of EDUCATION is this, that thereby we receive many speculative Opinions, sometimes true and sometimes false; and are often led to believe that Objects may be naturally apt to give Pleasure or Pain to our external Senses, when in reality the Object has no such Qualitys: And further, by *Education* there are some strong Associations of Ideas, without any Reason, by mere Accident sometimes, as well as by

by Design, which it is very hard for us ever after to break asunder. Thus Aversions are rais'd to Darkness, and to many kinds of Meats, and to certain innocent Actions: Approbations without Ground are rais'd in like manner. But in all these Instances, *Education* never makes us apprehend any Qualitys in Objects, which we have not naturally Senses capable of perceiving. We know what Sickness of the Stomach is, and may without Ground believe that very healthful Meats will raise this; we by our Sight and Smell receive disagreeable Ideas of the Food of Swine, and their Styes, and perhaps cannot prevent the recurring of these Ideas at Table: but never were Men naturally *Blind* prejudic'd against Objects as of a disagreeable Colour, or in favour of others as of a beautiful Colour; they hear perhaps Men dispraise one Colour, they imagine this Colour to be some quite different sensible Quality of the other Senses: And the same way a Man naturally void of *Taste* could by no *Education* receive the Ideas of Taste, or be prejudic'd in favour of Meats as delicious: so, had we no *natural Sense* of *Beauty* and *Harmony*, we never could be prejudic'd in favour of Objects or Sounds as *Beautiful* or *Harmonious*. *Education* may make an unattentive GOTH imagine that his *Countrymen* have attain'd the Perfection of *Architecture*; and an Aversion Sect. 7.

Sect. 7. to their Enemys the ROMANS, may have join'd ſome diſagreeable Ideas to their very Buildings, and excited them to their Demolition; but he had never form'd theſe Prejudices, had he been void of a *Senſe* of *Beauty*. Did ever *blind Men* debate whether *Purple* or *Scarlet* were the finer *Colour*? or could any *Education* prejudice them in favour of either as *Colours*?

THUS *Education* and *Cuſtom* may influence our *internal Senſes*, where they are antecedently, by enlarging the Capacity of our Minds to retain and compare the Parts of complex Compoſitions: And if the fineſt Objects are preſented to us, we grow conſcious of a Pleaſure far ſuperior to what common Performances excite. But all this preſuppoſes our *Senſe* of *Beauty* to be *natural*. Inſtruction in *Anatomy*, Obſervation of *Nature*, and of thoſe *Airs* of the Countenance and *Attitudes* of Body, which accompany any *Sentiment*, *Action* or *Paſſion*, may enable us to know where there is a juſt Imitation; but why ſhould an exact Imitation pleaſe upon Obſervation, if we had not *naturally* a *Senſe* of *Beauty* in it, more than the obſerving the Situation of fifty or a hundred Pebbles thrown at random? and ſhould we repeat our Attention to them ever ſo often, we ſhall never dream of their growing *Beautiful*.

4. THERE

Sect. 7.

4. THERE is ſomething worth our Obſervation as to the manner of rooting out the *Prejudices* of *Education*, not quite foreign to the preſent purpoſe. When the *Prejudice* ariſes from Aſſociations of Ideas without any natural Connection, we muſt frequently force our ſelves to bear Repreſentations of thoſe Objects, or the Uſe of them when ſeparated from the diſagreeable Idea; and this may at laſt disjoin the unreaſonable Aſſociation, eſpecially if we can join new agreeable Ideas to them: Thus Opinions of *Superſtition* are beſt remov'd by pleaſant Converſation of Perſons we eſteem for their *Virtue*, or ſeeing them deſpiſe ſuch Opinions. But when the *Prejudice* ariſes from an Apprehenſion or Opinion of *natural Evil*, as the Attendant, or Conſequent of any Object or Action; if the *Evil* be apprehended to be the conſtant and immediate Attendant, a few Trials without receiving any Damage will remove the *Prejudice*, as in that againſt *Meats*: But where the *Evil* is not repreſented as the perpetual Concomitant, but as what may poſſibly or probably at ſome time or other accompany the uſe of the Object, there muſt be frequent Reaſoning with our ſelves, or a long Series of Trials without any Detriment, to remove the *Prejudice*; ſuch is the Caſe of our Fear of *Spirits* in the *dark*, and in *Church-yards*. And when

Sect. 7. the *Evil* is represented as the Consequence perhaps a long time after, or in a *future State*, it is then hardest of all to remove the *Prejudice*; and this is only to be effected by slow Processes of Reason, because in this Case there can be no Trials made: and this is the Case of *superstitious Prejudices* against Actions apprehended as offensive to the DEITY; and hence it is that they are so hard to be rooted out.

5. EXAMPLE seems to operate in this manner. We are conscious that we act very much for *Pleasure*, or *private Good*; and hence are led to imagine that others do so too: hence we conclude there must be some *Perfection* in the Objects which we see others pursue, and *Evil* in those which we observe them constantly shunning. Or, the *Example* of others may serve to us as so many Trials to remove the Apprehension of *Evil* in Objects which we had an Aversion to. But all this is done upon an Apprehension of Qualitys perceivable by the Senses which we have; for no *Example* will induce the *Blind* or *Deaf* to pursue Objects as *Colour'd* or *Sonorous*; nor could *Example* any more engage us to pursue Objects as *Beautiful* or *Harmonious*, had we no *Sense* of *Beauty* or *Harmony* naturally.

EXAM-

Sect. 7.

EXAMPLE may make us without Examination conclude, that our Countrymen have obtain'd the Perfection of *Beauty* in their *Works*, or that there is less *Beauty* in the Orders of *Architecture* or *Painting* us'd in other *Nations*, and so content our selves with very imperfect Forms. And often Fear of Contempt as void of *Taste* or *Genius*, makes us join in approving the Performances of the reputed Masters in our Country, and restrains those who have naturally a fine *Genius*, or the *internal Senses* very acute, from studying to obtain the greatest Perfection: it makes also those of a bad *Taste* pretend a Perception of Ideas of *Beauty* when they do not perceive them: But all this presupposes some *natural Power* of receiving Ideas of *Beauty* and *Harmony*. Nor can *Example* effect any thing further, unless it be to lead Men to pursue Objects by implicit Faith, for some Perfection which the Pursuer is conscious he does not know, or which perhaps is some very different Quality from the Idea perceiv'd by those of a good *Taste* in such Affairs.

SECT. VIII.

Of the Importance of the internal Senſes *in Life, and the* final Cauſes *of them.*

1. THE buſy part of Mankind may look upon theſe things as airy Dreams of an inflam'd Imagination, which a wiſe Man ſhould deſpiſe, who rationally purſues more ſolid Poſſeſſions independent on Fancy: but a little Reflection will convince us, "That the Gratifications of our "*internal Senſes* are as natural, real, and "ſatisfying Enjoyments as any ſenſible "Pleaſure whatſoever;" and "that they "are the chief Ends for which we com-"monly purſue *Wealth* and *Power*." For how is *Wealth* or *Power advantageous*? How do they make us *happy*, or prove *good* to us? No otherwiſe than as they ſupply Gratifications to our *Senſes* or Faculty's of perceiving Pleaſure. Now, are theſe *Senſes* or Faculty's only the *External ones*? No: Every Body ſees, that a ſmall portion of *Wealth* or *Power* will ſupply more Pleaſures of the *external Senſes* than we can enjoy; we know that Scarcity often heightens theſe Perceptions more than Abundance, which cloys that Appetite which is neceſſary to all Pleaſure in Enjoyment: and

and hence the *Poet*'s Advice is perfectly just; Sect. 8.

——*Tu pulmentaria quære*
Sudando, ——— *

In short, the only use of a great Fortune, above a very small one (except in *good Offices* and *moral Pleasures*) must be to supply us with the Pleasures of *Beauty*, *Order*, and *Harmony*.

THIS is confirm'd by the constant Practice of the very Enemys to these *Senses*: As soon as they think they are got above the *World*, or extricated from the Hurrys of *Avarice* and *Ambition*, banish'd *Nature* will return upon them, and set them upon Pursuits of *Beauty* and *Order* in their *Houses*, *Gardens*, *Dress*, *Table*, *Equipage*; they are never easy without some degree of this: and were their Hearts open to our View, we should see *Regularity*, *Decency*, *Beauty*, as what their Wishes terminate upon, either to themselves or their Posterity, and what their Imagination is always presenting to them as the possible Effect of their Labours; nor without this could they ever justify their Pursuits to themselves.

THERE may perhaps be some Instances of human Nature perverted into a thorow

* Hor. Lib. 2 Sat. 2. v. 20.

Miser,

Sect. 8. *Miser*, who loves nothing but Money, and whose Fancy arises no higher than the cold dull Thought of Possession. But such an Instance in an Age must not be made the Standard of Mankind against the whole Body.

IF we examine the Pursuits of the *Luxurious*, who in the opinion of the World is wholly devoted to his Belly; we shall generally find that the far greater part of his Expence is employ'd to procure other Sensations than those of Taste; such as *fine Attendants*, *regular Apartments*, *Services of Plate*, and the like. Beside, a large share of the Preparation must be suppos'd design'd for some sort of generous friendly Purposes, as to please *Acquaintance*, *Strangers*, *Parasites*: How few would be contented to enjoy the same Sensations alone, in a Cottage, or out of earthen Pitchers? To conclude this Point, however these *internal Sensations* may be overlook'd in our Philosophical Inquirys about the human Facultys, we shall find in Fact, "That "they employ us more, and are more effi- "cacious in *Life*, either to our *Pleasure*, "or *Uneasiness*, than all our *external* "*Senses* taken together."

2. As to the *final Causes* of this *internal Sense*, we need not enquire, "whether to "an *almighty* and *all-knowing Being* there "be

" be any real Excellence in *regular Forms*, Sect. 8.
" in acting by *general Laws*, in knowing
" by *Theorems*." We seem scarce capable of answering such Questions any way; nor need we enquire, " whether other A-
" nimals may not discern *Uniformity* and
" *Regularity* in Objects which escape our
" Observation, and may not perhaps have
" their Senses constituted so as to perceive
" *Beauty*, from the same Foundation which
" we do, in Objects which our Senses are
" not fitted to examine or compare." We shall confine our selves to a Subject where we have some certain Foundations to go upon, and only enquire " if we can find
" any Reasons worthy of the Great Au-
" THOR of *Nature* for making such a Con-
" nection between regular Objects, and
" the Pleasure which accompanys our Per-
" ceptions of them;" or, " what Reasons
" might possibly influence him to create
" the *World* as it at present is, as far as
" we can observe, every where full of
" *Regularity* and *Uniformity*." Let it be here observ'd, that as far as we know of any of the great Bodys of the *Universe*, we see Forms and Motions really *Beautiful* to our Senses; and if we were plac'd in any *Planet*, the *apparent Courses* would still be *Regular* and *Uniform*, and consequently *Beautiful* to our Sense. Now this gives us no small Ground to imagine, that if the Senses of their Inhabitants are in the

same

Sect. 8. same manner adapted to their Habitations and the Objects occurring to their View, as ours are here, their Senses must be upon the same general Foundation with ours.

But to return to the Questions: What occurs to resolve them, may be contain'd in the following Propositions.

1. The Manner of Knowledge by *universal Theorems*, and of Operation by *universal Causes*, as far as we can attain to this Manner, must be most convenient for *Beings* of limited Understanding and Power, since this prevents Distraction in their Understandings thro the Multiplicity of Propositions, and Toil and Wearinesss to their Powers of Action: and consequently their *Reason*, without any *Sense* of *Beauty*, must approve of such Methods when they reflect upon their apparent *Advantage*.

2. Those Objects of Contemplation in which there is *Uniformity amidst Variety*, are more distinctly and easily comprehended and retain'd, than *irregular Objects*; because the accurate Observation of one or two Parts often leads to the Knowledge of the Whole: Thus we can from a *Pillar* or two with an intermediate *Arch*, and *Cornice*, form a distinct Idea of a whole *regular Building*, if we know of what

what Species it is, and have its Length and Breadth: From a *Side* and *ſolid Angle* we have the whole *regular Solid*; the meaſuring one *Side* gives the whole *Square*; one *Radius* the whole *Circle* pretty nearly; two *Diameters* an *Oval*; one *Ordinate* and *Abſciſſa* the *Parabola*; and ſo on in more complex Figures which have any *Regularity*, which can be entirely determin'd and known in every Part from a few *Data*: Whereas it muſt be a long Attention to a vaſt Multiplicity of Parts, which can aſcertain or fix the Idea of any *irregular Form*, or give any diſtinct Idea of it, or make us capable of retaining it; as appears in the Forms of *rude Rocks*, and *Pebbles*, and *confus'd Heaps*, even when the Multitude of ſenſible Parts is not ſo great as in the *regular Forms*: for ſuch *irregular Objects* diſtract the *Mind* with *Variety*, ſince for every ſenſible Part we muſt have a quite different Idea. Sect. 8.

3. FROM the laſt two Propoſitions it follows, "That *Beings* of limited Underſtanding and Power, if they act rationally for their own *Intereſt*, muſt chuſe "to operate by the *ſimpleſt Means*, to invent *general Theorems*, and to ſtudy "*regular Objects* if they be but equal in "Uſe with *irregular ones*, that they may "avoid the endleſs Toil of producing each "Effect by a ſeparate Operation, of ſearching

"ing

Sect. 8. " ing each different Truth by a different
" Inquiry, and of imprinting the endless
" *Variety* of dissimilar Ideas in *irregular*
" *Objects.*"

4. But then, beside this Consideration of *Interest*, there does not appear to be any necessary Connection, antecedently to the Constitution of the Author of *Nature*, between the *regular Forms*, *Actions*, *Theorems*, and that sudden sensible *Pleasure* excited in us upon observation of them, even when we do not reflect upon the Advantage mention'd in the former Proposition. And possibly the Deity could have formed us so as to have receiv'd no Pleasure from such Objects, or connected Pleasure to those of a quite contrary Nature. We have a tolerable Presumption of this in the *Beautys* of various Animals; they give some small Pleasure indeed to every one who views them, but then every one in its own Species seems vastly more delighted with their peculiar *Beautys*, than with the *Beautys* of a different Species, which seldom raise any desire but among Animals of the same Species with the one admir'd: This makes it probable, that the *Pleasure* is not the necessary Result of the *Form* it self, otherwise it would equally affect all Apprehensions in what Species soever. This present Constitution is much more adapted to preserve the *Regularity* of the *Universe*, and

is

is probably not the Effect of *Neceſſity* but *Choice* in the SUPREME AGENT who conſtituted our *Senſes*. Sect. 8.

5. Now from the whole we may conclude, "That ſuppoſing the DEITY ſo "kind as to connect *ſenſible Pleaſure* "with certain Actions or Contemplations, "beſide the *rational Advantage* perceiv-"able in them, there is a great *moral* "*Neceſſity*, from his *Goodneſs*, that the "*internal Senſe* of Men ſhould be con-"ſtituted as it is at preſent, ſo as to make "*Uniformity amidſt Variety* the Occaſion "of Pleaſure." For were it not ſo, but on the contrary, if *irregular Objects*, *particular Truths*, and *Operations* pleaſed us, beſide the endleſs Toil this would involve us in, there muſt ariſe a perpetual Diſſatisfaction in all rational Agents with themſelves; ſince *Reaſon* and *Intereſt* would lead us to ſimple *general Cauſes*, while a *contrary Senſe* of *Beauty* would make us diſapprove them: *Univerſal Theorems* would appear to our Underſtanding the beſt Means of increaſing our Knowledge of what might be uſeful; while a *contrary Senſe* would ſet us on the ſearch after *ſingular Truths*: *Thought* and *Reflection* would recommend Objects with *Uniformity amidſt Variety*, and yet this *perverſe Inſtinct* would involve us in Labyrinths of *Confuſion* and *Diſſimilitude*. And hence

we

Sect. 8. we see " how suitable it is to the *sagacious* " *Bounty* which we suppose in the DEITY, " to constitute our *internal Senses* in the " manner in which they are, by which " Pleasure is join'd to the Contemplation " of *those Objects*, which a finite *Mind* " can best imprint and retain the Ideas of " with the least Distraction; to *those Ac-* " *tions* which are most efficacious, and " fruitful in useful Effects; and to *those The-* " *orems* which most enlarge our *Minds*."

As to the other Question, " What Rea- " son might influence the DEITY, whom " no Diversitys of Operation could distract " or weary, to chuse to operate by *sim-* " *plest Means* and *general Laws*, and to " diffuse *Uniformity*, *Proportion* and " *Similitude* thro all the Parts of *Nature* " which we can observe;" perhaps there may be some real Excellence in this Manner of Operation, and in these Forms, which we know not: but this we may probably say, that since the *divine Goodness*, for the Reasons above mention'd, has constituted our *Sense* of *Beauty* as it is at present, the same *Goodness* might determine the *Great* ARCHITECT to adorn this *vast Theatre* in that manner which should be agreeable to the Spectators, and that part which is expos'd to the Observation of Men, so as to be pleasant to them; especially if we suppose that he design'd to discover

discover himself to them as *Wise* and *Good*, as well as *Powerful*; for thus he has given them greater Evidences, thro the whole *Earth*, of his *Art*, *Wisdom*, *Design*, and *Bounty*, than they can possibly have for the *Reason*, and *Counsel*, and *Good-will* of their fellow-Creatures, with whom they converse with full Persuasion of this in their common Affairs. Sect. 8.

As to the Operations of the DEITY by *general Laws*, there is a further Reason from a *Sense* still superior to these already consider'd, even that of VIRTUE, or the *Beauty* of *Action*, which is the Foundation of our greatest Happiness: For were there no *general Laws* fix'd in the Course of *Nature*, there could be no *Prudence* or *Design* in Men, no *rational Expectation* of Effects from Causes, no *Schemes* of Action projected, nor any *regular Execution*. If then according to the *Frame* of our *Nature*, our greatest Happiness must depend upon our Actions, as it may perhaps be made appear it does, "The *Universe* must "be governed, not by *particular Wills*, "but by *general Laws*, upon which we "can found our Expectations, and project "our Schemes of Action."

TREATISE II.

VIZ.

AN INQUIRY

Concerning the

ORIGINAL of our IDEAS

OF

Virtue or *Moral Good.*

——————Quod magis ad nos
Pertinet, & nescire malum est, agitamus : utrumne
Divitiis homines, an sint Virtute beati :
Quidve ad Amicitias, Usus, Rectumne, trahat nos
Et quæ sit natura Boni, summumque quid ejus.
Hor. Sat. 6. Lib. 2. v. 72.

AN INQUIRY

INTO THE ORIGIN AND TENDENCY OF PRINCIPAL DISCIPLINES

AN INQUIRY CONCERNING MORAL GOOD and EVIL.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Word MORAL GOODNESS, denotes our Idea of *some Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation, and Love toward the Actor, from those who receive no Advantage by the Action.* MORAL EVIL denotes our Idea of *a contrary Quality, which excites Aversion, and Dislike toward the Actor, even from Persons unconcern'd in its natural Tendency.* We must be contented with these imperfect Descriptions, until we discover some general Foundation of this Difference of Actions, as *morally Good* or *Evil.*

THESE Deſcriptions ſeem to contain an univerſally acknowledg'd Difference of *moral Good* and *Evil*, from *Natural*. All Men who ſpeak of *moral Good* acknowledge that it procures Love toward thoſe we apprehend poſſeſs'd of it; whereas *natural Good* does not. In this matter Men muſt conſult their own Breaſts. How differently are they affected toward thoſe they ſuppoſe poſſeſs'd of *Honeſty*, *Faith*, *Generoſity*, *Kindneſs*, even when they expect no Benefit from theſe admir'd Qualitys; and thoſe who are poſſeſs'd of the *natural Goods*, ſuch as *Houſes*, *Lands*, *Gardens*, *Vineyards*, *Health*, *Strength*, *Sagacity*? We ſhall find that we neceſſarily love and approve the Poſſeſſors of the former; but the Poſſeſſion of the latter procures no Love at all toward the Poſſeſſor, but often contrary Affections of *Envy* and *Hatred*. In the ſame manner, whatever Quality we apprehend to be *morally Evil*, raiſes our Hatred toward the Perſon in whom we obſerve it, ſuch as *Treachery*, *Cruelty*, *Ingratitude*, even when they are no way hurtful to our ſelves; whereas we heartily love, eſteem, and pity many who are expos'd to *natural Evils*, ſuch as *Pain*, *Poverty*, *Hunger*, *Sickneſs*, *Death*.

Now

NOW the first Question on this Subject is, "Whence arise these different Ideas of "Actions."

BECAUSE we shall afterwards frequently use the Words *Interest*, *Advantage*, *natural Good*, it is necessary here to fix their Ideas. The Pleasure in our sensible Perceptions of any kind, gives us our first Idea of *natural Good*, or *Happiness*; and then all Objects which are apt to excite this Pleasure are call'd *immediately Good*. Those Objects which may procure others immediately pleasant, are call'd *Advantageous*: and we pursue both Kinds from a View of *Interest*, or from *Self-Love*.

OUR *Sense* of Pleasure is antecedent to *Advantage* and *Interest*, and is the Foundation of them. We do not perceive Pleasure in Objects, because it is our *Interest* to do so; but Objects or Actions are *Advantageous*, and are pursu'd or undertaken from *Interest*, because we receive Pleasure from them. Our Perception of Pleasure is necessary, and nothing is *Advantageous* or *naturally Good* to us, but what is apt to raise Pleasure *mediately*, or *immediately*; and such Objects as we know either from Experience of Sense, or Reason, to be *immediately*, or *mediately Advantageous*, or apt to minister Pleasure, we pursue

from *Self-Interest*, when our Intention is only to enjoy this Pleasure, which they have the Power of exciting. Thus *Meats*, *Drink*, *Harmony*, *fine Prospects*, *Painting*, *Statues*, are perceiv'd by our Senses to be *immediately Good*; and our Reason shews *Riches* and *Power* to be *mediately so*, that is, apt to furnish us with Objects of immediate Pleasure: and both Kinds of these *natural Goods* are pursu'd from *Interest*, or *Self-Love*.

Now the greatest part of our later *Moralists* establish it as undeniable, "That all "*moral Qualitys* have necessarily some "Relation to the *Law* of a *Superior*, "of sufficient Power to make us *Happy*, "or *Miserable*;" and since all *Laws* operate only by Sanctions of *Rewards*, or *Punishments*, which determine us to Obedience by Motives of *Self-Interest*, they suppose, "that it is thus that *Laws* do con-"stitute some Actions *mediately Good*, "or *Advantageous*, and others the same "way *Disadvantageous*." They say indeed, "That a *benevolent Legislator* con-"stitutes no Actions *Advantageous* to the "Agent by Law, but such as in their own "Nature tend to the *natural Good* of the "*Whole*, or, at least, are not inconsistent "with it; and that therefore we approve "the *Virtue* of others, because it has some "small Tendency to our *Happiness*, either "from

" from its own Nature, or from this general Conſideration, That Obedience to " a *benevolent Legiſlator*, is in general " *Advantageous* to the *Whole*, and to us " in particular; and that for the contrary " Reaſons alone, we diſapprove the *Vice* " of others, that is, the prohibited Action, " as tending to our particular *Detriment* in " ſome degree." But then they maintain, " That we are determin'd to Obedience to " *Laws*, or deterr'd from Diſobedience, " merely by Motives of *Self-Intereſt*, to " obtain either the *natural Good* ariſing " from the commanded Action, or the " *Rewards* promiſed by the Sanction; or " to avoid the *natural evil* Conſequences " of Diſobedience, or at leaſt the *Penal-* " *tys* of the *Law*."

SOME other Moraliſts ſuppoſe " an *im-* " *mediate natural Good* in the Actions " call'd *Virtuous*; that is, " That we are " determin'd to perceive ſome *Beauty* in " the Actions of others, and to love the " Agent, even without reflecting upon any " *Advantage* which can any way redound " to us from the Action; that we have " alſo a ſecret Senſe of Pleaſure accom- " panying ſuch of our own Actions as we " call *Virtuous*, even when we expect no " other *Advantage* from them." But they alledge at the ſame time, " That we are " excited to perform theſe Actions, even

" as

" as we purſue, or purchaſe *Pictures*, *Sta-*
" *tues*. *Landskips*, from *Self-Intereſt*,
" to obtain this Pleaſure which accompa-
" nys the very Action, and which we
" neceſſarily enjoy in doing it." The De-
ſign of the following Sections is to enquire into this matter; and perhaps the Reaſons to be offer'd may prove,

" I. THAT ſome Actions have to Men
" an *immediate Goodneſs*;" or " that by
" a *ſuperior Senſe*, which I call a *Moral*
" *one*, we perceive Pleaſure in the Con-
" templation of ſuch Actions in others,
" and are determin'd to love the Agent,
" (and much more do we perceive Plea-
" ſure in being conſcious of having done
" ſuch Actions our ſelves) without any
" View of further *natural Advantage*
" from them."

II. IT may perhaps alſo appear, " That
" what excites us to theſe Actions which
" we call *Virtuous*, is not an Intention
" to obtain even this *ſenſible Pleaſure*;
" much leſs the *future Rewards* from
" Sanctions of Laws, or any other *natu-*
" *ral Good*, which may be the Conſequence
" of the *virtuous* Action; but an entirely
" different Principle of Action from *Inte-*
" *reſt* or *Self-Love*."

SECT.

SECT. I.

Of the Moral Senſe *by which we perceive* Virtue *and* Vice, *and approve or diſapprove them in others.*

I. THAT the Perceptions of *moral Good* and *Evil*, are perfectly different from thoſe of *natural Good*, or *Advantage*, every one muſt convince himſelf, by reflecting upon the different Manner in which he finds himſelf affected when theſe Objects occur to him. Had we no *Senſe* of *Good* diſtinct from the *Advantage* or *Intereſt* ariſing from the external Senſes, and the Perceptions of *Beauty* and *Harmony*; our Admiration and Love toward a *fruitful Field* or *commodious Habitation*, would be much the ſame with what we have toward a *generous Friend*, or any *noble Character*; for both are, or may be *advantageous* to us: And we ſhould no more admire any Action, or love any Perſon in a diſtant *Country*, or *Age*, whoſe Influence could not extend to us, than we love the *Mountains* of PERU, while we are unconcern'd in the *Spaniſh Trade*. We ſhould have the ſame Sentiments and Affections toward *inanimate Beings*, which we have toward *rational Agents*; which yet every one

Sect. 1. one knows to be false. Upon Comparison, we say, "Why should we admire or love "with Esteem *inanimate Beings?* They "have no Intention of *Good* to us; their "*Nature* makes them fit for our Uses, "which they neither know nor study to "serve. But it is not so with *rational* "*Agents:* they study our *Interest*, and "delight in our *Happiness*, and are *Bene-* "*volent* toward us." We are all then conscious of the Difference between that Esteem, or Perception of *moral Excellence*, which *Benevolence* excites toward the Person in whom we observe it, and that Opinion of *natural Goodness*, which only raises Desire of Possession toward the good Object. Now "what should make this "Difference, if all Approbation, or *Sense* "of *Good* be from Prospect of *Advan-* "*tage*? Do not *inanimate Objects* pro- "mote our *Advantage*, as well as *Benevo-* "*lent Persons* who do Offices of *Kind-* "*ness*, and *Friendship*? Should we not "then have the same endearing Sentiments "of both? or only the same cold Opi- "nion of *Advantage* in both?" The Reason why it is not so, must be this, "That we have a distinct Perception of "*Beauty*, or *Excellence* in the kind Af- "fections of *rational Agents*; whence we "are determin'd to admire and love such "*Characters* and *Persons*."

SUP-

SUPPOSE we reap the same *Advantage* from two Men, one of which serves us from *Delight* in our Happiness, and *Love* toward us; the other from Views of *Self-Interest*, or by *Constraint*: both are in this Case equally beneficial or *advantageous* to us, and yet we shall have quite different Sentiments of them. We must then certainly have other Perceptions of *moral Actions* than those of *Advantage*: And that Power of receiving these Perceptions may be call'd a MORAL SENSE, since the Definition agrees to it, *viz.* a *Determination of the Mind, to receive any Idea from the Presence of an Object, which occurs to us, independently on our Will.*

THIS perhaps will be equally evident from our Ideas of *Evil* done to us designedly by a *rational Agent*. Our Senses of *natural Good* and *Evil* would make us receive with equal Serenity and Composure, an *Assault*, a *Buffet*, an *Affront* from a *Neighbour*, a *Cheat* from a *Partner*, or *Trustee*, as we would an equal Damage from the Fall of a *Beam*, or *Tile*, or a *Tempest*; and we should have the same Affections and Sentiments of both. *Villany*, *Treachery*, *Cruelty*, would be as meekly resented as a *Blast*, or *Mildew*, or an *overflowing Stream*. But I fancy every one is very differently affected on these Occasions, tho there

Sect. 1. there may be equal *natural Evil* in both. Nay, Actions no way detrimental may occasion the strongest Anger, and Indignation, if they evidence only impotent Hatred, or Contempt. And, on the other hand, the Intervention of *moral Ideas* may prevent our Hatred of the Agent, or bad moral Apprehension of that Action, which causes to us the greatest *natural Evil*. Thus the Opinion of *Justice* in any Sentence, will prevent all Ideas of *moral Evil* in the Execution, or Hatred toward the *Magistrate*, who is the immediate Cause of our greatest Sufferings.

II. In our Sentiments of Actions done toward our selves, there is indeed a Mixture of the Ideas of *natural Good*, which requires some Attention to separate. But when we reflect upon the Actions which do not affect our selves, but other Persons, we may observe the moral *Ideas* unmix'd with those of *natural Good*, or *Evil*. For let it be here observ'd, that *those Senses* by which we perceive Pleasure in natural Objects, whence they are constituted *Advantageous*, could never raise in us any Desire of *publick Good*, but only of what was good to our selves in particular. Nor could they ever make us pleas'd with any Action because of its promoting the Happiness of others. And yet as soon as any Action is represented to us as flowing from

Love,

Love, *Humanity*, *Gratitude*, *Compaſſion*, a *Study* of the good of others, and a *Delight* in their Happineſs, altho it were in the moſt diſtant Part of the World, or in ſome paſt Age, we feel Joy within us, admire the lovely Action, and praiſe its Author. And on the contrary, every Action repreſented as flowing from *Hatred*, *Delight* in the Miſery of others, or *Ingratitude*, raiſes Abhorrence and Averſion. Sect. 1.

IT is true indeed, that the Actions we approve in others, are generally imagin'd to tend to the *natural Good* of *Mankind*, or that of ſome *Parts* of it. But whence this *ſecret Chain* between *each Perſon* and *Mankind?* How is my *Intereſt* connected with the moſt diſtant *Parts* of it? And yet I muſt admire beneficent Actions toward them, and love the Author. Whence this *Love*, *Compaſſion*, *Indignation* and *Hatred* toward even *feign'd Characters*, in the moſt diſtant Ages, and Nations, according as they appear *Kind*, *Faithful*, *Compaſſionate*, or of the *oppoſite Diſpoſitions*, toward their imaginary Contemporaries? If there is no *moral Senſe*, which makes rational Actions appear *Beautiful*, or *Deformed*; if all Approbation be from the *Intereſt* of the Approver,

* *What's*

Sect. 1.

* *What's* HECUBA *to us, or we to* HECUBA?

III. SOME refin'd Explainers of *Self-Love* may tell us, "That we hate, or love "*Characters*, according as we apprehend "we ſhould have been ſupported, or in-"jur'd by them, had we liv'd in their "Days." But how obvious is the Anſwer, if we only obſerve, that had we no Senſe of *moral Good* in *Humanity*, *Mercy*, *Faithfulneſs*, why ſhould not *Self-Love* engage us always to the victorious Side, and make us admire and love the ſucceſsful *Tyrant*, or *Traitor*? Why do not we love SINON, or PYRRHUS, in the *Æneid*? for had we been GREEKS, theſe two would have been very *advantageous Characters*. Why are we affected with the Fortunes of PRIAMUS, POLITES, CHOROEBUS or ÆNEAS? It is plain we have ſome *ſecret Senſe* which determines our Approbation without regard to *Self-Intereſt*; otherwiſe we ſhould always favour the fortunate Side without regard to *Virtue*.

SUPPOSE any great Deſtruction occaſion'd by mere *Accident*, without any Deſign, or Negligence of the Perſon who caſually was the Author of it: This Action

* *Tragedy of* Hamlet.

might

might have been as *disadvantageous* to us as design'd *Cruelty*, or *Malice*; but who will say he has the same Idea of both Actions, or Sentiments of the Agents? "Whence then this Difference?" Sect. 1.

AND further, Let us make a Supposition, which perhaps is not far from Matter of Fact, to try if we cannot approve even *disadvantageous Actions*, and perceive *moral Good* in them. A few ingenious *Artisans*, persecuted in their own Country, flee to ours for Protection; they instruct us in *Manufactures* which support Millions of Poor, and increase the Wealth of almost every Person in the *State*, and make us formidable to our *Neighbours*. In a *Nation* not far distant from us, some resolute *Burgomasters*, full of Love to their *Country*, and Compassion toward their *Fellow-Citizens*, oppress'd in Body and Soul by a *Tyrant*, and *Inquisition*, with *indefatigable Diligence*, *public Spirit*, and *Courage*, support a tedious perilous War against the *Tyrant*, and form an *industrious Republick*, which rivals us in *Trade*, and almost in *Power*. All the World sees whether the *former* or the *latter* have been more *advantageous* to us: and yet let every Man consult his own Breast, which of the two Characters he has the most agreeable Idea of; whether of the *useful Refugee*, or the *public-spirited Burgomaster*, by whose

Sect. 1. Love to his own *Country*, we have often ſuffer'd in our *Intereſts*; and I am confident he will find ſome other Foundation of Eſteem than *Advantage*, and will ſee a juſt Reaſon, why the Memory of our *Artizans* is ſo obſcure among us, and yet that of our *Rivals* is immortal.

IV. SOME *Moraliſts*, who will rather twiſt *Self-Love* into a thouſand Shapes, than allow any other Principle of Approbation than *Intereſt*, may tell us, "That whatever profits one Part without "detriment to another, profits *the Whole*, "and then ſome ſmall Share will redound "to *each Individual*; that thoſe Actions "which tend to the *Good* of *the Whole*, if "univerſally perform'd, would moſt effectually ſecure to *each Individual* his "own Happineſs; and that conſequently "we may approve ſuch Actions, from the "Opinion of their tending ultimately to "our own *Advantage*." We need not trouble theſe *Gentlemen* to ſhew by their nice Train of Conſequences, and Influences of Actions by way of Precedent, in particular Inſtances, that we in this Age reap any *Advantage* from ORESTES's killing the *treacherous* ÆGYSTHUS, or from the Actions of CODRUS or DECIUS. Allow their Reaſonings to be perfectly good, they only prove that after long Reflection, and Reaſoning, we may find out ſome ground,

even

even from Views of *Intereſt*, to approve the ſame Actions which every Man admires as ſoon as he hears of them, and that too under a quite different Conception. Should any of our Travellers find ſome old *Grecian Treaſure*, the *Miſer* who hid it, did certainly perform an Action more to the Traveller's *Advantage* than CODRUS, or ORESTES; for he muſt have but a ſmall Share of Benefit from their Actions, whoſe Influence is ſo diſpers'd, and loſt in various Ages, and Nations: Surely then this *Miſer* muſt appear to the Traveller a prodigious Hero in *Virtue!* For *Self-Intereſt* will make us only eſteem Men according to the *Good* they do to *our Selves*, and not give us high Ideas of *public Good*, but in proportion to our Share of it. But muſt a Man have the Reflection of CUMBERLAND, or PUFFENDORF, to admire *Generoſity*, *Faith*, *Humanity*, *Gratitude?* Or reaſon ſo nicely to apprehend the *Evil* in *Cruelty*, *Treachery*, *Ingratitude?* Do not the *former* excite our *Admiration*, and *Love*, and *Study* of Imitation, wherever we ſee them, almoſt at firſt View, without any ſuch Reflection; and the *latter* our *Hatred*, *Contempt*, and *Abhorrence?* Unhappy would it be for *Mankind*, if a *Senſe of Virtue* was of as narrow an Extent, as a Capacity for ſuch *Metaphyſicks*.

Sect. 1.

Sect. 1.

V. THIS *moral Senſe*, either of our *own* Actions, or of thoſe of *others*, has this in common with our other Senſes, That however our Deſire of *Virtue* may be counterballanc'd by *Intereſt*, our Sentiment or Perception of its *Beauty* cannot; as it certainly might be, if the only Ground of our Approbation were Views of *Advantage*. Let us conſider this both as to our *own* Actions and thoſe of *others*.

A COVETOUS *Man* ſhall diſlike any Branch of Trade, how uſeful ſoever it may be to the Publick, if there is no Gain for himſelf in it; here is an Averſion from *Intereſt*. Propoſe a ſufficient Premium, and he ſhall be the firſt who ſets about it, with full Satisfaction in his own Conduct. Now is it the ſame way with our *Senſe* of *moral Actions*? Should any one adviſe us to wrong a *Minor*, or *Orphan*, or to do an ungrateful Action toward a *Benefactor*; we at firſt View abhor it: Aſſure us that it will be very *advantageous* to us, propoſe even a *Reward*; our *Senſe* of the Action is not alter'd. IT is true, theſe Motives may make us undertake it; but they have no more Influence upon us to make us approve it, than a Phyſician's Advice has to make a nauſeous Potion pleaſant to the Taſte, when we perhaps force our ſelves to take it for the Recovery of Health. Had we no Notion of

of Actions, beſide our Opinion of their *Advantage*, or *Diſadvantage*, could we ever chuſe an Action as *Advantageous*, which we are conſcious is ſtill *Evil*? as it too often happens in human Affairs. Where would be the need of ſuch *high Bribes* to prevail with Men to abandon the Intereſts of a ruin'd Party, or of *Tortures* to force out the Secrets of their Friends? Is it ſo hard to convince Mens Underſtandings, if that be the only Faculty we have to do with, that it is more probably advantageous to ſecure preſent Gain, and avoid preſent Evils, by joining with the prevalent Party, than to wait for the remote Poſſibility of future Good, upon a Revolution often improbable, and ſometimes unexpected? And when Men are overperſuaded by *Advantage*, do they always approve their own Conduct? Nay, how often is their remaining Life odious, and ſhameful, in their *own Senſe* of it, as well as in that of *others*, to whom the baſe Action was Profitable? Sect. 1.

IF any one becomes ſatisfy'd with his own Conduct in ſuch a Caſe; upon what Ground is it? how does he pleaſe himſelf, or vindicate his Actions to others? Never by reflecting upon his *private Advantage*, or alledging this to others as a Vindication; but by gradually warping into the *moral Principles* of his *new Party*; for no

Sect. 1. Party is without them. And thus Men become pleas'd with their Actions under some Appearance of *moral Good*, distinct from *Advantage*.

It may perhaps be alledg'd, "That in "those Actions of our own which we call "*Good*, there is *this* constant *Advantage* "superior to all others, which is the "Ground of our Approbation, and the Mo- "tive to them from *Self-love*, *viz.* That "we suppose the DEITY will *reward* "them." This will be more fully consi- der'd * afterwards: At present it is enough to observe, that many have high Notions of *Honour*, *Faith*, *Generosity*, *Justice*, who have scarce any Opinions about the DEITY, or any Thoughts of *future Rewards*; and abhor any thing which is *Treacherous*, *Cruel*, or *Unjust*, without any regard to *future Punishments*. But further, Tho these *Rewards*, and *Punishments*, may make my *own* Actions appear *advantageous* to me, and make me approve them from *Self-Love*, yet they would never make me approve, and love *another* Person for the like Actions, whose Merit would not be imputed to me. Those Actions are *advantageous* indeed to the *Agent*; but his *Advantage* is not my *Advantage*: And *Self-Love* could never in-

* See *Sect.* 2. *Art.* VII.

fluence

fluence me to approve Actions as *advantageous* to others, or to love the Authors of them on that account. Sect. 1.

THE second thing to be consider'd, is, "Whether our *Sense* of the *moral Good*, "or *Evil*, in the Actions of others, can "be over-ballanc'd, or brib'd by Views of "*Interest*." I may easily be capable of wishing, that another would do an Action I abhor as *morally Evil*, if it were very *Advantageous* to me: *Interest* in that Case may overballance my Desire of *Virtue* in another. But no *Interest* will make me approve an Action as *Good*, which, without that *Interest* to my self, would have appear'd *morally Evil*. The *Sense* of the *moral Good*, or *Evil*, cannot be over-ballanc'd by *Interest*. How ridiculous an Attempt wou'd it be, to engage a Man by Rewards, or to threaten him into a good Opinion of an Action, which was contrary to his *moral Notions*? We may procure Dissimulation by such means, and that is all.

VI. A LATE witty Author* says, That "the Leaders of Mankind do not really "admire any Actions, such as those of "REGULUS, or DECIUS, but only ob-"serve, that Men of such Dispositions are

* See the Fable of the Bees, Page 34, 36. 3d Edition.

Sect. 1. " very useful for the Defence of any State;
" and therefore by *Panegyricks*, and *Sta-*
" *tues*, they encourage such Tempers in
" others, as the most *tractable*, and *use-*
" *ful*." Here, first, let us consider, If a *Traitor*, who would sell his own Country to us, may not often be as *advantageous* to us, as a *Hero* who defends us: And yet we can love the Tréason, and hate the Traitor. We can at the same time praise a *gallant Enemy*, who is very *pernicious* to us. Is there nothing in all this but an Opinion of *Advantage?* Again, upon this Scheme what could a *Statue* or *Panegyrick* effect?—Men love *Praise*—They will do the Actions which they observe to be *praised*—*Praise*, with Men, who have no other Idea of *Good* but *Self-Interest*, is *the Opinion which a Nation or Party have of a Man as useful to them*——REGULUS or CATO, or DECIUS had no *Advantage* by the Actions which profited their Country, and therefore they themselves could not admire them, however the Persons who reaped the *Advantage* might praise such Actions. REGULUS or CATO could not possibly praise or love another Hero for a *virtuous Action*; for this would not gain them the *Advantage* of *Honour*, and their own Actions they must have look'd upon as the hard Terms on which Honour was to be purchas'd, without any thing amiable in them,

in

in the Contemplation or Reflection upon which, they could be pleas'd.—Now how unlike is this to what the leaſt Obſervation would teach a Man concerning ſuch Characters? Sect. 1.

BUT ſays * he, "Theſe wondrous cunning Governours made Men believe, by "their *Statues* and *Panegyricks*, that there "was *publick Spirit*, and that this was in "it ſelf *Excellent*; and hence Men are "led to admire it in others, and to imitate it in themſelves, forgetting the Purſuit of their own *Advantage*." So eaſy a matter it ſeems to him, to quit judging of others by what we feel in our ſelves!—— for a Perſon who is wholly *ſelfiſh*, to imagine others to be *publick-ſpirited!*——for one who has no Ideas of *Good* but in his own *Advantage*, to be led by the Perſuaſions of others into a Conception of *Goodneſs* in what is avowedly detrimental to himſelf, and profitable to others; nay, ſo entirely, as not to approve the Action thorowly, but in ſo far as he was conſcious that it proceeded from a *diſintereſted Study* of the *Good* of others!—Yet this it ſeems *Statues* and *Panegyricks* can accompliſh! †

Nil intra eſt oleam, nil extra eſt in nuce duri!

* See the ſame Author in the ſame Place.

† Hor. Ep. 1. Lib. 2. v. 31.

Sect. 1.

IT is an easy matter for Men to assert any thing in Words; but our own Hearts must decide the Matter, "Whether some "*moral Actions* do not at first View appear "*amiable*, even to those who are uncon- "cern'd in their Influence." It is true, that the Actions which we approve, are useful to Mankind; but not always to the Approver. It would perhaps be useful to the *Whole*, that all Men agreed in performing such Actions; and then every one would have his Share of the *Advantage*: But this only proves, that *Reason* and *calm Reflection* may recommend to us, from *Self-Interest*, those Actions, which at first View our *moral Sense* determines us to admire, without considering this *Interest*. Nay, our *Sense* shall operate even where the *Advantage* to our selves does not hold. We can approve the Justice of a Sentence against our selves: A condemn'd *Traitor* may approve the Vigilance of a CICERO in discovering Conspiracies, tho it had been for the Traitor's Advantage, that there never had been in the World any Men of such Sagacity. To say that he may still approve such Conduct as tending to the *publick Good*, is a Jest from one whose only Idea of *Good* is *Self-Interest*. Such a Person has no Desire of *publick Good* further than it tends to his own *Advantage*, which it does not at all in the present Case.

VII. IF

VII. IF what is ſaid makes it appear, that we have ſome other *amiable Idea* of Actions than that of *Advantageous* to our ſelves, we may conclude, "That this "Perception of *moral Good* is not deriv'd "from *Cuſtom*, *Education*, *Example*, or "*Study*." Theſe give us no new Ideas: They might make us ſee *Advantage* to our ſelves in Actions whoſe Uſefulneſs did not at firſt appear, or give us Opinions of ſome Tendency of Actions to our *Detriment*, by ſome nice Deductions of Reaſon, or by a raſh Prejudice; when upon the firſt View of the Action we ſhould have obſerv'd no ſuch thing: but they never could have made us apprehend Actions as *amiable* or *odious*, abſtractly from any Conſideration of our own *Advantage*.

VIII. IT remains then, "That as the "AUTHOR of *Nature* has determin'd us "to receive, by our *external Senſes*, plea- "ſant or diſagreeable Ideas of Objects, "according as they are uſeful or hurtful to "our Bodies; and to receive from *uniform* "*Objects* the Pleaſures of *Beauty* and *Har-* "*mony*, to excite us to the Purſuit of "Knowledge, and to reward us for it; "or to be an Argument to us of his *Good-* "*neſs*, as the *Uniformity* it ſelf proves "his *Exiſtence*, whether we had a *Senſe*

"of

Sect. 1. " of *Beauty* in *Uniformity* or not: ſo he
" has given us a MORAL SENSE, to di-
" rect our Actions, and to give us ſtill
" *nobler Pleaſures*; ſo that while we are
" only intending the *Good* of others, we
" undeſignedly promote our own greateſt
" *private Good*."

WE are not to imagine, that this *moral Senſe*, more than the other Senſes, ſuppoſes any *innate Ideas*, or *Knowledge*, or *practical Propoſition*: We mean by it only *a Determination of our Minds to receive amiable or diſagreeable Ideas of Actions, when they ſhall occur to our Obſervation, antecedently to any Opinions of Advantage or Loſs to redound to our ſelves from them*; even as we are pleas'd with a *regular Form* or an *harmonious Compoſition*, without having any Knowledge of *Mathematicks*, or ſeeing any *Advantage* in that Form, or Compoſition, different from the immediate Pleaſure.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Concerning the immediate Motive *to* virtuous Actions.

THE *Motives* of human Actions, or their *immediate Causes*, would be beſt underſtood after conſidering the *Paſſions* and *Affections*; but here we ſhall only conſider the *Springs* of the Actions which we call *virtuous*, as far as it is neceſſary to ſettle the general Foundation of the *Moral Senſe*.

I. EVERY Action, which we apprehend as either *morally good* or *evil*, is always ſuppoſed to flow from *ſome Affection* toward *rational Agents*; and whatever we call *Virtue* or *Vice*, is either ſome ſuch *Affection*, or ſome *Action* conſequent upon it. Or it may perhaps be enough to make an Action, or Omiſſion, appear *vitious*, if it argues the Want of ſuch Affection toward rational Agents, as we expect in Characters counted *morally good*. All the Actions counted *religious* in any Country, are ſuppoſed, by thoſe who count them religious, to flow from ſome Affections toward the DEITY; and whatever we call *ſocial Virtue*, we ſtill ſuppoſe to flow from Af-

Sect. 2. Affections toward our *Fellow-Creatures*; for in this all seem to agree, "That exter-
"nal Motions, when accompany'd with no
"Affections toward GOD or *Man*, or
"evidencing no Want of the *expected* Af-
"fections toward either, can have no *mo-*
"*ral Good* or *Evil* in them." Ask the most *abstemious Hermit*, if *Temperance* of it self wou'd be *morally good*, supposing it shew'd no Obedience toward the DEITY, made us no fitter for Devotion, or the Service of Mankind, or the Search after Truth, than *Luxury*; and he will easily grant, that it wou'd be no *moral Good*, tho still it might be *naturally good* or *advantageous* to Health: And mere *Courage*, or Contempt of Danger, if we conceive it to have no regard to the Defence of the Innocent, or repairing of Wrongs, wou'd only entitle its Possessor to *Bedlam*. When such sort of Courage is sometimes admir'd, it is upon some secret Apprehension of a good Intention in the use of it. *Prudence*, if it were only employ'd in promoting *private Interest*, is never imagin'd to be a *Virtue*: and *Justice*, or observing a strict Equality, if it have no regard to the *Good* of *Mankind*, the Preservation of Rights, and securing Peace, is a Quality properer for its ordinary *Gestamen*, a *Beam* and *Scales*, than for a *rational Agent*. So that these four Qualities, commonly call'd *Cardinal Virtues*, obtain that Name, because they are

are Diſpoſitions univerſally neceſſary to promote *publick Good*, and denote *Affections* toward *rational Agents*; otherwiſe there would appear no *Virtue* in them. Sect. 2.

II. NOW if it can be made appear, that none of theſe Affections which we call *virtuous*, do ſpring from *Self-love*, or Deſire of *private Intereſt*; ſince all *Virtue*, is either ſome ſuch *Affections*, or *Actions* conſequent upon them; it muſt neceſſarily follow, "That *Virtue* is not purſu'd from "the *Intereſt* or *Self-love* of the *Purſuer*, "or any Motives of his own Advan- "tage."

THE Affections which are of moſt Importance in *Morals*, are LOVE and HATRED: All the reſt ſeem but different Modifications of theſe two *original Affections*. Now in diſcourſing of *Love* toward rational Agents, we need not be caution'd not to include that *Love* between the *Sexes*, which, when no other Affections accompany it, is only Deſire of Pleaſure, and is never counted a *Virtue*. *Love* toward rational Agents, is ſubdivided into *Love* of *Complacence* or *Eſteem*, and *Love* of *Benevolence*: And *Hatred* is ſubdivided into *Hatred* of *Diſplicence* or *Contempt*, and *Hatred* of *Malice*. Concerning each of theſe ſeparately we ſhall conſider, "Whe- "ther

Sect. 2. " ther they can be influenc'd by Motives
" of *Self-Interest*."

LOVE of *Complacence*, *Esteem*, or *Goodliking*, at first view appears to be *disinterested*, and so the *Hatred* of *Displicence* or *Dislike*; and are entirely excited by some *moral Qualitys*, *Good* or *Evil*, apprehended to be in the Objects, which Qualitys the very *Frame* of our *Nature* determines us to *love* or *hate*, to approve or disapprove, according to the *moral Sense* * above explain'd. Propose to a Man all the Rewards in the World, or threaten all the Punishments, to engage him to *love* with *Esteem*, and *Complacence*, a third Person entirely *unknown*, or if known, apprehended to be *cruel*, *treacherous*, *ungrateful*; you may procure external Obsequiousness, or good Offices, or Dissimulation of Love; but *real Love* of *Esteem* no Price can purchase. And the same is obvious as to *Hatred* of *Contempt*, which no Motive of *Advantage* can prevent. On the contrary, represent a Character as *generous*, *kind*, *faithful*, *humane*, tho in the most distant Parts of the World, and we cannot avoid *loving* it with *Esteem* and *Complacence*. A *Bribe* may possibly make us attempt to ruin such a Man, or some strong Motive of *Advantage* may excite us to

* See *Sect.* 1.

oppose

oppoſe his Intereſt; but it can never make us *hate* him, while we apprehend him as *morally excellent*. Nay, when we conſult our own Hearts, we ſhall find, that we can ſcarce ever perſuade our ſelves to attempt any Miſchief againſt ſuch Perſons, from any motive of *Advantage*, nor execute it, without the ſtrongeſt Reluctance, and Remorſe, until we have blinded our ſelves into a bad Opinion of the Perſon in a *moral Senſe*. Sect. 2.

III. As to the *Love* of *Benevolence*, the very Name excludes *Self-Intereſt*. We never call that Man *benevolent*, who is in fact uſeful to others, but at the ſame time only intends his *own Intereſt*, without any deſire of, or delight in, the *Good* of *others*. If there be any *Benevolence* at all, it muſt be *diſintereſted*; for the moſt uſeful Action imaginable, loſes all appearance of *Benevolence*, as ſoon as we diſcern that it only flowed from *Self-Love*, or *Intereſt*. Thus, never were any human Actions more *advantageous*, than the Inventions of *Fire*, and *Iron*; but if theſe were caſual, or if the *Inventor* only intended his *own Intereſt* in them, there is nothing which can be call'd *Benevolent* in them. Wherever then *Benevolence* is ſuppos'd, there it is imagin'd *diſintereſted*, and deſign'd for the *Good* of others.

BUT it muſt be here obſerv'd, That as all Men have *Self-Love*, as well as *Benevo-*

Sect. 2. *lence*, these two Principles may jointly excite a Man to the same Action; and then they are to be consider'd as two Forces impelling the same Body to Motion; sometimes they conspire, sometimes are indifferent to each other, and sometimes are in some degree opposite. Thus, if a Man have such strong *Benevolence*, as would have produc'd an Action without any Views of *Self-Interest*; that such a Man has also in View *private Advantage*, along with *publick Good*, as the Effect of his Action, does no way diminish the *Benevolence* of the Action. When he would not have produc'd so much *publick Good*, had it not been for Prospect of *Self-Interest*, then the Effect of *Self-Love* is to be deducted, and his *Benevolence* is proportion'd to the remainder of *Good*, which pure *Benevolence* would have produc'd. When a Man's *Benevolence* is hurtful to himself, then *Self-Love* is opposite to *Benevolence*, and the *Benevolence* is proportion'd to the Sum of the *Good* produc'd, and the Resistance of *Self-Love* surmounted by it. In most Cases it is impossible for Men to know how far their Fellows are influenc'd by the one or other of these Principles; but yet the general Truth is sufficiently certain, That this is the Way in which the *Benevolence* of Actions is to be computed.

Sect. 2.

IF any enquire, "Whence ariſes this "*Love* of *Eſteem*, or *Benevolence*, to "good Men, or to Mankind in general, "if not from ſome nice Views of *Self-* "*Intereſt?* Or, how we can be mov'd to "deſire the Happineſs of *others*, without "any View to our *own*?" It may be anſwer'd, "That the *ſame Cauſe* which de- "termines us to purſue Happineſs for our "ſelves, determines us both to *Eſteem* and "*Benevolence* on their proper Occaſions; "even the very *Frame* of our *Nature*, or "a *generous Inſtinct*, which ſhall be after- "wards explain'd."

IV. HERE we may obſerve, That as *Love* of *Eſteem* and *Complacence* is always join'd with *Benevolence*, where there is no ſtrong Oppoſition of *Intereſt*; ſo *Benevolence* ſeems to preſuppoſe ſome ſmall degree of *Eſteem*, not indeed of *actual* good Qualitys; for there may be ſtrong *Benevolence*, where there is the *Hatred* of *Contempt* for actual Vices; as a Parent may have great *Benevolence* to a moſt abandon'd Child, whoſe Manners he *hates* with the greateſt *Diſplicence*: but *Benevolence* ſuppoſes a Being *capable* of *Virtue*. We judge of *other* rational Agents by *our ſelves*. The *human Nature* is a lovely Form; we are all conſcious of ſome *morally good* Qualitys and Inclinations in our ſelves, how partial and imperfect ſoever they may be; we

Sect. 2. preſume the *ſame* of every thing in human Form, nay almoſt of every living Creature: ſo that by this ſuppos'd remote Capacity of *Virtue*, there may be ſome ſmall degree of *Eſteem* along with our *Benevolence*, even when they incur our greateſt Diſpleaſure by their Conduct. *Human Nature* ſeems ſcarce capable of *malicious diſintereſted Hatred*, or a ſedate Delight in the Miſery of others, when we imagine them no way pernicious to us, or oppoſite to our *Intereſts*: And for that Hatred which makes us oppoſe *thoſe* whoſe Intereſts are oppoſite to *ours*, it is only the Effect of *Self-Love*, and not of *diſintereſted Malice*. A ſudden Paſſion may give us wrong Repreſentations of our Fellow-Creatures, and for a little time repreſent them as *abſolutely Evil*; and during this Imagination perhaps we may give ſome Evidences of *diſintereſted Malice*: but as ſoon as we reflect upon *human Nature*, and form juſt Conceptions, this *unnatural* Paſſion is allay'd, and only *Self-Love* remains, which may make us, from *Self-Intereſt*, oppoſe our Adverſaries.

EVERY one at preſent rejoices in the Deſtruction of our *Pirates*; and yet let us ſuppoſe a Band of ſuch Villains caſt in upon ſome deſolate Iſland, and that we were aſſur'd ſome Fate would confine them there perpetually, ſo that they ſhould diſturb Mankind no more: now let us calmly reflect that

theſe

these Persons are capable of Knowledge and Counsel, may be happy, and joyful, or may be involv'd in Misery, Sorrow, and Pain; that they may return to a State of *Love*, *Humanity*, *Kindness*, and become *Friends*, *Citizens*, *Husbands*, *Parents*, with all the sweet Sentiments which accompany these Relations: then let us ask our selves, when *Self-Love* no longer makes us desire their Destruction, and when we cease to look upon them, under the Ideas suggested by fresh Resentment of Injuries done to us or our Friends, as utterly incapable of any good *moral Quality*; whether we would rather wish them the Fate of CADMUS's *Army*, by plunging their Swords in each others Breast, or a worse Fate by the most exquisite Tortures; or rather that they should recover the ordinary Affections of Men, become *Kind*, *Compassionate*, and *Friendly*, contrive *Laws*, *Constitutions*, *Governments*, *Propertys*, and form an honest happy Society, with *Marriages*, and Sect. 2.

Relations Dear, and all the Charities
Of Father, Son, and Brother— —— *

I fancy the latter would be the Wish of every Mortal, notwithstanding our present just Abhorrence from *Self-Interest*, or *publick Love*, and Desire of promoting the Interest of our Friends who are expos'd to their Fury.

* Milt. Par. Lost, B. 4. v. 756.

Sect. 2. Now this plainly evidences, that we ſcarce ever have any *ſedate Malice* againſt any Perſon, or delight in his Miſery: our *Hatred* is only from Oppoſition of *Intereſt*; or if we can entertain *ſedate Malice*, it muſt be toward a Character apprehended *neceſſarily* and *unalterably Evil* in a *moral Senſe*; ſuch as a ſudden Paſſion ſometimes repreſents our Enemies to us: and perhaps no *ſuch Being* occurs to us among the Works of a *good* DEITY.

V. NOW having offer'd what may perhaps prove, That our *Love* either of *Eſteem*, or *Benevolence*, is not founded on *Self-Love*, or views of *Intereſt*; let us ſee "if ſome *other Affections*, in which *Vir-*"*tue* may be plac'd, do ariſe from *Self-*"*Love*;" ſuch as *Fear*, or *Reverence*, ariſing from an Apprehenſion of *Goodneſs*, *Power*, and *Juſtice*. For no body apprehends any *Virtue* in *baſe Dread* and *Servitude* toward a *powerful Evil Being*: This is indeed the *meaneſt Selfiſhneſs*. Now the ſame Arguments, which prove *Love* of *Eſteem* to be *diſintereſted*, will prove this *honourable Reverence* to be ſo too; for it plainly ariſes from an apprehenſion of *amiable Qualitys* in the Perſon, and *Love* toward him, which raiſes an *Abhorrence* of offending him. Could we reverence a *Being* becauſe it were our *Intereſt* to do ſo, a third Perſon might bribe us into Reverence toward a *Being* neither *Good*, nor

Power-

Powerful, which every one sees to be a Sect. 2.
Jest. And this we might shew to be common to all other Passions, which have rational Agents for their Objects.

VI. THERE is one Objection against *disinterested Love*, which occurs from considering, "That nothing so effectually procures our *Love* toward rational Agents, "as their *Beneficence*, whence we are "led to imagine, that our Love of Persons, as well as irrational Objects, flows "intirely from *Self-Interest*." But let us here examine our selves more narrowly: Do we only love the *Beneficent*, because it is our *Interest* to love them? or do we chuse to love them because our *Love* is the means of procuring their *Bounty*? If it be so, then we could indifferently love any Character, even to obtain the Bounty of a third Person; or we could be brib'd by a third Person to love the greatest Villain heartily, as we may be brib'd to external Offices: Now this is plainly impossible. And further, is not our *Love* always the Consequent of *Bounty*, and not the Means of procuring it? External Shew, Obsequiousness, and Dissimulation may precede an Opinion of *Beneficence*; but *real Love* always presupposes it, and shall necessarily arise, even when we expect no more, from Consideration of past Benefits. Or can any one say he only loves the *Beneficent*, as he

Sect. 2. does a *Field* or *Garden*, becauſe of its *Advantage*? His *Love* then muſt ceaſe toward one who has ruin'd himſelf in kind Offices to him, when he can do him no more; as we ceaſe to love an inanimate Object which ceaſes to be uſeful, unleſs a Poetical *Proſopopœia* animate it, and raiſe an imaginary Gratitude, which is indeed pretty common. And then again, our *Love* wou'd be the ſame towards the worſt Characters that 'tis towards the beſt, if they were *equally bountiful* to us, which is alſo falſe. *Beneficence* then muſt raiſe our *Love* as it is an amiable *moral Quality*; and hence it is that we love even thoſe who are *beneficent* to others.

It may be further alledg'd, "That "*Bounty* toward our ſelves is much more "powerful to excite *Love*, than *equal* "*Bounty* toward others." This is true for a Reaſon to be offer'd below *: but it does not prove, that in this Caſe our *Love* of Perſons is from Views of *Intereſt*; ſince this Love is not *prior* to the Bounty, as the means to procure it, but *ſubſequent* upon it, even when we expect no more. In the Benefits which we receive our ſelves, we are more fully ſenſible of their Value, and of the Circumſtances of the Action which are Evidences of a generous Temper in the *Donor*; and, by the good Opi-

* See *Sect.* 5. *Art.* II.

nion

nion we have of our ſelves, look upon the Kindneſs better employ'd, than when it is beſtow'd on others, of whom perhaps we have leſs favourable Sentiments. It is however ſufficient to remove the Objection, that *Bounty* from a *Donor* apprehended as *morally Evil*, or extorted by *Force*, or conferr'd with ſome View of *Self-Intereſt*, will not procure *real Love*; nay, it may raiſe *Indignation*, if we ſuſpect Diſſimulation of Love, or a Deſign to allure us into any thing Diſhonourable: whereas wiſely employ'd *Bounty* is always approv'd, and gains love to the Author from all who hear of it. Sect. 2.

IF then no *Love* toward Perſons be influenc'd by *Self-Love*, or Views of *Intereſt*, and all *Virtue* flows from *Love* toward Perſons, or ſome other Affection equally *diſintereſted*; it remains, "That "there muſt be ſome other Motive than "*Self-Love*, or *Intereſt*, which excites "us to the Actions we call *Virtu-* "*ous*."

VII. THERE may perhaps ſtill remain another Suſpicion of *Self-Intereſt* in our Proſecution of *Virtue*, taken from this, "That the *whole Race* of Mankind ſeems "perſuaded of the Exiſtence of an *Al-* "*mighty Being*, who will certainly ſe- "cure Happineſs either *now*, or *here-* "*after*,

Sect. 2. " *after*, to those who are *Virtuous*, ac-
" cording to their several Notions of *Vir-*
" *tue* in various Places: and upon this Per-
" suasion, *Virtue* may in all Cases be pur-
" su'd from Views * of *Interest*." Here again we might appeal to all Mankind, Whether there be no *Benevolence* but what flows from a View of *Reward* from the DEITY. Nay do we not see a great deal of it among those who entertain few Thoughts of Devotion at all? Not to say that this *Benevolence* does scarce deserve the Name, when we desire not, nor delight in the *Good* of others, any farther than it serves our own Ends. But if we have no other Idea of *Good*, but *Advantage* to our selves, every *rational Being* must only act for its own *Advantage*; and however we may call a *beneficent Being*, a *good Being*, because it acts for our Advantage, yet upon *this Scheme* we can have no reason to imagine that there is any *beneficent Being* in *Nature*, or a *Being* who acts for the *Good* of others. Particularly, if there is no *Sense* of Excellence in *publick Love*, and promoting the Happiness of others, whence should this Persuasion arise, " That the DEITY will make the *Virtuous* happy?" Can we prove that it is for the *Advantage* of the DEITY to do so? This I fancy will be look'd upon as very absurd, unless we

* See above *Sect.* 1. *Art.* V. *Par.* 4.

sup-

ſuppoſe ſome beneficent Diſpoſitions eſſen- Sect. 2.
tial to the DEITY, which determine him to
conſult the *publick Good* of his *Creatures*, and reward ſuch as co-operate with this *kind Intention:* and if there be ſuch Diſpoſitions in the DEITY, where is the impoſſibility of ſome ſmall degree of this *publick Love* in Creatures? And why muſt they be ſuppos'd incapable of acting but from *Self-Love?* In ſhort, without acknowledging ſome other Principle of Action in rational Agents than *Self-Love*, I ſee no Foundation to expect *Beneficence*, or *Rewards* from *God*, or *Man*, further than it is the *Intereſt* of the *Benefactor*; and all Expectation of Benefits from a *Being* whoſe Intereſts are independent on us, muſt be *perfectly ridiculous*. What ſhould engage the DEITY to reward *Virtue? Virtue* is commonly ſuppos'd, upon *this Scheme*, to be only *a conſulting our own Happineſs in the moſt artful way, conſiſtently with the Good of the Whole*; and in *Vice* the *ſame thing* is fooliſhly purſu'd, in a manner which will not ſo probably ſucceed, and which is contrary to the *Good* of the *Whole*. But how is the DEITY concern'd in this *Whole*, if every Agent always acts from *Self-Love*? And what Ground have we from the Idea of a *God* it ſelf to believe the DEITY is *good* in the *Chriſtian Senſe*, that is, *ſtudious of the Good of his Creatures*? Perhaps the *Miſery* of Creatures may

Sect. 2. may be as capable of giving him Pleasure, as their *Happiness*: And who can find fault, or blame such a *Being* to study their *Misery*; for what else should we expect? A *Manichean Evil God* is a Notion which Men would as readily run into as that of a *Good one*, if there is no Excellence in *disinterested Love*, and no *Being* acts but for its own *Advantage*; unless we prov'd that the happiness of *Creatures* was *advantageous* to the DEITY.

VIII. THE last, and only remaining Objection against what has been said, is this, "That perhaps *Virtue* is pursu'd because "of the *concomitant Pleasure*." To which we may answer, first, by observing, that this plainly supposes a *Sense* of *Virtue* antecedent to Ideas of *Advantage*, upon which this Advantage is founded; and that from the very *Frame* of our *Nature* we are determin'd to perceive Pleasure in the practice of *Virtue*, and to approve it when practis'd by our selves, or others. But further, may we not justly question, whether all *Virtue* is *pleasant*? Or, whether we are not determin'd to some *amiable Actions* in which we find no Pleasure? 'Tis true, all the Passions, and Affections justify themselves; or, we approve our being in such a manner affected on such an Occasion, and condemn a Person who is otherwise affected. So the *Sorrowful*, the *Angry*, the

Jea-

Jealous, the *Compaſſionate*, think it reaſonable they ſhould be ſo upon the ſeveral Occaſions which move theſe Paſſions; but we ſhould not therefore ſay that *Sorrow*, *Anger*, *Jealouſy* and *Pity* are pleaſant, and that we chuſe to be in theſe Paſſions becauſe of the concomitant Pleaſure. The matter is plainly this: The *Frame* of our *Nature*, on ſuch Occaſions as move theſe Paſſions, determines us to be thus affected, and to approve our being ſo: Nay, we diſlike any Perſon who is not thus affected upon ſuch occaſions, notwithſtanding the uneaſineſs of theſe Paſſions: And then this uneaſineſs determines us to endeavour an Alteration in the ſtate of the Object; but not otherwiſe to remove the painful Affection, while the occaſion is unalter'd; which ſhews that theſe Paſſions are not from *Self-Love*. The Actions which theſe Paſſions move us to, do tend generally in Fact to remove the uneaſy Paſſion by altering the ſtate of the Object: but the removal of our Pain is not directly intended; for then we ſhould run away, ſhut our Eyes, divert our Thoughts from the miſerable Object, to avoid the Pain of Compaſſion, which we ſeldom do: nay, we croud about ſuch Objects, and voluntarily run into Pain, unleſs Reaſon, and Reflection upon our inability to relieve the Miſerable, countermand our Inclination, or ſome ſelfiſh Affection, as fear of Danger, over-ballances it. Sect. 2.

Now

Sect. 2.

Now there are several *morally amiable* Actions, which flow from these Passions which are so uneasy; such as Attempts of *relieving* the Distress'd, of *defending* the Injur'd, of *repairing* of Wrongs done by ourselves. These Actions are often accompany'd with no Pleasure in the mean time, nor have they any subsequent Pleasure, except as they are successful; unless it be that which may arise from *calm Reflection*, when the Passion is over, upon our having been in a Disposition, which to our *moral Sense* appears *lovely* and *good:* but this Pleasure is never intended in the Heat of Action, nor is it any Motive exciting to it.

Besides, In the *pleasant Passions*, we do not *love*, because it is *pleasant* to love; we do not *chuse* this State, because it is an *advantageous*, or *pleasant* State: This Passion necessarily arises from seeing its proper Object, a *morally good Character*. And if we could love, whenever we see it would be our *Interest* to love, *Love* could be brib'd by a third Person; and we could never love Persons in Distress, for then our Love gives us Pain. The same Observation may be extended to all the *other Affections* from which *Virtue* is supposed to flow: And from the whole we may conclude, "That the *virtuous Agent* "is

" is never apprehended by us as acting *on-* Sect. 2.
" *ly* from Views of his *own Interest*, but
" as *principally* influenc'd by some other
" Motive."

IX. HAVING remov'd these falsly supposed Springs of those Actions which are counted *Virtuous*, let us next establish the *true one*, viz. *some Determination of our Nature to study the Good of others*; or *some Instinct, antecedent to all Reason from Interest, which influences us to the Love of others*, even as the *moral Sense*, * above supposed, determines us to *approve* the Actions which flow from *this Love* in our selves or others. This *disinterested Affection* may appear strange to Men impress'd with Notions of *Self-Love* as the *sole* Motive of Action, from the Pulpit, the Schools, the Systems, and Conversations regulated by them: but let us consider it in its strongest, and simplest Kinds; and when we see the Possibility of it in these Instances, we may easily discover its *universal Extent*.

AN honest *Farmer* will tell you, that he studies the *Preservation* and *Happiness* of his Children, and loves them without any design of Good to himself: But say some of our *Philosophers*, " The Happiness of

* See Sect. 1.

" their

Sect. 2. " their Children gives Parents Pleasure, and " their Misery Pain; and therefore to ob- " tain the *former*, and avoid the *latter*, " they study from *Self-Love* the Good of " their Children." Suppose several Merchants join'd in Partnership of their whole Effects; one of them bustles abroad in managing the Stock of the Company; his Prosperity occasions Gain to all, and his Losses give them Pain from their Share in the Loss: is this then the *same* Kind of Affection with *that* of Parents to their Children? Is there the *same* tender, personal Regard? I fancy no Parent will say so. In this Case of Merchants there is a plain Conjunction of Interest; but whence the Conjunction of Interest between the *Parent* and *Child*? Do the Child's *Sensations* give Pleasure or Pain to the Parent? Is the Parent *hungry*, *thirsty*, *sick*, when the Child is so? " No, but *his Love* to " the Child makes him affected with his " Pleasures or Pains." *This Love* then is antecedent to the Conjunction of Interest, and the Cause of it, not the Effect: *this Love* then must be *disinterested*. " No, " says another *Sophist*, Children are *Parts* " of our selves, and in loving them we but " love *our selves* in them." A very good Answer! Let us carry it as far as it will go. How are they *Parts* of our selves? Not as a *Leg* or an *Arm*: We are not conscious of their Sensations. " But *their*

" Bodies

" Bodys were form'd from Parts of *ours*." Sect. 2.
So is a *Fly*, or a *Maggot* which may breed in any discharg'd Blood or Humour: Very dear Insects surely! There must be something else then which makes Children *Parts* of our selves; and what is this but *that Affection* which NATURE determines us to have toward them? *This Love* makes them *Parts* of our selves, and therefore does not flow from their being so before. This is indeed a good Metaphor; and wherever we find a determination among several rational Agents to *mutual Love*, let *each Individual* be look'd upon as a *Part* of a great *Whole* or *System*, and concern himself in the *publick Good* of it. But a *later* Author * observes, " That *natural Affection* " in Parents is *weak*, till the Children be- " gin to give Evidences of *Knowledge* and " *Affections*." Mothers say they feel it strong from the very first: and yet I could wish, for the Destruction of his Hypothesis, that what he alledges were true; as I fancy it is. The observing of *Understanding* and *Affections* in Children, which make them appear to be *moral Agents*, can increase Love toward them without prospect of *Interest*; for I hope this Increase of Love is not from prospect of Advantage from the Knowledge or Affections of Children, for whom Parents are still toiling, and never

* See the Fable of the Bees, *Page* 68. 3d *Ed.*

Sect. 2. intend to be refunded their Expences, or recompens'd for their Labour, but in Cases of extreme Necessity. If then the observing a *moral Capacity* can be the occasion of increasing Love without *Self-Interest*, even from the *Frame* of our *Nature*; pray, may not *this* be a Foundation of *weaker* degrees of Love where there is no preceding tie of Parentage, and extend it to *all Mankind?*

X. And that this is so in fact, will appear by considering some more distant Attachments. If we observe any Neighbours, from whom perhaps we have receiv'd no good Offices, form'd into *Friendships*, *Familys*, *Partnerships*, and with Honesty and Kindness assisting each other; pray ask any Mortal if he would not be better pleas'd with their *Prosperity*, when their Interests are no way inconsistent with his own, than with their *Misery*, and *Ruin*; and you shall find a *Bond* of *Benevolence* further extended than a *Family* and *Children*, altho the Ties are not so strong. Again, suppose a Person, for Trade, had left his *native Country*, and with all his Kindred had settled his Fortunes abroad, without any View of returning; and only imagine he had receiv'd no Injurys from his Country: ask such a Man, would it give him no Pleasure to hear of the *Prosperity* of his Country? or could he, now that his

his Interests are separated from that of his Nation, as gladly hear that it was laid *waste* by *Tyranny*, or a *foreign* Power? I fancy his Answer would shew us *a Benevolence* extended beyond *Neighbourhoods* or *Acquaintances*. Let a Man of a *compos'd* Temper, out of the hurry of his *private* Affairs, read of the *Constitution* of a *foreign* Country, even in the *most distant* parts of the Earth, and observe *Art*, and *Design*, and *Study* of *publick Good* in the *Laws* of this Association; and he shall find his Mind *mov'd* in their favour; he shall be *contriving* Rectifications and Amendments in their Constitution, and *regret* any unlucky part of it which may be pernicious to their Interest; he shall *bewail* any Disaster which befalls them, and *accompany* all their Fortunes with the Affections of a Friend. Now this argues *a Benevolence* in some degree extended to all Mankind, where there is no *interfering* Interest, which from *Self-Love* may obstruct it. And had we any Notions of *rational Agents*, capable of moral Affections, in the *most distant* Planets, our *good Wishes* would still attend them, and we should *delight* in their Happiness. Sect. 2.

XI. HERE we may transiently remark the Foundation of what we call *national Love*, or LOVE of one's *native Country*. Whatever place we have liv'd in for any

Sect. 2. considerable time, there we have most distinctly remark'd the *various Affections* of *human Nature*; we have known many *lovely Characters*; we remember the *Associations*, *Friendships*, *Familys*, *natural Affections*, and other *humane Sentiments*: our *moral Sense* determines us to approve these *lovely Dispositions* where we have most distinctly observ'd them; and our *Benevolence* concerns us in the Interests of the Persons possess'd of them. When we come to observe the like as distinctly in *another* Country, we begin to acquire a *national Love* toward it also; nor has our *own* Country any other preference in our Idea, unless it be by *an Association* of the pleasant Ideas of our Youth, with the *Buildings*, *Fields*, and *Woods* where we receiv'd them. This may let us see, how *Tyranny*, and *Faction*, a *Neglect* of Justice, a *Corruption* of Manners, and *any thing* which occasions the Misery of the Subjects, destroys this *national Love*, and the *dear Idea* of a COUNTRY.

WE ought here to observe, That the only Reason of that *apparent want* of natural Affection among *collateral Relations*, is, that these *natural Inclinations*, in many Cases, are overpower'd by *Self-Love*, where there happens any *Opposition* of Interests; but where this does not happen, we shall find all Mankind under its Influence, but

but with different degrees of Strength, according to the *nearer* or *more remote* Relations they ſtand in to each other; and according as the *natural Affection* of *Benevolence* may be join'd with and ſtrengthen'd by *Eſteem*, *Gratitude*, *Compaſſion*, or *other kind Affections*; or on the contrary weaken'd by *Diſplicence*, *Anger*, or *Envy*. Sect. 2.

SECT. III.

The Sense *of* Virtue, *and the* various Opinions *about it, reducible to* one general Foundation. *The Manner of computing the* Morality *of* Actions.

I. IF we examine all the Actions which are counted *amiable* any where, and enquire into the Grounds upon which they are *approv'd*, we shall find, that in the Opinion of the Person who approves them, they always appear as BENEVOLENT, or flowing from the *Love of others*, and Study of their Happiness, whether the *Approver* be one of the Persons belov'd, or profited, or not; so that all those *kind Affections* which incline us to make others happy, and all Actions suppos'd to flow from *such* Affections, appear *morally Good*, if while they are *benevolent* toward some Persons, they be not *pernicious* to others: Nor shall we find any thing amiable in any Action whatsoever, where there is no *Benevolence* imagin'd; nor in any Disposition, or Capacity, which is not suppos'd applicable to, and design'd for *benevolent* Purposes. Nay, as it was before observ'd *,

* See *Sect.* 2. Art. III. *Par.* 1. *Art.* VI. *Par.* 2.

The

The Actions which in fact are exceedingly useful, shall appear void of *moral Beauty*, if we know that they proceeded from no kind Intentions toward others; and yet an unsuccessful Attempt of Kindness, or of promoting *publick Good*, shall appear as amiable as the most successful, if it flow'd from as *strong Benevolence*. Sect. 3.

II. HENCE it is, that *those* Affections which would lead us to do good to our Benefactor, shall appear *amiable*, and the *contrary* Affections *odious*, even when our Actions cannot possibly be of any advantage or hurt to him. Thus a *sincere Love* and *Gratitude* toward our Benefactor, a *chearful Readiness* to do whatever he shall require, how burdensom soever, a *hearty Inclination* to comply with his Intentions, and *Contentment* with the State he has plac'd us in, are the strongest Evidences of *Benevolence* we can shew to such a Person; and therefore they must appear exceedingly *amiable*: and under these is included all the *rational Devotion*, or *Religion*, toward a DEITY apprehended as *Good*, which we can possibly perform.

WE may here transiently observe one Circumstance in the *Frame* of our *Nature*, which is wonderfully adapted to promote *Benevolence*, *viz.* that as a Benefit confer'd, necessarily raises Gratitude in the *Benefi-*

Sect. 3. *ciary*, so the Expressions of this Gratitude, even from the meanest of Mankind, are *wonderfully delightful* to the Benefactor. Never were there any Mortals so poor, so inconsiderable, whose grateful Praise would not be some way delightful; and by whom we would not rather chuse to be lov'd, than hated, if their Love no way evidenc'd us to be Partners in their Vices, or concern'd in their Meanness. And thus the *most abject Beneficiary* is capable, and inclin'd to make no small addition to our Happiness by his *Love*, and *Gratitude*, when he is utterly incapable of any other Return, and when we expect none from him: Thus,

——————*A grateful Mind*
By owing owes not, and still pays, at once
Indebted and discharged————————*

As to *external Performances* of Religion, they are no doubt very various in different Nations, and Ages; and *Education* may give Men Opinions, that certain Actions are pleasing, and others displeasing to the DEITY: but then wherever any external Rite of Worship is approv'd, there also it is look'd upon to proceed from *Love* toward the DEITY, or some other Affec-

* Par. Lost, B. 4. l. 55.

tion

tion neceſſarily join'd with *Love*, as *Reverence*, *Repentance*, or *Sorrow* to have offended. So that the general Principle of *Love*, is the Foundation of all the *apparent moral Excellence*, even in the moſt fantaſtick Rites of Worſhip which were ever approv'd. For as to Rites deſign'd only to appeaſe a *furious Being*, no Mortal, I fancy, apprehends there is any *Virtue*, or *Excellence* in them; but that they are choſen only as the diſhonourable Means of avoiding a greater Evil. Now as there are various ſpeculative Opinions about what is acceptable to the DEITY, it neceſſarily follows, "That, accordingly, *Practices*, and *Approbation*, muſt be *various*; "tho all the *moral Goodneſs* of Actions is "ſtill preſum'd to flow from *Love*." Sect. 3.

III. AGAIN, That we may ſee how *Love*, or *Benevolence*, is the Foundation of all apprehended *Excellence* in *ſocial Virtues*, let us only obſerve, That amidſt the diverſity of Sentiments on this Head among various Sects, this is ſtill allow'd to be the way of deciding the Controverſy about any diſputed Practice, to enquire whether this Conduct, or the contrary, will moſt effectually promote the *publick Good*. The *Morality* is immediately adjuſted, when the natural Tendency, or Influence of the Action upon the *univerſal natural Good* of *Mankind* is agreed upon. That which produces

Sect. 3. duces more *Good* than *Evil* in the *Whole*, is acknowledg'd *Good*; and what does not, is counted *Evil*. In this Case, we no other way regard the good of the *Actor*, or that of those who are thus enquiring, than as they make a Part of the great *System*.

In our late Debates about *Passive Obedience*, and the Right of *Resistance* in Defence of *Privileges*, the Point disputed among Men of Sense was, whether *universal Submission* would probably be attended with greater *natural Evils*, than *temporary Insurrections*, when Privileges are invaded; and not, whether what tended in the Whole to the *publick natural Good*, was also *morally Good*. And if a *divine Command* was alledg'd in favour of the Doctrine of *Passive Obedience*, this would, no doubt, by its eternal Sanctions cast the ballance of *natural Good* to its own side, and determine our Election from *Interest*; and yet *our Sense* of the *moral Good* in *Passive Obedience*, would still be founded upon some Species of *Benevolence*, such as *Gratitude* toward the DEITY, and *Submission* to his Will to whom we are so much oblig'd. But I fancy those, who believe the DEITY to be *Good*, would not rashly alledge such a Command, unless they also asserted, that the thing commanded did tend more to the *universal Good* than the contrary, either by preventing

ing the external Evils of *Civil War*, or by enuring Men to *Patience*, or some *other Quality* which they apprehended neceſſary to their everlaſting Happineſs. And were it not ſo, *Paſſive Obedience* might be recommended as an *inglorious Method* of eſcaping a greater Miſchief, but could never have any thing *morally amiable* in it. Sect. 3.

BUT let us quit the Diſputes of the *Learned*, on whom, it may be alledg'd, *Cuſtom* and *Education* have a powerful Influence; and conſider upon what Grounds, in common Life, Actions are *approv'd* or *condemn'd*, *vindicated* or *excus'd*. We are univerſally aſham'd to ſay an Action is *Juſt*, becauſe it tended to my *Advantage*, or to the *Advantage* of the *Actor*: And we as ſeldom condemn a *beneficent kind Action*, becauſe it was not *advantageous* to us, or to the *Actor*. *Blame*, and *Cenſure*, are founded on a Tendency to *publick Evil*, or a Principle of *private Malice* in the *Agent*, or *Neglect* at leaſt of the *Good* of others; on *Inhumanity* of Temper, or at leaſt ſuch *ſtrong Selfiſhneſs* as makes the *Agent* careleſs of the Sufferings of others: and thus we *blame* and *cenſure* when the Action no way affects our ſelves. All the moving and perſuaſive Vindications of Actions, which may, from ſome *partial* evil Tendency, appear *evil*, are taken from this, that they were neceſſary to ſome *greater Good* which counterballanc'd the *Evil*;

Sect. 3. *Evil:* "*Severity* toward a few, is *Com-*
"*passion* toward multitudes; *tranſitory*
"*Puniſhments* are neceſſary for avoiding
"more *durable Evils*; did not *ſome* ſuffer
"on ſuch Occaſions, there would be *no*
"*living* for honeſt Men;" and ſuch like. And even when an Action cannot be entirely juſtify'd, yet how greatly is the Guilt extenuated, if we can alledge; "That it "was only the Effect of *Inadvertence* "without *Malice*, or of *partial good Na-*"*ture*, *Friendſhip*, *Compaſſion*, *natural* "*Affection*, or *Love* of a *Party*." All theſe Conſiderations ſhew what is the *univerſal Foundation* of *our Senſe* of *moral Good*, or *Evil*, viz. *Benevolence* toward others on one hand, and *Malice*, or even *Indolence*, and *Unconcernedneſs* about the *apparent publick Evil* on the other. And let it be here obſerv'd, that we are ſo far from imagining all Men to be acted only by *Self-Love*, that we univerſally expect in others a Regard for the *Publick*; and do not look upon the want of this, as barely the abſence of *moral Good*, or *Virtue*, but even as *poſitively evil*, and *hateful*.

IV. CONTRARYS may illuſtrate each other; let us therefore obſerve the *general Foundation* of *our Senſe* of *moral Evil* more particularly. *Diſintereſted Malice*, or *Delight* in the Miſery of others, is the higheſt pitch of what we count *vitious*; and every

every Action appears *evil*, which is imagin'd to flow from any degree of *this Affection*. Perhaps a *violent Passion* may hurry Men into it for a few Moments, and our *rash angry Sentiments* of our Enemys, may represent them as having such *odious Dispositions*; but it is very probable from the Reasons offer'd above *, that there is no such degree of wickedness in *human Nature*, as, in *cold blood*, to be pleas'd with the *Misery* of others, when it is conceiv'd to be no way useful to *our Interests*. Sect. 3.

THE Story of NERO and PÆTUS may be alledg'd against this, but perhaps unjustly, even allowing the Fact to be true. NERO was conscious that he was hated by those whom the World call'd *good Men*, and that they were dangerous to him; he fancy'd his best Security lay in being terrible, and appearing such on all Occasions, by making others miserable when he pleas'd; to let his Enemys see, that they should have no Security from that Compassion which a NERO would imagine argu'd Weakness. This *unfortunate Gentleman*'s Happiness might by some *foolish Courtier* be so related, as to carry a Reproof of the *Tyrant's* unnatural Pursuits, whereby his Passion might be excited to cut off the Person admir'd, and prefer'd before him. Any

* See *Sect.* 2. *Art.* IV.

Sect. 3. of these Motives of *apparent Interest* seem more probably to have influenc'd him, than that we should in *him*, and a few *others*, suppose a Principle of *calm Malice* without *Interest*, of which the *rest* of *Mankind* seem entirely incapable.

THE Temper of a *Tyrant* seems probably to be a continu'd state of *Anger*, *Hatred*, and *Fear*. To form our Judgment then of his Motives of Action, and those of Men of like Tempers in lower Stations, let us reflect upon the Apprehensions we form of Mankind, when we are under any of those Passions which to the *Tyrant* are *habitual*. When we are under the fresh Impressions of an Injury, we plainly find, that our Minds are wholly fill'd with Apprehensions of the Person who injur'd us, as if he were *absolutely Evil*, and *delighted* in doing Mischief: We overlook the Virtues, which, when calm, we could have observ'd in him; we forget that it is perhaps only *Self-Love*, and not *Malice*, which was his Motive, or it may be some *generous* or *kind Intention* toward others. These, probably, are the Opinions which a *Tyrant* constantly forms concerning *Mankind*; and having very much weaken'd all *kind Affections* in himself, however he may pretend to them, he judges of the Tempers of others by his own. And were *Mankind* really *such* as he apprehends them, his

his Treatment of them would not be very unreaſonable. We ſhall generally find our Paſſions ariſing ſuitably to the Apprehenſions we form of others: if theſe be raſhly form'd upon ſome ſudden ſlight Views, it is no wonder if we find Diſpoſitions following upon them, very little ſuited to the *real State* of *human Nature*. Sect. 3.

THE ordinary Springs of *Vice* among Men, muſt then be ſuppos'd to be a *miſtaken Self-Love*, made too violent, ſo as to overcome *Benevolence*; or *Affections* ariſing from *falſe* and *raſhly form'd Opinions* of *Mankind*, which we run into thro the weakneſs of our *Benevolence*. When Men, who had mutually good Opinions of each other, happen to have *contrary Intereſts*, they are apt to have their *good Opinions* of each other *abated*, by imagining a *deſign'd Oppoſition* from *Malice*; without this, they can ſcarcely *hate* one another. Two *Candidates* for the ſame Office wiſh each other *dead*, becauſe that is an ordinary way by which Men make room for each other; but if there remains any Reflection on each other's Virtue, as there ſometimes may in benevolent Tempers, then their Oppoſition may be without *Hatred*; and if another better Poſt, where there is no Competition, were beſtow'd on one of them, the other ſhall rejoice at it.

V. THE

Sect. 3.

V. THE Actions which flow ſolely from *Self-Love*, and yet evidence no Want of *Benevolence*, having no hurtful Effects upon others, ſeem *perfectly indifferent* in a *moral Senſe*, and neither raiſe the *Love* or *Hatred* of the Obſerver. Our Reaſon can diſcover indeed certain Bounds, within which we may not only act from *Self-Love*, conſiſtently with the *Good* of the *Whole*, but every Mortal's acting thus within theſe Bounds for his own *Good*, is abſolutely neceſſary for the *Good* of the *Whole*, and the Want of ſuch *Self-Love* would be *univerſally pernicious*; and hence, he who purſues his own *private Good*, with an Intention alſo to concur with that Conſtitution, which tends to the *Good* of the *Whole*; and much more he who promotes his *own Good*, with a direct View of making himſelf more capable of ſerving GOD, or doing good to *Mankind*; acts not only *innocently*, but alſo *honourably*, and *virtuouſly*: for in both theſe Caſes, a Motive of *Benevolence* concurs with *Self-Love* to excite him to the Action. And thus *a Neglect* of our *own Good*, may be *morally evil*, and argue a Want of *Benevolence* toward the *Whole*. But when *Self-Love* breaks over the Bounds above-mention'd, and leads us into Actions detrimental to *others*, and to the *whole*, or makes us inſenſible of the *generous kind Affections*; then

then it appears *vitious*, and is *disapprov'd*. Sect. 3.
So also, when upon any small Injurys, or sudden Resentment, or any weak superstitious Suggestions, our *Benevolence* is so faint, as to let us run into any odious Conceptions of *Mankind*, or any Part of them, without just Ground, as if they were *wholly Evil*, or *Malicious*, or as if they were a worse Sort of Beings than they really are; these Conceptions must lead us into *malevolent Affections*, or at least weaken our *good ones*, and make us *really Vitious*.

VI. HERE we must also observe, that every *moral Agent* justly considers himself as a *Part* of this *rational System*, which may be useful to the *Whole*; so that he may be in part an Object of his own *Benevolence*. Nay further, as was hinted above, he may see, that the Preservation of the *System* requires, that every one should be *innocently sollicitous* about himself. Hence he may conclude, that an Action which brings *greater Evil* to the *Agent*, than *Good* to *others*; however it may evidence *strong Benevolence*, or a *virtuous Disposition* in the *Agent*; yet it shews it to be founded upon a mistaken Opinion of the Tendency of an Action to the *publick Good*, which does not in Reality tend to it: so that a wise Man who reason'd justly, and consider'd the Whole, would not be led into it, were his *Benevolence* ever so strong;

Sect. 3. nor would he recommend it to the Practice of others; however he might acknowledge, that the Detriment arising to the *Agent* from a *kind Action*, did evidence a strong Disposition to *Virtue*. Nay further, were there any *Good* propos'd to the Pursuit of an *Agent*, and he had a *Competitor* in every respect *only equal* to himself, the *highest Benevolence* possible would not lead a wise Man to prefer another to himself, were there no Ties of Gratitude, or some other external Circumstance to move him to yield to his *Competitor*. A Man surely of the *strongest Benevolence*, may just treat himself as he would do a third Person, who was a Competitor of *equal Merit* with the other; and as his preferring one to another, in such a Case, would argue no Weakness of *Benevolence*, so, no more would he evidence it by preferring himself to a Man of only *equal Abilitys*.

VII. The *moral Beauty*, or *Deformity* of Actions, is not alter'd by the *moral Qualitys* of the Objects, any further than as the Qualitys of the Objects increase or diminish the *Benevolence* of the Action, or the *publick Good* intended by it: Thus *Benevolence* toward the *worst* Characters, or the Study of their *Good*, may be as *amiable* as any whatsoever; yea often more so than that toward the *Good*, since it argues such a strong Degree of *Benevolence* as can surmount

surmount the greatest Obstacle, the *moral* Sect. 3.
Evil in the Object. Hence the *Love* of
unjust Enemys, is counted among the *highest Virtues:* Yet when our *Benevolence* to the *Evil* encourages them in their bad Intentions, or makes them more capable of Mischief; this diminishes or destroys the *Beauty* of the Action, or even makes it *evil*, as it betrays *a Neglect* of the *Good* of *others* more valuable; Beneficence toward *whom*, would have tended more to the *publick Good*, than that toward our *injurious Favourites:* But *Benevolence* toward *evil* Characters, which neither encourages them, nor enables them to do Mischief, nor diverts our *Benevolence* from Persons more useful, has as much *moral Beauty* as any whatsoever.

VIII. IN comparing the *moral Qualitys* of Actions, in order to regulate our Election among various Actions propos'd, or to find which of them has the greatest *moral Excellency*, we are led by *our moral Sense* of *Virtue* thus to judge, that in *equal Degrees* of Happiness, expected to proceed from the Action, the *Virtue* is in proportion to the *Number* of Persons to whom the Happiness shall extend: And here the *Dignity*, or *moral Importance* of Persons, may compensate Numbers; and in equal *Numbers*, the *Virtue* is as the *Quantity* of the Happiness, or natural

Sect. 3. Good; or that the *Virtue* is in a *compound Ratio* of the *Quantity* of Good, and *Number* of Enjoyers: And in the same manner, the *moral Evil*, or *Vice*, is as the *Degree* of Misery, and *Number* of Sufferers; so that, *that Action* is *best*, which accomplishes the *greatest Happiness* for the *greatest Numbers*; and *that*, *worst*, which, in *like manner*, occasions *Misery*.

IX. AGAIN, when the *Consequences* of Actions are of a *mix'd* Nature, partly *Advantageous*, partly *Pernicious*, *that Action* is *good*, whose *good* Effects preponderate the *evil*, by being useful to many, and pernicious to few; and *that*, *evil*, which is otherwise. Here also the *moral Importance* of Characters, or *Dignity* of Persons may compensate Numbers; as may also the *Degrees* of Happiness or Misery: for to procure an *inconsiderable Good* to many, but an *immense Evil* to few, may be *Evil*; and an *immense Good* to few, may preponderate a *small Evil* to many.

BUT by the *Consequences* of Actions, we are not only to understand the immediate Effects directly produc'd by them, but also all those Events which otherwise would not have happen'd. Thus many Actions which have no immediate evil Effects; nay, which actually produce good Effects, may be *evil*, if their universal Allowance

lowance would be more detrimental to Mankind than their universal Prohibition; or if there be no fixed Standard, that Men may easily know when such Actions are allow'd, and when prohibited; or when such Actions, however useful in particular Instances, might be Precedents to the greatest Mischief. As for Example, the *Execution* of Justice by *private Persons* on Offenders, in any State not entirely perverted from the Ends of Government; the *violating* the Rights of *worthless Persons*, in favour of those of great *moral Capacitys*, and of great *Benevolence*; the *protecting* the *Innocent* by *false Testimony* in a Court of Justice, and such like, may be very useful in singular Instances: but then the Allowance of such Actions would lead into the greatest Mischief, since every one would judge for himself what Cases were proper, and what not, and then there could be no Certainty of *Life*, *Possessions* or *Evidences*: and hence such Practices are universally counted *evil*. Sect. 3.

X. FROM the two last Observations, we may see what Actions our *moral Sense* would most recommend to our Election, as the most *perfectly Virtuous*; *viz.* such as appear to have the most universal unlimited Tendency to the *greatest* and *most extensive Happiness* of all the *rational Agents*, to whom our Influence can extend. All *Benevolence*, even toward a *Part*, is amiable,

Sect. 3. if not inconsistent with the *Good* of the *Whole:* But this is a smaller Degree of *Virtue*, unless our Beneficence be restrain'd by want of Power, and not want of Love to the *Whole*. All strict Attachments to Partys, Sects, Factions, have but an imperfect Species of *Beauty*, unless when the *Good* of the *Whole* requires a stricter Attachment to a *Part*, as in *natural Affection*, or *virtuous Friendships*; or when *some Parts* are so eminently useful to the *Whole*, that even *universal Benevolence* would determine us with special Care and Affection to study their Interests. Thus *universal Benevolence* would incline us to a more strong Concern for the Interests of *great* and *generous Characters* in a high Station, or make us more earnestly study the Interests of any *generous Society*, whose whole Constitution is contriv'd to promote *universal Good*. Thus a good Fancy in *Architecture*, would lead a Man, who was not able to bear the Expence of a compleatly regular Building, to chuse such a Degree of Ornament as he could keep uniformly through the *Whole*, and not move him to make a vain unfinish'd Attempt in *one Part*, of what he foresaw he could not succeed in as to *the Whole*. And the most perfect Rules of *Architecture* condemn an excessive Profusion of Ornament on *one Part*, above the Proportion of *the Whole*, unless *that Part* be some eminent

eminent Place of the *Edifice*, such as the *chief Front*, or *publick Entrance*; the adorning of which, would beautify the *Whole* more than an equal Expence of Ornament on any *other Part*. Sect. 3.

THIS Increase of the *moral Beauty* of Actions, or Dispositions, according to the *Number* of Persons to whom the good Effects of them extend, may shew us the Reason why Actions which flow from the *nearer Attachments* of *Nature*, such as *that* between the *Sexes*, and the *Love* of *our Offspring*, are not so *amiable*, nor do they appear so *virtuous*, as Actions of *equal Moment* of *Good* towards Persons less attach'd to us. The Reason is plainly this: These strong Instincts are by *Nature* limited to small Numbers of Mankind, such as *our Wives* or *Children*; whereas a Disposition, which would produce a *like Moment* of *Good* to others, upon no special Attachment, were it accompany'd with natural Power to accomplish its Intention, would be incredibly more fruitful of great and good Effects to the *Whole*.

FROM this primary Idea of *moral Good* in Actions, arises the Idea of *Good* in those Dispositions, whether *natural* or *acquir'd*, which enable us to do good to others, or which are presum'd to be design'd, and acquir'd, or cultivated for that purpose: And hence those Abilitys, while nothing appears contrary to our Presumption, may increase

Sect. 3. our Love to the Poſſeſſor of them; but when they are imagin'd to be intended for *publick Miſchief*, they make us hate him the more: Such are a *penetrating Judgment*, a *tenacious Memory*, a *quick Invention*; *Patience* of *Labour*, *Pain*, *Hunger*, *Watching*; a *Contempt* of *Wealth*, *Rumour*, *Death*. Theſe may be rather call'd *natural Abilitys*, than *moral Qualitys Good* or *Evil*. Now, a Veneration for theſe Qualitys, any further than as they are employ'd for the *publick Good*, is fooliſh, and flows from our *moral Senſe*, grounded upon a falſe Opinion; for if we plainly ſee them *maliciouſly* employ'd, they make the Agent more deteſtable.

XI. To find a *univerſal Canon* to compute the *Morality* of any Actions, with all their Circumſtances, when we judge of the Actions done by our ſelves, or by others, we muſt obſerve the following *Propoſitions*, or *Axioms*.

1. The *moral Importance* of any Character, or the *Quantity* of *publick Good* produc'd by him, is in a *compound Ratio* of his *Benevolence* and *Abilitys*: or (by ſubſtituting the initial Letters for the Words, as M=*Moment* of *Good*, and μ=*Moment* of *Evil*) $M=B\times A$.

2. When in comparing the *Virtue* of two Actions, the *Abilitys* of the *Agents* are

are equal, the *Benevolence* is as the *Moment* of *publick Good*, produc'd by them in like Circumstances: or $B=M\times 1$. Sect. 3.

3. WHEN *Benevolence* in two *Agents* is equal, and other Circumstances alike, the *Moment* of *publick Good* is as the *Abilitys*: or $M=A\times 1$.

4. THE *Virtue* then of *Agents*, or their *Benevolence*, is always *directly* as the *Moment* of *Good* produc'd in like Circumstances, and *inversly* as their *Abilitys*: or $B=\frac{M}{A}$.

5. BUT as the natural Consequences of our Actions are various, some *good* to our selves, and *evil* to the Publick, and others *evil* to our selves, and *good* to the Publick; or either *useful* both to our selves and others, or *pernicious* to both; the entire Motive to good Actions is not always *Benevolence alone*; or Motive to Evil, *Malice alone*; (nay, this last is seldom any Motive at all): But in most Actions we must look upon *Self-Love* as another Force, sometimes conspiring with *Benevolence*, and assisting it, when we are excited by Views of *private Interest*, as well as *publick Good*; and sometimes opposing *Benevolence*, when the good Action is any way *difficult* or *painful* in the Performance, or *detrimental* in its Consequences to the *Agent*.

These

Sect. 3. These *selfish Motives* shall be * afterwards more explain'd; here we may in general denote them by the Word *Interest:* which when it concurs with *Benevolence*, in any Action capable of Increase, or Diminution, must produce a greater Quantity of *Good*, than *Benevolence* alone in the same *Abilitys*; and therefore when the *Moment* in one Action, partly intended for the *Good* of the *Agent*, is but equal to the *Moment* in the Action of *another Agent* influenc'd only by *Benevolence*, the former is less *virtuous*; and in his Case the *Interest* must be deducted to find the true Effect of the *Benevolence*, or *Virtue:* And in the same manner, when *Interest* is opposite to *Benevolence*, and yet is surmounted by it, this *Interest* must be added to the *Moment*, to increase the *Virtue* of the Action, or the Strength of the *Benevolence:* Or thus, in *advantageous Virtue* $B=\frac{M-I}{A}$. And in *laborious*, *painful*, *dangerous* or *expensive Virtue* $B=\frac{M+I}{A}$. By *Interest*, in this last Case, is understood all the *Advantage* which the *Agent* might have obtained by omitting the Action, which is a *negative Motive* to it; and this, when subtracted, becomes *positive*.

* Vide *Sect.* 5.

Sect. 3.

BUT here we must observe, That no *Advantage*, not intended, altho casually, or naturally redounding to us from the Action, does at all affect its *Morality* to make it less *amiable*; nor does any *Difficulty* or *Evil* unforeseen, or not resolv'd upon, tend to make a kind Action more *virtuous*; since in such Cases *Self-Love* neither assists nor opposes *Benevolence*. Nay, *Self-Interest* only then diminishes the *Benevolence*, when without this View of *Interest* the Action would not have been undertaken, or so much *Good* would not have been produc'd by the *Agent*; and it extenuates the *Vice* of an *evil* Action, when without this *Interest* the Action would not have been pleasing to the *Agent*, nor so much *Evil* produc'd by him.

THE fifth Axiom only explains the external Marks by which Men must judge, who do not see into each others Hearts; for it may really happen in many Cases, that Men may have a *Benevolence* sufficient to have surmounted any Difficulty, and yet they may meet with none at all: And in that Case, it is certain there is as much *Virtue* in the *Agent*, tho he does not give such Proof of it to his Fellow-Creatures, as if he had surmounted Difficultys in his kind Actions: And this too must be

the

Sect. 3. the Case with the DEITY, to whom nothing is difficult.

SINCE then *Benevolence*, or *Virtue* in any *Agent*, is as $\frac{M}{A}$, or as $\frac{M+I}{A}$, and no *Being* can act above his *natural Ability*, *that* must be the Perfection of *Virtue* where M=A, or when the *Being* acts to the utmost of its Power for the *publick Good*; and hence the Perfection of *Virtue* in this Case, or $\frac{M}{A}$ is as *Unity*. And this may shew us the only Foundation for the boasting of the *Stoicks*, "That a Creature supposed Innocent, by pursuing *Virtue* with "its utmost Power, may in *Virtue* equal "the *Gods*." For in their Case, if [A] or the *Ability* be *Infinite*, unless [M] or the *Good* to be produc'd in the whole, be so too, the *Virtue* is not *absolutely perfect*; and the *Quotient* can never surmount *Unity*.

XII. THE same Axioms may be apply'd to compute the *moral Evil* in Actions; that is, calling the Disposition which leads us to *Evil*, *Hatred*, tho it is oftner only *Self-Love*, with Inadvertence to its Consequences; then,

1*st*. THE

Sect. 3.

1*ſt*. THE *Moment* of *Evil* produc'd by any *Agent*, is as the *Product* of his *Hatred* into his *Ability*, or $\mu = H \times A$. And,

2*dly*. IN *equal Abilitys*, $\mu = H \times 1$.

3*dly*. WHEN *Hatred* is equal, $\mu = A \times 1$: And,

4*thly*. THE Degree of *moral Evil*, or the Degree of *Vice*, which is equal to the *Hatred* or *Neglect* of *publick Good*, is thus expreſs'd, $H = \frac{\mu}{A}$.

5*thly*. THE Motives of *Intereſt* may be co-operating with *Hatred*, or oppoſing it the ſame way as with *Benevolence*; and then according as *Self-Intereſt* may partly excite to the Action, and ſo diminiſh the *Evil*; or diſſuade from it, and ſo increaſe it, the *Malice* which ſurmounts it, or $H = \frac{\mu + I}{A}$, in like manner as in the Caſe of *moral Good*.

BUT we muſt obſerve, that not only *Innocence* is expected from all Mortals, but they are preſum'd from their *Nature*, in ſome meaſure, inclin'd to *publick Good*; ſo that a bare Abſence of this Deſire is enough to make an *Agent* be reputed *Evil*: Nor is a direct

Sect. 3. a direct Intention of *publick Evil* necessary to make an Action *evil*, it is enough that it flows from *Self-Love*, with a plain Neglect of the *Good* of others.

XIII. From Axiom the *4th*, we may form almost a demonstrative Conclusion, that we have a *Sense* of *Goodness* and *moral Beauty* in Actions, distinct from *Advantage*; for had we no other Foundation of Approbation of Actions, but the *Advantage* which might arise to us from them, if they were done toward our selves, we would make no Account of the *Abilitys* of the *Agent*, but would barely esteem them according to their *Moment*: The *Abilitys* come in only to shew the Degree of *Benevolence*, which supposes *Benevolence* necessarily *amiable*. Who was ever the better pleas'd with a *barren rocky Farm*, or an *inconvenient House*, by being told that the *poor Farm* gave as great Increase as it could; or that the *House* accommodated its Possessor as well as it could? And yet in our Sentiments of Actions, whose *Moment* is very inconsiderable, it shall wonderfully increase the *Beauty* to alledge, "That it was all the *poor Agent* "could do for the *Publick*, or his "*Friend*."

XIV. The *moral Beauty* of *Characters* arises from their Actions, or sincere Intentions

tions of the *publick Good*, according to their Power. We form our Judgment of them according to what appears to be their *fix'd Disposition*, and not according to any *particular Sallys* of *unkind Passions*: Altho these do abate the *Beauty* of *good Characters*, as the Motions of the *kind Affections* may diminish the *Deformity* of the *bad ones*. What then properly constitutes a *virtuous Character*, is not some few accidental Motions of *Compassion*, *natural Affection*, or *Gratitude*; but such a *fix'd Humanity*, or *Desire* of the *publick Good* of all, to whom our Influence can extend, as uniformly excites us to all Acts of *Beneficence*, according to our utmost Prudence and Knowledge of the Interests of others; and a *strong Benevolence* will not fail to make us careful of informing our selves right, concerning the truest Methods of serving the Interests of Mankind. Every Motion indeed of the *kind Affections* appears in some degree *amiable*; but we denominate the *Character* from the *prevailing Principle*. Sect. 3.

XV. I KNOW not for what Reason some will not allow that to be *Virtue*, which flows from *Instincts*, or *Passions*; but how do they help themselves? They say, "*Virtue* arises from *Reason*." What is *Reason* but *that Sagacity we have in prosecuting any End?* The *ultimate End* pro-

pos'd

Sect. 3. pos'd by the common *Moraliſts* is the *Happineſs* of the *Agent* himſelf, and this certainly he is determin'd to purſue from *Inſtinct*: Now may not another *Inſtinct* toward the *Publick*, or the *Good* of others, be as proper a Principle of *Virtue*, as the *Inſtinct* toward *private Happineſs?* and is there not the ſame Occaſion for the Exerciſe of our *Reaſon* in purſuing the *former*, as the *latter*? This is certain, that whereas we behold the *ſelfiſh* Actions of others, with *Indifference* at beſt, we ſee ſomething *amiable* in every Action which flows from *kind Affections* or *Paſſions* towards others; if they be conducted by Prudence, ſo as any way to attain their End. Our *paſſionate* Actions, as we ſhew'd * above, are not generally *Self-intereſted*; ſince our Intention is not to free our ſelves from the *Uneaſineſs* of the Paſſion, but to alter the *State* of the Object. If it be ſaid, "That Actions "from *Inſtinct*, are not ſo much the Effect "of *Prudence* and *Choice*;" this Objection holds full as ſtrongly againſt Actions which flow from *Self-Love:* And I ſee no harm in ſuppoſing, that Men are *naturally* diſpos'd to *Virtue*, and not left *merely indifferent*, to be engag'd into Actions only as they ſhall appear to tend to their own *private Good.* Surely, the Suppoſition of a *benevolent univerſal Inſtinct*, would re-

* See *Sect.* 2. Art. VIII.

commend

commend *human Nature*, and its AUTHOR, more to the *Love* of a *good Man*, and leave room enough for the Exercise of our *Reason*, in contriving and settling *Rights*, *Laws*, *Constitutions*; in *inventing* Arts, and *practising* them so as to gratify, in the most effectual Manner, that *generous Inclination*. And if we must bring in *Self-Love* to make *Virtue Rational*, a little Reflection will discover, as it may appear afterwards, that this *Benevolence* is our *greatest Happiness*; and thence we may resolve as much as possible, to cultivate this *sweet Disposition*, and to despise every *opposite Interest*. Not that we can be *truly Virtuous*, if we intend only to obtain the Pleasure which accompanies *Beneficence*, without the *Love* of *others*: Nay this very Pleasure is founded on our being conscious of *disinterested Love* to *others*, as the *Spring* of our Actions: But *Self-Interest* may be our *Motive*, in choosing to continue in this *agreeable State*, tho it cannot be the *sole* or *principal Motive* of any Action, which to our *moral Sense* appears *Virtuous*. Sect. 3.

THE applying a *mathematical Calculation* to *moral Subjects*, may appear perhaps at first *extravagant* and *wild*; but some Corollarys, which are easily and certainly deduc'd below,* may shew the Conveniency of

* See *Sect. 7. Art.* VI, VII.

Sect. 3. this Attempt, if it could be further purſu'd. At preſent, we may only take this one, which ſeems the moſt joyful imaginable, even to the loweſt Rank of Mankind, *viz.* That no external Circumſtances of Fortune, no involuntary Diſadvantages, can exclude any Mortal from the *moſt heroick Virtue*: For how ſmall ſoever the *Moment* of *publick Good* be, which any one can accompliſh, yet if his *Abilitys* be proportionably ſmall, the *Quotient*, which expreſſes the Degree of *Virtue*, may be as great as any whatſoever. Thus, not only the *Prince*, the *Stateſman*, the *General*, are capable of *true Heroiſm*; tho theſe are the chief Characters, whoſe Fame is diffus'd thro various Nations and Ages; but when we find in an *honeſt Trader*, the *kind Friend*, the *faithful*, *prudent Adviſer*, the *charitable* and *hoſpitable Neighbour*, the *tender Husband*, and *affectionate Parent*, the *ſedate*, yet *chearful Companion*, the *generous Aſſiſtant* of *Merit*, the *cautious Allayer* of *Contention* and *Debate*, the *Promoter* of *Love* and *good Underſtanding* among Acquaintances; if we conſider, that theſe were *all* the *good Offices* which his Station in the World gave him an Opportunity of performing to Mankind, we muſt judge *this Character* really as *amiable*, as thoſe, whoſe external Splendor dazzles an injudicious World into an Opinion "that "they are the *only Heroes* in *Virtue*."

SECT.

SECT. IV.

All Mankind agree in this general Foundation *of their Approbation of* moral Actions. *The Grounds of the* different Opinions *about* Morals.

I. TO see how far Mankind agree in that, which we have made the *universal Foundation* of this *moral Sense*, *viz.* BENEVOLENCE, we have obſerv'd already, that when we are ask'd the Reaſon of our Approbation of any Action, we perpetually alledge its *Uſefulneſs* to the *Publick*, and not to the *Actor* himſelf. If we are vindicating a cenſur'd Action, and maintaining it lawful, we always make this one Article of our Defence, "That it injur'd "no body, or did more *Good* than *Harm*." On the other hand, when we blame any Piece of Conduct, we ſhew it to be *prejudicial* to others, beſides the *Actor*; or to evidence, at leaſt, a *Neglect* of their Intereſt, when it was in our power to ſerve them, or when *Gratitude*, *natural Affection*, or ſome other *diſintereſted Tie* ſhould have rais'd in us a Study of their Intereſt. We all know how great an Extenuation of

Sect. 4. Crimes this is, to alledge, "That the poor "Man does harm to no body but himself;" and how often this turns Hatred into Pity: and yet if we examine the Matter well, we shall find, that the greatest part of the Actions which are *immediately prejudicial* to our selves, and are often look'd upon as *innocent* toward others, do really tend to the *publick Detriment*, by making us incapable of performing the good Offices we could otherwise have done, and perhaps would have inclin'd to do: this is the Case of *Intemperance* and *extravagant Luxury*.

II. And further, we may observe, that no Action of any other Person was ever approv'd by us, but upon some Apprehension, well or ill grounded, of some *really good moral Quality*. If we observe the Sentiments of Men concerning Actions, we shall find, that it is still some *really amiable* and *benevolent Appearance* which engages their Approbation. We may perhaps commit Mistakes, in judging Actions to tend to the publick Good, which do not; or be so stupidly inadvertent, that while our Attention is fix'd on some *partial good Effects*, we may quite over-look many *evil Consequences* which counter-ballance the *Good*. Our *Reason* may be very deficient in its Office, by giving us partial Representations of the tendency of Actions; but it is still some *apparent Species* of *Benevolence* which com-

commands our Approbation. And *this* Sect. 4.
Senſe, like our other Senſes, tho counter-
acted from Motives of *external Advantage*,
which are ſtronger than it, yet does not
ceaſe to operate, but has Strength enough
to make us *uneaſy* and *diſſatisfy'd* with our
ſelves; even as the *Senſe* of *Taſting* ſhall
make us loath, and diſlike the nauſeous Po-
tion which we may command our ſelves,
from Intereſt, to ſwallow.

IT is, therefore, to no purpoſe to al-
ledge here, "That many Actions are
"really done, and approv'd, which tend
"to the *univerſal Detriment*." For the
ſame way, Actions are often perform'd,
and in the mean time approv'd, which in
fact tend to the *Hurt* of the *Actor*. But,
as we do not from the *latter*, infer the
Actor to be void of *Self-Love*, or a *Senſe*
of *Intereſt*; no more ſhould we infer from
the *former*, that ſuch Men are void of a
Senſe of *Morals*, or a deſire of *publick*
Good. The matter is plainly this. Men
are often miſtaken in the Tendency of Ac-
tions, either to *publick*, or *private Good*:
Nay, ſometimes *violent Paſſions*, while
they laſt, will make us approve very bad
Actions in a *moral Senſe*, or very *perni-*
cious ones to the *Agent*, as *advantageous*:
But this proves only, "That ſometimes
"there may be ſome more *violent Motive*
"to Action, than a *Senſe* of *moral Good*,

Sect. 4. " or that Men may be blinded by Paſſion, " even to their own *Intereſt*." But to prove that ſome Men are void of a *moral Senſe*, we ſhould find ſome Inſtances of *cruel*, *malicious Actions*, done, and *approv'd* in others, when there is no *Motive* of *Intereſt*, *real*, or *apparent*, ſave gratifying that very *deſire* of Miſchief to others: We muſt find a Country where *Murder* in cold blood, *Tortures*, and *every thing malicious*, without any *Advantage*, is, if not *approv'd*, at leaſt look'd upon with *indifference*, and raiſes *no Averſion* toward the Actors in the unconcern'd Spectators: We muſt find Men with whom the *Treacherous*, *Ungrateful*, *Cruel*, are in the ſame account with the *Generous*, *Friendly*, *Faithful*, and *Humane*; and who approve the *latter* no more than the *former*, in all Caſes where they are not affected by the Influence of theſe Diſpoſitions, or when the *natural Good* or *Evil* befalls other Perſons. And it may be queſtion'd, whether the *Univerſe*, tho large enough, and ſtor'd with no inconſiderable variety of Characters, will yield us any Inſtance, not only of a *Nation*, but even of a *Club*, or a *ſingle Perſon* of ſuch Sentiments, who will think all Actions *indifferent*, but thoſe which touch his *own Concerns*.

III. FROM what has been ſaid, we may eaſily account for the *vaſt Diverſity* of

moral

moral Principles, in *various Nations*, and *Ages*; which is indeed a good Argument againſt *innate Ideas*, or *Principles*, but will not evidence Mankind to be void of a *moral Senſe* to perceive *Virtue* or *Vice*, when Actions occur to their Obſervation. Sect. 4.

THE Grounds of *this Diverſity* are principally theſe:

1ſt. DIFFERENT Opinions of *Happineſs*, or *natural Good*, and of the moſt effectual Means to advance it. Thus in one Country, where there prevails a *courageous Diſpoſition*, where *Liberty* is counted a *great Good*, and *War* an *inconſiderable Evil*, all Inſurrections in defence of Privileges, will have the appearance of *moral Good* to our *Senſe*, becauſe of their appearing *benevolent*; and yet the *ſame Senſe* of *moral Good* in *Benevolence*, ſhall, in another Country, where the Spirits of Men are more *abject* and *timorous*, where *Civil War* appears the *greateſt natural Evil*, and *Liberty* no *great Purchaſe*, make the ſame Action appear *odious*. So in SPARTA, where, thro Contempt of Wealth, the Security of Poſſeſſions was not much regarded, but the thing chiefly deſir'd, as *naturally good* to the *State*, was to abound in a *hardy*, *ſhifting Youth*; *Theft*, if dexterouſly

Sect. 4. perform'd, was so little odious, that it received the Countenance of a Law to give it Impunity. But in these, and all other Instances of the like nature, the Approbation is founded on *Benevolence*, because of some real, or apparent Tendency to the *publick Good*. For we are not to imagine, that *this Sense* should give us antecedent to Observation, Ideas of complex Actions, or of their natural Tendencys to *Good* or *Evil*: It only determines us to approve *Benevolence*, whenever it appears in any Action, and to hate *the contrary*. So our *Sense* of *Beauty* does not, without Reflection, Instruction, or Observation, give us Ideas of the *regular Solids*, *Temples*, *Cirques*, and *Theatres*; but determines us to approve and delight in *Uniformity amidst Variety*, wherever we observe it. Let us read the Preambles of any Laws we count unjust, or the Vindications of any disputed Practice by the *Moralists*, and we shall find no doubt, that Men are often mistaken in computing the Excess of *natural Good* or *Evil Consequences* of certain Actions; but the Ground on which any Action is approv'd, is still some Tendency to the *greater natural Good* of others, apprehended by those who approve it.

The same Reason may take away also the Objections against the *Universality of this Sense*, from some Storys of Travellers, con-

concerning *ſtrange Crueltys* practis'd toward the *Aged*, or *Children*, in certain Countrys. If ſuch Actions be done in ſudden angry Paſſions, they only prove, that other Motives, or Springs of Action, may overpower *Benevolence* in its *ſtrongeſt Ties*; and if they really be univerſally allow'd, look'd upon as innocent, and vindicated, it ſhall certainly be under ſome appearance of *Benevolence*; ſuch as to ſecure them from Inſults of Enemys, to avoid the Infirmitys of Age, which perhaps appear greater Evils than Death, or to free the vigorous and uſeful Citizens from the Charge of maintaining them, or the Troubles of Attendance upon them. A love of Pleaſure and Eaſe, may, in the immediate Agents, be ſtronger in ſome Inſtances, than *Gratitude* toward Parents, or *natural Affection* to Children. But that ſuch Nations are continu'd, notwithſtanding all the Toil in educating the Young, is ſtill a ſufficient Proof of *natural Affection*: For I fancy we are not to imagine any nice Laws in ſuch Places, compelling Parents to a proper Education of ſome certain number of their Offspring. We know very well that an appearance of *publick Good*, was the Ground of Laws, equally Barbarous, enacted by LYCURGUS, and SOLON, of killing the deform'd, or weak, to prevent a burdenſom Croud of uſeleſs Citizens. Sect. 4.

MEN

Sect. 4.

MEN have *Reason* given them, to judge, and compare the Tendencys of Actions, that they may not stupidly follow the first Appearance of *publick Good*; but it is still some Appearance of *Good* which they pursue: And it is strange, that *Reason* is universally allow'd to Men, notwithstanding all the stupid, ridiculous Opinions receiv'd in many Places, and yet absurd Practices, founded upon those very Opinions, shall seem an Argument against any *moral Sense*; altho the bad Conduct is not any Irregularity in the *moral Sense*, but in the *Judgment* or *Opinion*. If putting the *Aged* to *death*, with all the Consequences, really tends to the *publick Good*, and to the *lesser Misery* of the *Aged*, it is no doubt *justifiable*; nay, perhaps the *Aged* chuse it, in hopes of a *future State*. If a *deform'd*, or *weak Race*, could never, by Ingenuity and Art, make themselves useful to Mankind, but should grow an absolutely unsupportable Burden, so as to involve a whole State in Misery, it is *just* to put them to death. This all allow to be *just*, in the Case of an over-loaded Boat in a Storm. And as for *killing* of their Children, when Parents are sufficiently stock'd, it is perhaps practis'd, and allow'd from *Self-love*; but I can scarce think it passes for a good Action any where. If *Wood*, or *Stone*, or *Metal* be a DEITY, have *Government*,

vernment, and *Power*, and have been the *Authors* of *Benefits* to us, it is *morally amiable*, gratefully to praise and worship them: Or if the *true* DEITY be pleas'd with Worship before *Statues*, or any *other Symbol* of some more *immediate Presence*, or *Influence*, *Image-Worship* is *virtuous*. If *he* delights in *Sacrifices*, *Penances*, *Ceremonys*, *Cringings*, they are *all laudable*. Our *Sense* of *Virtue* generally leads us exactly enough according to our Opinions; and therefore the absurd Practices which prevail in the World, are much better Arguments that Men have no *Reason*, than that they have no *moral Sense* of *Beauty* in Actions. Sect. 4.

IV. THE next *Ground* of *Diversity* in Sentiments, is the *Diversity* of *Systems*, to which Men, from foolish Opinions, confine their *Benevolence*. We insinuated above *, that it is *regular* and *beautiful* to have *stronger Benevolence* toward the *morally good* Parts of Mankind, who are *useful* to the *Whole*, than toward the *useless* or *pernicious*. Now if Men receive a *low*, or *base Opinion* of any *Body*, or *Sect* of Men; if they imagine them bent upon the Destruction of the more valuable Parts, or but *useless Burdens* of the Earth, *Benevolence* itself will lead us to neglect the In-

* See *Sect.* 3. *Art.* X. *Par.* 1.

terests

Sect. 4. terests of such, and to suppress them. This is the Reason, why, among Nations who have high Notions of *Virtue*, every Action toward an Enemy may pass for *just*; why ROMANS, and GREEKS, could approve of making those they call'd *Barbarians*, *Slaves*.

WERE we freely conversant with *Robbers*, who shew a *moral Sense* in the *equal* or *proportionable Division* of their Prey, and in *Faith* to each other, we should find they have their own sublime *moral Ideas* of their Party, as *Generous*, *Courageous*, *Trusty*, nay *Honest* too; and that those we call *Honest* and *Industrious*, are imagin'd by them as *Mean-spirited*, *Selfish*, *Churlish*, or *Luxurious*; on whom that Wealth is ill bestow'd, which therefore they would apply to better Uses, to maintain gallanter Men, who have a Right to a Living as well as their Neighbours, who are their profess'd Enemys. Nay, if we observe the Discourse of our *profess'd Debauchees*, our *most dissolute Rakes*, we shall find their Vices clothed, in their Imaginations, with some amiable Dress of *Liberty*, *Generosity*, *just Resentment* against the Contrivers of artful Rules to enslave Men, and rob them of their Pleasures. Perhaps never any Men pursu'd with Peace a long Tract of Vice, without some such deluding

luding Imagination of *moral Good**, while they may be ſtill inadvertent to the *barbarous* and *inhuman Conſequences* of their Actions. The Idea of an *ill-natur'd Villain*, is too frightful ever to become familiar to any Mortal: And hence we ſhall find, that the *baſeſt Actions* are dreſs'd in ſome *tolerable Mask:* What others call *Avarice*, appears to the *Agent* a *prudent Care* of a *Family*, or *Friends*; *Fraud*, *artful Conduct*; *Malice* and *Revenge*, a *juſt Senſe* of *Honour*, and a *Vindication* of our Right in Poſſeſſions, or Fame; *Fire* and *Sword*, and *Deſolation* among Enemys, a *juſt thorow Defence* of *our Country*; *Perſecution*, a *Zeal* for the *Truth*, and for the *eternal Happineſs* of Men, which *Hereticks* oppoſe. In all theſe Inſtances, Men generally act from a *Senſe* of *Virtue* upon *falſe Opinions*, and *miſtaken Benevolence*; upon *wrong* or *partial Views* of *publick Good*, and the means to promote it; or upon very *narrow Syſtems* form'd by like *fooliſh Opinions*. It is not a *Delight* in the Miſery of others, or *Malice*, which occaſions the horrid Crimes which fill our Hiſtorys; but generally an *injudicious unreaſonable Enthuſiaſm* for ſome kind of *limited Virtue*. Sect. 4.

* See below, *Sect.* 6. *Art.* II. *Par.* I.

Sect. 4.

Insani sapiens nomen ferat, æquus iniqui,
Ultra, quam satis est, VIRTUTEM si
petat ipsam.*

V. THE last Ground of *Diversity* which occurs, are the *false Opinions* of the *Will* or *Laws* of the DEITY. To obey these we are determin'd from *Gratitude*, and a *Sense* of *Right* imagin'd in the DEITY, to dispose at pleasure the Fortunes of his Creatures. This is so abundantly known to have produc'd *Follys*, *Superstitions*, *Murders*, *Devastations* of Kingdoms, from a Sense of *Virtue* and *Duty*, that it is needless to mention particular Instances. Only we may observe, "That all those *Follys*, or "*Barbaritys*, rather confirm than destroy "the Opinion of a *moral Sense*;" since the DEITY is believ'd to have a *Right* to dispose of his Creatures, and *Gratitude* to him, if he be conceiv'd *good*, must move us to Obedience to his Will; if he be not conceiv'd as *good*, *Self-love* may overcome our *moral Sense* of the Action which we undertake to avoid his Fury.

AS for the Vices which are commonly observ'd to proceed from *Love* of *Pleasure*, or any *violent Passion*, since generally the *Agent* is soon sensible of their *Evil*; and

* Hor. *Ep.* 6. *Lib.* 1. *v.* 15.

some-

sometimes so, amidst the heat of the Action, they only prove, " That this *moral Sense* " and *Benevolence* may be overcome by " the more importunate Sollicitations of " *other Desires.*" Sect. 4.

VI. BEFORE we leave this Subject, it is necessary to remove one of the strongest Objections against what has been said so often, *viz.* " That *this Sense* is *natural* and " independent on *Custom* and *Education.*" The Objection is this, " That we shall find " *some Actions* always attended with the " strongest Abhorrence, even at first View, " in some whole Nations, where yet there " is nothing contrary to *Benevolence* appa- " rent in the Actions; and that the *same* " *Actions* shall in another Nation be coun- " ted *innocent*, or *honourable:* Now we " generally allow, that what is from *Na-* " *ture* in one Nation, would be so in all. " Thus Incest, among *Christians*, is ab- " horr'd at first appearance as much as " *Murder*; and yet we cannot find any " necessary tendency of it to the detri- " ment of Mankind, at least among *Colla-* " *terals.* Now this Abhorrence cannot " be from *Nature*, since in GREECE the " marrying half Sisters was counted *honou-* " *rable*; and among the *Persian* MAGI, " the marrying of Mothers: Say they " then, may not all our *Approbation* or " *Dislike*

Sect. 4. " *Diſlike* of Actions ariſe the ſame way from " *Cuſtom* and *Education?* "

THE Anſwer to this may be eaſily found from what is already ſaid: had we no *moral Senſe natural* to us, we ſhou'd only look upon *Inceſt* as hurtful to our ſelves, and ſhun it, and never hate other *inceſtuous Perſons* more than we do a *broken Merchant*; ſo that ſtill this Abhorrence ſuppoſes a *Senſe* of *moral Good*. And further, it is true, that it is very hard to ſhew any natural tendency of ſome ſorts of *Inceſt* to the *publick Detriment*; but wherever it is hated, it is apprehended as offenſive to the DEITY, and that it expoſes the Perſons concern'd to his juſt Vengeance. Now it is univerſally acknowledg'd to be the groſſeſt ingratitude and baſeneſs in any Creature to counteract the Will of the DEITY, to whom it is under ſuch Obligations; and this is plainly *a moral evil Quality* apprehended in *Inceſt*, and reducible to the general Foundation of want of *Benevolence*, or *Malice*. Nay further, where this Opinion, that *Inceſt* is offenſive to the DEITY, prevails, *Inceſt* muſt have another direct Contrariety to *Benevolence*; ſince we muſt *apprehend* the *Inceſtuous*, as expoſing an Aſſociate, who ſhould be dear to him by the Ties of *Nature*, to the loweſt State of *Miſery* and *Baſeneſs*, *Infamy* and *Puniſhment*.

ment. But in those Countrys where no such Opinion prevails of the DEITY's abhorring *Incest*, or prohibiting it; since it does not appear that any obvious *natural Evils* follow from it, it may be look'd upon as *innocent*. And further, as Men who have the *Sense* of *Tasting*, may by *Company* and *Education* have Prejudices against Meats they never tasted, as *unsavoury*; so may Men, who have a *moral Sense*, acquire an Opinion by implicit Faith, of the *moral Evil* of Actions, altho they do not themselves discern in them any tendency to *natural Evil*; imagining that others do so: but without a *moral Sense*, we could receive no Prejudice against Actions, under any other View than as *naturally disadvantageous* to our selves. Sect. 4.

VII. THE *Universality* of this *moral Sense*, and that it is antecedent to *Instruction*, may appear from observing the Sentiments of *Children*, upon hearing the Storys with which they are commonly entertain'd as soon as they understand Language: They always passionately interest themselves on that side where *Kindness* and *Humanity* are found, and detest the *Cruel*, the *Covetous*, the *Selfish*, or the *Treacherous*. How strongly do we see their Passions of *Joy*, *Sorrow*, *Love*, and *Indignation*, mov'd by these *moral Representations*, even tho there

Sect. 4. has been no pains taken to give them Ideas of a DEITY, of *Laws*, of a *future State*, or of the more intricate Tendency of the *universal Good* to that of each *Individual.*

SECT.

SECT. V.

A further Confirmation that we have practical Diſpoſitions *to* Virtue *implanted in our* Nature, *with a further Explication of our* Inſtinct *to* Benevolence *in its various Degrees; with the* additional Motives *of* Intereſt, *viz.* Honour, Shame, *and* Pity.

I. WE have already endeavour'd to prove, "That there is a *univerſal Determination* to *Benevolence* in "*Mankind*, even toward the moſt diſtant "parts of the Species:" But we are not to imagine that this *Benevolence* is equal, or in the ſame degree toward *all*; there are ſome nearer and ſtronger Degrees of *Benevolence*, when the Objects ſtand in ſome nearer relations to our ſelves, which have obtain'd diſtinct Names, ſuch as *natural Affection* and *Gratitude*; or when *Benevolence* is increas'd by *greater Love of Eſteem*.

ONE Species of *natural Affection*, viz. that in *Parents* towards *Children*, has been conſider'd already *; we may only further obſerve, That there is the ſame kind of *Affection* among *collateral Relations*, tho

* See above, *Sect.* 2. *Art.* IX. *Par.* 2.

Sect. 5. in a weaker degree, which is univerſally obſervable where no Oppoſition of *Intereſt* produces contrary Actions, or counterballances the Power of this *natural Affection*. We may alſo obſerve, that as to the *Affection* of *Parents*, it cannot be entirely founded on *Merit* or *Acquaintance*; not only becauſe it is antecedent to all Acqaintance, which might occaſion the *Love* of *Eſteem*; but becauſe it operates where Acquaintance would produce *Hatred*, even toward *Children* apprehended to be *vitious*. And this *Affection* is further confirm'd to be from NATURE, becauſe it is always obſerv'd to *deſcend*, and not *aſcend* from *Children* to *Parents* mutually. NATURE, who ſeems ſometimes frugal in her Operations, has ſtrongly determin'd *Parents* to the Care of their *Children*, becauſe they univerſally ſtand in abſolute need of Support from them; but has left it to *Reflection*, and a *Senſe* of *Gratitude*, to produce Returns of *Love* in *Children*, toward ſuch *tender kind Benefactors*, who very ſeldom ſtand in ſuch abſolute need of Support from their Poſterity, as their Children did from them. Now did *Acquaintance* or *Merit* produce *natural Affection*, we ſurely ſhould find it ſtrongeſt in *Children*, on whom all the Obligations are laid by a thouſand good Offices; which yet is quite contrary to Obſervation. Nay, this Principle ſeems not confin'd to *Mankind*,

but

but extends to other *Animals*, where yet we ſcarcely ever ſuppoſe any Ideas of Merit; and is obſerv'd to continue in them no longer than the Neceſſitys of their Young require; nor could it be of any ſervice to the Young that it ſhould, ſince when they are grown up, they can receive lit le Benefit from the Love of their *Dams*: But as it is otherwiſe with *rational Agents*, ſo *their Affections* are of longer continuance, even during their whole lives. Sect. 5.

II. BUT there is nothing will give us a juſter Idea of the *wiſe Order* in which *human Nature* is form'd for *univerſal Love*, and *mutual good Offices*, than conſidering *that ſtrong attraction* of *Benevolence*, which we call *Gratitude*. Every one knows that *Beneficence* toward our ſelves makes a much deeper Impreſſion upon us, and raiſes *Gratitude*, or a *ſtronger Love* toward the *Benefactor*, than *equal Beneficence* toward a *third Perſon**. Now becauſe of the vaſt Numbers of Mankind, their diſtant Habitations, and the incapacity of any one to be remarkably uſeful to vaſt Multitudes; that our *Benevolence* might not be quite diſtracted with a multiplicity of Objects, whoſe equal Virtues would equally recommend them to our regard, or be made uſeleſs towards multitudes, whoſe Intereſts, at vaſt diſtances, we could not underſtand, nor be capable of promoting, having no

* See above, *Sect.* 2. *Art.* VI. *Part* 2.

Sect. 5. Intercourse of Offices with them; NATURE has more powerfully determin'd us to *admire* and *love* the *moral Qualitys* of others, which affect our selves, and has given us more powerful Impressions of *Good-will* towards those who are *beneficent* to our selves; which we call *Gratitude*; and thus has laid a Foundation for *joyful Associations* in all kinds of *Business*, and *virtuous Friendships*.

BY *this Constitution* also the *Benefactor* is more encourag'd in his *Beneficence*, and better secur'd of an *increase* of Happiness by *grateful Returns* *, than if his *Virtue* were only to be honour'd by the colder general Sentiments of Persons unconcern'd, who could not know his Necessitys, nor how to be profitable to him; especially, when they would all be equally determin'd to love innumerable multitudes, whose equal Virtues would have the same Pretensions to their Love, were there not an *increase* of *Love*, according as the Object is more *nearly attach'd* to *us*, or our *Friends*, by Offices which affect *our selves*, or *them*.

THIS *universal Benevolence* toward all Men, we may compare to that Principle of *Gravitation*, which perhaps extends to all Bodys in the *Universe*; but, like the *Love*

* See above, *Sect.* 3. *Art.* II. *Part* 2.

of

of *Benevolence*, *increaſes* as the Diſtance is diminiſh'd, and is *ſtrongeſt* when Bodys come to *touch* each other. Now this *increaſe* of *Attraction* upon nearer Approach, is as neceſſary to the *Frame* of the *Univerſe*, as that there ſhould be any *Attraction* at all: For a *general Attraction*, equal in all Diſtances, would by the Contrariety of ſuch multitudes of equal Forces, put an end to all Regularity of Motion, and perhaps ſtop it altogether. Sect. 5.

THIS *increaſe* of *Love* towards the *Benevolent*, according to their *nearer Approaches* to *our ſelves* by their *Benefits*, is obſervable in the high degree of *Love*, which *Heroes* and *Law-givers* univerſally obtain in their own Conntrys, above what they find abroad, even among thoſe who are not inſenſible of their Virtues; and in all the ſtrong Ties of *Friendſhip*, *Acquaintance*, *Neighbourhood*, *Partnerſhip*; which are exceedingly neceſſary to the Order of human Society.

III. FROM conſidering *that ſtrong Determination* in our *Nature* to *Gratitude*, and *Love* toward our *Benefactors*, which was already ſhewn to be *diſintereſted**; we are eaſily led to conſider *another Determination* of our *Minds* equally *natural* with the *for-*

* See above, *Sect.* 2. *Art.* VI.

Sect. 5. *mer*, which is to *delight* in the *good Opinion* and *Love* of *others*, even when we expect no other *Advantage* from them, except what flows from *this Conſtitution*, whereby HONOUR is made an *immediate Good*. This Deſire of *Honour* I would call AMBITION, had not *Cuſtom* join'd ſome evil Ideas to that Word, making it denote ſuch a *violent deſire* of *Honour*, and of *Power* alſo, as will make us ſtop at no baſe Means to obtain them. On the other hand, we are by NATURE ſubjected to a *grievous Senſation* of *Miſery*, from the unfavourable Opinions of others concerning us, even when we dread no other *Evil* from them: This we call SHAME; which in the ſame manner as *Honour*, is conſtituted an *immediate Evil*.

NOW were there no *moral Senſe*, or had we no other Idea of Actions but as *advantageous* or *hurtful*, I ſee no reaſon why we ſhould be *delighted* with *Honour*, or ſubjected to the *uneaſineſs* of *Shame*; or how it could ever happen, that a Man, who is ſecure from Puniſhment for any Action, ſhould ever be *uneaſy* at its being known to *all the World*. The *World* may have the worſe Opinion of him for it; but what ſubjects my Eaſe to the Opinion of the *World*? Why, perhaps, we ſhall not be ſo much truſted henceforward in Buſineſs, and ſo ſuffer Loſs. If this be the only reaſon of *Shame*, and it has no *immediate Evil* or

Pain

Pain in it, distinct from Fear of Loss, then wherever we expose our selves to Loss, we should be *asham'd*, and endeavour to conceal the Action; and yet it is quite otherwise. Sect. 5.

A MERCHANT, for instance, from Interest conceals a *Shipwreck*, or a very bad *Market*, which he has sent his Goods to: But is this the same with the Passion of SHAME? Has he that *Anguish*, that *dejection* of *Mind*, and *Self-condemnation*, which one shall have whose *Treachery* is detected? Nay, how will Men sometimes glory in their Losses, when in a Cause imagin'd *morally good*, tho they really weaken their Credit in the Merchant's Sense; that is, the Opinion of their *Wealth*, or *fitness* for Business? Was any Man ever *asham'd* of impoverishing himself to serve his *Country*, or his *Friend?*

IV. THE *Opinions* of our Country are by some made the first Standard of *Virtue*: They alledge, "That by comparing Actions to them, we first distinguish between "*moral Good*, and *Evil:* And then, say "they, AMBITION, or the *Love* of HONOUR, is our *chief Motive.*" But what is *Honour?* it is not to be universally known, no matter how: A *covetous Man* is not *honour'd* by being universally known as *covetous*; nor a *weak*, *selfish*, or *luxurious Man*,

Sect. 5. *Man*, when he is known to be so: Much less can a *treacherous*, *cruel*, or *ungrateful Man* be said to be *honour'd* for his being known as such. A *Posture-master*, a *Fire-eater*, or *Practiser* of *Leger-de-main*, is not *honour'd* for these publick Shews, unless we consider him as a Person capable of giving the Pleasures of *Admiration* and *Surprize* to multitudes. *Honour* then is *the Opinion of others concerning our morally good Actions, or Abilitys presum'd to be apply'd that way*; for *Abilitys* constantly apply'd to other Purposes, procure the greatest Infamy. Now, it is certain, that *Ambition* is founded on *Self-love*; but then our Determination to love *Honour*, presupposes a *Sense* of *moral Virtue*, both in the Persons who confer the Honour, and in him who pursues it. And let it be observ'd, that if we knew an *Agent* had no other Motive of Action but *Ambition*, we should apprehend no Virtue even in his most useful Actions, since they flow'd not from any *Love* to others, or *Desire* of their Happiness. When *Honour* is thus constituted by NATURE *pleasant* to us, it may be an *additional Motive* to *Virtue*, as we said above *, the Pleasure arising from *Reflection* on our *Benevolence* was: but the Person whom we imagine *perfectly virtuous*, acts immediately from the *Love* of others; however

* See *Sect.* 3. *Art.* XV.

these refin'd Interests may be *joint Motives* to him to set about such a Course of Actions, or to cultivate every *kind Inclination*, and to despise every *contrary Interest*, as giving a smaller Happiness than *Reflection* on his own Virtue, and *Consciousness* of the Esteem of others. Sect. 5.

SHAME is in the same manner constituted an *immediate Evil*, and influences us the same way to abstain from *moral Evil*; not that any Action or Omission would appear *virtuous*, where the *sole Motive* was Fear of *Shame*.

V. BUT to enquire further, how far the Opinions of our Company can raise a Sense of *moral Good* or *Evil*. If any Opinion be universal in any Country, Men of little Reflection will probably embrace it: If an Action be believ'd to be *advantageous* to the *Agent*, we may be led to believe so too, and then *Self-love* may make us undertake it; or may the same way make us shun an Action reputed *pernicious* to the *Agent*. If an Action pass for *advantageous* to the *Publick*, we may believe so too; and what next? If we have no *disinterested Benevolence*, what shall move us to undertake it? "Why, "we love *Honour*; and to obtain this Plea- "sure, we will undertake the Action from "*Self-Interest*." Now, is *Honour* only the Opinion of our Country, that an Action is

advan-

Sect. 5. *advantageous* to the *Publick?* No: we see no Honour paid to the *useful Treachery* of an Enemy whom we have brib'd to our Side, to *casual undesign'd Services*, or to the most useful Effects of *Compulsion* on *Cowards*; and yet we see Honour paid to *unsuccessful Attempts* to serve the Publick from sincere Love to it. *Honour* then presupposes a *Sense* of something *amiable*, besides *Advantage*, a *Sense* of *Excellence* in a *publick Spirit*; and therefore the *first Sense* of *moral Good* must be antecedent to *Honour*, for *Honour* is founded upon it. The Company we keep may lead us without examining, to believe that certain Actions tend to the *publick Good*; but that our Company *honours* such Actions, and *loves* the *Agent*, must flow from a *Sense* of *some Excellence* in this *Love* of the *Publick*, and serving its Interests.

"WE therefore, say they again, pre-
"tend to *love* the *Publick*, altho we only
"desire the Pleasure of *Honour*, and we
"will applaud all who seem to act in that
"manner, either that we may reap *Ad-*
"*vantage* from their Actions, or that o-
"thers may believe we *really love* the
"*Publick*:" But shall any Man ever *really love* the *Publick*, or study the *Good* of others in his heart, if *Self-love* be the only spring of his Actions? No: that is impossible. Or shall we ever really love Men

Men who appear to *love* the *Publick*, without a *moral Senſe*? No: we could form no Idea of ſuch a Temper; and as for theſe Pretenders to *publick Love*, we ſhould hate them as Hypocrites, and our Rivals in Fame. Now this is all which could be effected by the Opinions of our Country, even ſuppoſing they had a *moral Senſe*, provided we had none our ſelves: They never could make us admire *Virtue*, or *virtuous Characters* in others; but could only give us Opinions of *Advantage*, or *Diſadvantage* in Actions, according as they tended to procure to us the Pleaſures of *Honour*, or the Pain of *Shame*. Sect. 5.

BUT if we ſuppoſe that Men have by NATURE a *moral Senſe* of *Goodneſs* in Actions, and that they are capable of *diſintereſted Love*; all is eaſy. The Opinions of our Company may make us raſhly conclude, that certain Actions tend to the univerſal Detriment, and are *morally Evil*, when perhaps they are not ſo; and then *our Senſe* may determine us to have an averſion to them, and their Authors; or we may the ſame way be led into implicit Prejudices in favour of Actions as *good*; and then our deſire of *Honour* may co-operate with *Benevolence*, to move us to ſuch Actions: but had we no *Senſe* of *moral Qualitys* in Actions, nor form'd any Conceptions of them, but as *advantageous* or *hurtful*,

Sect. 5. we never could have *honour'd* or *lov'd Agents* for *publick Love*, or had any regard to their Actions, further than they affected ourselves in particular. We might have form'd the metaphysical Idea of *publick Good*, but we had never desir'd it, any further than it tended to our own *private Interest*, without a Principle of *Benevolence*; nor admir'd and lov'd those who were studious of it, without a *moral Sense*. So far is *Virtue* from being (in the Language of a late * Author) *the Offspring of Flattery, begot upon Pride*, that *Pride*, in the bad meaning of that Word, is *the spurious Brood of Ignorance by our moral Sense*, and *Flattery* only *an Engine, which the Cunning may use to turn this moral Sense in others, to the Purposes of Self-love in the Flatterer.*

VI. To explain what has been said of the Power of *Honour*: Suppose a STATE or PRINCE, observing the Money which is drawn out of *England* by *Italian Musicians*, did decree *Honours, Statues, Titles*, for *great Musicians*; this would certainly excite all who had hopes of Success, to the Study of *Musick*; and Men of a *good Ear* would approve of the *good* Performers as useful Subjects, as well as very entertaining:

* Author of the Fable of the Bees, *Page 37. 3d Ed.*

but

but would this give all Men a *good Ear*, or make them delight in *Harmony?* or could it ever make us really love a *Muſician*, who ſtudy'd nothing but his own Gain, in the ſame manner we do a *Patriot*, or a *generous Friend*? I doubt not. And yet *Friendſhip*, without the Aſſiſtance of Statues, or Honours, can make Perſons appear *exceedingly amiable*. Sect. 5.

LET us take another Inſtance: Suppoſe *Statues* and *triumphal Arches* were decreed, as well as a *large Sum* of *Money*, to the Diſcoverer of the *Longitude*, or any other uſeful Invention in Mathematicks: This would raiſe a univerſal Deſire of ſuch Knowledge from *Self-love*; but would Men therefore love a *Mathematician* as they do a *virtuous Man*? Would a *Mathematician* love every Perſon who had attained Perfection in that Knowledge, wherever he obſerv'd it, altho he knew that it was not accompany'd with any *Love* to *Mankind*, or *Study* of their *Good*, but with *Ill-nature*, *Pride*, *Covetouſneſs*? In ſhort, let us honour other Qualitys by external Shew as much as we pleaſe, if we do not diſcern a *benevolent Intention* in the Application, or preſume upon it; we may look upon theſe Qualitys as uſeful, enriching, or otherwiſe advantageous to any one who is poſſeſs'd of them; but they ſhall never meet with thoſe endearing Sentiments of *Eſteem* and *Love*, which

Sect. 5. which our *Nature* determines us to appropriate to *Benevolence* or *Virtue*.

LOVE of *Honour*, and Averſion to *Shame*, may often move us to do Actions for which others profeſs to honour us, even tho we ſee no *Good* in them our ſelves; and *Compliance* with the Inclinations of others, as it evidences Humanity, may procure ſome Love to the *Agent*, from Spectators who ſee no *moral Good* in the Action it ſelf: But without ſome *Senſe* of *Good* in the Actions, Men ſhall never be fond of ſuch Actions in Solitude, nor ever love any one for Perfection in them, or for practiſing them in Solitude; and much leſs ſhall they be diſſatisfy'd with themſelves when they act otherwiſe in Solitude. Now this is the caſe with us, as to *Virtue*; and therefore we muſt have by NATURE a *moral Senſe* of it antecedent to *Honour*.

THIS will ſhew us with what Judgment a late * Author compares the Original of our Ideas of *Virtue*, and Approbation of it, to *the manner of regulating the Behaviour of aukard Children by Commendation*. It ſhall appear afterward †, that our Approbation of ſome *Geſtures*, and what we call

* See the Fable of the Bees, *Page* 38. 3d *Ed.* † See *Sect.* 6. *Art.* IV.

Decency

Decency in Motion, depends upon some *moral Ideas* in People of advanc'd Years: But before Children come to obſerve this Relation, it is only *good Nature*, an *Inclination* to pleaſe, and *Love* of *Praiſe*, which makes them endeavour to behave as they are deſir'd; and not any Perception of *Excellence* in this Behaviour. And hence they are not ſollicitous about Geſtures when alone, unleſs with a View to pleaſe when they return to Company; and they never love or approve others for Perfection of this kind, but rather envy or hate them, till they either diſcern the Connexion between *Geſtures* and *moral Qualitys*, or reflect on the *good Nature* which is evidenc'd by ſuch a Compliance with the deſire of the Company. Sect. 5.

VII. THE conſidering *Honour* in the manner above explain'd, may ſhew us the reaſon why Men are often *aſham'd* for things which are not *vitious*, and *honour'd* for what is not *virtuous*. For, if any Action only appears *vitious* to any Perſons or Company, altho it be not ſo, they will have a bad Idea of the *Agent*; and then he may be aſham'd, or ſuffer Uneaſineſs in being thought *morally vil.* And the ſame way, thoſe who look upon an Action as *morally good*, will honour the *Agent*, and he may be pleas'd with the

Sect. 5. *Honour*, altho he does not himself perceive any *moral Good* in what has procur'd it.

AGAIN, we shall be *asham'd* of every Evidence of *moral Incapacity*, or want of *Ability*; and with good ground, when this want is occasion'd by our own Negligence. Nay further, if any Circumstance be look'd upon as *indecent* in any Country, *offensive* to others, and *deform'd*; we shall, out of our Love to the good Opinions of others, be *asham'd* to be found in such Circumstances, even when we are sensible that this Indecency or Offence is not founded on *Nature*, but is merely the Effect of *Custom*. Thus being observ'd in some of the Functions of Nature, which are counted *indecent* and *offensive*, will make us *uneasy*, altho we are sensible that they really do not argue any *Vice* or *Weakness*. But on the contrary, since *moral Abilitys* of any kind, upon the general Presumption of a good Application, procure the Esteem of others, we shall value our selves upon them, or grow proud of them, and be asham'd of any Discovery of our want of such *Abilitys*. This is the reason that *Wealth* and *Power*, the great *Engines* of *Virtue*, when presum'd to be intended for *benevolent* Purposes, either toward our Friends or our Country, procure *Honour* from others, and are apt to beget *Pride* in the Possessor which, as it is a general Passion which may

be

be either *good* or *evil*, according as it is grounded, we may describe to be *the Joy which arises from the real or imagin'd Possession of Honour, or Claim to it:* And the same are the Effects of *Knowledge, Sagacity, Strength*; and hence it is that Men are apt to boast of them. Sect. 5.

BUT whenever it appears that Men have only their *private Advantage* in view, in the application of these *Abilitys*, or *natural Advantages*, the *Honour* ceases, and we study to conceal them, or at least are not fond of displaying them; and much more when there is any Suspicion of an *ill-natur'd* Application. Thus some *Misers* are asham'd of their *Wealth*, and study to conceal it; as the *malicious* or *selfish* do their *Power:* Nay this is very often done where there is no positive evil Intention; because the diminishing their *Abilitys*, increases the *moral Good* of any little kind Actions, which they can find in their hearts to perform.

IN short, we always see Actions which flow from *publick Love*, accompany'd with generous Boldness and Openness; and not only *malicious*, but even *selfish ones*, the matter of Shame and Confusion; and that Men study to conceal them. The Love of *private Pleasure* is the ordinary occasion of *Vice*; and when Men have got any lively Notions of *Virtue*, they generally begin to be asham'd

Sect. 5. of every thing which betrays *Selfishness*, even in Instances where it is innocent. We are apt to imagine, that others observing us in such Pursuits, form mean Opinions of us, as too much set on private Pleasure; and hence we shall find such Enjoyments in most polite Nations, conceal'd from those who do not partake with us. Such are *venereal Pleasures* between *Persons marry'd*, and even *eating* and *drinking* alone, any nicer sorts of Meats or Drinks; whereas a *hospitable Table* is rather matter of boasting; and so are all other kind, generous Offices between *marry'd Persons*, where there is no Suspicion of *Self-love* in the *Agent*; but he is imagin'd as acting from Love to his *Associate*. This, I fancy, first introduc'd Ideas of *Modesty* in polite Nations, and *Custom* has strengthen'd them wonderfully; so that we are now asham'd of many things, upon some confus'd implicit Opinions of *moral Evil*, tho we know not upon what account.

HERE too we may see the reason, why we are not asham'd of any of the Methods of *Grandeur*, or *high-Living*. There is such a Mixture of *moral Ideas*, of *Benevolence*, of *Abilitys* kindly employ'd; so many Dependants *supported*, so many Friends *entertain'd*, *assisted*, *protected*; such a *Capacity* imagin'd for *great* and *amiable Actions*, that we are never asham'd, but rather boast

boaſt of ſuch things: We never affect Obſcurity or Concealment, but rather deſire that our *State* and *Magnificence* ſhould be known. Were it not for this Conjunction of *moral Ideas*, no Mortal could bear the Drudgery of *State*, or abſtain from laughing at thoſe who did. Could any Man be pleas'd with a Company of *Statues* ſurrounding his Table, ſo artfully contriv'd, as to conſume his various Courſes, and inſpir'd by ſome Servant, like ſo many Puppets, to give the uſual trifling Returns in praiſe of their Fare? or with ſo many *Machines* to perform the Cringes and Whiſpers of a Levee? Sect. 5.

THE *Shame* we ſuffer from the Meanneſs of *Dreſs*, *Table*, *Equipage*, is entirely owing to the ſame reaſon: This Meanneſs is often imagin'd to argue *Avarice*, *Meanneſs of Spirit*, want of *Capacity*, or *Conduct* in Life, of *Induſtry*, or *moral Abilitys* of one kind or other. To confirm this, let us obſerve that Men will glory in the Meanneſs of their Fare, when it was occaſion'd by a *good* Action. How many are there who would be aſham'd to be ſurpriz'd at a Dinner of *cold Meat*, who will boaſt of their having fed upon *Dogs* and *Horſes* at the Siege of *Derry*? and they will all tell you that they were not, nor are aſham'd of it.

THIS ordinary Connexion in our Imagination between *external Grandeur*, *Re-*

Sect. 5. *gularity* in *Dress*, *Equipage*, *Retinue*, *Badges* of *Honour*, and some *moral Abilitys* greater than ordinary, is perhaps of more consequence in the World than some *recluse Philosophers* apprehend, who pique themselves upon despising these external Shews: This may possibly be a great, if not the only Cause of what some count *miraculous*, *viz.* That *Civil Governors* of no greater Capacity than their Neighbours, by some inexpressible *Awe*, and *Authority*, quell the very Spirits of the *Vulgar*, and keep them in subjection by such small Guards, as might easily be conquer'd by those Associations which might be rais'd among the *Disaffected* or *Factious* of any *State*; who are daring enough among their *Equals*, and shew a sufficient Contempt of Death for undertaking such an Enterprize.

We may also hence discover the reason, why the gratifying our *superior Senses* of *Beauty* and *Harmony*, or the Enjoyment of the Pleasures of *Knowledge*, never occasions any Shame or Confusion, tho our Enjoyment were known to all the *World*. The Objects which furnish this Pleasure, are of such a nature, as to afford the same Delights to multitudes; nor is there any thing in the Enjoyment of them by one, which excludes any Mortal from a like Enjoyment; so that altho we pursue these Enjoyments from *Self-love*, yet as our Enjoyment

ment cannot be prejudicial to others, ſo no Man is imagin'd any way *inhumanly ſelfiſh* from the fulleſt Enjoyment of them which is poſſible. The ſame *Regularity* or *Harmony* which delights me, may at the ſame time delight multitudes; the ſame *Theorem* ſhall be equally fruitful of Pleaſure, when it has entertain'd thouſands: and therefore none are aſham'd of ſuch Purſuits, ſince they do not of themſelves ever ſeduce us into any thing *malicious*, *envious*, or *ill-natur'd*; nor does any one apprehend another *too ſelfiſh*, from purſuing Objects of unexhauſted univerſal Pleaſure. Sect. 5.

THIS View of *Honour* and *Shame* may alſo let us ſee the reaſon, why moſt Men are uneaſy at being prais'd, when they themſelves are preſent. Every one is delighted with the Eſteem of others, and muſt enjoy great Pleaſure when he hears himſelf commended; but we are unwilling others ſhould obſerve our Enjoyment of this Pleaſure, which is really *ſelfiſh*; or that they ſhould imagine us fond of it, or influenc'd by hopes of it in our good Actions; and therefore we chuſe Secrecy for the Enjoyment of it, as we do with reſpect to other Pleaſures, in which others do not ſhare with us.

VIII. LET us next conſider another Determination of our *Mind*, which ſtrongly proves *Benevolence* to be *natural* to us,

Sect. 5. and that is COMPASSION; by which we are dispos'd to study the *Interest* of others, without any Views of *private Advantage*: This needs little Illustration. Every Mortal is made uneasy by any grievous Misery he sees another involv'd in, unless the Person be imagin'd *evil*, in a *moral Sense*: Nay, it is almost impossible for us to be unmov'd, even in that Case. *Advantage* may make us do a cruel Action, or may overcome *Pity*; but it scarce ever extinguishes it. A sudden Passion of *Hatred* or *Anger* may represent a Person as *absolutely evil*, and so extinguish *Pity*; but when the Passion is over, it often returns. Another *disinterested* View may even in cold blood overcome *Pity*; such as *Love* to *our Country*, or *Zeal* for *Religion*. *Persecution* is generally occasion'd by *Love* of *Virtue*, and *Desire* of the *eternal Happiness* of *Mankind*, altho our *Folly* makes us chuse absurd Means; and it is often accompany'd with *Pity* enough to make the *Persecutor* uneasy, in what, for prepollent Reasons, he chuses; unless his Opinion leads him to look upon the *Heretick* as *absolutely* and *entirely evil*.

WE may here observe how wonderfully the Constitution of *human Nature* is adapted to move *Compassion*. Our *Misery* and *Distress* immediately appears in our *Countenance*, if we do not study to prevent it, and propa-

gates

gates ſome Pain to all Spectators; who from Obſervation univerſally underſtand the meaning of thoſe *diſmal Airs*. We *mechanically* ſend forth *Shrieks* and *Groans* upon any ſurprizing Apprehenſion of *Evil*; ſo that no regard to Decency can ſometimes reſtrain them: Thus all who are preſent are rouz'd to our Aſſiſtance, and ſometimes our *injurious* Enemy is made to relent. Sect. 5.

WE obſerv'd above *, that we are not immediately excited by *Compaſſion* to deſire the *Removal* of our own Pain; we think it juſt to be ſo affected upon the Occaſion, and diſlike thoſe who are not ſo: but we are excited directly to deſire the *Relief* of the Miſerable; and if we ſee this impoſſible, we may by *Reflection* diſcern it to be vain for us to indulge our *Compaſſion* any further; and then from *Self-love* we retire from the Object which occaſions our Pain, and ſtudy to divert our Thoughts. But where there is no ſuch *Reflection*, People are hurry'd by a *natural, kind Inſtinct*, to ſee Objects of *Compaſſion*, and expoſe themſelves to this Pain when they can give no reaſon for it; as in the Inſtance of *publick Executions*.

THIS ſame Principle leads men to *Tragedys*; only we are to obſerve, that ano-

* See *Sect.* 2. *Art.* VIII.

ther

Sect. 5. ther ſtrong reaſon of this, is the *moral Beauty* of the *Characters* and *Actions* which we love to behold: for I doubt, whether any Audience would be pleas'd, barely to ſee fictitious Scenes of Miſery, if they were kept ſtrangers to the *moral Qualitys* of the Sufferers, or their *Characters* and *Actions*. As in ſuch a caſe, there would be no *Beauty* to raiſe Deſire of ſeeing ſuch Repreſentations, I fancy we would not expoſe our ſelves to Pain alone, from Miſery, which we knew to be fictitious.

IT was the ſame Cauſe which crouded the *Roman Theatres* to ſee *Gladiators*; there the People had frequent Inſtances of great *Courage*, and *Contempt* of Death, two great *moral Abilitys*, if not *Virtues*; hence CICERO looks upon them as great Inſtructions in *Fortitude*. The *Antagoniſt Gladiator* bore all the blame of the Cruelty committed, among People of little Reflection; and the *courageous* and *artful* one, really obtain'd a Reputation of *Virtue*, and Favour among the Spectators, and was vindicated by the Neceſſity of *Self-defence*. In the mean time they were inadvertent to this, that their crouding to ſuch Sights, and favouring the Perſons who preſented them with ſuch Spectacles of Courage, and with Opportunitys of following their *natural Inſtinct* to *Compaſſion*, was the true occaſion of

of all the real Distress, or Assaults which they were sorry for. Sect. 5.

WHAT Sentiments can we imagine a *Candidate* would have rais'd of himself, had he presented his Countrymen only with Scenes of *Misery*; had he drain'd *Hospitals* and *Infirmarys* of all their pityable Inhabitants, or had he bound so many *Slaves*, and without meeting with any Resistance, butcher'd them with his own Hands? I should very much question the Success of his Election, (however *Compassion* might cause his Shews still to be frequented,) if his *Antagonist* chose a Diversion apparently more *virtuous*, or with a *Mixture* of Scenes of *Virtue*.

HOW independent this Disposition to *Compassion* is of all *Custom*, *Education*, *Instruction*, will appear from the Prevalence of it in *Women* and *Children*, who are less influenc'd by these. That *Children* do delight in some Actions which in fact are *cruel* and *tormenting* to Animals, which they have in their Power, flows not from *Malice*, or want of *Compassion*, but from their *Ignorance* of those signs of Pain which many Creatures make; together with a *Curiosity* to see the various Contortions of their Bodys: for when they are more acquainted with these Creatures, or come by any means to know their Sufferings, their *Com-*

Sect. 5. *paſſion* often becomes too ſtrong for their *Reaſon*; as it generally does in beholding *Executions*, where as ſoon as they obſerve the evidences of Diſtreſs, or Pain in the *Malefactor*, they are apt to condemn this neceſſary Method of Self-defence in the *State*.

SECT.

SECT. VI.

Concerning the Importance *of this* moral Senſe *to the preſent Happineſs of* Mankind, *and its* Influence *on human Affairs.*

I. IT may now probably appear, that notwithſtanding the Corruption of Manners ſo juſtly complain'd of every where, this *moral Senſe* has a greater Influence on *Mankind* than is generally imagin'd, altho it is often directed by very partial imperfect Views of *publick Good*, and often overcome by *Self-love*. But we ſhall offer ſome further Conſiderations, to prove, "That it "gives us more *Pleaſure* and *Pain* than all "our *other Facultys*." And to prevent Repetitions, let us obſerve, that wherever it appears, that any *morally good Quality* gives Pleaſure from *Reflection*, or from *Honour*, the contrary *evil one* will give proportionable Pain, from *Remorſe* and *Shame*. Now we ſhall conſider the *moral Pleaſures*, not only *ſeparately*, but as they are the *moſt delightful Ingredient* in the ordinary Pleaſures of *Life*.

ALL

Sect. 6.

ALL MANKIND seem perſuaded of ſome *Excellency* in the Poſſeſſion of *good moral Qualitys*, which is ſuperior to all other Enjoyments; and on the contrary, look upon a State of *moral Evil*, as worſe and more wretched than any other whatſoever. We muſt not form our Judgment in this matter from the Actions of Men; for however they may be influenc'd by *moral Sentiments*, yet it is certain, that *Self-intereſted Paſſions* frequently overcome them, and *partial Views* of the Tendency of Actions, make us do what is really *morally evil*, apprehending it to be *good*: But let us examine the Sentiments which Men univerſally form of the State of others, when they are no way immediately concern'd; for in theſe Sentiments *human Nature* is *calm* and *undiſturb'd*, and ſhews its *true Face*.

NOW would we imagine a *rational Creature* in a ſufficiently happy State, when his Mind was without interruption wholly occupy'd with pleaſant Senſations of *Smell*, *Taſte*, *Touch*, *&c.* if at the ſame time all other Ideas were excluded? Would we not think the State *low*, *mean* and *ſordid*, if there were no *Society*, no *Love* or *Friendſhip*, no *good Offices*? What then muſt that State be wherein there are no Pleaſures but thoſe of the *external Senſes*, with ſuch long Intervals as *human Nature* at preſent muſt

must have? do these short Fits of Pleasure make the *Luxurious* happy? How *insipid* and *joyless* are the Reflections on past Pleasure? and how poor a Recompense is the Return of the transient Sensation, for the *nauseous Satietys*, and *Languors* in the Intervals? This *Frame* of our *Nature*, so incapable of long Enjoyments of the *external Senses*, points out to us, "That there "must be some other more *durable Plea-* "*sure*, without such *tedious Interruptions*, "and *nauseous Reflections*." Sect. 6.

LET us even join with the Pleasures of the *external Senses*, the Perceptions of *Beauty*, *Order*, *Harmony*: These are no doubt more *noble Pleasures*, and seem to inlarge the *Mind*; and yet how *cold* and *joyless* are they, if there be no *moral Pleasures* of *Friendship*, *Love* and *Beneficence*? Now if the bare Absence of *moral Good*, makes in our Judgment the State of a rational Agent contemptible, the Presence of *contrary* Dispositions is always imagin'd by us to sink him into a degree of Misery, from which no other Pleasures can relieve him. Would we ever wish to be in the same Condition with a *wrathful*, *malicious*, *revengeful*, or *envious Being*, tho we were at the same time to enjoy all the external Sensations of Pleasure, or all the Opportunitys of seeing the most *beautiful regular Prospects*, and hearing the most *harmonious Sounds*, or obtain-

Sect. 6. obtaining the moſt *extenſive Knowledge*? These internal Pleaſures of *Beauty* and *Harmony*, have a great Power to ſooth the Mind into a forgetfulneſs of *Wrath*, *Malice* or *Revenge*; and they muſt do ſo, before we can have any tolerable Delight or Enjoyment: for while *theſe Affections* poſſeſs the Mind, there is nothing but *Torment* and *Miſery*.

What *Caſtle-builder*, who forms to himſelf imaginary Scenes of Life, in which he thinks he would be happy, ever made *acknowledg'd Treachery*, *Cruelty*, or *Ingratitude*, the Steps by which he mounted to his wiſh'd for Elevation, or Parts of his Character, when he had attain'd it? We always conduct our ſelves in ſuch Reſveries, according to the Dictates of *Honour*, *Faith*, *Generoſity*, *Courage*; and the loweſt we can ſink, is hoping we may be enrich'd by ſome innocent Accident:

> *O ſi urnam Argenti* Fors *quà mihi monſtret!* * ——

But *Labour*, *Hunger*, *Thirſt*, *Poverty*, *Pain*, *Danger*, have nothing ſo deteſtable in them, that our *Self-love* cannot allow us to be often expos'd to them: Nay, the Virtues which theſe give us occaſions of

* Hor. *Lib.* 2. *Sat.* 6. v. 10.

displaying, are so amiable and excellent, Sect. 6.
that scarce ever is any imaginary Hero in
Romance, or *Epic*, brought to his highest
Pitch of Happiness, without going thro
them *all*. Where there is no *Virtue*, there
is nothing worth Desire or Contemplation;
the *Romance*, or *Epos* must end: Nay, the
Difficulty * or *natural Evil* does so much
increase the *Virtue* of the *good* Action,
which it accompanys, that we cannot easily
sustain these Works after the Distress is over;
and if we do continue the Work, it must be
by presenting a new Scene of *Benevolence*
in a prosperous Fortune. A Scene of *external Prosperity*, or *natural Good*, without any thing *moral*, or *virtuous*, cannot entertain a Person of the dullest Imagination, had he ever so much interested himself in the Fortunes of his Hero; for where *Virtue* ceases, there remains nothing worth wishing to our Favourite, or which we can be delighted to view his Possession of, when we are most studious of his Happiness.

LET us take a particular Instance, to try how much we prefer the Possession of *Virtue* to all other Enjoyments, and how we look upon *Vice* as worse than any other Misery. Who could ever read the History of REGULUS, without concerning himself

* *Sect. 3. Art. XI. Par. 5.*

Sect. 6. in the Fortunes of that *gallant* Man, sorrowing at his Sufferings, and wishing him a better Fate? But how a better Fate? should he have comply'd with the Terms of the CARTHAGINIANS, and preserv'd himself from the intended Tortures, tho to the detriment of his Country? or should he have violated his plighted Faith and Promise of returning? Will any Man say, that either of these is the better Fate he wishes his Favourite? Had he acted thus, *that* Virtue would have been gone, which interests every one in his Fortunes. "Let him take his "Fate like other common Mortals." What else do we wish then, but that the CARTHAGINIANS had relented of their Cruelty, or that PROVIDENCE by some unexpected Event, had rescu'd him out of their hands? Now may not this teach us, that we are indeed determin'd to judge *Virtue* with Peace and Safety, preferable to *Virtue* with Distress; but that at the same time we look upon the State of the *Virtuous*, the *Publick-spirited*, even in the utmost natural Distress, as preferable to all affluence of other Enjoyments? For this is what we chuse to have our favourite Hero in, notwithstanding all its Pains and natural Evils. We would never have imagin'd him happier, had he acted otherwise; or thought him in a more eligible State, with Liberty and Safety, at the expence of his *Virtue*: we secretly judge the Purchase too dear; and therefore

we never imagine he acted foolishly in securing his *Virtue*, his *Honour*, at the expence of his *Ease*, his *Pleasure*, his *Life*: nor can we think these *latter* Enjoyments worth the keeping, when the *former* are entirely lost. Sect. 6.

II. LET us in the same manner examine our Sentiments of the Happiness of others in common Life. WEALTH and EXTERNAL PLEASURES bear no small bulk in our Imaginations; but does there not always accompany this Opinion of Happiness in *Wealth*, some supposed *beneficent Intention* of doing good Offices to Persons dear to *us*, at least to our *Familys*, or *Kinsmen*? And in our imagin'd Happiness of *external Pleasure*, some Ideas are always included of some *moral* Enjoyments of *Society*, some *Communication* of Pleasure, something of *Love*, of *Friendship*, of *Esteem*, of *Gratitude*. Who ever pretended to a *Taste* of Pleasures without *Society*? or if any seem violent in pursuit of such Pleasures, how *base* and *contemptible* do they appear to all Persons, even to those who could have no expectation of Advantage from their having a more generous Notion of Pleasure? Now were there no *moral Sense*, no Happiness in *Benevolence*, and did we act from no other Principle but *Self-love*; sure there is no Pleasure of the external Senses, which we could not obtain the *solitary* Perceptions

Sect. 6. of, with less trouble and expence than in *Society*. But a *Mixture* of the *moral Pleasures* is what gives the *alluring Relish*; 'tis some Appearance of *Friendship*, of *Love*, of *communicating* Pleasure to others, which preserves the Pleasures of the *Luxurious* from being *nauseous* and *insipid*. And this partial Imagination of some *good moral Qualitys*, some *Benevolence*, in Actions which have many *cruel*, *inhuman*, and *destructive* Consequences toward others, is what has kept *Vice* more in countenance than any other Consideration*.

But to convince us further, wherein the Happiness of *Wealth* and *external Pleasure* lies; let us but suppose *Malice*, *Wrath*, *Revenge*; or only *Solitude*, Absence of *Friendship*, of *Love*, of *Society*, of *Esteem*, join'd with the Possession of them; and all the Happiness vanishes like a Dream. And yet *Love*, *Friendship*, *Society*, *Humanity*, tho accompany'd with *Poverty* and *Toil*, nay even with smaller degrees of *Pain*, such as do not wholly occupy the Mind, are not only the Object of Love from others, but even of a sort of Emulation; which plainly shews, "That *Virtue* is the chief "*Happiness* in the *universal* Judgment of "*Mankind*."

* See above, *Sect.* 4. *Art.* IV. *Par.* 2.

III. There

Sect. 6.

III. THERE is a further Conſideration which muſt not be paſs'd over, concerning the EXTERNAL BEAUTY of Perſons, which all allow to have great Power over human Minds. Now it is ſome apprehended *Morality*, ſome natural or imagin'd indication of *concomitant Virtue*, which gives it this powerful Charm above all other kinds of *Beauty*. Let us conſider the Characters of *Beauty*, which are commonly admir'd in Countenances, and we ſhall find them to be *Sweetneſs*, *Mildneſs*, *Majeſty*, *Dignity*, *Vivacity*, *Humility*, *Tenderneſs*, *Good-nature*; that is, that certain *Airs*, *Proportions*, *je ne ſcai quoy's*, are natural Indications of ſuch Virtues, or of Abilitys or Diſpoſitions toward them. As we obſerv'd above * of *Miſery*, or *Diſtreſs* appearing in Countenances; ſo it is certain, almoſt all *habitual Diſpoſitions* of *Mind*, form the Countenance in ſuch a manner, as to give ſome Indications of them to the Spectator. Our *violent* Paſſions are obvious at firſt view in the Countenance; ſo that ſometimes no Art can conceal them: and ſmaller degrees of them give ſome leſs obvious Turns to the Face, which an accurate Eye will obſerve. Now when the *natural Air* of any Face approaches to that which any Paſſion would form it unto, we make a

* See *Sect.* 5. *Art.* VIII. *Par.* 2.

Sect. 6. conjecture from this concerning the *leading Disposition* of the Person's *Mind*.

As to those Fancys which prevail in certain Countrys toward *large Lips*, *little Noses*, *narrow Eyes*, unless we knew from themselves under what Idea it is that such Forms are admir'd, whether as *naturally beautiful* in Form, or Proportion to the rest of the Face; or as presum'd Indications of some *moral Qualitys*, we may more probably conclude that it is the *latter*; since this is so much the Ground of Approbation, or Aversion toward Faces among our selves. And for these Irregularitys of Features which we count *naturally disagreeable* as to Form, we know the Aversion on this account is so weak, that *moral Qualitys* shall procure a liking, even to the Face, in Persons who are sensible of the *Irregularity*, or want of that *Regularity* which is common in others. With us, certain Features are imagin'd to denote *Dulness*; as *hollow Eyes*, *large Lips*; a *Colour* of Hair, *Wantonness*: and may we not conclude the like *Association of Ideas*, perhaps in both Cases without Foundation in *Nature*, to be the Ground of those Approbations which appear unaccountable to us?

In the same manner, when there is nothing *grosly* disproportion'd in any Face, what is it we dispraise? It is *Pride*, *Haughtiness*,

tineſs, *Sourneſs*, *Ill-nature*, *Diſcontent*, *Folly*, *Levity*, *Wantonneſs*; which ſome Countenances diſcover in the manner above hinted at. And *thoſe Airs*, when brought by Cuſtom upon the moſt *regular Set* of Features, have often made them very diſagreeable; as the *contrary Airs* have given the ſtrongeſt Charms to Countenances, which are far from Perfection in *external Beauty*. Sect. 6.

ONE cannot but obſerve the Judgment of HOMER in his Character of HELEN. Had he ever ſo much rais'd our Idea of her *external Beauty*, it would have been ridiculous to have engag'd his Countrymen in a War for ſuch a HELEN as VIRGIL has drawn her. He therefore ſtill retains ſomething amiable in a *moral Senſe* amidſt all her Weakneſs, and often ſuggeſts to his Reader,

—— Ἑλένης ὁρμήματά τε σοναχάς τε *,

as the Spring of his Countrymens Indignation and Revenge.

THIS Conſideration may ſhew us one reaſon, among many others, for Mens *different Fancys*, or *Reliſhes* of *Beauty*. The *Mind* of Man, however generally diſpos'd to eſteem *Benevolence* and *Virtue*, yet by more particular Attention to ſome

* See *Homer*, *Iliad* 2. *v.* 356, 590.

Sect. 6. kinds of it than others, may gain a ſtronger Admiration of ſome *moral Diſpoſitions* than others. *Military Men* may admire *Courage* more than other Virtues; Perſons of *ſmaller Courage* may admire *Sweetneſs of Temper*; Men of *Thought* and *Reflection*, who have more extenſive Views, will admire the *like Qualitys* in others; Men of *keen Paſſions* expect equal Returns of all the kind Affections, and are wonderfully charm'd by *Compliance*: the *Proud* may like thoſe of *higher Spirit*, as more ſuitable to their Dignity; tho *Pride*, join'd with *Reflection* and *good Senſe*, will recommend to them *Humility* in the Perſon belov'd. Now as the *various* Tempers of Men make *various* Tempers of others agreeable to them, ſo they muſt differ in their *Reliſhes* of *Beauty*, according as it denotes the ſeveral Qualitys moſt agreeable to themſelves.

THIS may alſo ſhew us, how in *virtuous Love* there may be the greateſt Beauty, without the leaſt Charm to engage a Rival. *Love* it ſelf gives a Beauty to the *Lover*, in the Eyes of the Perſon *belov'd*, which no other Mortal is much affected with: and this perhaps is the *ſtrongeſt Charm* poſſible, and that which will have the greateſt Power, where there is not ſome very great Counter-ballance from *worldly Intereſt*, *Vice*, or *groſs Deformity*.

IV. THIS

Sect. 6.

IV. THIS ſame Conſideration may be extended to the whole AIR and MOTION of any Perſon. Every thing we count agreeable, ſome way denotes *Chearfulneſs*, *Eaſe*, a *Condeſcenſion*, and *Readineſs* to oblige, a *Love* of *Company*, with a *Freedom* and *Boldneſs* which always accompanys an *honeſt*, *undeſigning Heart*. On the contrary, what is ſhocking in *Air*, or *Motion*, is *Roughneſs*, *Ill-nature*, a *Diſregard* to others, or a *fooliſh Shame-facedneſs*, which evidences a Perſon to be unexperienc'd in Society, or Offices of Humanity.

WITH relation to theſe *Airs*, *Motions*, *Geſtures*, we may obſerve, that conſidering the different *Ceremonys*, and *Modes* of ſhewing reſpect, which are practis'd in different Nations, we may indeed probably conclude that there is no *natural* Connexion between any of theſe *Geſtures*, or *Motions*, and the *Affections* of *Mind* which they are by *Cuſtom* made to expreſs; but when *Cuſtom* has made any of them paſs for Expreſſions of *ſuch Affections*, by a conſtant *Aſſociation* of Ideas, ſome ſhall become *agreeable* and *lovely*, and others *extremely offenſive*, altho they were both, in their own Nature, *perfectly indifferent*.

V. HERE we may remark the manner in which NATURE leads *Mankind* to the Conti-

Sect. 6. Continuance of their Race, and by its strongest Power engages them to what occasions the greatest Toil and Anxiety of Life, and yet supports them under it with an inexpressible delight. We might have been excited to the Propagation of our Species, by such an uneasy Sensation as would have effectually determin'd us to it, without any great prospect of Happiness; as we see *Hunger* and *Thirst* determine us to preserve our Bodys, tho few look upon eating and drinking as any considerable Happiness. The *Sexes* might have been engag'd to Concurrence, even as we imagine the *Brutes* are, by *Desire* only, or by a *Love* of *sensual Pleasure*. But how dull and insipid had Life been, were there no more in MARRIAGE? Who would have had Resolution enough to bear all the Cares of a *Family*, and Education of *Children?* or who from the general Motive of *Benevolence*, would have chosen to subject himself to *natural Affection* toward an *Offspring*, when he could foresee all the Troubles it might occasion? This Inclination therefore of the *Sexes* is founded on something stronger, and more efficacious and joyful, than the Sollicitations of *Uneasiness*, or the bare *desire* of *sensible Pleasure*.

BEAUTY gives a favourable Presumption of *good moral Dispositions*, and *Acquaintance* confirms this into a *real Love* of *Esteem*,

Esteem, or begets it, where there is little *Beauty*: This raises an expectation of the greatest *moral Pleasures* along with the *sensible*, and a thousand tender Sentiments of *Humanity* and *Generosity*; and makes us impatient for a *Society* which we imagine big with unspeakable *moral Pleasures*; where nothing is indifferent, and every trifling Service being an Evidence of *this strong Love* of *Esteem*, is mutually receiv'd with the Rapture and Gratitude of the greatest Benefit, and of the most substantial Obligation. And where *Prudence* and *Good-nature* influence both sides, this *Society* may answer all their Expectations. Sect. 6.

NAY, let us examine those of looser Conduct with relation to the *fair Sex*, and we shall find, that it is not *Love* of *sensible Pleasure* which is the chief Motive of *Debauchery*, or *false Gallantry*. Were it so, the *meanest Prostitutes* would please as much as any; but we know sufficiently that we are fond of *Good-nature*, *Faith*, *Pleasantry* of *Temper*, *Wit*, and many other *moral Qualitys*, even in a *Mistress*. And this may furnish us with a Reason for what appears pretty unaccountable, *viz.* That *Chastity* it self has a powerful Charm in the Eyes of the *Dissolute*, even when they are attempting to destroy it.

THIS

Sect. 6.

THIS powerful Determination even to a *limited Benevolence*, and other *moral Sentiments*, is obſerv'd to give a great biaſs to our Minds toward a *univerſal Goodneſs*, *Tenderneſs*, *Humanity*, *Generoſity*, and *Contempt* of *private Good* in our whole Conduct; beſides the obvious Improvement it occaſions in our *external Deportment*, and in our reliſh of *Beauty*, *Order*, and *Harmony*. As ſoon as a Heart, before *hard* and *obdurate*, is ſoften'd in this Flame, we ſhall obſerve a Love of *Poetry*, *Muſick*, the *Beauty* of *Nature* in rural Scenes, a *Contempt* of other ſelfiſh Pleaſures of the *external Senſes*, a *neat Dreſs*, a *humane Deportment*, a *Delight* in and *Emulation* of every thing which is *gallant*, *generous* and *friendly*.

IN the ſame manner we are determin'd to common Friendſhips and Acquaintances, not by the ſullen Apprehenſions of our *Neceſſitys*, or Proſpects of *Intereſt*; but by an incredible variety of little agreeable, engaging Evidences of *Love*, *Good-nature*, and other *morally amiable Qualitys* in thoſe we converſe with: And among the reſt, none of the leaſt conſiderable is an inclination to *Chearfulneſs*, a *Delight* to raiſe *Mirth* in others, which procures a ſecret Approbation and Gratitude toward the Perſon who puts us in ſuch an *agreeable*, *innocent*,

cent, *good-natur'd*, and *eaſy ſtate* of Mind, Sect. 6.
as we are conſcious of while we enjoy plea-
ſant Converſation, enliven'd by *moderate Laughter*.

VI. UPON this *moral* Senſe is founded all the Power of the ORATOR. The various Figures of Speech are the ſeveral Manners which a lively Genius, warm'd with Paſſions ſuitable to the Occaſion, naturally runs into, only a little diverſify'd by *Cuſtom*: and they only move the *Hearers*, by giving a lively Repreſentation of the Paſſions of the *Speaker*; which are communicated to the *Hearers*, as we *obſerv'd above of one Paſſion, *viz. Pity*.

NOW the Paſſions which the *Orator* attempts to raiſe, are all founded on *moral Qualitys*. All the bold *Metaphors*, or *Deſcriptions*, all the artificial Manners of *Expoſtulation*, *Arguing*, and *addreſſing* the *Audience*, all the *Appeals* to *Mankind*, are but more lively Methods of giving the *Audience* a ſtronger impreſſion of the *moral Qualitys* of the Perſon *accus'd*, or *defended*; of the Action *advis'd*, or *diſſuaded*: and all the *Antitheſes*, or *Witticiſms*; all the *Cadences* of ſonorous Periods, whatever inferior kind of Beauty they may have ſeparately, are of no conſequence to perſuade,

* See *Sect.* 5. *Art.* VIII. *Par.* 2.

Sect. 6. if we neglect moving the Passions by some Species of *Morality*. They may perhaps raise a little Admiration of the *Speaker* among those who already favour his Party; but they oftner raise Contempt in his *Adversaries*. But when you display the *Beneficence* of any Action, the *good Effect* it shall have on the *Publick* in promoting the Welfare of the *Innocent*, and relieving the *unjustly distressed*; if you prove your Allegations, you make every Mortal approve the undertaking it. When any Person is to be *recommended*, display his *Humanity*, *Generosity*, *Study* of the *publick Good*, and *Capacity* to promote it, his *Contempt* of Dangers, and private Pleasures; and you are sure to procure him *Love* and *Esteem*. If at the same time you shew his *Distress*, or the *Injurys* he has suffer'd, you raise *Pity*, and every *tender* Affection.

On the contrary, represent the *Barbarity*, or *Cruelty* of any Action, the *Misery* it shall procure to the *Kind*, the *Faithful*, the *Generous*, or only to the *Innocent*; and you raise an Abhorrence of it in the Breasts of the *Audience*, tho they were not the Persons who would have suffer'd by it. The same way, would you make a Person *infamous*, and *despis'd* and *hated*, represent him as *cruel*, *inhuman*, or *treacherous* toward the most distant rational

tional Agents; or shew him only to be *selfish*, given to *solitary Luxury* without regard to any *Friend*, or the *Interest* of others; and you have gain'd your Point as soon as you prove what you alledge. Nay, how far does it go to stop our Admiration of any *celebrated* Action, to suggest, "That the *Author* of it was no *Fool*, "he knew it would turn to his own "*Advantage*." Sect. 6.

Now, are the *Learned* and *Polite* the only Persons who are mov'd by such Speeches? Must Men know the Schemes of the *Moralists* and *Politicians*, or the *Art* of *Rhetorick*, to be capable of being perswaded? Must they be nicely conversant in all the Methods of promoting *Self-Interest*? Nay, do we not see on the contrary, the *rude undisciplin'd Multitude* most affected? Where had *Oratory* so much Power as in *popular States*, and that too before the Perfection of the Sciences? *Reflection*, and *Study*, may raise in Men a suspicion of Design, and Caution of Assent, when they have some knowledge of the various Topicks of Argument, and find them employ'd upon themselves: but *rude Nature* is still open to every *moral* Impression, and carry'd furiously along without Caution, or Suspense. It was not the *Groves* of the *Academy*, or the *polish'd Stones* of the *Portico*, or the *manag'd Horses*

Sect. 6. *Horſes* of GREECE, which liſten'd to the Harp of an AMPHION, or an ORPHEUS; but the *Trees*, and *Rocks*, and *Tygers* of the *Foreſt*: which may ſhew us, "That "there is ſome *Senſe* of *Morality* antece- "dent to Inſtruction, or metaphyſical Ar- "guments proving the *private Intereſt* "of the Perſon who is perſuaded, to be "connected with the *publick Good*."

VII. WE ſhall find the ſame *moral Senſe* to be the Foundation of the chief Pleaſures of POETRY. We hinted, in the former Treatiſe, at the Foundation of Delight in the *Numbers*, *Meaſures*, *Metaphors*, *Similitudes* *. But as the Contemplation of *moral Objects*, either of *Vice* or *Virtue*, affects us more ſtrongly, and moves our Paſſions in a quite different and more powerful manner than *natural Beauty*, or (what we commonly call) *Deformity*; ſo the moſt moving Beautys bear a Relation to our *moral Senſe*, and affect us more vehemently than the Repreſentation of *natural Objects* in the livelieſt Deſcriptions. *Dramatic*, and *Epic* Poetry are entirely addreſs'd to this *Senſe*, and raiſe our Paſſions by the Fortunes of *Characters*, diſtinctly repreſented as *morally good*, or *evil*; as might be ſeen more fully, were we to conſider the Paſſions ſeparately.

* See *Treatiſe* I. *Sect.* 2. *Art.* XIII. *Sect.* 4. *Art.* III.

Where

Where we are ſtudying to raiſe any *Deſire*, or *Admiration* of an Object *really beautiful*, we are not content with a *bare Narration*, but endeavour, if we can, to preſent the *Object* it ſelf, or the moſt *lively Image* of it. And hence it is that the *Epic Poem*, or *Tragedy*, give a vaſtly greater Pleaſure than the Writings of *Philoſophers*, tho both aim at recommending *Virtue*. The repreſenting the Actions themſelves, if the Repreſentation be *judicious*, *natural*, and *lively*, will make us admire the *Good*, and deteſt the *Vitious*, the *Inhuman*, the *Treacherous*, and *Cruel*, by means of our *moral Senſe*, without any Reflections of the *Poet* to guide our Sentiments. It is for this Reaſon that HORACE has juſtly made Knowledge in *Morals* ſo neceſſary to a *good Poet*: Sect. 6.

Scribendi rectè SAPERE *eſt & principium & fons* *.

And again:

Qui didicit Patriæ quid debeat, & quid Amicis,
Quo ſit amore Parens, quo Frater amandus, & Hoſpes,
Quod ſit Conſcripti, quod Judicis officium, quæ

* Hor. de Arte Poet. v. 309.

Sect. 6.

Partes in bellum missi Ducis; ille profecto
Reddere Personæ scit convenientia cuique †.

UPON this same *Sense* is founded the Power of that *great Beauty* in Poetry, the PROSOPOPOEIA, by which *every Affection* is made a *Person*; every *natural Event*, *Cause*, *Object*, is animated by *moral Epithets*: for we join the Contemplation of *moral Circumstances* and *Qualitys* along with *natural Objects*, to increase the *Beauty* or *Deformity*, and affect the *Hearer* in a more lively manner with the Affections describ'd, by representing them as *Persons*. Thus a shady Wood must have its *solemn venerable Genius*, and proper *rural Gods*; every clear Fountain, its *sacred chaste Nymph*; and River, its *bountiful God*, with his *Urn*, and perhaps a *Cornu-copia* diffusing *Plenty* and *Fruitfulness* along his Banks. The *Day-light* is *holy*, *benign*, and *powerful* to banish the pernicious Spirits of the *Night*. The Morning is a *kind*, *officious Goddess*, *tripping* over the dewy Mountains, and *ushering* in Light to *Gods* and *Men*. War is an *impetuous*, *cruel*, *undistinguishing Monster*, whom no *Virtue*, no Circum-

† Hor. de Arte Poet. v. 312.

stance

ſtance of *Compaſſion*, can move from his bloody Purpoſes. The Steel is *unrelenting*; the Arrow and Spear are *impatient* to deſtroy, and carry *Death* on their Points. Our modern Engines of War are alſo *frightful Perſonages*, with their rude Throats counterfeiting the Thunder of JOVE. The *moral Imagery* of *Death* is every where known, *viz.* his *inſenſibility* to *Pity*, his *Inflexibility*, and *univerſal impartial Empire*. FORTUNE is inimitably drawn by HORACE*, with all her *Retinue* and *Votaries*, and with her *rigid ſevere* Miniſter, *Neceſſity*. The Qualitys of *Mind* too become *Perſons*: *Love* becomes a VENUS, or a CUPID; *Courage*, or *Conduct*, a MARS, or a PALLAS *protecting* and *aſſiſting* the Hero; before them march *Terror* and *Dread*, *Flight* and *Purſuit*, *Shouts*, and *Amazement*. Nay, the *moſt ſacred Poets* are often led into this *Imagery*, and repreſent *Juſtice* and *Judgment* as *ſupporting* the ALMIGHTY'S Throne, and *Mercy* and *Truth going* before his Face: They ſhew us *Peace* as *ſpringing* up from the Earth, and *Mercy looking* down from Heaven. Sect. 6.

EVERY one perceives a greater Beauty in this manner of Repreſentation, this Imagery, this Conjunction of *moral Ideas*,

* See *Lib.* 1. *Od.* 35.

Sect. 6. than in the fulleſt Narration, or the moſt lively natural Deſcription. When one reads the fourth Book of HOMER, and is prepar'd, from the Council of the *Gods*, to imagine the bloody Sequel, and amidſt the moſt beautiful Deſcription which ever was imagin'd of *ſhooting* an Arrow, meets with its *moral Epithet*,

——— μέλαιναων ἑρμ' ὀδυνάων *,

——*The Source of blackeſt Woes*;

he will find himſelf more mov'd by this Circumſtance, than by all the Profuſion of natural Deſcription which Man could imagine.

HISTORY derives its chief Excellence from the repreſenting the *Manners* and *Characters*; the Contemplation of which in *Nature* being very affecting, they muſt neceſſarily give Pleaſure when well related. It is well known too, that a Collection of the beſt Pieces of *Face-painting* is but a poor Entertainment, when compar'd with thoſe Pieces which repreſent *moral Actions*, *Paſſions*, and *Characters*.

VIII. WE are often told, "That there "is no need of ſuppoſing ſuch a *Senſe* "of *Morality* given to Men, ſince *Re-*

* See *Homer*, *Iliad* 4. *v.* 117.

" *flection*, and *Inſtruction* would recom- Sect. 6.
" mend the ſame Actions from Arguments
" of *Self-Intereſt*, and engage us, from
" the acknowledg'd Principle of *Self-love*,
" to the Practice of them, without this
" *unintelligible Determination* to *Bene-*
" *volence*, or the *occult Quality* of a *moral*
" *Senſe*."

IT is perhaps true, that *Reflection* and *Reaſon* might lead us to approve the ſame Actions as *advantageous*. But would not the *ſame* Reflection and Reaſon likewiſe generally recommend the ſame *Meats* to us which our *Taſte* repreſents as pleaſant? And ſhall we thence conclude that we have no *Senſe* of *Taſting*? or that ſuch a *Senſe* is *uſeleſs*? No: The uſe is plain in both Caſes. Notwithſtanding the mighty *Reaſon* we boaſt of above other Animals, its Proceſſes are too ſlow, too full of doubt and heſitation, to ſerve us in every Exigency, either for our own Preſervation, without the *external Senſes*, or to direct our Actions for the *Good* of the *Whole*, without this *moral Senſe*. Nor could we be ſo ſtrongly determin'd at all times to what were moſt conducive to either of theſe Ends, without theſe *expeditious Monitors*, and *importunate Sollicitors*; nor ſo nobly rewarded when we act vigorouſly in purſuit of theſe Ends, by the calm dull Reflections of *Self-Intereſt*, as by thoſe delightful Senſations.

Sect. 6.

THIS *natural Determination* to approve and admire, or hate and dislike Actions, is no doubt an *occult Quality*. But is it any way more mysterious that the Idea of an Action should raise *Esteem*, or *Contempt*, than that the motion, or tearing of Flesh should give *Pleasure*, or *Pain*; or the Act of Volition should move *Flesh* and *Bones*? In the latter Case we have got the Brain, and elastic Fibres, and animal Spirits, and elastic Fluids, like the *Indian*'s Elephant, and Tortoise, to bear the Burden of the Difficulty: but go one step further, and you find the whole as difficult as at first, and equally a Mystery with *this Determination* to love and approve, or hate and despise *Actions* and *Agents*, without any Views of *Interest*, as they appear *benevolent* or the contrary.

WHEN they offer it as a Presumption that there can be no such *Sense* antecedent to all prospect of *Interest*, "That these "Actions for the most part are really *ad*-"*vantageous*, one way or other, to the "*Actor*, the *Approver*, or *Mankind* in "general, by whose Happiness our own "State may be some way made better;" may we not ask, supposing the DEITY intended to impress such a *Sense* of something *amiable* in Actions, (which is no impossible Supposition) what sort of Actions would

a *good* GOD determine us to *approve*? Must we deny the possibility of such a Determination, if it did not lead us to admire Actions of no *Advantage* to *Mankind*, or to love *Agents* for their being *eminent Triflers*? If then the Actions which a *wise* and *good* GOD must determine us to approve, if he give us any such *Sense* at all, must be Actions *useful* to the *Publick*, this *Advantage* can never be a Reason against the *Sense* it self. After the same manner we should deny all *Revelation* which taught us *good Sense*, *Humanity*, *Justice*, and a *rational Worship*, because *Reason* and *Interest* do confirm and recommend such *Principles* and *Services*; and should greedily embrace every *Contradiction*, *Foppery*, and *Pageantry*, as a *truly divine Institution*, without any thing *humane*, or *useful* to *Mankind*. Sect. 6.

IX. THE Writers upon opposite Schemes, who deduce all Ideas of *Good* and *Evil* from the *private Advantage* of the *Actor*, or from Relation to a *Law* and its *Sanctions*, either known from *Reason* or *Revelation*, are perpetually recurring to this *moral Sense* which they deny, not only in calling the *Laws* of the DEITY *just* and *good*, and alledging *Justice* and *Right* in the DEITY to govern us; but by using a set of Words which import something different from what they will allow to be their

Sect 6. only meaning. *Obligation* with them is nothing else but such a *Constitution either of Nature, or some governing Power, as makes it advantageous for the Agent to act in a certain manner.* Let this Definition be substituted wherever we meet with the words, *ought*, *should*, *must*, in a moral Sense, and many of their Sentences would seem very strange; as that the DEITY *must* act rationally, *must* not, or *ought* not to punish the Innocent, *must* make the state of the *Virtuous* better than that of the *Wicked*, *must* observe Promises; substituting the Definition of the Words, *must*, *ought*, *should*, would make these Sentences either ridiculous, or very disputable.

SECT.

SECT. VII.

A Deduction of ſome Complex moral Ideas, *viz. of* Obligation, *and* Right, Perfect, Imperfect, *and* External, Alienable, *and* Unalienable, *from this* moral Senſe.

I. TO conclude this Subject, we may, from what has been ſaid, ſee the *true Original* of *moral Ideas*, *viz.* "This "*moral Senſe* of *Excellence* in every Ap- "pearance, or Evidence of *Benevolence*;" and that we have Ideas of *Virtue* and *Vice*, abſtractly from any *Law*, *Human* or *Divine*.

IF any one ask, Can we have any Senſe of OBLIGATION abſtractly from the *Laws* of a *Superior?* we muſt anſwer according to the various Senſes of the word *Obligation*. If by *Obligation* we underſtand *a Determination, without regard to our own Intereſt, to approve Actions, and to perform them; which Determination ſhall alſo make us diſpleas'd with our ſelves, and uneaſy upon having acted contrary to this Senſe*; in this meaning of the word *Obligation*, there is *naturally* an *Obligation*

Sect. 7. *tion* upon all Men to *Benevolence*; and they are still under its Influence, even when by false or partial Opinions of the natural Tendency of Actions, this *moral Sense* leads them to *Evil*; unless by long inveterate Habits it be exceedingly weaken'd: for it scarce seems possible wholly to extinguish it. Or, which is to the same purpose, this *internal Sense*, and *Instinct* toward *Benevolence*, will either influence our Actions, or else make us very uneasy and dissatisfy'd; and we shall be conscious that we are in a base unhappy State, even without considering any *Law* whatsoever, or any external Advantages lost, or Disadvantages impending from its Sanctions. And further, there are still such Indications given us of what is in the whole *benevolent*, and what not; as may probably discover to us the true Tendency of every Action, and let us see, some time or other, the evil Tendency of what upon a partial View appear'd *benevolent*: so that no Mortal can secure to himself a perpetual Serenity, Satisfaction, and Self-approbation, but by a *serious Inquiry* into the Tendency of his Actions, and a *perpetual Study* of *universal Good*.

But if by *Obligation* we understand *a Motive from Self-Interest sufficient to determine all those who duly consider it, and pursue their own Advantage wisely,*

to

to a certain Course of Actions; we may have a Sense of such *Obligation* by reflecting on this *Determination* of our *Nature* to approve *Virtue*, to be pleas'd and happy when we reflect upon our having done *virtuous Actions*, and to be uneasy when we are conscious of having acted otherwise; and also by considering how much superior we esteem the Happiness of *Virtue* to any other Enjoyment *. We may likewise have a Sense of this sort of *Obligation*, by considering those Reasons which prove a constant Course of *benevolent* and *social Actions* to be the most probable means of promoting the *natural Good* of every *Individual*; as CUMBERLAND and PUFFENDORF have prov'd: And all this without Relation to a *Law*. Sect. 7.

BUT further, if our *moral Sense* be suppos'd exceedingly weaken'd, and the *selfish Passions* grown strong, either thro some general Corruption of Nature, or inveterate Habits; if our *Understanding* be weak, and we be often in danger of being hurry'd by our *Passions* into precipitate and rash Judgments, that *malicious Actions* shall more promote our Advantage than *Beneficence*; in such a Case, if it be inquir'd what is necessary to engage Men to *beneficent Actions*, or induce a steady Sense of

* See above, *Sect. 6. Art.* I, II.

Obli-

Sect. 7. *Obligation* to act for the *publick Good*; then, no doubt, " A *Law* with Sanctions, " given by a *ſuperior Being*, of ſufficient " Power to make us happy or miſerable, " muſt be neceſſary to counter-ballance " thoſe apparent Motives of *Intereſt*, to " calm our *Paſſions*, and give room for " the recovery of our *moral Senſe*, or at " leaſt for a juſt View of our *Intereſt*."

II. Now the principal Buſineſs of the *moral Philoſopher* is to ſhew, from ſolid Reaſons, " That *univerſal Benevolence* " tends to the Happineſs of the *Benevo-* " *lent*, either from the Pleaſures of *Re-* " *flection*, *Honour*, *natural Tendency* to " engage the good Offices of Men, upon " whoſe Aid we muſt depend for our Hap- " pineſs in this World; or from the Sanc- " tions of *divine Laws* diſcover'd to us " by the Conſtitution of the *Univerſe*;" that ſo no apparent Views of *Intereſt* may counteract this *natural Inclination*: but not to attempt proving, " That Proſpects " of our *own Advantage* of any kind, can " raiſe in us *real Love* to others." Let the Obſtacles from *Self-love* be only remov'd, and NATURE it ſelf will incline us to *Benevolence*. Let the Miſery of *exceſſive Selfiſhneſs*, and all its Paſſions, be but once explain'd, that ſo *Self-love* may ceaſe to counteract our *natural Propenſity* to *Benevolence*, and when this *noble* Diſpoſition gets

gets loose from these Bonds of *Ignorance*, and false Views of *Interest*, it shall be assisted even by *Self-love*, and grow strong enough to make a *noble virtuous Character*. Then he is to enquire by *Reflection* upon human Affairs, what Course of Action does most effectually promote the *universal Good*, what universal Rules or Maxims are to be observ'd, and in what Circumstances the Reason of them alters so as to admit Exceptions; that so our *good Inclinations* may be directed by *Reason*, and a *just Knowledge* of the *Interests* of *Mankind*. But *Virtue* it self, or *good Dispositions* of *Mind*, are not directly taught, or produc'd by *Instruction*; but are the *Effect* of the *great* AUTHOR of all things, who forms our *Nature* for them. Sect. 7.

II. BUT that our first Ideas of *moral Good* depend not on *Laws*, may plainly appear from our constant Inquirys into the *Justice* of *Laws themselves*, and that not only of *human Laws*, but of the *divine*. What else can be the meaning of that universal Opinion, "That the *Laws* of GOD "are *just*, and *holy*, and *good*?" *Human Laws* may be call'd *good*, because of their Conformity to the *Divine*. But to call the *Laws* of the *supreme* DEITY *good*, or *holy*, or *just*, if all *Goodness*, and *Holiness*, and *Justice* be constituted by *Laws*, or the *Will* of a *Superior* any way re-

Sect. 7. reveal'd, must be an insignificant Tautology amounting to no more than this, "That "GOD *wills* what he *wills*." It must then first be suppos'd that there is something in Actions which is apprehended *absolutely good*; and this is *Benevolence*, or a Tendency to the *publick natural Happiness* of *rational Agents*; and that our *moral Sense* perceives this *Excellence:* and then we call the *Laws* of the DEITY *good*, when we imagine that they are contriv'd to promote the *publick Good* in the most effectual and impartial manner. And the DEITY is called *good* in a *moral Sense*, when we apprehend that his *whole Providence* tends to the universal Happiness of his *Creatures*; whence we conclude his *Benevolence*, and *Delight* in their Happiness.

SOME tell us, "That the *Goodness* "of the *divine Laws* consists in their "Conformity to some *essential Rectitude* "of his *Nature*." But they must excuse us from assenting to this, till they make us understand the meaning of this Metaphor, *essential Rectitude*, and till we discern whether any thing more is meant by it than a *perfectly wise, uniform, impartial Benevolence*.

HENCE we may see the Difference between *Constraint*, and *Obligation*. There is

is indeed no Difference between *Conſtraint*, and the ſecond Senſe of the word *Obligation*, viz. *a Conſtitution which makes an Action eligible from Self-Intereſt*, if we only mean *external Intereſt*, diſtinct from the delightful Conſciouſneſs which ariſes from the *moral Senſe*. The Reader need ſcarcely be told, that by *Conſtraint* we do not underſtand *external Force* moving our Limbs without our Conſent, for in that Caſe we are not *Agents* at all; but that *Conſtraint* which ariſes from the threatning and preſenting ſome *Evil*, in order to make us act in a certain manner. And yet there ſeems a univerſally acknowledged Difference between even this ſort of *Conſtraint*, and *Obligation*. We never ſay we are *oblig'd* to do an Action which we count baſe, but we may be *conſtrain'd* to it; we never ſay that the *divine Laws* by their Sanctions *conſtrain* us, but *oblige* us; nor do we call Obedience to the DEITY *Conſtraint* unleſs by a Metaphor, altho many own that they are influenc'd by fear of Puniſhments. And yet ſuppoſing an *almighty evil Being* ſhould require under grievous Penaltys, *Treachery*, *Cruelty*, *Ingratitude*, we would call this *Conſtraint*. The difference is plainly this; when any Sanctions are join'd to co-operate with our *moral Senſe*, in exciting us to Actions which we count *morally good*, we ſay we are *obliged*; but when Sanctions of Rewards or Threatnings oppoſe our *moral* Sect. 7.

Sect. 7. *ral Senſe*, then we ſay we are *brib'd* or *conſtrain'd:* In the former Caſe we call the *Lawgiver good*, as deſigning the *publick Happineſs*; in the latter we call him *evil*, or *unjuſt*, for the ſuppos'd *contrary* Intention. But were all our Ideas of *moral Good* or *Evil* deriv'd ſolely from Opinions of *private Advantage* or *Loſs* in Actions, I ſee no poſſible difference which could be made in the meaning of theſe words.

IV. FROM this Senſe too we derive our Ideas of RIGHTS. Whenever it appears to us, that *a Faculty of doing, demanding, or poſſeſſing any thing, univerſally allow'd in certain Circumſtances, would in the whole tend to the general Good*, we ſay that any Perſon in ſuch Circumſtances has *a Right to do, poſſeſs, or demand that Thing*. And according as this Tendency to the *publick Good* is *greater* or *leſs*, the *Right* is *greater* or *leſs*.

THE *Rights* call'd *perfect* are of *ſuch neceſſity to the publick Good, that the univerſal Violation of them would make human Life intolerable*, and it actually makes thoſe miſerable, whoſe *Rights* are thus *violated:* And on the contrary, to fulfil theſe *Rights* in every Inſtance, tends to the *publick Good*, either *directly*, or by promoting the innocent Advantage of a *Part*. Hence it plainly follows, "That allow-

"ing

" ing a violent Defence, or Profecution of Sect. 7.
" fuch *Rights*, before Civil Government
" be conftituted, cannot in any particular
" Cafe be more detrimental to the *Publick*,
" than the Violation of them with Impu-
" nity:" And as to the general Confe-
quences, The univerfal Ufe of Force in *a State of Nature*, in purfuance of *perfect Rights*, feems exceedingly *advantageous* to the *Whole*, by making every one dread any Attempts againft the *perfect Rights* of others. This is the *moral Effect* which attends *proper Injury*, or *a Violation of the perfect Rights of others, viz.* A *right* to *War*, and *all Violence* which is neceffary to oblige the *Injurious* to repair the Damage, and give Security againft fuch Offences for the future. Inftances of *perfect Rights* are thofe to our *Lives*; to the *Fruits* of our Labours; to demand Performance of *Contracts* upon valuable Confiderations, from Men capable of performing them; to *direct* our own Actions either for *publick*, or *innocent private Good*, before we have fubmitted them to the Direction of others in any meafure: and many others of like nature.

IMPERFECT *Rights* are *fuch as, when univerfally violated, would not neceffarily make Men miferable.* Thefe *Rights* tend to the improvement and increafe of *poftive Good* in any Society, but are not *abfolute-*

Sect. 7. *ly* neceſſary to prevent univerſal Miſery. The Violation of them only diſappoints Men of the Happineſs expected from the Humanity or Gratitude of others; but does not deprive Men of any *Good* which they had before. From this Deſcription it appears, "That a violent Pro- "ſecution of ſuch *Rights* would generally "occaſion greater *Evil* than the Violation "of them." Beſides, the allowing of Force in ſuch Caſes, would deprive Men of the greateſt Pleaſure in Actions of *Kindneſs*, *Humanity*, *Gratitude*; which would ceaſe to appear amiable, when Men could be conſtrain'd to perform them. Inſtances of *imperfect Rights* are thoſe which the *Poor* have to the Charity of the Wealthy; which *all Men* have to Offices of no trouble or expence to the Performer; which *Benefactors* have to returns of Gratitude, and ſuch like. The Violation of *imperfect Rights* only argues a Man to have ſuch weak *Benevolence*, as not to ſtudy advancing the *poſitive Good* of others, when in the leaſt oppoſite to his own: but the Violation of *perfect Rights* argues the *injurious Perſon* to be *poſitively evil* or *cruel*; or at leaſt ſo *immoderately ſelfiſh*, as to be indifferent about the *poſitive Miſery* and *Ruin* of others, when he imagines he can find his *Intereſt* in it. In violating the *former*, we ſhew a weak Deſire of *publick Happineſs*, which every ſmall View of *private Intereſt* over-ballances;

but in violating the *latter*, we shew our Sect. 7.
selves so entirely negligent of the *Misery* of others, that Views of increasing our own *Good* overcome all our Compassion toward their Sufferings. Now as the absence of *Good* is more easily born than the presence of *Misery*, so the Power of our *good Wishes* toward the *positive Good* of others, is weaker than that of *Compassion* toward their *Misery*. He then who violates *imperfect Rights*, shews that his *Self-love* overcomes only the Desire of *positive Good* to others; but he who violates *perfect Rights*, betrays such a *selfish* Desire of advancing his own *positive Good*, as overcomes all the Power of *Compassion* toward the *Misery* of others.

BESIDE these two sorts of *Rights*, there is a third call'd *External*; as when *the doing, possessing, or demanding of any thing is really detrimental to the Publick in any particular Instance, as being contrary to the imperfect Right of another: but yet the universal denying Men this Faculty of doing, possessing, or demanding that Thing, or of using Force in pursuance of it, would do more mischief than all the Evils to be fear'd from the Use of this Faculty.* And hence it appears, "That "there can be no Right to use Force in "opposition even to *external Rights*, since "it tends to the *universal Good* to allow "Force in pursuance of them."

Sect. 7.

CIVIL Societys ſubſtitute *Actions in Law*, inſtead of the Force allow'd in *the State of Nature*.

INSTANCES of *external Rights* are theſe; that of a *wealthy Miſer* to recal his Loan from the moſt induſtrious poor Tradeſman at any time; that of demanding the Performance of a *Covenant* too burdenſom on one ſide; the Right of a *wealthy Heir* to refuſe Payment of any Debts which were contracted by him under Age, without Fraud in the Lender; the Right of taking advantage of a *poſitive Law*, contrary to what was *Equity* antecedent to that Law; as when a *regiſter'd Deed* takes place of one not regiſter'd, altho prior to it, and known to be ſo before the ſecond Contract.

NOW whereas no *Action*, *Demand*, or *Poſſeſſion* can at once be either neceſſary to the *publick Good*, or conducive to it, and at the ſame time its *contrary* be either neceſſary or conducive to the ſame end; it follows, "That there can be no Oppoſi-"tion of *perfect Rights* among themſelves, "of *imperfect* among themſelves, or be-"tween *perfect* and *imperfect Rights*." But it may often tend to the *publick Good*, to allow a *Right* of *doing*, *poſſeſſing*, or *demanding*, and of uſing *Force* in purſuance of it, while perhaps it would have been more

humane and *kind* in any Perſon to have acted otherwiſe, and not have claim'd his *Right*: but yet a violent Oppoſition to *theſe Rights* would have been vaſtly more *pernicious* than all the Inhumanity in the uſe of them. And therefore, however *external Rights* cannot be oppoſite among themſelves; yet they may be oppoſite to *imperfect Rights*; but *imperfect Rights*, tho violated, give no *Right* to *Force*: and hence it appears, "That there can never "be a *Right* to *Force* on both Sides, or a "*War* on both Sides *juſt* at the ſame time." Sect. 7.

V. THERE is another important Difference of *Rights*, according as they are *Alienable*, or *Unalienable*. To determine what *Rights* are *alienable*, and what not, we muſt take theſe two Marks:

1*ſt*. IF the Alienation be within our natural Power, ſo that it be poſſible for us in Fact to transfer our *Right*; and if it be ſo, then,

2*dly*. IT muſt appear that a Power to transfer ſuch *Rights* may ſerve ſome valuable Purpoſe.

BY the *firſt* Mark it appears, "That the "*Right* of *private Judgment*, or of our "*inward Sentiments*, is *unalienable*;" ſince we cannot command our ſelves to think what either

Sect. 7. either we our ſelves, or any other Perſon pleaſes: and ſo are alſo our *internal Affections*, which neceſſarily ariſe according to our Opinions of their Objects. By the *ſecond* Mark it appears, "That our *Right* of "*ſerving* GOD in the manner which we "think acceptable, is not *alienable*;" becauſe it can never ſerve any valuable purpoſe to make Men ſerve him in a way which ſeems to them diſpleaſing to him. The ſame way, a *direct Right* over our *Lives* or *Limbs*, is not *alienable* to any Perſon; ſo that he might at pleaſure put us to death, or maim us. We have indeed a *Right* to hazard our Lives in any good Action which is of importance to *the Publick*; and it may often ſerve a moſt valuable end, to ſubject the direction of ſuch perilous Actions to the Prudence of others in purſuing a *publick Good*; as *Souldiers* do to their *General*, or to a *Council* of *War*: and ſo far this *Right* is *alienable*. Theſe may ſerve as Inſtances to ſhew the Uſe of the two Marks of *alienable Rights*, which muſt both concur to make them ſo, and will explain the manner of applying them in other Caſes.

VI. THAT we may ſee the Foundation of ſome of the more *important Rights* of *Mankind*, let us obſerve, That probably nine Tenths, at leaſt, of the things which are uſeful to Mankind, are owing to their *Labour* and *Induſtry*; and conſequently all Men

Men are oblig'd to obſerve ſuch a Tenour of Action as ſhall moſt effectually promote *Induſtry*; and to abſtain from all Actions which would have the contrary effect. It is well known, that *general Benevolence* alone is not a Motive ſtrong enough to *Induſtry*, to bear *Labour* and *Toil*, and many other Difficultys which we are averſe to from *Self-love*: For the ſtrengthning therefore our Motives to *Induſtry*, we have the ſtrongeſt Attractions of *Blood*, of *Friendſhip*, of *Gratitude*, and the additional Motives of *Honour*, and even of *external Intereſt*. *Self-love* is really as neceſſary to the *Good* of the *Whole* as *Benevolence*; as that *Attraction* which cauſes the Coheſion of the Parts, is as neceſſary to the *regular State* of the *Whole*, as *Gravitation*: Without theſe additional Motives, *Self-love* would generally oppoſe the Motions of *Benevolence*, and concur with *Malice*, or influence us to the ſame Actions which *Malice* would. "Whatever Tenour of Action then would "take away the ſtronger Ties of *Benevo-* "*lence*, or the additional Motives of *Ho-* "*nour* and *Advantage* from our *Minds*, "and ſo hinder us from purſuing *induſtri-* "*ouſly* that Courſe which really increa- "ſes the *Good* of the *Whole*, is *evil*; "and we are oblig'd to ſhun it." Sect. 7.

FIRST then, the depriving any Perſon of the Fruits of his own innocent Labour, takes

Sect. 7. away all Motives of *Self-love* from *Induſtry*, and leaves *Benevolence* alone; nay it expoſes the *Induſtrious* as a conſtant Prey to the *Slothful*, and ſets *Self-love* againſt *Induſtry*. This is the Ground of our *Right* of *Dominion* and *Property* in the *Fruits* of our *Labours*; without which *Right*, we could ſcarce hope for any *Induſtry*, or any thing beyond the Product of uncultivated Nature. *Induſtry* will be confin'd to our preſent Neceſſitys, and ceaſe when they are provided for, at leaſt it will only continue from the weak Motive of *general Benevolence*, if we are not allow'd to ſtore up beyond preſent Neceſſity, and to diſpoſe of what is above our Neceſſitys, either in Barter for other kinds of Neceſſarys, or for the Service of our Friends or Familys. And hence appears the *Right* which Men have to lay up for the *future*, the Goods which will not be ſpoil'd by it; of alienating them in *Trade*; of Donation to *Friends*, *Children*, *Relations:* otherwiſe we deprive *Induſtry* of all the Motives of *Self-love*, *Friendſhip*, *Gratitude*, *natural Affection*. The ſame Foundation there is for the *Right* of Diſpoſition by *Teſtament*. The *Preſumption* of this Diſpoſition is the Ground of the *Right* of Succeſſion to the *Inteſtate*.

THE *external Right* of the *Miſer* to his uſeleſs Hoards, is founded alſo on this, That allowing Perſons by Violence, or without Conſent

Consent of the Acquirer, to take the Use of his Acquisitions, would discourage *Industry*, and take away all the Pleasures of *Generosity*, *Honour*, *Charity*, which cease when Men can be forc'd into these Actions. Besides, there is no determining in many Cases, who is a *Miser*, and who is not. Sect. 7.

MARRIAGE must be so constituted as to ascertain the Offspring; otherwise we take away from the *Males* one of the strongest Motives to *publick Good*, viz. *natural Affection*, and discourage *Industry*; as has been shewn above.

THE *Labour* of each Man cannot furnish him with all Necessarys, tho it may furnish him with a needless Plenty of one sort: Hence the *Right* of *Commerce*, and *alienating* our Goods; and also the *Rights* from *Contracts* and *Promises*, either to the *Goods* acquir'd by others, or to their *Labours*.

VII. THESE Instances may shew how our *moral Sense*, by a little Reflection upon the tendencys of Actions, may adjust the *Rights* of *Mankind*. Let us now apply the general Canon laid down above *, for comparing the Degrees of *Virtue* and *Vice* in Actions, in a few Corollaries besides that one already deduc'd †.

* See *Sect.* 3. *Art.* XI.
† See *Sect.* 3. *Art.* XV. *Par.* 2.

1. THE

Sect. 7.

1. THE Disappointment in whole or in part of any Attempt, *Good* or *Evil*, if it be occasion'd only by external Force, or any unforeseen Accident, does not vary the *moral Good*, or *Evil*; for as in *good* Attempts, the *Moment* of *Good*, or [M] is diminish'd, or vanishes in such a case, so does the *Ability*, or [A] likewise: The *Quotient* then may still be the same; and so in *evil* Attempts: So that Actions are not to be judg'd *good* or *evil* by the Events, any farther than they might have been foreseen by the *Agent* in *evil* Attempts; or were actually intended, if they were *good*, in *good* Actions; for then only they argue either *Love* or *Hatred* in the *Agent*.

2. SECULAR *Rewards* annex'd to *Virtue*, and actually influencing the *Agent* further than his *Benevolence* would, diminish the *moral Good*, in as far as they were necessary to move the *Agent* to the Action, or to make him do more *Good* than otherwise he would have done; for by increasing the *Interest*, or [I *positive*] to be subtracted, they diminish the *Benevolence*. But *additional Interests* which were not necessary to have mov'd the *Agent*, such as the *Rewards* of a *good Being* for Actions which he would have undertaken without a Reward, do not diminish the *Virtue*. In this however no Mortal is capable of judging ano-

another. Nor do the Prospects of *grateful* Returns for Benefits which we would have conferr'd gratuitously, diminish the *Generosity*. This Corollary may be apply'd to the *Rewards* of a *future State*, if any Person conceives them distinct from the Pleasures of *Virtue* itself: If they be not conceiv'd as something distinct from those Pleasures, then the very Desire of them is a strong Evidence of a *virtuous Disposition*. Sect. 7.

3. EXTERNAL *Advantage* exciting us to Actions of *evil* Tendency to others, if without this Prospect of *Advantage* we would not have undertaken them, diminishes the *Evil* of the Action; such as the Prospects of *great Rewards*, of avoiding *Tortures*, or even the *uneasy Sollicitations* of violent *selfish Passions*: And this is commonly call'd the *greatness of Temptation*. The reason of this is the same with that in the former Case, since $H = \frac{\mu - I}{A}$. We may here also remember again, that we are more uneasy upon the presence of *Pain*, than upon the absence of *Good*; and hence *Torture* is a more extenuating Circumstance than *Bribes* engaging us to *Evil*, because [I] is greater.

4. THE surmounting the uneasy Sollicitations of the *selfish Passions*, increases the *Virtue*

Sect. 7. *Virtue* of a *benevolent* Action, and much more worldly Loſſes, Toil, &c. for now the *Intereſt* becomes *negative*; the Subtraction of which increaſes the *Quantity*.

5. A MALICIOUS Action is made the more odious by all its foreſeen *Diſadvantages* to the *Agent*, for the ſame reaſon: particularly,

6. THE Knowledge of a *Law* prohibiting an *evil* Action, increaſes the *Evil* by increaſing the *negative Intereſt* to be ſubtracted; for then the *ill-natur'd* Inclination muſt be ſo ſtrong as to ſurmount all the Motives of *Self-love*, to avoid the Penaltys, and all the Motives of *Gratitude* toward the *Law-giver*. This is commonly call'd *ſinning againſt Conſcience*.

7. OFFICES of no *Toil* or *Expence*, have little *Virtue* generally, becauſe the *Ability* is very great, and there is no *contrary Intereſt* ſurmounted.

8. BUT the refuſing of them may be very *vitious*, as it argues an abſence of *good Affection*, and has often a great enough Moment of *natural Evil*. And,

9. IN general, the fulfilling the *perfect Rights* of others has little *Virtue* in it; for thereby no *Moment* of *Good* is produc'd more than there was before; and the *Intereſt*

reſt engaging to the Action is very great, even the avoiding all the Evils of *War* in a *State of Nature*. Sect. 7.

10. BUT the *violating perfect Rights*, or even *external ones*, is always *exceedingly evil*, either in the immediate, or more remote Conſequences of the Action; and the *ſelfiſh* Motives ſurmounted by this *vitious* Inclination, are the ſame with thoſe in the former Caſe.

11. THE trueſt Matter of Praiſe are thoſe Actions or Offices which others claim from us by an *imperfect Right*; and generally, the ſtronger their *Right* is, there is the leſs *Virtue* in fulfilling it, but the greater *Vice* in violating it.

LEMMA. The ſtronger Ties of *Benevolence*, in *equal Abilitys*, muſt produce a greater *Moment* of *Good*, in *equally good Characters*, than the weaker Ties: thus, *natural Affection*, *Gratitude*, *Friendſhip*, have greater Effects than *general Benevolence*. Hence,

12. IN *equal Moments* of *Good* produc'd by two *Agents*, when one acts from *general Benevolence*, and the other from a *nearer Tie*; there is greater *Virtue* in the *Agent*, who produces *equal Good* from the weaker Attachment, and leſs *Virtue*, where there is

Sect. 7. is the ſtronger Attachment, which yet produces no more.

13. But the Omiſſion of the *good Offices* of the ſtronger Ties, or Actions *contrary* to them, have greater *Vice* in them, than the like Omiſſions or Actions contrary to the weaker Ties; ſince our *Selfiſhneſs* or *Malice* muſt appear the greater, by the ſtrength of the contrary Attachment which it ſurmounts. Thus in co-operating with *Gratitude*, *natural Affection*, or *Friendſhip*, we evidence leſs *Virtue* in any *given Moment* of *Good* produc'd, than in equally important Actions of *general Benevolence:* But *Ingratitude* to a *Benefactor*, *Negligence* of the *Intereſts* of a *Friend*, or *Relation*; or Returns of *evil Offices*, are vaſtly more *odious*, than *equal Negligence*, or *evil Offices* toward *Strangers*.

14. When we cannot at once follow two different Inclinations of *Benevolence*, we are to prefer gratifying the ſtronger Inclination according to the wiſe Order of Nature, who has conſtituted theſe Attachments: thus, we are rather to be *Grateful* than *Liberal*, rather ſerve a *Friend*, or *Kinſman*, than a Stranger of only *equal Virtue*, when we cannot do both.

VIII. Let us not imagine, that from the above Idea of *Right* it will follow, that

that the *wise* and *benevolent* have a per- Sect. 7.
fect Right to dispose of the Labours or
Goods of the *weak* or *foolish*, because perhaps they would better employ them for the *publick Good* than the unskilful Possessors can; for tho in some particular Cases this might happen to do good, as when a *good-natur'd* OCTAVIUS assum'd the Government of a *distracted Commonwealth*; yet what would be the Consequence of allowing this universally, while there is no acknowledg'd Standard, or Judge of *superior Wisdom* or *Benevolence*, which every one would be too apt to claim? And as each Man is more nearly engag'd for his own *Good* by *Self-love*, than another is by mere *Benevolence*, he will scarcely be brought to believe, that another understands his *Interest*, or pursues it, better than he could himself. And what Happiness can remain to the *Govern'd*, while there is any Suspicion of either the *Benevolence* or *Wisdom* of the *Governor*? Especially when there are too great Presumptions, that Governors may be sway'd by *Self-love* against the *publick Good*. From this Consideration, as well as the *natural Love* of *Liberty*, and *Inclination* both to act and judge for our selves, we justly conclude, "That except when "Men, for their *own Interest*, or out of "*publick Love*, have by *consent* subjected "their Actions, or their Goods within cer-"tain Limits to the Pleasure of others; no

"Mortal

Sect. 7. " Mortal can have a *Right* from his *ſuperior Wiſdom*, or *Goodneſs*, or any *other* " *Quality*, to give Laws to others without " their *Conſent*, *expreſs* or *tacit*; or to " diſpoſe of the *Fruits* of their Labours, " or of any other *Right* whatſoever."

But then with relation to the Deity, ſuppos'd *omniſcient* and *benevolent*, and ſecure from *Indigence*, the ordinary Cauſe of Injurys towards others; it muſt be *amiable* in ſuch a *Being*, to aſſume the Government of *weak*, *inconſtant Creatures*, often miſled by *Selfiſhneſs*; and to give them Laws. To theſe Laws every Mortal ſhould ſubmit from *publick Love*, as being contriv'd for the *Good* of *the Whole*, and for the *greateſt private Good* conſiſtent with it; and we ſhould be better guided by them than by our own utmoſt Circumſpection. Hence we imagine, " That a *good* and *wiſe* God muſt " have a *perfect Right* to govern the *Uni-* " *verſe*; and that all Mortals are oblig'd " to *univerſal Obedience*."

The *Juſtice* of the Deity is only a Conception of his *univerſal impartial Benevolence*, as it ſhall influence him, if he gives any Laws, to attemper them to the *univerſal Good*, and inforce them with the moſt effectual Sanctions of *Rewards* and *Puniſhments*.

Some

IX. SOME imagine that the *Property* the *Creator* has in all his Works, must be the *true* Foundation of his *Right* to govern. Among Men indeed, we find it necessary for the *publick Good*, that none should arbitrarily dispose of the Goods acquir'd by the Labour of another, which we call his *Property*; and hence we imagine that *Creation* is the *only* Foundation of GOD'S *Dominion*. But if the Reason of establishing the *Rights* of *Property* does not hold against a *perfectly wise* and *benevolent Being*, I see no Reason why *Property* should be necessary to his *Dominion*; but the Reason does not hold: For an *infinitely wise* and *good Being* could never (by his assuming Authority) counteract the *universal Good*. The tie of *Gratitude* is stronger indeed than bare *Benevolence*; and therefore supposing two *equally wise* and *good Beings*, the one our *Creator*, and the other not, we would think our selves more oblig'd to obey our *Creator*. But supposing our *Creator Malicious*, and a *good Being* condescending to rescue us, or govern us better, with sufficient Power to accomplish his kind Intentions; his *Right* to govern would be perfectly good. But this is rather matter of curious Speculation than Use; since both Titles of *Benevolence* and *Property* concur in the *one only true* DEITY, as far as we can know, join'd with *infinite Wisdom* and *Power*. Sect. 7.

Sect. 7.

X. If it be here enquir'd, "Could not "the DEITY have given us a *different* or "*contrary determination* of *Mind*, *viz.* to "*approve* Actions upon another Foundation "than *Benevolence*? It is certain, there is nothing in this surpassing the natural Power of the DEITY. But as in the first Treatise * we resolv'd the Constitution of our present *Sense* of *Beauty* into the *divine Goodness*, so with much more obvious Reason may we ascribe the present Constitution of our *moral Sense* to his *Goodness*. For if the DEITY be really *benevolent*, or *delights* in the Happiness of others, he could not *rationally* act otherwise, or give us a *moral Sense* upon another Foundation, without counteracting his own *benevolent Intentions*. For, upon the Supposition of a *contrary Sense*, every *rational Being* must have been sollicitous in some degree about his own external Happiness: Reflection on the Circumstances of Mankind in this World would have suggested, that *universal Benevolence* and *social Temper* or a Course of such external Actions, would most effectually promote the *external Good* of every one, according to the Reasonings of CUMBERLAND and PUFFENDORF while at the same time this *perverted Sense* of *Morality* would have made us un-

* *Sect.* 8. *Art.* 2. *Par.* 5.

easy

easy in such a Course, and inclin'd us to the quite contrary, *viz. Barbarity*, *Cruelty*, and *Fraud*; and *universal War*, according to Mr. HOBBS, would really have been our *natural State*; so that in every Action we must have been distracted by two contrary Principles, and perpetually miserable, and dissatisfy'd when we follow'd the Directions of either. Sect. 7.

XI. IT has been often taken for granted in *these Papers*, "That the DEITY is *morally good*;" tho the Reasoning is not at all built upon this Supposition. If we would know the Reason of the great Agreement of Mankind in this Opinion, we shall perhaps find no demonstrative Arguments *a priori*, from the Idea of an *Independent Being*, to prove his *Goodness*: but there is abundant Probability deduc'd from the whole *Frame* of *Nature*, which seems, as far as we know, plainly contriv'd for the *Good* of the *Whole*; and the casual Evils seem the necessary Concomitants of some Mechanism design'd for vastly prepollent *Good*. Yea, this very *moral Sense*, implanted in *rational Agents*, to delight in, and admire whatever Actions flow from a Study of the *Good* of *others*, is one of the strongest Evidences of *Goodness* in the AUTHOR of *Nature*. But these Reflections are no way so universal as the Opinion, nor are they often inculcated by any one.

What

Sect. 7. What then more probably leads *Mankind* into that Opinion, is this: The obvious *Frame* of the *World* gives us Ideas of *boundless Wisdom* and *Power* in its AUTHOR; such a *Being* we cannot conceive *indigent*, and must conclude *happy*, and in the *best State* possible, since he can still gratify himself: The *best State* of *rational Agents*, and their *greatest* and most *worthy Happiness*, we are necessarily led to imagine must consist in *universal efficacious Benevolence*; and hence we conclude the DEITY *benevolent* in the most *universal impartial manner*. Nor can we well imagine what else deserves the Name of *Perfection* but *Benevolence*, and those *Capacitys* or *Abilitys* which are necessary to make it *effectual*; such as *Wisdom*, and *Power*: at least we can have no other valuable Conception of it.

FINIS.

A N

EXAMINATION

[Wollaston's]
Of the Notion of

Moral Good and Evil,

Advanced in a late Book, entitled,

The Religion of Nature delineated.

By *JOHN CLARKE*,
Master of the publick Grammar-School in HULL.

LONDON:
Printed for A. BETTESWORTH, at the *Red Lyon* in *Pater-noster-Row*. MDCCXXV.
Price 1 *s*.

AN

EXAMINATION

OF THE

Notion of *Moral* GOOD and EVIL, &c.

TO advance wrong Notions of Religion, is apt to have these two very ill Effects. 1. To mislead such as are imposed upon thereby in the Conduct of Life; and 2. To expose Religion to the Insults of those that being engaged in Deism or Atheism, or inclinable that way, have, notwithstanding their Folly, Sense e-

nough to perceive the Weakneſs of ſuch Notions. 'Tis upon this Account I have thought it worth while to take under Examination the firſt Section of a late Book, entitled *The Religion of Nature delineated*, writ by one Mr. *Wollaſton*, a Perſon of conſiderable Parts, who might have made a fine Book of it, had he ſet out upon a right Bottom: But unluckily falling upon a whimſical Notion of Morality, and perhaps too much tickled with the Novelty of it, and a Deſire to ſupport, and leave it as a Legacy to the World, has ſo leavened his Treatiſe with it, as muſt render it diſagreeable to the moſt judicious Readers, and at the ſame time expoſe Morality, inſtead of recommending it. There is beſides ſuch a Mixture of Pedantry in almoſt every Page, as is very unaccountable in a Man of his Senſe. The *Latin* and *Greek* Quotations are generally very little to the Purpoſe, unleſs it can be ſuppoſed to the Purpoſe, to expreſs Thoughts, and thoſe oftentimes pretty common, and to be met with in numerous Authors, in *Latin* and *Greek*, at the Bottom of the Page, which have been already as well or better expreſſed in the Text it ſelf in *Engliſh*. This is ſtopping and diſturbing his Reader to no Purpoſe, and preventing him from taking in the Senſe of what he reads, in the moſt eaſy expeditious Manner, and to the beſt

Advan-

Advantage. But what he could mean by his frequent Quotations from the Rabbinical Writers, eſpecially upon ſuch a Subject, unleſs it was to make a Parade of his great Reading in a ſort of Authors remarkable for nothing but Stupidity and Lying, muſt be the Wonder of every Man of Senſe that reads him. He knew very well what Kind of Character the Rabbins have amongſt the Learned, and how well they deſerve it, and muſt be ſenſible, tho' their Character was the reverſe of what it is, how little to the Purpoſe of his Readers it was, to trouble them with Quotations, they would none of them, or not one in ten thouſand underſtand. But this *en paſſant* only.

The Author in the firſt Section of his Book propoſes to ſhew upon what Ground the Law of Nature ſtands, from what Principle it is to be deduced, or how it may be made out, that there is ſuch a Law or Religion of Nature; and this in anſwer to the firſt Query of his Friend, *Is there really any ſuch Thing as natural Religion properly and truly ſo called?* I ſhall tranſcribe the Subſtance of what he has ſaid, to explain and vindicate his Notion, to ſave the Reader the Trouble of turning continually to his Book.

Page 8. We are told, *a true Propoſition may be denied, or Things may be denied to be what they are, by Deeds as well as by expreſs*

expreſs Words, or another Propoſition.—*That there are many ſuch Acts, as conſtitute the Character of a Man's Conduct in Life, which have in Nature, and would be taken by any indifferent Judge, to have a Signification, and to imply ſome Propoſition as plainly to be underſtood, as if it was declared in Words; and therefore, if what ſuch Acts declare to be, is not, they muſt contradict Truth as much, as any falſe Propoſition or Aſſertion can.* This is illuſtrated by an Example. *If a Body of Soldiers ſeeing another Body approach, ſhould fire upon them, would not this Action declare, that they were Enemies, and if they were not Enemies, would not this military Language declare what was falſe?* Again p. 13. *I lay this down as a fundamental Maxim, that whoever acts as if Things were ſo, or not ſo, doth by his Acts declare that they are ſo, or not ſo, as plainly as he could with Words, and with more Reality; and if the Things are otherwiſe, his Acts contradict thoſe Propoſitions, which aſſert them to be as they are. No Act (whether Word or Deed) of any Being, to whom moral Good or Evil are imputable, that interferes with any true Propoſition, or denies any thing to be as it is, can be right.* This Propoſition the Author endeavours to ſupport by ſeveral Reaſons, which ſhall hereafter

after be taken notice of. P. 16. *What has been said of Actions inconsistent with Truth, may also be said of many Omissions, or Neglects to act, that is, by these also true Propositions may be denied to be true, and then those Omissions by which this is done, must be wrong.* Again p. 20. *Every Act therefore of such a Being as is before described, and all those Omissions, which interfere with Truth* (i. e. *deny any Proposition to be true, or suppose any thing not to be what it is, in any regard*) *are morally evil in some Degree or other, the forbearing such Acts, and the acting in Opposition to such Omissions, are morally good, and when any thing may be either done or not done, equally without the Violation of Truth, that Thing is indifferent. I would have it to be minded well, that when I speak of Acts inconsistent with Truth, I mean any Truth, any true Proposition whatsoever, whether containing Matter of Speculation or plain Fact. I would have every thing taken for what in Fact and Truth it is.*

From all this our Author's Notion of moral Good and Evil I think is very evident. Those Acts according to him are morally good or obligatory, the Omission whereof would amount to, or imply the Denial of some Truth, any Truth whatsoever. Those Omissions, Neglects, or Forbearances,

bearances to act are morally good and obligatory, where the Actions omitted or forborn, would, if perform'd, be a Denial of the Truth. And all Actions or Omissions whereby a Man denies Truth of any Kind whatsoever, are immoral and unlawful. I suppose this Sort of Language of denying Truth by Action, or acting a Lie, as the Author somewhere expresses himself, will be a little surprizing to the Reader. And I am afraid the Novelty surprized the Author into an Approbation of it, and a passionate Desire to make good what he thought would gain him the Character and Credit of being an Original. He takes notice, that what he has advanced concerning the Nature of moral Good and Evil, and is the prevailing Thought that runs through his Book, he never met with any where. And I hope to make it appear, before I have done with him, it would have been more for his Credit, if it had not been to be met with in his Book.

I desire the Reader to take notice, that Affirming and Denying are Actions, which in strict Propriety of Language are only applicable to Agents; so that Actions, whether Words or Deeds, can not be properly said to affirm or deny any thing; the Agent only can be properly said to affirm or deny Truth by his Actions, whether Words or Deeds. This tho' it may seem a nice Distinction

ſtinction, yet is not more nice than neceſſary; for in order to a Perſon's affirming or denying the Truth, an Intention to affirm or deny is requir'd, without which he cannot be ſaid to affirm or deny it. A Man is then, and then only, ſaid to affirm or deny a Thing, when he conveys a Propoſition in his own Mind to the Minds of others; as expreſſing his own Senſe, Apprehenſion or Perſuaſion of the Agreement or Diſagreement of Things. It matters not, what Notions or Propoſitions his Words or Actions may naturally, or by Compact, excite in the Minds of thoſe that hear the one, or ſee the other; if he himſelf had no ſuch Propoſitions in his own Mind, had no Intention of communicating any ſuch Propoſitions to others, he cannot in any Propriety of Language be ſaid to affirm or deny them. Thus for Inſtance, a Perſon that ſhould pronounce, in the hearing of others, Words in the *Greek* Tongue, which he underſtands not, equivalent to this Propoſition in *Engliſh*, There is no God, could not be ſaid to deny the being of God; and for this Reaſon, becauſe he had no ſuch Propoſition in his own Mind, nor any Intention of conveying it to the Minds of others. The ſame may be ſaid of Deeds, as well as Words. Let us ſuppoſe ſome Action ſhould as neceſſarily convey the aforementioned Propoſition into the Minds of ſuch as

ſhould ſee or hear of it, as Words themſelves could; yet ſuppoſe the Agent altogether inſenſible of it, and to have no ſuch Intention at all, he could not be ſaid to deny the Being of a God. Let us ſuppoſe, again, Orders given in a Nation under the Apprehenſion of an Invaſion from an Enemy, that Beacons ſhould be fir'd, or Lights ſet up in ſuch and ſuch Places, to give Notice of his Approach; that Perſons were appointed accordingly for the Purpoſe, and agreed to execute the ſaid Orders: If they fire the Beacons, or ſet up the Lights, that Action would be equivalent to this Propoſition, The Enemy is come; and they might be ſaid thereby to affirm a Truth, if the Enemy was come, and a Lie if he was not, becauſe this was really meant and intended. But ſuppoſing other Perſons ignorant of the Orders and Uſe of Beacons, ſhould fire the Beacons, or ſet up Lights, they could not be ſaid thereby to affirm that the Enemy was come, notwithſtanding their Action would neceſſarily convey that Propoſition to the Minds of ſuch as, being acquainted with the Orders given, ſhould ſee the Lights; and that for this Reaſon only, becauſe they had not the leaſt Intention to affirm any ſuch Thing. All this, I think, is plain beyond Diſpute, and need not be longer inſiſted upon.

If

If therefore nobody can be ſaid to affirm or deny any thing, without an Intention ſo to do, I doubt the greateſt of Villains, will, according to Mr. *Wollaſton*'s Doctrine, ſtand diſcharged from the Guilt of the greateſt of Crimes; ſince they are ſo far from intending the Denial of any Truth, any true Propoſition whatſoever, by the Rapine and Murther they are guilty of, that they never ſo much as once imagine, their Actions have any ſuch Tendency, Meaning or Signification at all. Does a Villain that demands a Man's Money upon the Road, with a Piſtol at his Breaſt, intend thereby the Denial of any Truth, or the Truth Mr. *Wollaſton* pretends is denied by ſuch an Action, *viz.* that the Money belongs to the Traveller? Far from it! He never ſo much as dreams of the Denial of any ſuch Thing, nor has his Action any ſuch Signification, but quite the contrary. For Men do not uſe to claim their own in that violent manner, but Rogues frequently take that Method to deprive honeſt People of their own; and therefore the Thought that would naturally ariſe in the Mind of a Spectator upon it, that is, the natural Meaning or Signification of the Action would be, that the Money certainly belong'd to the Traveller, and not the Highwayman.

If it ſhould be ſaid in Defence of our Author, that tho' the Action of the Highwayman does not indeed imply a Denial of the Money to be the Traveller's, yet it may interfere with other Truths; that I put too preciſe and ſtrict a Senſe upon his Words; whereas he means no more, but that Actions or Omiſſions denominated immoral, have a natural Meaning or Signification, inconſiſtent with ſome Truth; and that therefore the Immorality of any Action, or Omiſſion, does not lie in the Intention, but in the natural Tendency or Signification of the Action or Omiſſion to deny ſome Truth, in a Fitneſs to raiſe, or excite in the Minds of ſuch as ſee or hear of it, Propoſitions contrary to the Truth. I anſwer, this is ſtrange Morality indeed, and ſuch as renders a Perſon that denies a Truth in Words without being ſenſible it is a Truth, and ſo conſequently without any Intention to deny the Truth, equally guilty with him who denies it, though he knows it to be a Truth; for in both Caſes the Words are ſuppoſed to be the ſame, and conſequently their Inconſiſtency with the Truth preciſely the ſame; ſo that if the Immorality of the Action lies there excluſive of the Intention, it is plain the Guilt muſt be the very ſame.

Take it therefore which way you will, whether an Intention to deny the Truth be made

made neceſſary or not neceſſary to the Immorality of any Action, Mr. *Wollaſton*'s Doctrine cannot ſtand. Upon the former Suppoſition, the greateſt of Rogues will be excuſable in the vileſt of Actions for want of this Intention to deny the Truth, as it is very certain they have it not. They trouble not their Heads about Truth, or the Denial of it; all they are concerned for, is to get Money to ſpend in Lewdneſs and Debauchery; and their Manner of getting it, is ſo far from implying ſuch a Denial of Truth, as Mr. *Wollaſton* ſuppoſes the Immorality of their Action to conſiſt in, that the natural Signification of it lies quite the contrary way, as I have above taken notice. And upon the Suppoſition that an Intention to deny the Truth, is not neceſſary to the Immorality of an Action, but that it is ſufficient to render an Action immoral, that it has a Meaning or Signification inconſiſtent with ſome Truth, tho' the Agent has not the leaſt Intention of denying any Truth: I ſay upon this ſuppoſition it will be a crime, and as great a crime to deny the Truth thro' Ignorance or Miſtake, as to do it wittingly and knowingly, with a perverſe and malicious Intention; which to be ſure is admirable Morality.

Tho' what has been ſaid be ſufficient to blaſt our Author's new Notion of Morality, yet I ſhall not leave him thus, I have not

done with him by far. Affirming or denying is neither more nor leſs than conveying our Senſe (real or pretended) of things, their Agreement or Diſagreement to others by Words. This is the primary, original, and moſt proper Notion of affirming and denying. But becauſe it is poſſible, to ſome Degree, to convey our Minds or Senſe of Things to others, by Actions as well as Words, where they have by Conſent a Signification or Meaning apply'd to them, for that Purpoſe the Senſe of the Words *affirm* and *deny* has perhaps been ſometimes extended to Actions of that kind; and if any one has a mind to uſe them ſo, I ſhall not diſpute the Propriety of that Uſe of them with him. But to extend them farther to ſuch Actions as the Conſent of Men has not attached any Meaning to at all, if it be not peculiar to Mr. *Wollaſton*, is at beſt a violent Figure, a bold Catachreſis, ſuch as ſhould by all means be avoided in philoſophical Diſcourſes, where the plaineſt Language, and the leaſt liable to be diſputed, is certainly the beſt. This Stretch, in point of Language, has obliged him to put forc'd and violent Meanings upon the ſeveral Inſtances of immoral Actions he has Occaſion to take notice of, ſuch as, I dare ſay, never entered into the Thoughts of any body before himſelf. *Does a Man break a Bargain?*

gain? this is, according to Mr. *Wollaſton, denying the Truth by Action, denying there was any Bargain:* Tho' if another might take the ſame Freedom, or pretend to the like Skill for the finding out the Senſe and Meaning of Actions, he would be apt to think it perhaps a Denial not of the Bargain, as tho' there had been none, but of the Obligation only to keep it. Another Critic in Actions would perhaps find it out to be a Denial of neither, but an Affirmation rather of this Propoſition, that the Breach of the Bargain was a likely means to rook his Chapman of ſome Money, or at leaſt ſave his own, and thereby lay the Diſturbance which a covetous griping Humour at that time gave him. And if ſuch a Critic ſhould ſtand buff, in vindication of the Fellow's Action, as very innocent, and ſo far from implying the Denial, that it imported the Affirmation of a manifeſt and undeniable Truth, I ſee not how our Author would be able to come handſomly off with him; he would find himſelf in ſome danger, I doubt, of being fool'd at his own Weapon; it would at leaſt, I think, be an even Wager on the Critic's ſide.

Again, is a rich Man regardleſs or negligent of the poor? according to Mr. *Wollaſton,* he denies by that Neglect the Condition of the poor to be what it is, his

own

own Condition to be what it is. Does a Man lie with his Neighbour's Wife? he by that Action impudently denies her to be his Neighbour's, and affirms her to be his own; tho' the Circumstance of Secrecy, with which that kind of Gallantry is usually carried on, visibly implies the quite contrary, *viz.* that she is not his own: Which being a Truth, some people may perhaps be thankful to our Author for the notable Argument his doctrine furnishes them with, to prove the Innocence of Adultery. Besides, this Action is the Affirmation of another Truth, *i. e.* that the Man is in love, and knows no other way so ready to make himself easy as that. And several other Meanings perhaps might be found conformable to Truth, all of them as likely and natural at least as those our Author has thought fit to assign. For these Actions are, I think, something like the Clinking of a Bell; you may, by the Help of that Freedom Mr. *Wollaston* takes with them, make them say almost what you have a mind, affirm or deny Truth just as you please. Nay, I do not know but a good ingenious Fellow, that would but apply his Parts for some reasonable Time to study the Meaning of Actions, might venture for a Wager, with any one of the Admirers of our Author's new Notion of Morality, to drop Meanings with him,

him, a Truth affirmed for a Truth denied, to Ranting, Roaring, Tearing, Swearing, Drinking, Gaming, Pimping, Whoring, or whatever Species of immoral Action he could think of beſides.

Will our Author needs have it that all Vice, every immoral Action denies ſome Truth? let that be granted, we will for once allow him the Privilege of expreſſing himſelf in his own way: But then he muſt be forced to allow that every ſuch Action or Omiſſion does as well affirm Truth as deny it: For Inſtance this Truth, that the Perſon concern'd propoſes or promiſes to himſelf ſome Intereſt or Advantage, ſome Pleaſure or Satisfaction from his vicious and immoral Behaviour. This Meaning of his Behaviour is a certain Truth, and much more obvious in any Inſtance of Immorality that can be put, than any of thoſe Mr. *Wollaſton* has invented. It will avail nothing to ſay, that notwithſtanding any vicious Action or Omiſſion implies indeed this Truth, yet it denies ſome other Truth, which is ſufficient to bring it under the Denomination of vicious or immoral; for I ſay on the other hand let the Action deny what Truth you will, yet ſince it affirms other Truth, that is as ſufficient to bring it under the Denomination of virtuous.

For if the Denial of Truth, any Truth whatever be, as Mr. *Wollaſton* pretends, immoral, and for this Reaſon only, becauſe it is a Denial of the Truth, without any Reference or Regard to Conſequences, that may follow from Actions or Omiſſions, whereby Truth is denied; muſt not then the affirming of Truth, any Truth, whether of any Conſequence or Importance, or no, be matter of Duty, or a Virtue, or at leaſt very commendable or praiſe-worthy? For if Truth, all Truth without Exception, be ſo very ſacred, as that Mankind ought to have a ſupreme, ultimate and terminating Regard to it in all their Conduct, in all they ſay or do, if Vice be Vice, therefore and only upon Account of its Oppoſition to, or Inconſiſtency with the Truth; it will puzzle, I doubt, any one even of our Author's Head-piece, to allege a ſolid ſubſtantial Reaſon, why the affirming of Truth, any Truth whatever by Word or by Deed, even in Caſes, where Forbearance or Omiſſion would not imply a Denial of Truth, ſhould not be look'd upon as a Virtue, or meritorious; becauſe by this means as Regard is ſhewn to Truth, to which the higheſt Regard is due, and upon Account of which alone any Regard is due to ought elſe, according to Mr. *Wollaſton*. Does not Virtue receive all its Merit from the Regard it implies

plies to Truth? muſt not therefore every Action, whether Word or Deed, whereby a Regard is paid to Truth, or Truth is affirmed, be at leaſt commendable, if not matter of ſtrict Duty? And if ſo, it will then be a glorious Exerciſe for a Man to ſpend his Time in thrumming over ſuch worthy and weighty Propoſitions as theſe, A Man's no Horſe, a Horſe no Cow, a Cow no Bull, nor a Bull an Aſs. Every body at firſt Sight perceives how ridiculouſly trifling this would be, and may thereby judge of our Author's Doctrine, from which ſuch ſilly idle Conſequences viſibly and manifeſtly flow.

If it ſhould be further alledged in Behalf of our Author, that all immoral Actions deny more Truths than they affirm, and are upon that Account immoral. I anſwer, this is uncertain, and perhaps falſe; for I doubt not but a Man of Invention equal to that of our Author might aſſign to any Species of vicious Action or Omiſſion, as many probable Meanings, affirmative of Truth, as he could for the Denial of it. But be that as it will, to put Morality upon ſuch a Foot is viſibly ridiculous, and unworthy of a ſerious Confutation.

That Action or Omiſſion, or Perſons by Action or Omiſſion, cannot be properly ſaid to affirm or deny Truth, unleſs where Acti-

on has by Conſent a Signification applied to it; which Signification is deſigned to be communicated to others, has been above ſufficiently ſhewn. The only reaſonable and true Senſe therefore that can be put upon Mr. *Wollaſton*'s general Aſſertion, That Men may by their Actions or Omiſſions deny Truth, is this, That Actions, even ſuch as are not by Compact or Agreement made expreſſive of, and equivalent to Propoſitions, may yet convey Propoſitions into the Minds of ſuch as may ſee, or otherwiſe come to the Knowledge of them, inconſiſtent with, or contrary to ſome Truth, even where a Perſon has no Intention by his Action or Omiſſion of conveying any ſuch Senſe or Propoſition to the Minds of others. This is all, I ſay, that can be allowed him, and perhaps all at bottom that he meant, tho' his improper and barbarous way of wording himſelf, might eaſily miſlead his Reader into an Imagination, that he meant ſomething further. We are now therefore to examine his Doctrine according to this Senſe of his Words.

That Actions or Omiſſions oftentimes betray Mens Senſe of Things, real Intentions or Deſigns, is too obvious to be denied; and therefore ſuch Actions or Omiſſions may in ſome Senſe be ſaid to have a Signification; but yet ſo far from being certain

or

or determinate, generally ſpeaking, that the ſame Action or Omiſſion not only may, but frequently does convey into the Minds of different People different Notions or Propoſitions, and oftentimes ſuch as are quite contrary to one another. A Man, not acquainted with the World, meets with a Sharper, that treats him with abundance of Civility and Reſpect, in Hopes by that means of finding an Opportunity of picking his Pocket, or rooking him of his Money at Game: The poor innocent Mortal naturally from thence conceives a good Opinion of him, and the Propoſition conveyed to his Mind by the Sharper's enſnaring Carriage is this, that he's a mighty civil honeſt Gentleman. A Spectator, well acquainted with the World, that obſerves the Rogue's Air and Manner, conceives immediately a quite different Notion of him, and the Meaning or Signification of the Sharper's Action to him is, that he is a cunning deſigning Raſcal. I deſire to know which of theſe Meanings is the right one, or whether both theſe Significations may be allowed as juſt and proper Significations of the Rogue's Action? If only one is to be allowed it will be a hard matter, I fear, to aſſign a very ſatisfactory Reaſon, why one rather than the other ſhould paſs for the juſt and proper Meaning of the Rogue's Action; when both

ſeem to have an equal Title to it, as being both equally conveyed, and the one as naturally as the other. The Difficulty of making a Determination will grow with the Number of Significations the ſame Action may have or convey to different People. This Difficulty attending our Author's Scheme, he ſeems not to have been in the leaſt aware of, tho' it lies ſo very obvious, and was ſo neceſſary to be taken notice of, in order to the clearing up of his Doctrine, and delivering it from an Incumbrance that ſeems to confound and overwhelm it all at once; for the ſame Action or Omiſſion may have very different Significations, or convey very different Notions and Propoſitions to the Minds of different People, ſome of which may be conformable to Truth, and others not. Without ſome Criterion therefore whereby to determine which of the various Significations of the ſame Action or Omiſſion are to be taken into the Account, in order to judge of the Morality or Immorality thereof; all he has ſaid upon the Subject ſignifies not one Straw, and amounts to nothing. Unleſs his Meaning was that all Actions or Omiſſions that convey but to any one ſingle Body a Senſe inconſiſtent with the Truth, any Truth whatever, for ſo he words himſelf, are to be look'd upon as immoral. If this was his Meaning, it was a very ſtrange

one,

one, and as wild a Thought as ever enter'd into the Soul of Man: Such, in ſhort, as may make the moſt innocent, and the moſt virtuous Actions in the World, and ſuch as are allow'd ſo to be by all Mankind, immoral; becauſe ſuch may chance to convey (as they often have done) Notions or Apprehenſions utterly inconſiſtent with Truth.

It would be eaſy to multiply Inſtances of Actions, very various in their Significations, ſome of which would be agreeable to Truth, others not; but I ſhall only add one more brought by himſelf, *p.* 9. *When* Popillius Lænas *ſolicited to have* Cicero *proſcribed, and that he might find him out and be his Executioner; would not his Carriage have ſufficiently ſignified to any one, who was ignorant of the Caſe, that* Tully *either was ſome very bad Man, and had deſerved capital Puniſhment, or had ſome way grievouſly injured this Man, or at leaſt had not ſaved his Life, or had not as much Reaſon to expect his Service and good Offices, upon Occaſion, as he ever had to expect* Tully's *?* Now all theſe various Significations *Lænas*'s Action had by our Author's own Confeſſion; but then it is worth the Reader's while to remark, that *this Carriage of* Lænas, he ſays, *would only have ſignified one or other of theſe various Meanings*

Meanings to one that was ignorant of the Caſe. What then would that Carriage of his have ſignified to one that was not ignorant of the Caſe, but knew *Tully* to be a Perſon of eminent Parts, Learning, Eloquence and Virtue, that had merited highly from his Country, and particularly from *Lænas*, whoſe Life he had ſaved? why 'tis as clear as the Sun can be at Noon-day, that to ſuch a Perſon it would have had ne'er a one of thoſe various Significations, but only this, that *Lænas* was what the World call an ungrateful profligate Villain. What then becomes of our Author's Denial of the Truth, implied in the Behaviour of *Lænas*, wherein preciſely, according to him, the Immorality of it lay, and without which it would have been very innocent? Perhaps we ſhall be told in the Language and Stile of our Author, that *Lænas* by his Carriage denied *Cicero* to be a Man; a very pretty Defenſe! He muſt have been ignorant of the Caſe with a witneſs, that from the Carriage of *Lænas* could have conceived an Imagination, that *Cicero* was a Cow.

From hence then, I ſay, our Author's new Scheme of Morality appears clogg'd and embaraſſed with inſuperable Difficulty. Since the ſame Actions will have various Significations, with reſpect to thoſe that are and thoſe that are not ignorant of the Caſe,

that

that is, the Condition and Circumſtances of the Actor, and the Relation he ſtands in to the World about him, and of thoſe various Significations, ſome will be agreeable to Truth and ſome not. In the midſt of all this perplexing Variety, what Significations we are to have regard to, in forming a Judgment of the Morality or Immorality of human Actions, will, I doubt, be impoſſible to determine upon any ſolid ſubſtantial Reaſons: And yet without this all our Author's Doctrine comes to nothing. For to ſay, what is all that is left to be ſaid to evade that Difficulty and Perplexity, that it is ſufficient to render an Action or Omiſſion immoral, if it does but communicate or carry with it an Intimation, that interferes with any Truth, to the Mind of any Body whatever, whether ignorant or not ignorant of the Caſe, I ſay, to pretend to evade the Difficulty thus, would be downright Madneſs and Diſtraction. And therefore, tho' what our Author ſays up and down his Book, ſeems to amount to that, and any one at firſt Reading would be inclinable to think he meant ſo; yet, as that is a Meaning not to be reconcil'd with common Senſe, I cannot think he would be guilty of ſuch an Abſurdity: And therefore it will lie upon the Eſpouſers of his Notion of Morality, if any ſuch there be,

to make up the Deficiency of his Scheme, by giving us ſome Criterion, whereby we may be enabled to diſtinguiſh, in the Variety of Significations the ſame Action or Omiſſion may poſſibly have, thoſe we are to form a Judgment upon, as to the moral Good or Evil thereof.

But to go to the Bottom of this Buſineſs of the Signification of Actions at once.

The free and voluntary Actions of Men may have various Significations, according to the various Senſe and Diſcernment, the different Knowledge of Mankind, particularly of the Condition and Circumſtances of the Perſon acting, and thoſe his Action has any Relation to, in different Obſervers. This is evident beyond all Diſpute, that different Perſons may have different Senſes, Notions, Apprehenſions or Propoſitions conveyed to them by the ſame Action. And accordingly we find that Perſons well acquainted with the World, ſuch as have ſtudied Mankind, will penetrate ſtrangely into other Men, and diſcover by their way and manner of Action their Notions, Humours, Inclinations, paſſions, real Deſigns and Intentions, where others of leſs Diſcernment will be altogether at a loſs, or have very different Conceptions. I ſhall endeavour to illuſtrate what I ſay by another Inſtance fetch'd from our Author *p.* 10. *If* A *ſhould enter*

enter into Compact with B, *by which he promiſes and engages never to do ſome certain Thing; and after this he does that Thing; in this Caſe it muſt be granted that his Act interferes with his Promiſe, and is contrary to it. Now it cannot interfere with his Promiſe but it muſt alſo interfere with the Truth of that Propoſition, which ſays there was ſuch a Promiſe made, or that there is ſuch a Compact ſubſiſting. If this Propoſition be true,* A *made ſuch a certain Agreement with* B, *it would be denied by this,* A *never made any Agreement with* B; *why? becauſe the Truth of this latter is inconſiſtent with the Agreement aſſerted in the former. The Formality of the Denial, or that which makes it to be a Denial, is this Inconſiſtence: If then the Behaviour of* A *be inconſiſtent with the Agreement mentioned in the former Propoſition, that Propoſition is as much denied by* A*'s Behaviour, as it can be by the latter or any other Propoſition.*

I obſerve in the firſt Place that what our Author ſays, that A*'s Act cannot interfere with his Promiſe, but it muſt interfere with the Truth of that Propoſition, which ſays there was ſuch a Promiſe made,* is falſe. For let us ſuppoſe *A* comes to *B*, ſometime after the Promiſe made, and makes a Declaration in theſe Words; I will do what I promiſed you I would not: 'Tis plain this Declaration interferes with, or is

contrary to the Promiſe, and yet is ſo far from denying that it acknowledges it. Why then may not the Action, which is but the Declaration in fact, or put in Execution, interfere, or be inconſiſtent with the Promiſe, without neceſſarily implying a Denial of it. Let us ſuppoſe again *C* a Stranger to both *A* and *B*, but accidentally preſent at the making of the Promiſe. The Action of *A*, contrary to his Promiſe, could never ſuggeſt to him that there had been no Promiſe, when he knew the contrary. 'Tis very evident the Action of *A*'s could have no ſuch Intimation or Meaning with reſpect to C; but it might raiſe ſeveral other Thoughts or Imaginations in his Mind; as for Inſtance, this, perhaps *B* has releas'd *A* from the Obligation: Or this, perhaps *A* has made *B* Satisfaction ſome other ways: Or this, perhaps *B* has done ſome great Injury to *A*, and by that means cancel'd the Obligation: Or this, perhaps there was ſome Condition implyed to be performed by *B*, which being not perform'd, *A* was at Liberty: Or this, *A* had forgot his Promiſe; or perhaps *B* is dead, and *A* by that means diſcharged from the Obligation: Or perhaps ſomebody told *A* ſo, and by that means occaſioned his acting contrary to his Promiſe: Or perhaps he was commanded to do the Thing by ſome that had Authority ſo

to

to command him: Or finally *A* is, what the World call a Knave.

Theſe are all poſſible Meanings of *A*'s Action to *C*, becauſe it might very eaſily ſuggeſt or convey, one or more of theſe ſeveral Propoſitions, to his Mind. But our Author's pretended Meaning, it is utterly impoſſible *A*'s Action ſhould ſuggeſt to *C*, who knew there had been ſuch a Promiſe made: That Knowledge of his would effectually exclude the leaſt Thought or Imagination, that there had been no Promiſe given. Now if we ſuppoſe *C*, very well acquainted with *A*, and *B*, then ſome of theſe Meanings may vaniſh, and of the reſt different Significations become attached to the Action of *A*, according to the different Characters of *A*, and *B*. If *A* have a very good Name for Honeſty, whilſt *B* paſſes in the World for a Trickſter, the Significations of *A*'s Action will be in his Favour, and Vice verſa.

Now ſuppoſe any one of the firſt nine Significations to be true, the reſt with the Tenth would be all falſe, and yet the Action of *A* very Innocent; whereas if the Morality of it was to be judged of, and determin'd by the plain obvious Meaning of our Author's Rule of Morality, that no Act that interferes with any true Propoſition can be right, *i. e.* innocent or lawful, it ought

to

to be condemn'd as immoral, becauſe it has ſo many various Meanings, all inconſiſtent with the Truth. As for Inſtance ſuppoſe *B* to have frankly releaſed *A* from the Obligation of his Promiſe, unknown to *C*; *A*'s Action contrary to the Promiſe given, would be indiſputably very harmleſs, innocent, and lawful: And yet all the other Meanings or Significations of his Action, would interfere with the Truth of that Propoſition, that *B* had frankly releaſed *A* from the Obligation of his Promiſe, and ſo by our Author's Rule, *A*'s Action would be immoral, and unlawful.

I ſuppoſe the Reader by this Time ſees pretty plainly, how little the World is obliged to Mr. *Wollaſton* for his new Notion, or Rule of Morality. I ſhall but take Notice of one Inſtance more of his Weakneſs upon this Head, of the Denial of Truth by immoral or vicious Actions. He tells us, p. 28. *that a Debtor, who refuſes to pay his Creditor, directly denies the Money which is the Creditor's to be the Creditor's.* I Anſwer, tho' it ſhould be never ſo true, upon the Suppoſal of Property amongſt men, that the Debtor's Refuſal did deny the Creditor's Property: Yet our Author is not at Liberty to ſuppoſe, there is ſuch a Thing as Property in the World, or that any Man can be truly ſaid to have a Property in any Thing:

Thing: Becauſe ſuch a Suppoſition, is taking the Thing for granted, which it is the Deſign of this firſt Section of his Book to prove. The Reader muſt remember, that what our Author propoſes in this firſt Section, is to make out in general, that there is a Religion, or Law of Nature; now Property is founded in the Law of Nature, and is, without that, nothing but an empty Name: So that to ſuppoſe Property, is to ſuppoſe there is a Law of Nature, the very Thing in Queſtion, and which it is the Buſineſs and Deſign of this Section to prove. That Property is grounded upon the Law of Nature, is evident, becauſe it is nothing but a Power to enjoy or diſpoſe of a Thing, agreeably to the good Pleaſure of God, allowed, and granted, by the Law of Nature. Thus an honeſt man is ſaid to have a Property in his Life, or a Right to his Life, that is, a Power or Licence from the Law of God, to enjoy it; ſo that whoever goes about to take it from him, or diſturb him, in the peaceable Enjoyment of it, becomes thereby liable to the Diſpleaſure of God, and his Vengeance. Thus too a Man is ſaid to have a Property in Lands or Goods, that is, Allowance or Licence, from the Law of God, to uſe, and diſpoſe of them, that is, give, ſell, or barter them; and therefore whoever goes about, by Fraud, or by Force,

to moleſt, diſturb, let, or hinder him, in the Uſe of his Property, contrary to the Intention of the Law, becomes thereby expoſed to the Reſentment of the Almighty, as acting contrary to his Pleaſure, declared by the Voice of Nature. This is, I think, what every Body means by Property, that have any meaning at all in the Uſe of that Word, which I am afraid our Author had not, by his weak Way of talking about it. And from hence it appears very manifeſtly, a plain Begging of the Queſtion to ſuppoſe any ſuch Thing as Property, in an Attempt to prove, that there is a Law of Nature, becauſe it is ſuppoſing the very Thing to be proved.

In other Inſtances of immoral Action or Omiſſion, wherein Property is not concerned, our Author does, I think, keep pretty clear of the Suppoſition of moral Truth, and rather chooſes to put ſtrange kind of uncouth far-fetched Meanings, upon immoral Actions or Omiſſions, than to take Notice of one Meaning, they might be ſuppoſed to have a thouſand Times more obvious than thoſe of his own coining; that is, of their implying the Denial of moral Truth, or the ſuppoſed Obligation from the Law of God, with Reſpect to thoſe Actions, or Omiſſions. And herein he acted very right, for theſe two very obvious Reaſons. One is,

that

that the Founding the Immorality or Viciouſneſs of any action or Omiſſion, in the Denial of moral Truth, or the Obligation from the Law of Nature, reſpecting that Action, or Omiſſion, would have been viſibly ſuppoſing the Thing he was to prove, that there is moral Truth, a Law or Religion of Nature; for theſe are all the ſame. The other is, that a meaning aſſign'd to immoral Actions implying a Denial of moral Truth, would be in Effect ſetting aſide the other pretended Meaning, implying a denial of Things to be what they are.

The Application of this to an Inſtance, will perhaps better let the Reader into my Meaning. *A Man of Ability*, he tells us, p. 17. *that ſhould never give any thing to the Poor, would certainly deny the Condition of the poor, to be what it is, and his own to be what it is.* Now this appears at firſt Sight, to any indifferent Reader, a very violent, forc'd Senſe, put upon the rich Man's Neglect, and ſuch a Meaning, as, I dare ſay, never any one dreamt of, before our Author. The Condition of both, is oftentimes ſo very glaring, and evident to the World, that neither can the rich Man intend any ſuch thing by his Neglect of the Poor, as to deny their Circumſtances, and his own, to be what they are; that would be too ſtupid and ridiculous, for any one

in his Wits to intend; and for that Reaſon his Omiſſion cannot naturally carry any ſuch Intimation, or Signification, along with it, but this rather, as vaſtly more obvious, and natural, that he did not look upon himſelf as obliged by any Law of God, to relieve them; and ſo his Neglect of them would be a Denial, not of their Circumſtances, and Condition, to be what they are, but only of his Obligation to regard or relieve them. Now this Meaning of the rich Man's Omiſſion or Neglect, *viz.* the Denial of all Obligation to relieve the Poor, infinitely more obvious, and natural, than that of his own, he takes no Notice of, and ſo far he was undoubtedly right: Becauſe that was viſibly nothing to his Purpoſe, but inconſiſtent with it; for to pretend to prove the rich Man's Neglect of the Poor immoral, becauſe it implies a Denial of this Truth, that the Rich are obliged to relieve the Poor, is ſo palpably proving the Thing by itſelf, that no Man of our Author's Senſe, or indeed but common Senſe, could well be guilty of it. But having no clear diſtinct Notion of Property, he has, in Caſes, where that is concern'd, unluckily blunder'd upon that manner of Proof, commonly called *petitio principii.* The Denial of Property in the Owner did not ſo viſibly imply the Suppoſition of a Law of Nature, as the Denial of Obligation did. And

And then if our Author had taken Notice of, and insisted upon this Meaning of the rich Man's Inhumanity to the Poor, the Denial of all Obligation to relieve them, that would have effectually set aside the other, the Denial of his own, and the Poor's Circumstances to be what they are, as being plainly inconsistent therewith; for if the natural Meaning of the rich Man's want of Charity, be a Denial of his Obligation to relieve the Poor, it is grounded upon the Supposition that their Circumstances and his own are what they are, and by consequence cannot stand with the contrary Supposition. There could, it's manifest, be no Foundation for any one to conceive, from the rich Man's Neglect of his poor Neighbours, any Imagination that he denied, or did not look upon himself to be obliged to relieve them, but upon the Supposition, that his Circumstances and his poor Neighbours are what they are, that is, that he was Rich, and they Poor. So that it is as plain as any thing can be, that those two Meanings are utterly incompatible and inconsistent with one another.

But supposing Actions or Omissions rightly denominated immoral, did really imply a Denial of the Truth, such as our Author contends for, a Denial of Things to be what they are; yet how will it follow from such

a Denial, that those Actions therefore are truly and properly immoral, that is, contrary to the Will and good Pleasure of God, declared by the Voice of Reason, or the Light of Nature? For this our Author gives several Reasons, which I come now, in the next Place, to examine. We are told, p. 13. *No Act (whether Word or Deed) of any Being to whom moral Good or Evil are imputable, that interferes with any true Proposition, or denies any thing to be as it is, can be right.* That is, if our Author means any thing to the Purpose, agreeable to the Will and Mind of God; and therefore what he says, must amount to this, that every such Action must be immoral, or contrary to some Law or Rule, which God has prescribed to the Actions, and Conduct of Men. For right and wrong must be here tantamount to moral and immoral, commanded and forbidden, agreeable and disagreeable to the divine Law; for if he means any thing else by right and wrong, it is visibly nothing to the Purpose.

His first Proof runs thus. *If that Proposition which is false be wrong, that Act which implies such a Proposition, or is founded in it cannot be right, because it is the very Proposition in Practice.* Here I fear the Word *wrong* stands for nothing, or what is the same as nothing, to our Author's

thor's Purpoſe. The Terms of Right and Wrong are not applicable to Propoſitions at all, in any moral Senſe, or Signification of them, nor to any thing elſe, but the Actions, or Omiſſions of reaſonable Beings. What? You'll ſay perhaps, is not a falſe Propoſition viſibly wrong? Yes to be ſure, if by wrong you mean falſe, a falſe Propoſition is certainly falſe. Right and Wrong are Denominations given to things, upon account of their Agreement or Diſagreement with ſome Rule, to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of. Now the only Rule to which Propoſitions, conſidered as true or falſe, are referred, and by which they are judg'd of, is the Nature and Exiſtence of things, or matter of Fact. Such Propoſitions as are conformable thereto, may be, and are properly called right, thoſe that are not, wrong; that is, true or falſe, and in no other Senſe can Propoſitions be denominated right or wrong. Theſe Terms in their Application to Propoſitions, ſignify neither more nor leſs, than true or falſe. For Inſtance, this Propoſition, that the Diagonal of a Square is commenſurable to the Side thereof, cannot be ſaid to be wrong, in any other Senſe, than as it is not agreeable to the Nature of thoſe Lines, or the Nature of a Square; ſo that to ſay that Propoſition is wrong, is but the very ſame, as to ſay it is falſe.

And

And I desire any one, that can dispute a Thing so very evident, to inform me how the Term *wrong*, in the moral Sense of it, can be applied to that or any other false Proposition whatsoever. Propositions considered in themselves, are never called, nor can properly be called moral or immoral. The affirming or denying Propositions may come under those Denominations, but the Propositions themselves cannot. If any Teacher of the Mathematicks should go about to mislead, and impose upon his Scholar, by affirming, and pretending to demonstrate the foresaid Proposition, that, I grant, would be wrong in the moral Sense of the Word, that is, it would be vitious or immoral, because forbid by the Law of God; but it is Nonsense to say the Proposition itself is so. This is so very plain, as not to admit of a Dispute. If therefore the Word *wrong* here signifies false, which is all the Sense it can have, when applied to Propositions; then what our Author says, will be this, *if that Proposition which is false be false, that Act which implies such a Proposition, or is founded in it cannot be true, or declarative of the Truth, contrary to that false Proposition*; which is to be sure very true, but at the same Time very trifling, and nothing at all to the Purpose; for the Thing to be proved was, not that Actions

which

which imply a Denial of the Truth, cannot be declarative of the Truth they deny, which is ſelf-evident, and needs no Proof, but that ſuch Actions are immoral, or forbidden by God.

Our Author's ſecond Proof, is but the ſame over again in different Words, to wit, *that nothing can interfere with any Propoſition, that is true, but it muſt likewiſe interfere with Nature—and conſequently be unnatural or wrong in Nature; for I deſire any one to tell me, what interfering with Nature, unnatural or wrong in Nature,* can poſſibly here ſignify, but falſe, or declarative of what is falſe. So that our Author's Way of proving Actions, or Omiſſions, that deny Truth, to be immoral, or contrary to the Will of God, is but affirming over and over again in darker Language, that Actions or Omiſſions that deny Truth deny Truth: A wonderful Demonſtration, to be ſure, of their being immoral!

His third Proof, is the ſame again exactly, with a Variation of the Phraſe only. He tells us, p. 14. *that to own things to be as they are, is to own what God cauſes, or at leaſt permits, to be thus cauſed, or permitted, and this is to take things as he gives them, to go into his Conſtitution of the World, and to ſubmit to his Will, revealed in the Books of Nature; to do this therefore muſt be*

be agreeable to his Will, and if ſo the contrary muſt be diſagreeable. Now the Phraſes, *to take things as God gives them, to go into his Conſtitution of the World*, are but different Ways of wording the ſame Senſe, of owning things to be as they are, by Actions or Omiſſions. If any one thinks otherwiſe, I deſire him to make out how and wherein they differ; as likewiſe to ſhew how owning *Socrates* to have been a Perſon of admirable Virtue, and *Julius Cæſar* a great Rogue, is *taking things as God gives them, and going into his Conſtitution of the World, ſubmitting to his Will, revealed in the Books of Nature:* If any more is meant by that Language, than to own things to have been as they were or to be as they are. Perhaps I ſhall be told, that by owning things to be as they are, our Author means only owning them ſo to be, in Inſtances of Action or Omiſſion, where a contrary Behaviour would imply a Denial of things to be as they are. To which I ſay, if he meant ſo, he ſhould have ſaid ſo; whereas his Propoſition is general without reſtriction: However we ſhall apply his Language to an Inſtance, not liable to be diſputed as improper. It is doubted whether a Man of Ability is obliged to relieve the Poor by any Law of Nature. Yes, ſays our Author, he is: Not to do it, would be to

deny

deny his own Condition and that of the Poor to be what they are, and to relieve them will be *taking things as God has given them, and going into his Conſtitution of the World, ſubmitting to his Will revealed in the Book of Nature*; ſo that *taking things as God has given them*, is here, it ſeems, altering things that God has cauſed or permitted to be; and *coming into his Conſtitution of the World*, is altering that Conſtitution, which he himſelf has appointed or permitted to be: A very ſtrange Way of taking things as he has given them, and coming into his Conſtitution of the World. This Language, one would think, is rather more juſtly applicable to the quite contrary Conduct, a Neglect of the Poor; becauſe by that things are left in the Condition he has cauſed or permitted them to be, and his Conſtitution of things ſuffered to remain unaltered. It is by this Time, I ſuppoſe, pretty evident to the Reader that this Language of Mr. *Wollaſton*'s amounts to nothing, but a dark myſtical Way of Expreſſing, what in other Words he calls, owning things to be what they are, and is very far from being any Proof of what he propoſed.

His next Proof is much of a piece with the former. *Things cannot be denied*, he ſays, *to be what they are without contra-*

dicting Axioms and Truths eternal —— that have always ſubſiſted in the divine Mind —— and cannot be denied, but the Truth of the divine Knowledge muſt be denied too. All this is but ſaying again in other Words, that the Denial of Truth is the Denial of Truth, and proves nothing. The Denial of any Truth is the Denial of that to be true which God knows to be true, becauſe he knows all Truth; but cannot be called a Denial of the Truth or Certainty of the divine Knowledge, unleſs it was to be denied under that Conſideration preciſely, of its being Truth known to the divine Being. But be that as it will; let it be granted, that the Denial of any Truth is the Denial of the Truth of the divine Knowledge, it is a groſs Abſurdity, a Contradiction in Terms: But that it is an Immorality, ſhould not here have been ſuppoſed but proved. Thoſe that deny that God has given any Law to Men, do thereby deny that he has laid them under any Reſtraint, with reſpect to their Conduct towards him, or demands any Reverence or Regard from them: And therefore our Author, who undertook to prove that there is a Religion or Law of Nature, ſhould not have taken the Thing for granted, as he here does. To deny Truth, ſays he, is to deny the Truth of the divine Knowledge:

Well,

Well, what then? ſays the *Epicurean*, how does that prove it to be immoral or contrary to the divine Will? God's Happineſs is not effected by the Behaviour of Men; and therefore he regards it not, but has left them to act as they pleaſe. So that to prove Actions or Omiſſions contrary to the Will of God, it is not ſufficient to alledge that they imply a Denial of the Truth of the divine Knowledge, becauſe ſuch a Denial is no Immorality, but upon the Suppoſition of a Law that requires Honour and Worſhip to be paid to God; which is the very thing to be proved, and therefore not to be ſuppoſed. Our Author ſays indeed that it's contrary to the Government and Sovereignty of God; but ſaying is not proving. To ſuppoſe God to be a Governor, as our Author here does, without proving it, is to ſuppoſe he has given Laws to the World (for a Governor, a ſovereign Governor, without Law, is a Contradiction in Terms) the very thing he ſhould have proved.

It is a little ſurpriſing to ſee how our Author preſents his Reader, with the very ſelf ſame Stuff, under different Diſguiſes, over and over again. It brings to mind a Story, I have read, of a *Roman* General, that was entertain'd with a vaſt Variety, as he imagined, of ſeveral ſorts of Veniſon,

very good, and at a time too when Venison was not much in Season. Upon expressing his Wonder at it, he was still the more surprised to find it was only Swine's Flesh, disguised by various ways of Cookery; just thus does our Author deal with his Readers: Whilst they imagine themselves entertain'd with a curious Variety of Venison, his Feast is all made up entirely of reasty Bacon. Instead of several solid substantial Reasons for his Doctrine, which a careless Perusal might dispose his Readers to imagine themselves regal'd with, there is indeed nothing but the same Thought, that the Denial of Truth is the Denial of Truth, dressed up in a Variety of Phrase, with a Supposition all along of the Immorality of it, under that Disguise. But to return; we are told in the fifth Place, *that to treat Things as not being what they are, is to put bitter for sweet* (that is, to deny Truth) *Darkness for Light* (deny Truth again) *crooked for strait* (denying Truth again) *Occidit miseros Crambe repetita.* This is the old Song over again; the Denial of Truth is the Denial of Truth. *Ohe! jam satis est.* Ah! but here's worse behind still: It's to subvert all Science, renounce all Sense of Truth, flatly to deny the Existence of any Thing. Wonderful! who cou'd have thought it, if our Author had

not

not told us ſo? or who beſides himſelf cou'd have found out, for Inſtance, that to commit Fornication, is to deny that there is ſo much as one Woman in the World; and to get drunk, is to deny that there is one Drop of Liquor, ſtrong or ſmall, for a Man to quench his Thirſt with, upon the Face of the whole Earth: Nay to deny that there is any Earth, any World, any Man, or ought elſe? How has poor Science done to ſubſiſt in the World, under ſuch terrible and furious Aſſaults, from the Vices and Follies of Men? Nay, what is far more wonderful, how comes it ſo many vicious Men attain to ſo great a Degree of Perfection in the ſeveral Sciences? whilſt they poor Fellows are, it ſeems, without knowing any thing of the Matter, or meaning any the leaſt Harm of that kind, daily ſubverting all Science, renouncing all Senſe of Truth, and falſly denying the Exiſtence of any one Thing. I dare not be anſwerable for it, that the Reader ſhall not ſuſpect our Author, from his way of talking, to have renounced all Senſe of Truth. But I dare ſay he will think this Proof of his too extravagant to deſerve a ſerious Confutation.

The laſt Reaſon for his Doctrine is, that *to deny things to be what they are, is a Tranſgreſſion of the great Law of our Nature, the Law of Reaſon.* He was to prove there

there is a Law of Nature, a Law of Reason, and that Actions or Omissions, denying Truth, are contrary to that Law; and this is here done at last for a finishing Stroke, by a solemn Affirmation, without so much as the least Offer made for any thing of Proof.

Thus I have gone through all Mr. *Wollaston* has advanced, for the Support of his singular Notion of Morality; and having, I hope, sufficiently destroyed his fundamental Maxim, I judge it needless to pursue him in the Application of it to the several Branches of Morality. I shall only add a few Reflections, by which perhaps, the Reader may be enabled to discern the Weakness of his Doctrine, still the more clearly, and in a better Light.

He every where speaks of owning Things to be as they are, as in it self a matter of the highest Importance, as the *ne plus ultra*, beyond which no Man needs or ought to go in his Enquiries or Consultations, what is fit or proper to be done or not. This is the Principle in which the Mind is finally to rest and acquiesce, as if that alone was a Thing desirable in and for itself, and every thing else with a View to that only; which is a Contradiction to the common Sense and Experience of Mankind: For a little Reflection may quickly satisfie any one, that nothing

nothing but Pleaſure or Happineſs is or can be deſirable upon its own Account, without Reference to any thing elſe: And that other Things are deſirable and purſued by us, only ſo far as they are conceived or apprehended to be the Means of attaining Pleaſure or Happineſs. Nothing again is or can be the Object of Hatred or Averſion in it ſelf, or upon its own Account, but Pain or Miſery. Other Things we have a Hatred or Averſion for, not for themſelves, but for the Pain or Miſery that is ſuppoſed to attend or follow from them. Happineſs, in ſhort, is the ultimate End of all our Aims and Deſigns, all our Wiſhes and Deſires. This, either preſent or future, we conſtantly and ſteadily purſue. Nor can it be otherwiſe: And for the Truth of this I appeal to the inward Feeling and Experience of all Mankind, not excepting our Author himſelf, who has ſomething very like it, *p.* 35. where he tells us *Pain, conſidered in itſelf, is a real Evil; Pleaſure a real Good —— Pleaſure is in itſelf deſirable, Pain to be avoided:* Which is more than can be ſaid of owning and denying things to be what they are, I am ſure: The former is not deſirable in and for itſelf alone, without Regard to any thing further; that is the Privilege of Happineſs alone; conſequently owning things to be as they are is

no further desirable than as it is a Means, more or less conducive to the End of all our Wishes and Desires, Happiness.

To insist therefore with so much Stress upon the treating of Things, as what they are; to make such a mighty Pother, so huge a Din and Bustle up and down his Book, as he does, about owning Things by Action or Omission, to be what they are, a Man to be a Man, Men's Circumstances to be what they are, Happiness to be Happiness, Misery to be Misery, *&c.* as if this was something desirable in and for it self without Regard to Consequences, nay even preferable to Happiness it self; for some Cases put by him are so solved, and his way of talking now and then such as seem to imply as much; I say to insist upon this Owning of Things to be what they are, in such a way, is talking like one that was a Stranger to human Nature. Happiness with him seems but to be Matter of a secondary Consideration to abet the Practice of Truth; as if Happiness had been appointed by the Author of Nature only to encourage the Practice of Truth, or owning Things to be what they are, and the Regard due to Truth not instituted or commanded, as it is purely and solely with a View to the Well-being and Happiness of Mankind. In all the Instances of Immorality

morality of the moſt diſmal Conſequence to the World, in repreſenting the Nature of the Crime, the great Streſs is laid upon their implying a Denial of the Truth, the Denial of things to be what they are, whilſt the dreadful Conſequences are overlook'd, or but ſlightly touch'd upon; as if God was more concern'd to have Things own'd for what they are, than to ſee his Creatures contribute mutually to one another's Happineſs, which is repreſenting him as an odd kind of a capricious Being, (with Reverence be it ſpoken) whoſe Satisfaction conſiſts in ſomething, for which it is impoſſible the rational Part of the Creation ſhould have any real Reverence or Veneration for him. And how his Doctrine can be reconciled with that of the divine Goodneſs, I leave to the Conſideration and Judgment of the Reader. For, according to his Repreſentation of Things, God ſeems not to take any Satisfaction in the Happineſs of Mankind, further than their Happineſs by being connected with the Practice of Truth, becomes a Means of inducing them to own by Action or Omiſſion Things to be what in Fact and Truth they are. This ſeems with him to be the great and ultimate End of the great Creator, and that wherein all the Views, Aims, and Deſigns of Men are to terminate. Happineſs indeed he does allow

us to purſue, and ſays we are obliged ſo to do: But then his Notion of Morality, and his Application of it up and down his Book, ſeems to imply, that we are not to purſue it as our main End, but only for the ſake of practiſing Truth, or owning Things to be what they are; and becauſe if we did not we ſhould deny Happineſs to be Happineſs, a thing of infinitely more Weight and Conſideration it ſeems than Miſery; tho' if the Fear of the latter will not oblige Men to a Purſuit of Happineſs, the inſipid Conſideration of denying Happineſs to be Happineſs will hardly effect it I ſhould think. It was this aukward way of thinking, ſo diſagreeable to Nature, that obliged him in Spight of all his good Senſe, and contrary to the Streams of all the beſt Writers upon Morality, to that odd Determination of the two Caſes put by him *p.* 29, where he maintains that a Man in extreme Danger of periſhing by Hunger, and not reduc'd to that Extremity by any Fault but Misfortune only, may not ſteal from the Rich to ſave his Life. As likewiſe, where a Man has it in his Power to ſave the Life of an innocent Man from a Ruffian in purſuit of him, by a harmleſs Untruth, an Untruth that can hurt no body, he ought not to do it, but ſuffer the poor Innocent to periſh, and periſh himſelf likewiſe, rather than utter an Untruth, tho'

of

of no ill Conſequence in the World to any Body. They muſt take it as their Fate, Truth will be Truth, and muſt retain the Character of its Force, let the Caſe be what it will: A very weighty and a very worthy Reaſon to be ſure, but more likely I ſhould think to move the Scorn or Indignation of the Reader than gain his Aſſent.

Mankind neither are, nor can be concerned for any thing but Happineſs and the Means of attaining it. He that is compleatly happy, in a State of the higheſt Enjoyment, he either is, or conceives him capable of, has all he could wiſh for, and is by Conſequence entirely free from all Deſire of, or Concern for any thing elſe. Owning things therefore to be what they are, or a Conduct conformable to Truth, can ſignify nothing to Mankind any further than it is a Means to promote their Happineſs; and by Conſequence to urge the Practice of Truth, upon ſuch a Being as Man, as deſirable in and for itſelf, which nothing but Happineſs can be, from which yet Mr. *Wollaſton* himſelf allows it to be different, is doing nothing. If the Practice of Truth, or a Conduct conformable to Truth, be recommended, not indeed as a Thing deſirable in and for itſelf, without reference to ought elſe, but only as a Means for the at-

taining of Happineſs, ſomething is ſaid that may deſerve the Attention of Mankind, but ſomething that evidently overturns our Author's whole Scheme. For if this Conformity to Truth is pleaded for only upon the Score of its being the Way to procure Pleaſure or Happineſs, that is viſibly to give the Preference to Happineſs before Truth and the Practice thereof, ſince the latter is only valuable, it ſeems, ſo far as it proves a Means of attaining the former: And by Conſequence a Regard to Truth will ceaſe to be a Duty in all Caſes, where it has not a Tendency to promote the Good and Happineſs of Mankind; and human Actions or Omiſſions muſt be morally Good or Evil, according as they have in their Nature a Tendency to advance the Happineſs or Miſery of Mankind: And ſo our Author's general Idea or Notion of Morality is quite out of Doors.

This is ſo natural, that our Author could not help hitting upon it, and coming into it tho' it be ſo viſibly inconſiſtent with his own Doctrine. He tells us, p. 21. *That neither all evil nor all good Actions are equal. Thoſe Truths which they reſpect, may compriſe matters of very different Importance—If* A *ſteals a Book from* B, *which was pleaſing and uſeful to him, it is true* A *is guilty of a Crime, in not treating the*

Book as being what it is, the Book of B, *who is the Proprietor of it, and one whoſe Happineſs partly depends upon it. But ſtill if* A *ſhould deprive* B *of a good Eſtate, he would be guilty of a much greater Crime —Tho' the Convenience and innocent Pleaſure that* B *found in the Uſe of the Book, was a Degree of Happineſs, yet the Happineſs accruing to him from the Eſtate, by which he was ſupplied not only with Neceſſaries, but with many other Comforts and harmleſs Enjoyments, vaſtly exceeded it. And therefore the Truth violated in the former Caſe, was,* B *had a Property in that: which gave him ſuch a Degree of Happineſs, that violated in the latter,* B *had a Property in that, which gave him a Happineſs vaſtly ſuperior to the other. The Violation therefore in the latter Caſe is,* UPON THIS ACCOUNT, *a vaſtly greater Violation than in the former.* We are told again too p. 31. That *tho' to act againſt Truth in any Caſe is wrong, yet the Degrees of Guilt varying with the Importance of things, in ſome Caſes the Importance one Way or other may be ſo little as to render the Crime evaneſcent or almoſt nothing.* All Truths then by Mr. *Wollaſton*'s own Confeſſion are not of equal Importance, and their Importance is different, juſt in the ſame Proportion as they conduce

duce to the Happineſs of Mankind; or, to ſpeak more properly, according as a Conformity thereto in Practice, or the Conduct of Life, contributes more or leſs to that great End. Now if this be ſo, as it certainly is, and the Force of Truth obliges our Author to confeſs, why all this Buſtle and Stir about the Practice of Truth, or owning by our Conduct things to be as they are, as if that in itſelf, without all further Reference, was of the utmoſt Importance, and the ſupreme and ultimate End, to which all our Behaviour ought to be directed? When after all there is a further End to be regarded, and this Conformity to Truth is only valuable, and to be regarded, juſt ſo much or ſo far as it is a Means to promote that End, the Happineſs of Mankind. Truth, or a Conformity to Truth, rather receives its Value, its Importance from Happineſs, or the Relation it has thereto as a Means to attain it. Why then did our Author ſtop ſhort, and lay the Streſs upon the Means inſtead of the End? Does not his own Account of the different Importance of different Truths viſibly imply, that the great End, the ſole End aimed at in all the Laws of Nature, is Happineſs; ſince he acknowledges in expreſs Terms, that the owning of Truth by our Conduct has more or leſs of moral Goodneſs in it,

as

as it contributes more or leſs to that End; and the Diſagreement of our Conduct with Truth has more or leſs of moral Evil in it, as it has more or leſs a Tendency to the Contrary, Unhappineſs or Miſery? The moral Good and Evil therefore of the Conduct of Men is to be judged of and determined by that Tendency, and nothing elſe: And the general Notion of Morality to be ſtated accordingly, and applied to the ſeveral Branches of the Law of Nature.

Here then we may fix with the utmoſt Aſſurance; for we are as certain, that what has, in its Nature, a Tendency to promote the Well-being and Happineſs of Mankind, is morally Good, and what has a contrary Tendency, morally Evil, as we are, that God is a good and gracious Being, truly concerned for the Happineſs of his Creatures; and a greater Certainty than this, we cannot have, becauſe moral Good and Evil depend entirely upon the Suppoſition of the divine Goodneſs; take away that, and moral Good and Evil vaniſh at the ſame Time. What we call the Laws of Nature would indeed, upon the contrary Suppoſition, be pretty good Rules of Convenience, generally ſpeaking, but not properly Laws, or fit to be obſerved at all Times and in all Caſes.

If therefore it be evident beyond all Queſtion, that the moral Good or Evil of human Actions conſiſts in a Tendency to promote the Welfare and Happineſs of Mankind, or the contrary, Mr. *Wollaſton*'s general Idea of moral Good and Evil cannot be juſt, as not expreſſing that Tendency, wherein preciſely the moral Good or Evil of human Actions conſiſts; and beſides, is ſo far from coinciding with it, that it's hardly applicable to any Species of human Action, except thoſe of affirming or denying Truth by Words; and even there, in ſome extraordinary Caſes, it will miſlead us if followed, as it did him in the Caſe above mentioned: And with regard to other Actions, if his general Notion of Morality is to be applied to them, in the plain obvious Meaning of the Words, the moſt innocent, virtuous and commendable Actions in the World, muſt be frequently liable to be condemned as Immoralities, becauſe as certainly interfering with Truth, as any confeſs'd Immorality can do: In the only Senſe that Expreſſion can poſſibly have in our Author's Uſe of it. And if his general Notion of Morality is not to be underſtood in the plain obvious Meaning of the Words, it has none at all that we can come at, and the Application of it can only lead us to endleſs Perplexity, by reaſon of the various

rious Significations the ſame Action or Omiſſion may have, ſome conformable to Truth, and others not. And a great many good or bad Actions will be found upon Enquiry hardly to have any Meaning at all, beſides that univerſal one, that the Agent propoſes to himſelf ſome Degree of Pleaſure, Satisfaction, or Advantage, more or leſs, ſuch as our Author has found out for various kinds of immoral Action, are the moſt unnatural and forced that could be thought of. To pretend that Cruelty and Injuſtice is denying a Man to be a Man, is nothing but mere Rant, to be wondered at in a Man of our Author's Senſe; and borrowed from an hyperbolical Way of aggravating the Abſurdity of ſuch Behaviour, without ever ſtrictly meaning what is ſaid. And is ſuch a looſe Way of talking upon violent Acts of Injuſtice or Humanity, proper to be introduced into a philoſophical Diſcourſe upon the Law of Nature, to be made the Standard of Morality, a Criterion, whereby to judge of the moral Rectitude or Pravity of human Actions? Another of his Meanings too, applied to Actions of Inhumanity or Injuſtice, is the Denial of Happineſs to be what it is, Miſery to be what it is; a Meaning that I dare ſay Mr. *Wollaſton* himſelf did not believe, any mortal Man from the Days of *Adam* to his own, ever imagined to be implied

plied or ſignified by ſuch Actions. How ſtrangely unaccountable then is it in a Man of his Parts to lay a Streſs upon ſuch kind of Trumpery?

But ſuppoſing every immoral Action or Omiſſion, and none but ſuch, did interfere with, or imply a Denial of Truth, and in our Author's own Senſe of that Expreſſion (if he had any clear and determinate Meaning annexed to it, which is very much to be queſtioned) then indeed the interfering with or denying Truth would be a certain Criterion, whereby to diſtinguiſh immoral Action or Omiſſion from what is not ſo; but ſtill the Nature of Immorality, the Idea or formal Ratio of it, to borrow our Author's own Expreſſion, would not conſiſt in that Denial, but ſomething elſe; for if it did, the Degrees too of moral Evil would depend upon that only: Actions or Omiſſions would be more or leſs immoral, more or leſs criminal, according as they denied more or leſs Truth; and ſuch as denied equal Truths, or the ſame Truth, would be equally immoral or criminal. But here we have our Author himſelf falling in with us, for the confounding and confuting his own Doctrine; for he durſt not pretend to meaſure the Degrees of Immorality by the Number of Truths violated alone, which he ought to have done, did Immorality

conſiſt

conſiſt barely and preciſely in the Violation of Truth as he affirms, p. 138. where he tells us, that the Idea and formal Ratio of moral Evil conſiſts in acting a Lie. He has thought fit to take in the Importance of Truths violated as well as Number, p. 22. where he ſays, *the Degrees of Evil or Guilt are as the Importance and Number of Truths violated.* Which is a viſible Contradiction to his own Doctrine, that the Idea or formal Ratio of moral Evil conſiſts in acting a Lie. For if that be a juſt Repreſentation of the Nature of moral Evil, then the more Truth is contradicted or violated, by any Action the wickeder it is: No, ſays our Author, the Importance of the Truths violated is to be taken into Account, for the Degrees of moral Evil or Guilt are as the Importance and Number of Truths violated. Then, I ſay, this ſhould have been expreſſed in the Definition of moral Evil, wherein he pretends to give us the Idea or formal Ratio thereof; and it ſhould have been made to conſiſt in acting Lies of Importance, or contradicting Truths of Importance: If it ſhould be ſaid for our Author, that was needleſs, becauſe all Truth is of Importance. I Anſwer, by his own Confeſſion, that Importance in ſome Caſes is ſo little as to be evaneſcent, or almoſt nothing: Why may we not ſuppoſe then there may

be Caſes, where the Importance of Truth is abſolutely nothing, as in that of an innocent Man purſued by a Ruffian? How can that Truth be of any good Importance, which, if declared, will be the Ruin of an innocent Man; if denied, will ſave his Life, and hurt no body elſe? Are we not to underſtand by the Importance of Truth, the natural Tendency, which the Conformity of our Conduct thereto has to promote the Happineſs of Mankind? And if ſo, I deſire to know how the Diſcovery of the poor Man to one that intends to murther him, which is declaring the Truth, tends either to his Benefit or any body's elſe; and if it does not, in what Senſe can it be called a Truth of Importance, and therefore ſacred and inviolable?

All Denial of Truth, any Truth whatever, is, according to Mr. *Wollaſton*, immoral. This Notion has been battled with ſuch plauſible Reaſons at leaſt, by ſome of the fineſt and moſt judicious Writers upon the Law of Nature, that ſomething more than a bare Affirmation to the contrary was neceſſary to ſet them aſide. According to him all Feints in War, all falſe Reports ſpread to impoſe upon the Enemy, tho' they have no Tendency to hurt any body but him, whom we here ſuppoſe to be an unjuſt Aggreſſor, are utterly unlawful; and

why?

why? becauſe they are inconſiſtent with Truth: A weighty Conſideration indeed to be put in the Balance againſt the Defenſe and Security of Millions of innocent People, whoſe Defenſe and Security oftentimes depend upon the Practice of thoſe Arts! Innocent Nations, it ſeems, muſt be expoſed to the utmoſt Ravage and Deſolation rather than the leaſt Truth be violated, tho' the Violation thereof tends only to the Prejudice of thoſe who have forfeited their Lives by being Aggreſſors in an unlawful War, and not only may, but ought to be deſtroy'd in Defenſe of the Innocent.

A Man that falls into the Hands of Robbers or Pirates may not make uſe of the leaſt falſe Pretence to get out of their Clutches; tho' by ſuch Pretences he be ſo far from doing any Injury to the Innocent he does none to the Rogues themſelves.

A Man muſt not diſguiſe or conceal his Actions, Thoughts, or Intentions, by Word or by Deed, that may carry any the leaſt Intimation that they are not what they are; even where others have no Intereſt depending, or any Right to pry into or diſcover them, and where ſuch a Diſcovery might be highly prejudicial to a Man in the Management of his own honeſt Buſineſs, or the carrying on of uſeful and laudable Projects.

And

And finally, if no Act can be right that interferes with any true Propoſition, or denies any thing to be as it is, then none of the moſt innocent harmleſs Actions of Life may be performed, where ſuch Action may have a Tendency to convey a Miſtake to the Minds of others, tho' attended with no ill Conſequence in the World. A Man for Inſtance ought not to preſent a Fowling-piece at a Bird, unleſs he deſigns to ſhoot, for fear that Action ſhould convey to the By-ſtanders this dreadful Miſtake, that he deſigns to ſhoot when he does not. The two firſt of theſe Corollaries, from our Author's Notion of Immorality, every Body will allow to be agreeable to his Sentiments; and the two latter follow as evidently from it, in the only Senſe the Phraſe of denying Truth by Action or Omiſſion ſeems capable of, explained above, which yet makes his Doctrine at firſt Sight appear ſo very groſs, that I fear he uſed that Expreſſion without any clear determinate Meaning at all.

I have now done with Mr. *Wollaſton*, whom I own to have been a very ingenious Man, and capable enough of writing very finely upon the Subject, had he not been miſled by the unhappy Miſtake I have been all this while confuting. I did propoſe indeed when I firſt took up the Deſign of examining him, to have premiſed a Diſſertation upon

upon the Foundation of Morality, in order to erect a new Building of my own at the ſame time I demoliſhed his; but finding that Work was likely to run out to a greater Length than I at firſt imagined, I have choſen to publiſh this Examination of Mr. *Wollaſton* by itſelf: If it makes its way in the World to my liking, the other intended Part may perhaps follow after, as faſt as the cumberſom Employment I have upon my Hands will allow.

FINIS.

BOOKS Printed for ARTHUR BETTESWORTH *at the* Red Lion *in* Pater-noſter-row.

AN Introduction to the making of *Latin*; compriſing, after an eaſy compendious Method, the Subſtance of the *Latin* Syntax. With proper *Engliſh* Examples, moſt of them Tranſlations from the Claſſic Authors in one Column, and the *Latin* Words in another. To which is ſubjoined in the ſame Method, A Succinct Account of the Affairs of antient *Greece* and *Rome*, intended at once to bring Boys acquainted with Hiſtory and the Idiom of the *Latin* Tongue. The Fourth Edition. *Price* 2 *s.*

Cornelius Nepos. *Price* 3 *s.* 6 *d.*

Eutropius. *Price* 2 *s.* 6 *d.*

Eraſmus. *Price* 1 *s.* 6 *d.*

Corderius. *Price* 1 *s.*

All with Engliſh *Tranſlations as literal as poſſible*

An Eſſay upon the Education of Youth in Grammar Schools. *Price ſtitcht* 1 *s.*

Theſe ſix by *John Clark*, Maſter of the publick Grammar School in *Hull.*

THE

PRINCIPAL and PECULIAR

NOTION

Advanc'd in a Late

BOOK,

INTITLED,

The Religion of Nature Delineated;

Consider'd and Refuted.

Thomas Bott.

In a LETTER to a GENTLEMAN.

LONDON:

Printed for J. NOON, at the *White-Hart* in the *Poultry*. M.DCC.XXV.

SIR,

I NOW return you *The Religion of Nature delineated*, with abundance of Thanks for the Uſe of it: And to ſhew how deſirous I am to improve any Obligation you are pleas'd to lay upon me, I here ſend you a few *Remarks* I have made upon it. It is very far from my Temper to detract from the real Merits of any Author; and much more ſuch a one as this; who, I verily think, deſerves as much Applauſe as he has met with; and that is almoſt as much as he cou'd poſſibly have. But, as I have always the ſame Concern upon my Mind, when I ſee *Morality* or real Religion put upon a wrong *Baſis*, or ſupported in a weak manner, as when an inconcluſive Argument is offer'd to prove the Being of a *God*; I could not omit to examine more particularly the Foundation, upon which the Author has built the entire Scheme of *Morality*: And I was yet more inclined

to do this, becauſe I know, that however the greateſt part of his Readers may have gone haſtily into his Sentiments, many ingenious and reaſonable Men (tho ſo unhappy as to have contracted ſome Prejudices againſt all Diſtinctions of *moral Good and Evil*, or the *moral Differences* of human Actions) were too apt to conceive a degree of Pleaſure, upon ſeeing ſo rational a Man, as our Author muſt be allow'd to be, erecting his Scheme upon a *Baſis*, which they preſently obſerv'd was too weak, and incapable of ſupporting it.

If you ſhall ſee any thing in the following Remarks, which may incline you to think they deſerve, in any manner, to be communicated to the Publick; they may, probably, put ſome other Pen upon improving the Author's Notion; and, by adding the neceſſary Reſtrictions, making it ſtrong and good: which, I think, may be pretty eaſily done.

Had the *Author* himſelf been ſtill living, I ſhould, probably, have troubled him with theſe Obſervations, in a private Letter: and no one would have been fitter, or I am perſuaded, readier to alter any Miſtake than himſelf, as ſoon as he cou'd be made ſenſible of it. But ſince he is gone to his *Reſt*, we muſt be oblig'd to ſome other

other hand, if the *Error*, which I think he has been guilty of, be at all corrected.

BEFORE I proceed further, I ſhall only deſire (if your Patience will hold out ſo long) that you would read theſe *Remarks* thro, before any Judgment is made of them.

WHAT I deſign is, to confine my ſelf to the *peculiar* and *principal Notion* of our Author; and enquire whether it is right, or not. His Notion of *Morality* we have in his 9th *Prop.* p. 20. where he makes the *formal Ratio* of *moral Good and Evil* to conſiſt in an *Agreement* or *Diſagreement with Truth*: And by *Truth*, he immediately tells us, he means any Truth whatever; *any true Propoſition whatſoever, whether containing matter of Speculation, or plain Fact.* And it is viſible in every *Page*, how much he endeavours to carry this Notion thro the whole Book, and make it agree to, or comprehend all Virtues and Vices whatſoever: And as far as p. 138. we find him proving *T* guilty of an Immorality, by taking from *P* ſomething that was *P*'s; becauſe by ſuch an Act, *T* declared that to be his own which was not his own, and ſo *acted a Lye*; in which, as he adds, *conſiſts the Idea and formal Ratio of Moral*

ral Evil. Indeed, this is the peculiar Notion of the Book; and which diſtinguiſhes it from all others that ever were wrote upon the ſame Subject, as he himſelf tells you, p. 6. *That which is advanced in the following Papers, concerning the Nature of Moral Good and Evil, and is the prevailing Thought that runs thro them all, I never met with any where.* And yet notwithſtanding, it is obſervable, that he does not always keep ſtrictly to this Definition of his, but is as it were forced, upon particular Occaſions, to vary his Notion of *Morality*; and to conſider *Truth*, not merely as *Truth*, but according to the Importance of it, or its Influence upon the State and Circumſtances of Men: ſo that we have him, p. 52. defining *Natural Religion to be the purſuit of Happineſs, by the practice of Reaſon and Truth:* and he adds, *This is its trueſt Definition.* And again, p. 65. *I have ſhewn*, ſays he, *in what the Nature of Moral Good and Evil conſiſts*; viz. *a Conformity or Diſagreement to Truth, and thoſe things that are coincident with it, Reaſon and Happineſs.* Here therefore he takes into his Notion of *Morality*, not only the Practice of *Truth*, but the Influence alſo of that *Truth* upon the Welfare and Happineſs of Mankind. So that *Morality*, according to him, is the Practice

tice of *ſuch* Reaſon and Truth, as will have an Influence upon human Happineſs: And therefore, if there be any *ſuch Truth*, as in its nature has no influence this way, nor can have any, it has nothing to do with *Morality*, or *Morality* has nothing to do with it. And that our Author himſelf was apprehenſive there was a great deal of *Truth* of this kind, ſeems plain enough from many Paſſages; and particularly thoſe, where he ſpeaks, as he very often does, of *important* Truths, Truths *of weight*, &c. which, I think, may be fairly underſtood, as allowing that there are Truths of *no Importance*; (as it is very certain there are a great many, both ſpeculative ones and facts): Yet how ſuch a Conceſſion as this, is conſiſtent with the Definition of *Moral Good and Evil*, p. 20. it will be very hard to ſay; or rather, any one muſt plainly perceive an Abſurdity and Inconſiſtency. For ſure, if the very Eſſence of *Moral Good and Evil* lies in the mere *Agreement or Diſagreement* of our Acts with *Truth*, all Truth muſt be ſuppoſed to be *Moral*, and to have, in its tendency, an Influence upon human Happineſs: otherwiſe, the Practice or Neglect of it cou'd no ways affect human Happineſs. Indeed, let a Truth be ever ſo trifling; *e. g.* that the *Pen* I am writing with is *four* Inches long; if I

know

know it, and yet assert it is but *three*, I am guilty of an Immorality: Why? Not because I offend against Truth, or assert what is really false, but because I assert what I *know* or *think* to be false; and so am guilty of such an Act, as tends to breed *Distrust*, *Uneasiness*, &c. That this is the true Reason, and not the other, is evident; because the Guilt would be the same, if, tho the *Pen* was really *four* Inches in length, I, thro a mistake, thought it was but *three*, and yet asserted it was *four*. Here I asserted what was *true*, and so am free from an Immorality, (according to our Author's Definition;) and yet all the World and my own Conscience would tell me I was guilty. And this, by the way, gives me an Opportunity to observe, that even in *Lying* it self, which of all other Vices seems to be the most direct offence against *Truth*, it is neither the *principal*, nor indeed any proper Circumstance at all, that *Truth* is violated: For, as was just taken notice of, a Person may equally be guilty of *Lying*, whether he speaks according to the real Truth or not, if he does but speak contrary to *his own Apprehensions* of it. This, and this only, is the strictly proper Idea of a *Lye*: And therefore the Iniquity of it can never be proved, by saying it is a

Vio-

Violation of *Truth*; for, in multitudes of Inſtances, it is not really any Violation of *Truth* at all. And if *Truth*, or the Violation of it, does not properly come into the Notion of a *Lye*; one would much leſs expect to ſee how the formal Ratio of other Vices can conſiſt in a Diſagreement with it. But to return to our Author:

I THINK his Notion of *Moral Good and Evil* makes all Truths not only *Moral*, but equally ſo; or, in other words, All Truths are in themſelves of equal Importance, according to his Definition; and the Agreement or Diſagreement of our Actions with them, equally moral or immoral. For if the moral Goodneſs or Evil of Actions conſiſts in their Agreement or Diſagreement with Truth; then, not only where there is this Agreement or Diſagreement, there is moral Good or Evil, let the Truth reſpected be what it will; but alſo, whatever Actions have an *equal* Agreement or Diſagreement, (ſuppoſing for the preſent there may be Differences in degree of ſuch Agreement or Diſagreement;) they muſt be, in the *moral* Senſe, equally good or evil: *e. g.* When I endeavour to prove another Propoſition by this falſe one, That the three Angles of a Triangle are not equal to two right ones;

I conſider the Triangle otherwiſe than it is, and the Diſagreement of my Action with the real Truth of the Triangle, is as great as it can be. This Action, therefore, is as morally evil, as when, by an Act of Charity, I refuſe to ſave a Man from ſtarving. For in this Caſe, there is not a greater Diſagreement of my Action with the Truth, than in the other: The Diſagreement is equal in both Caſes. In the former Caſe, I as much deny the Triangle to be what it is, as in the latter I deny the poor Man's Circumſtances to be what they are. And this Propoſition, that the Equality of the three Angles of a Triangle with two right ones, is to be obſerved, will be as moral, or of as great Importance, as the Truth of this other, That a Man upon the point of ſtarving, is to be relieved by Charity.

It is true, as was before obſerved, our Author often ſpeaks of Truths of *Importance*, of *Weight*, &c. and ſo may be ſuppos'd to guard againſt any ſuch Objection as this: But, as he has not put it into his Definition of *moral Good and Evil*, and ſeems only *incidentally* to talk of the different Importance of Truths, when he is as it were forced to it by the Caſes that are put; and to which no tolerable Anſwer could be given, without allowing ſuch a Difference; and yet notwithſtanding,

ſtill

ſtill goes on thro the whole Book with his firſt Notion of *moral Good and Evil*, claiming to himſelf the honour of firſt diſcovering it; and ſteadily aſſerting it to conſiſt in ſuch an Agreement or Diſagreement with Truth: no one, I think, ſhould conſider this Diſtinction or Limitation, as having any thing to do with his Definition of *moral Good and Evil.*

HOWEVER, if others will be ſo kind as to put it into his Definition for him, tho they may mend it a little, it won't perhaps be perfectly right, even then. For ſtill, if the *moral Good or Evil of our Acts* depends upon the Agreement or Diſagreement of them, with Truths of *ſome Importance:* Then, I ſay, thoſe Acts in which there is an equal Agreement or Diſagreement, will be, in an equality, morally good or evil. But will this hold? *A* meets *B*, a poor Wretch at the point of ſtarving, takes notice of his caſe, ſays every thing that is right about it, and goes his way. *C* comes immediately after, ſees what *B*'s caſe is, gives him Relief, and departs. Here *A*'s Words and *C*'s Action, are ſuppos'd perfectly to agree with *B*'s Circumſtances; that is, (in the Language of our Author) they each of 'em ſay, *B*'s caſe is really what it is: and therefore, according to him, becauſe the *Agreement*

is equal, the *moral Goodneſs* of their Acts muſt be equal too. But is this true? nay, is it true, even tho we ſhould ſuppoſe, that *A* really had it not in his power to do more? it won't immediately follow, that his Act was morally as good as *C*'s. Again, *D* meets the Wretch *B*, and denies his caſe to be what it is, and calls him a Cheat, tho he knows to the contrary: *E* meets with him, and beats him to any degree. It will be impoſſible not to find both theſe Perſons equally moral, according to our Author: yet certainly they are not ſo. If *P* ſays *T*'s Horſe is his, when really he is not, he is as guilty as if he actually ſtole him: For the Diſagreement in both theſe Inſtances of *P*'s Action with the Truth of the caſe, is equal. In ſhort, for any thing there is in our Author's Definition, there is no difference betwixt a Man's talking to a *Poſt*, as if it were a Man; and beating a Man, as tho he was a *Poſt*.

'Tis true, the Author has put into his Definition, p. 20. a qualifying Word or two, in order to eſcape the Objection of his making all morally evil Acts, at leaſt, if not likewiſe all good ones, equal; when he ſays, *in ſome degree or other*. And he enlarges upon this Particular, p. 21. and tells us, he added thoſe Words, becauſe it muſt

muſt be own'd there is no ſuch thing as an *Equality of all Evil* or *all Good Actions*: He goes on, *Thoſe Truths which they reſpect, tho they are equally true, may compriſe matters of very different Importance; or more Truths may be violated one way than another.* So that here are two Caſes, in which there will be a difference in our Actions; firſt, when there is a Difference in the Truths reſpected by thoſe Actions, ſo that ſome of 'em are more important than others; and, ſecondly, when ſome Actions reſpect a greater number of Truths than others. But, in my mind, thoſe qualifying Words look very awkardly in his Propoſition; and what he ſays afterwards upon them, comes a great deal too late: For, if the very Eſſence, the *formal Ratio* (as he himſelf calls it) of *moral Evil*, lies in the Diſagreement of our Actions with *Truth*, as one Truth cannot be more truth than another; and, properly ſpeaking, there are no *Degrees* of Agreement or Diſagreement with *Truth*; but where-ever there is an Agreement or Diſagreement of any two Actions with any two Truths, that Agreement or Diſagreement muſt be *equal*: (For no Action can do more than either aſſert or deny a Truth; 'tis as impoſſible it ſhould do both, as it is thar a *verbal* Aſſertion ſhould be both poſitive and negative

gative at the ſame time. In ſhort, as a good Action aſſerts a Thing to be what it is, and does not at all deny it, ſo it is impoſſible that any other good Action, ſuppos'd to be a greater, ſhould do more with reference to the Truth reſpected by it; then, I ſay,) the Conſequence is neceſſary, that the Difference of Actions does not depend upon the different Importance of the Truths reſpected by them. *A* does an Action which diſagrees with the *Truth* reſpected by it; and, for that reaſon, his Action is morally Evil. *B* does another Action, which likewiſe diſagrees with the *Truth* reſpected by it. If *A*'s Action was evil, *becauſe* it diſagreed with the *Truth*; *B*'s Action muſt be evil too, and as evil as *A*'s, for the ſame reaſon. If this be deny'd, becauſe the Truth reſpected by *B*'s Action was not of ſo much *Importance* as that which was reſpected by *A*'s; does it not plainly follow, that the *moral Evil* of *A*'s Action does not lie only in its Diſagreement with the Truth reſpected by it, but in that and *ſomething elſe*? But, beſides that this is contrary to what the Author aſſerts, telling us quite thro the Book, that the very *Idea*, the *formal Ratio* of *moral Evil*, lies in denying a thing to be what it is; or in the Diſagreement of an Act with Truth; if,

if, at laſt, ſomething elſe is to be taken into the Notion of *moral Good or Evil*, beſides the Agreement or Diſagreement with Truth, ought he not to have told us expreſsly what that is? and, if it is ſome ſuch Word as *Important*, *Weighty*, or the like, that ought to be added, ſhould he not have been as particular in giving us ſome Rules, by which the *Importance* of Truths ought to be meaſured, and ſo known? But had he really attempted this, I know not whether we ſhould ever have ſeen his Book at all; at leaſt, I am ſure it would have been thrown into a quite different Form. The *Section* concerning *Truth*, would probably have been omitted; and that about *Happineſs*, would moſt properly have been the beginning of the Book.

So, after all, there is really only one Caſe, in which any Difference can be found in morally Good or Evil Actions; and that is, as a greater or leſs number of Truths is reſpected by them: But, certainly, this is not the only way of determining the Differences of Moral Actions.

I WOULD now obſerve, how ſtrangely our Author goes to work with the Objections, which he ſuppoſes to be made to his

his 11th *Prop.* p. 26. which is a Conſequence from the 9th *Prop.* and which I call his Definition of *Moral Good and Evil:* (tho perhaps, if I may be indulg'd a *Parentheſis* here, it might moſt properly be call'd, a Definition of *Moral Evil* only; and the Title of the Book better changed into, *The Nature of Moral Evil delineated:* For, as the Author's principal Notion is, that Vice conſiſts in Falſhood, it is eaſy to obſerve, his Endeavour throout the Book, is to reduce all Vices to this Notion, rather than to ſhew how Virtue conſiſts in the contrary. But to return,) I think no one can read his Anſwers to the Objections, which he ſuppoſes a very ignorant Perſon may make to his Doctrine, and not ſee, that the Author is extremely puzzled to give 'em a ſatisfactory Anſwer: Read eſpecially the Second, Third, and Fourth.

In the Anſwer to the ſecond Objection, is it to be *conſider'd above all*, or is it the principal Circumſtance in the *Debtor*'s Guilt, that, by refuſing to pay his Debts, he *denies* that to be his *Creditor*'s, which really is his? Juſt as much as it is to be conſidered *above all*, that when one Man baſtinado's another to Death, he denies him to be a *Man*, or to have the Senſe of Feeling,

Feeling; or, in other Words, asserts him to be a *Post*, contrary to *Truth*.

The Answer to the third Objection is yet more unsatisfactory. Who would have expected, that *such a Man*, as our Author appears to be, shou'd be capable of telling a poor Wretch, just upon the point of starving, (and this, as we may suppose, in a *State of Nature* too) that, if he cannot get Relief in an *honest* way, (in as vulgar a Sense of the Word as can be) he must e'en *take it as his Fate*? This, forsooth, *because Truth is Truth*: That is, tho such a poor Creature sees at his Feet a penny Loaf of his Neighbour's, (and which his Neighbour does not want) he must by no means touch it, because it is his Neighbour's, and not his own. Is that the true Reason? or, is it any Reason at all? or can any Man imagine he should be capable of perceiving the Force of such a Reason, was he reduc'd to this extreme Circumstance? *Puffendorf*, as I remember, has the same Case, and gives an Answer many thousand times righter. Our Author seems to have been reduc'd to this Extremity, not only by his Definition of *Moral Evil*, but his whimsical Notions also of *Property*, p. 131, — 134. *Puffendorf* is, I think, much more

reasonable on that head, as well as many others.

The Answer to the fourth Objection is yet more extravagant; and, methinks, a good deal odder than one would expect from a *thorow-pac'd Casuist*. One wou'd not indeed wonder much at it, to find St. *Austin*, or a number of other Persons, who were by chance got into a narrow way of thinking, talking at such a rate; but to see so reasonable a Man as our Author running into the same Cant, is astonishing. Yet it must be own'd, it is no more than the natural Consequence of his main Doctrine: Nor can one need a better Argument than this, that the Consequences of his *Top-Proposition* being wrong, the *Proposition* it self must be wrong too: For nothing can follow from Truth but Truth. A Man, we may suppose, sees a Ruffian just going to murder a Person; but the Ruffian, being in some doubt whether he has light of the right Person, asks the Man (who is suppos'd to be coming by) whether the Person he has got within his Clutches, be really such a one. If he says *Yes*, strait the Villain executes his bloody Purpose. But he needs not say *Yes*, says the Author; he may be silent: True; and the Author adds, *Silence here would con-*

contradict no Truth. Why? Suppoſe *A* wandring out of his Road, meets *B*, (who is ſuppos'd to know the Country) and asks him whether ſuch a Track does not lead to the Place he intends for; *B* is ſilent: *A* takes the Road, ſecurely depending upon it, that if it was not the right way, *B* would have ſaid ſo. This is the natural Signification of *B*'s Silence in ſuch a Caſe. And juſt in the ſame manner, I ſay, the Ruffian will and muſt underſtand the other Man's Silence to be equivalent to an Affirmation, and will accordingly butcher his Man; ſecurely depending upon it, that if there was a Miſtake, no Man would have omitted to tell him ſo. And thus that third Perſon would make himſelf an Acceſſary to Murder, as well by *Silence*, as if he had ſaid directly, *Yes*. And therefore, if any Truths would be contradicted this way, the ſame Truths would be all of 'em contradicted the other way. Well then, ſince he muſt neither be *ſilent*, nor ſay *Yes*, may he ſay *No*? One would think he might; for this is the only way he has to take. Nay, but he muſt not for all that: Why? Becauſe it is *contrary to Truth*; and *Truth is ſacred.* Would not one think the Man's Life was much more ſacred than *ſuch a Truth* as this? And who would not

think that ſuch a Fellow, as ſhould either by ſaying *Yes*, or by being *ſilent*, expoſe his Neighbour to the Knife of a *truculent Villain*, greatly deſerv'd, notwithſtanding all his Scruples, an equal Puniſhment with the Ruffian himſelf?

I THINK indeed, in general, it ought to be aſſerted, that even an *officious Lye* is unlawful; but not for ſuch Reaſons as this Author would give, but others of a quite different ſort. Nor can it be worth any one's while, in Speculation, to conſider and put Caſes, wherein the Obligation not to ſpeak an Untruth will ceaſe, and be no longer of any force. But, if People will needs be putting the moſt extreme Caſes, it ought not to be wonder'd at, if an extraordinary Anſwer be return'd to them. And I am perſuaded, that as to the Inſtance before us, the more virtuous any Perſon is, and the more reaſonable he is in being ſo, ſo much the more eaſily he will know what he has to do, in ſo extreme a Caſe as this.

BUT to go on with the Author. —— Does not he, in the ſame Anſwer, contradict himſelf, by his notable Diſtinction there, betwixt denying Truth *by Words*, and *by Facts*, and making the latter much more

more criminal? For wherein is the Guilt of a wicked Deed? has it not been defined to lie in *denying a Truth*? and is there not as much of this in a *verbal* Falſhood? When therefore the ſame Truth is equally affected both ways, ſure the Guilt is the ſame, or equal. There is in our Author one ſtroke more; which is ſuch an one as, I think, ſhews ſufficienlty he was driven to his Wits-end to anſwer this Objection. He ſays, one might look upon ſuch a Ruffian as *mad*, (tho contrary to *Truth*) and ſo treat him as a *Madman*. 'Tis great pity the Author has not expreſsly ſaid what this Treatment is, that one may give to a *Madman:* But ſure his meaning is, that one may tell a *Lye* to a *Madman*; and for this Reaſon, becauſe one may deceive a *Madman*, but not the *D——l*.

Laſtly, I THINK it may be proper juſt to obſerve, that I have here ſomewhat altered the Caſe from what it is put in the *Objection*, to which the Author returns his Anſwer; tho without perverting the Anſwer at all. But put the Caſe as the Author has it: What a pretty Obſervation is that, that to a Man who intends to murder another, and asks you where he is; tho, according to the ordinary

nary meaning of the Words, you do *know* where he is, you may notwithſtanding *deny* that you *know* it? becauſe, forſooth, in the philoſophical Senſe of the Word, (of which none but Philoſophers know any thing) it is true, that you do not *know* where any Man is, that you do not actually ſee. 'Tis certainly very well this *Word* happens to have a philoſophical Senſe, of which the *Raſcal* knows nothing. But, in good truth, is it not very odd, to put ſo great a Thing as a Man's Life upon ſuch a Quibble, or to allow of ſaving it only by ſuch a means?

HAVING thus conſider'd the principal Notion of our Author, I ſhall not deſcend to his particular Excellencies, (which indeed are very many; and the principal of them, in my mind, his Diſſertation concerning a *Providence*, p. 95.—114. where he has diſcover'd a great reach of Thought: and what he ſays concerning a *future State*, p. 199.—210.) or his Defects; but only for a Cloſe, ſhall ſay, I could be glad to have a reaſonable Man's Opinion of that Paſſage, p. 116. *As God is a pure uncompounded Being*, &c. and of that concerning *Space*, p. 74. and of that Argument, p. 185. *Again, as a Man peruſes and conſiders his own Body*, &c.

WHAT

WHAT there is in these *Remarks*, you are best capable of judging, and they are absolutely at your Disposal. For my self; I think it Pleasure enough to have such an Opportunity of assuring you, that I am, with the highest Affection and Esteem,

SIR,

Jan. 14. 172$\frac{4}{5}$. *Your most Obliged*

Humble Servant, &c.

FINIS.

BOOKS printed for J. NOON, at the *White Hart* in *Cheapside*, near the *Poultry*.

A Paraphrase with Notes on *Colossians*, with an Appendix upon *Ephes.* 4. 8. being a Sequel of Mr. *Locke* on the Epistles. Price 2 *s.*

Sermons on several Subjects, by the late Revd. and Learned Dr. *John Gale*. To which is prefix'd an Account of his Life, in 2 Vol. Price bound 10 *s.*

The Peace and Happiness of this World, the immediate Design of Christianity, a Discourse on *Luke* the 9th, and 56th Verse, with an Address in the Close to the *Deists*, or those who deny the Christian Revelation. By *Thomas Bott*, Rector of *Winburg* in *Norfolk*. Price 1 *s.*

Remarks on Dr. *Waterland*'s Second Defence. With an *Appendix*, shewing the true Sense of Creation, Eternity, and Consubstantiality. In a Letter to the Doctor, by *Philalethes Cantabrigiensis*. Price 1 *s.*

Farther Remarks on Dr. *Waterland*'s farther Vindication of *Christ*'s Divinity. By *Philalethes Cantabrigiensis*. Price 1 *s.*

An Answer to Mr. *Watts* concerning the Trinity. Being a sober Appeal to a *Turk* or an *Indian*. Price 2 *s.*

The Apostles Creed better than the Assembly's Catechism: Or the Doctrine of *Christ* and his Apostles concerning the Unity and Trinity. Price 1 *s.*

A Letter to a Dissenter at *Exeter*, occasion'd by the Heats in those Parts concerning the Trinity. The second Edition. Price 6 *d.*

An Essay towards a Demonstration of the Scripture-Trinity. By *Phylanthropus Londinensis*. To which is added, a Letter to the Revd. Dr. *Samuel Clarke*, Rector of St. *James*'s *Westminster*, concerning the Difficulty of reconciling Pre-science and Free-will.

A BRIEF

PROFESSION OF RELIGION,

As founded on

REASON,

Consistent with, and confirm'd by

REVELATION.

Collected and drawn up in the present Form,
By a *GENTLEMAN.*

To which are added,

Some THOUGHTS, occasion'd by a late *Remarker* on the principal and peculiar Notions advanced in *The Religion of Nature delineated.*

AND ON

A LETTER to the Reverend Dr. *C*——
Added to a late ESSAY *towards a Demonstration of the* SCRIPTURE-TRINITY.

LONDON:
Printed for JOHN CLARK *and* RICHARD HETT, *at the* Bible *and* Crown *in the* Poultry. M, DCC, XXV.

A BRIEF

PROFESSION

OF

RELIGION.

MY *Exiſtence* is ſo ſure, that even *Doubting* proves it.—— Nor is it leſs ſure, that *what I am*, I have not always been. —— If then I have not always been *what I am*, there muſt have *exiſted* ſome *prior Cauſe* of my *being what I am*, unleſs my preſent *being what I am* cou'd be ſuppos'd to cauſe itſelf; and then it muſt have *exiſted* at the ſame Time as a *Cauſe*, and not *exiſted* as an *Effect*, and ſo on in *Infinitum*; or elſe there muſt have been an *eternal* and *infinite* Progreſſion of *Cauſes* and *Effects*, which, in fine,

confounds theſe together, reducing them into one and the ſame, and really admits neither *Cauſe* nor *Effect*; which cannot ſubſiſt in *Nature*, but as *differing* from, however *related* to, each other.

If then *a firſt Cauſe* appear *neceſſary*, there can be but *one* ſuch; not only becauſe, ſuppoſing two of theſe, Neither cou'd be *firſt*; but becauſe the very *firſt Cauſe* of all muſt *neceſſarily* be *infinite*, and in itſelf include all *Perfections*; which is utterly inconſiſtent with the Suppoſition of two ſuch *firſt Cauſes*; inaſmuch as in the Caſe of more than *one* ſuch, they wou'd *neceſſarily* limit one another, and ſo be found *dependent*, which no ways can conſiſt with the *Nature* or *Notion* of *a firſt Cauſe of all*.

Next, I here note, That this *firſt Cauſe* muſt needs likewiſe be underſtood as either *Intelligent*, or *Un-intelligent*: Not the latter, becauſe ſuch admirable *Contrivance*, *Energy*, *Diſpoſition*, *Order*, and *Oeconomy*, as are manifeſt in the *mundane Syſtem*, are totally inconſiſtent with *blind Chance*, and *ſenſeleſs Matter*; nor is it conceivable, that *Effects* ſhou'd ſo tranſcend, as we behold and experience, had they proceeded only from ſuch Cauſes. This *firſt*

first Cause therefore must be confessed *Intelligent*.

Moreover, That this *one first Cause* of all is *necessarily Eternal*, is most evident, not only from hence, that all *Effects*, as before observ'd, must center at last in a *first Cause*; but also from the *internal* and *intrinsick Necessity* and *Reason* of its own *Existence*; this *Existence* being from *Necessity*, and of its *Essence*: Which is a *Proof* in the order of *Nature*, as well as the real *Ground*, of such an *absolutely necessary Being*.

Thus *one primary*, *necessary*, *infinite*, *intelligent*, and *eternal Cause* found and establish'd, I thence conclude, that I owe it *Homage* and *Worship* as my *Creator* and *Preserver*, on *whom* all the *Happiness* I enjoy, or have in Prospect, *absolutely depends*, and who, being *Infinite* in *himself*, and the very *Original* of all without *himself*, cou'd have no *Accession of Happiness* superadded to his own *Being*; and therefore must of *necessary* Consequence have *first created* all Things in order to communicate thereto, *finally*, some degree of *Happiness* suitable to their respective *Natures*.

This leads me to conclude further, That, as the State of *Mankind* in this Life evinceth, that nothing in this World

comes up, and anſwers fully, to Man's *natural Powers, Faculties,* and *Capacities*; nor indeed compenſates for what the *Generality* of *Mankind* undergo and ſuffer here; the Being and Belief of *a future State, and another Life* after the preſent, is moſt rational in itſelf, and in a manner *neceſſary* alſo; and this to ſuch a Degree, that the Notion of *God,* and of a *future State,* appear to ſtand and fall together; which ſhews, that *Atheiſm* is the moſt *malevolent,* as well as the moſt *impious* of all Suggeſtions; whereas ſuch a *Being,* and ſuch a *State,* if there was no Proof of them, were yet of all Things moſt *deſirable.*

But, ſince this *natural Belief* of *a future State* has been immediately, and appears evidently, confirm'd by *God* himſelf from Heaven; to refuſe aſſent hereto, is as it were, to reject at once, and altogether, all Credit upon any *Teſtimony* whatſoever. Now, that ſuch *Revelation* was made under the *Jewiſh Oeconomy,* not only the Jews themſelves of all Ages paſt, as well as the preſent, unanimouſly atteſt, adhere to, and live and die in the Hope of having it in God's due time fulfilled; but all collateral Hiſtories beſide concur herein; as alſo, that it has been, as it ſtill is, continually their fixt *Belief* and *Expectation,* grounded upon the many

many and inconteſtable Appearances, Viſions, and Miracles from Heaven itſelf, notify'd and wrought in full Proof of the *Jewiſh peculiar Diſpenſation.*

I call it *Peculiar*, not that it was wholy ſo, but becauſe it was partly ſo: For part, I take to have been *Moral*, grounded upon, and concurrent with the *primary Law of Nature* and *right Reaſon*, which therefore is of *univerſal* Extent, and of *eternal* Obligation; the other *Judicial and Ritual*, adapted only for ſeparating the *Jews* from the reſt of the Nations round about them, out of whom *God* had choſen and appointed them for his *peculiar* People, until he ſhou'd in his own due Time make again, as 'twas in the Beginning, *one People* of all *Nations* upon Earth; ſo that herein *God* is conſider'd under a *twofold Capacity*, or *Denomination*; under the former *i. e.* the *moral*, as *Lord and Judge of Mankind* univerſally; under the latter, *i. e.* the *Judicial* and *Ritual*, *as King and Ruler of the Jews among the Kingdoms of Men.*

This by the by; but to return.

The *Revelation* of *a future State* is ſo clearly evinc'd, and inconteſtably prov'd, under the Goſpel-Diſpenſation, if any Matter of Fact can be ſo prov'd; that the very ſingle Point of Chriſt's Reſur-

Reſurrection, waving all other Proofs, is a *Demonſtration* of the *Fact*, and can with no more *Reaſon* be doubted, than that there ever liv'd ſuch an one as *Julius Cæſar*, *Alexander*, &c.

Hence, as from a *Root*, or *Fountain-head*, ariſe and iſſue divers and ſundry other Duties, as ſo many *natural Streams* or *Branches*, both towards *God* and *One-another*, which are no ways *contrary*, much leſs *contradictory* in themſelves; yet, are more or leſs *obligatory*; and, as ſuch, to be regarded in a juſt *Subordination* to each other, as they more *immediately*, or more *remotely*, affect, or may be conſtru'd to relate to, *God*, or our *Fellow-Creatures*, and to be more or leſs *neceſſarily* connected with the *firſt* and *primary Foundation-Principles* before advanced.

And as to further Diſquiſitions (wherein however laudably the Learned and Ingenious might exerciſe their diſtinguiſh'd Talents, yet) theſe, without great Caution, Temper, and Circumſpection, are ſo much more apt to *gender Strife*, and undermine *true and real Religion*; as alſo to afford ſo much more Matter for ſuch as *craftily lie in wait to deceive*, rather than miniſter to Edification and Beneficence among Mankind; that I conceive, one may ſoon be over-nice and curious

curious in such Speculations; and therefore, that it's far more adviseable, as well as safe, for the generality to forbear all such Inquiries, at least to suspend taking up with any on one side or other, in Points so much more of *Curiosity* than *Practice*:—— But yet, if any think themselves herein too much abridg'd, they are at Liberty for themselves, while every one beside is entirely left to his own *private Judgment*, which is alike every one's *natural* and *unalienable Right*; nor can any other Means, save *Argument* and *Persuasion*, work *inward Conviction* in any mistaken *Professors*; forasmuch as *Coercion*, whether by direct *Force*, *pecuniary Penalties*, or any other suppos'd *wholesom Severities*, is so far from infusing *Knowledge*, or any way enlightning the *Understanding*, that the Natural, and almost unavoidable, Effect of such Measures is notorious *Hypocrisy*; and not only so, but the very source of frequent *Prejudices* against *Truth* itself, and also of great *personal Aversion*, and often *fatal Animosities*. Nay, meer Honours * and *Preferments*, tho' never so

" * Had our *blessed Saviour* appear'd in the *Person* and *Pomp* of a " great *temporal* Prince, the influence of his *Authority* and Example " wou'd probably have made many *Hypocrites*, and *servile Converts*, " but not have persuaded Men one jot more to be *inwardly Holy* and " *Good:* The great Arguments that must do that, must not be fetch'd " from the *Pomp* and *Prosperity* of this *World*, but from the great and " eternal *Recompence* of the other. Archbishop *Tillotson's* 1st. Volume, Sermon 45. on *John* 1. 14. P. 541.

much the juſt Rewards of *Truth* and *true Religion*, are found in Fact ſo frequently and effectually to put falſe *Byaſſes* on *Men*, that it's plainly ſeen, the common *Orthodoxies* * are but the *prevailing Tenets* of thoſe, who, for the Time being, are *uppermoſt* in all Climates under the Sun; which ſhews evidently, that *modern Orthodoxy* is as *various* and *Ambulatory*, as are the *higher Powers* throughout the Univerſe. —— And this implies, and greatly evinceth too, that *univerſal Liberty* is not only the *common Right of Mankind* in general, but moſt proper alſo to propagate and extend *Truth*, to promote the *Peace* and *Welfare* of *Government*, and all *ſocial Virtues*; as alſo, that *Kings* and *States* never more truly anſwer their Character of *nurſing Fathers and Mothers* of *Chriſt's Church*, and of *Defenders of the Faith*, than when they are found not *impoſing* upon, or *puniſhing*, but *protecting*, the ſeveral ſerious *Profeſſors* of all Denominations in *Religion*, who diſturb not the *civil Peace and Welfare of Society*, as before, againſt

* —— In the very *Cantons-Swiſs*,
All your Philoſophers agree,
And prove it plain, that one may be
A Heretick, or true Believer,
On this, or t'other ſide a River.
—— Mr. *Prior's* Poems 2 Vol. Alma, 2d. Canto, pa. 66.

all injurious Treatments from any pretending *Usurpations* whatsoever; That, in fine, the sole and universal *Catholicon* to Reconcile, and make all Parties and Denominations among Men to become *united* and *one*, is the centring in *Charity* and *Forbearance* of One-another, with the *Spirit of Meekness*, in their sincere Researches after *Truth*, giving *Glory* to *God*, and manifesting *Good-will universally to Men*, in Correspondence with the Reply made by *Jesus* himself, when one was forbid *casting out Devils in his Name, because he followed not those Disciples of Jesus*; That *such shou'd not be forbid: For* (as much as) *he that was not against Jesus, was for him*; —— Agreeably whereto it has been aptly observ'd and distnguish'd, Luke 9. 49, 50.

In Necessariis Unitas,
In non Necessariis Libertas,
In Utrisq; *Charitas.*

THOUGHTS

Occaſion'd by a late *Remarker* on *the principal and peculiar Notion advanced in the Religion of Nature delineated.*

THAT any human Compoſure ſhou'd fall ſhort of compleat Perfection is little ſtrange, or that ſome Inaccuracies of Expreſſion may not eſcape the moſt correct Pen, is ſcarce to be preſum'd. But that any *Remarker*, after

Page 3. owning, " An Author deſerves as much " Applauſe as he has met with; and that " is as much as he cou'd poſſibly have;

Page 4. and adding further, " the Author's No- " tion —— by —— neceſſary Reſtrictions may be pretty eaſily made ſtrong and

Page 22. good;—— And at laſt concluding, " The " Author's particular Excellencies indeed " are very many;— and that he had

Ibid. " diſcover'd a great reach of Thought; —— After

—— After too " the Author is gone to " his Reſt, and cannot himſelf alter any " Miſtake, as ready, as *it is ſuppos'd* " he wou'd have been to do it; —— And that himſelf profeſſedly had aſſum'd no further than to declare his Performance unfiniſh'd; and for that Reaſon, " Call'd " it only a Delineation, or rude Draught; and again at the Cloſe, " A Sketch on- " ly—— I ſay, after all this, *&c.* that the *Remarker* ſhou'd tax this ſelf ſame Au- thor with " *Whimſical Notions*; and not only ſo, but with (not ſo much ſay- ing, as) " meaning to juſtifie a Lye to a " Madman for this Reaſon, (which, by the Way, ſome may think carries rather more Reſemblance of a *Madman's Re- mark*) " becauſe one may deceive a " Madman, but not the D—l; is hard, " very hard, to be accounted for; and makes the Conjecture of thoſe the more probable, who have apprehended this *Remarker* to be one of his " inge- " nious and reaſonable Men, ſo unhappy " as to have contracted Prejudices againſt " all Diſtinctions of moral Good and " Evil, or the moral Differences of hu- " man Actions.

Page 4. Page 6. Page 218. Page 17. Page 21. Page 4.

I in no ſort pretend to *improve the Author's Notion*, which yet this *Re- marker*, as before, has profeſs'd that *he thought ſo eaſie to be done*; I ſhall only eſſay,

eſſay, in ſhort, to ſhew that the *Remarker* has not *dealt fairly* by his ſo *celebrated Author*; nor yet *conſider'd* him ſo as to *refute the principal and peculiar Notion advanc'd in the Religion of Nature delineated.*

The *Unfairneſs*, I think, ſhews itſelf in the maim'd, and imperfect Repreſentation of *the Author's Notion of Morality*, when himſelf confeſſeth at long run, that theſe particular *qualifying Words*, viz. *In ſome degree or other*, overlook'd till now by the *Remarker*, ſtand nevertheleſs part of the Author's Definition in the ſame 20th Page; and further, that *he enlarges upon this particular, Page* 21. *and tells us* why *he* added thoſe Words; which therefore ought in all Reaſon to have been by the *Remarker* inſerted together with the former Part, however afterwards *conſider'd and refuted*; and why thus omitted in their proper Place can't well be collected but from Appearance; whether as being more than enough irritated at the Note there below, that *Men affecting to appear Free-Thinkers, ſhew themſelves to be but Half-Thinkers, or leſs*; or that there is found more Art in firſt prepoſſeſſing Readers with partial Repreſentations, tho', to cover and colour ſuch indirect Practice, the *qualifying Words* be ſome how taken notice of by the By, as it were,

Page 5.
Page 12.
In loc.

and

and at a Distance; like as it has been observ'd, that an Expression in the Body of a Book, which might likely be stumbled at, and give Offence, has some time been noted among the *Errata* of the Press; when yet, 'twas plainly contrary to common Sense, as well as Practice, that such a Passage shou'd not have been designedly inserted, or no otherwise than as an incidental *Erratum* of the Press, or from what other Motive or *Consideration* this Omission took its Rise, I'll not take upon me to affirm; but conclude it an obvious *Specimen of Unfairness* in the *Remarker* thus to curtail the *Author's Definition*, and so to *Remark* thereon by piece-meals, which is the first Branch of my present Essay.— The other is, that the *Remarker* has not *consider'd the Author*, so as to *refute the principal and peculiar Notion advanced in the Religion of Nature delineated*; whereto it might suffice to say, that if the *Remarker* has not fairly and fully represented that *Notion*, any partial and imperfect *Consideration* can't be taken as a *Refutation* of it. But to descend a little to the *Remarker's* own Examination and Reflections.

He excepts against *an Agreement, or* Page 5.
Disagreement with Truth, as the formal Ratio of moral Good and Evil, whereby

Page 7. whereby he says, *all Truth must be supposed Moral*; But this Consequence by no means follows; nor are any of the many *physical* Truths, which in no degree partake of *Morality*, any where deny'd by the Author; no, not so much as by Implication. But sure an *Author*, who avowedly treats of *Religion* alone, tho' it be only that of Nature, can't with any manner of Congruity be understood, when he mentions *Truth* simply, and in general, yet still *agreeably to his Subject*, which must ever be admitted
Page 4. of so *rational a Man as our Author is allow'd to be*; I say, such an Author as this can't with any degree of Candour and Ingenuity be understood to intend meer *trifling*, *physical Truths*, and of no *Importance* whatever, or indeed of any other than *moral Truths in some Degree or other*, as the *Author* expresseth it in that very ninth *Proposition* thus excepted against; and so much one wou'd be further apt to think is likewise here admitted even by the *Remarker* himself from his foregoing Insinuation, that the *Author must suppose all Truth moral*; whereby, methinks, himself must intend to imply at least, that the *Author* consider'd only what was *moral Truth*, as his *proper Subject*. How *trifling* then is the *Remarker's* Objection from his Instance as

as put of a *Pen*, whether *four*, or but *three Inches* long; wherein nevertheleſs he confeſſeth at the ſame Time an *Immorality*, and alſo gives the Reaſon; becauſe, *What is aſſerted, is known or thought to be falſe, and ſo is a guilty Act, as it tends to breed Diſtruſt, Uneaſineſs*, &c. Now this, thus allow'd, ſerves alike the *Author*, as the *Remarker*: For the *Morality* of the *Truth*, is ever imply'd, and intended by the former *in ſome degree or other*, in like manner, as is here expreſſed by the latter. Page 7. Page 8.

The *Remarker*, not content with *ſuppoſing*, that according to the Author's Notion, *all Truths are Moral*, ſpeaks them further, *not only Moral*, but *equally ſo*. And to what he ſays on this Head, I think it ſufficient to reply, that tho' all *Truths* are *equally true*; yet, all *Truths* however are not *equal*; which ſhews a Difference, and takes off the Objection; tho' this Solution the *Remarker* wou'd avoid by ſaying only, that ſuch *Guard*, as *Truths of Importance, of Weight*, &c. ſeems only *incidental*, and to come in, as *it were*, by force, tho' in the ſame Breath he owns the *Author often ſpeaks of them*; whereas, in Truth, it's viſible enough beſides to an indifferent Eye, *how* effectually *the Author carries this Notion through the whole Book*; and ſo appa- Page 9. Page 10.

 rently

Page 6. rently too, that the *Remarker* quotes it very early for the *Author*'s own *truest Definition of natural Religion*, that it is *the Pursuit of Happiness* (not the bare *Agreement or Disagreement with* Physical *Truth*) *by the Practice of Reason and Truth*; which therefore wou'd not Page 11. be found so *kind in others* to insert or subjoin, as it had been *just* in the *Remarker* to have taken into his *Consideration* throughout his pretended *Refutation*. Yet admitting thus much, the *Remarker* wou'd still have it, that *Truths of Importance*, which plainly denote a *moral Relation*, make no Difference; but Page 9, 11. are all nevertheless *equally Good or Evil*; when, by only taking withal the *Importance to be equal*, as well as the *Agreement or Disagreement*, the *Remarker*'s Cases are all solv'd, and the *Author's Notion* holds good, notwithstanding what is hitherto offer'd to *refute* it.

The *Remarker* observes, and this from the *Author* himself, that he does indeed make a *Difference in Truths, when some* Page 13. *of them are more important than others*, —— *And secondly, when some Actions respect a greater number of Truths than others*;—— Yet, nevertheless *in his, the Remarker's, Mind, those qualifying Words look very awkwardly*—— *and come a great deal too late*; but in my *Mind*, as I yet stand

ſtand advis'd, this looks much more like an *aukward* Objection, and to ſavour rather of a carping Humour at the *Author's Eſſay*, than of the leaſt Diſpoſition or Deſire to *improve the Author's Notion*; eſpecially ſince himſelf denies not, but the *Author's qualifying Words* are found even in the very *Definition*, which he ſhews ſuch an inclination to *refute*: Beſides, that the *Author* has ſo far, ſo modeſtly, ſo fairly, and ſo cautiouſly, provided to ward off ſuch a far-fetch'd, and ſtrain'd, Miſconſtruction, as fully to explain and determine his own proper Senſe and Meaning, as well before, as after, he advanced that leſs perfect, as before noted, *Definition*; of which I here offer, among ſeveral others that might be added, the following Inſtances, *viz.* Page 6. Page 12.

" In order to judge rightly what a " *Truth* is, it muſt be *conſider'd*, not " only what it is in itſelf, or in one " Reſpect; but alſo what it may be in " any other Reſpect; I ſay therefore, " that thoſe, and all thoſe Properties, " Reſpects, and Circumſtances, which " may be contradicted, are to be taken " into *Conſideration*; for otherwiſe, the " *Thing* to be *conſider'd* is but imper- " fectly ſurvey'd, and the whole Com- " paſs of it being not taken in, it is " taken, not as being what it is, but Page 18, 19.

" as what it is in part only, and in
" other Reſpects perhaps as what it is
" not.——

Page 20. " I wou'd have it to be *noted well*,
" that when I ſpeak of Acts inconſiſtent
" with *Truth*, *I mean any Truth*.——

Page 27. " Since he (the Objector's Enemy) may
" be *conſider'd* as ſomething elſe beſide
" that, he muſt be us'd according to
" what he is in other Reſpects, as well
" as in that from which he is denomi-
" nated the Objector's Enemy.

Page 28. " Acting according to *Truth*, as that
" Phraſe is us'd in the Objection, *is not*
" *requir'd by my Rule*; but ſo to act,
" that *no truth* may be denied by any
" Act.——

Note. If the *Author* ha'n't here explicitly and ſatisfactorily enough explain'd his own Meaning; the *Remarker* wou'd do well to ſupply the Deficiency.——

Page 65. " I have ſhewn in what the *Nature of*
" *moral Good and Evil* conſiſts, *viz.* A
" Conformity or Diſagreement to *Truth*,
" and (N. B.) thoſe Things that are *coin-*
" *cident* with it, *Reaſon* and *Happineſs*.

Page 153. " A Man may defend himſelf by what
" Methods he thinks moſt proper, *pro-*
" *vided he treſpaſſes againſt no Truth*.

Page 167. " There are many Circumſtances and
" Incidents of Life capable of affecting
" this Obligation (of natural Relation)
" and altering the Degrees of it. " The

" The *grand Rule* requires, that what Page 177.
" he (every Man) does, ſhou'd *interfere*
" *with no Truth.*

Further, 'tis, I take it, with *Truths* much as it is with *Powers* in like Caſes, *viz.* As all truly *authoritative*, tho' *inferiour*, *Powers* are in themſelves always *obligatory*; ſo in like manner it holds good of *Truths*; yet, in either Caſe, the *prior and ſuperiour Obligation* ſuperſedes, for the time, any *inferiour*, that ſtands not conſiſtent with the *former*; not that it can at the ſame Time be ſaid to *void*, or *annul* the *latter*, or that they are *contrary*, much leſs *contradictory*, to each other; but only that they are, as thus rang'd, to be *conſider'd* in ſuch Caſes with a juſt and regular *Subordination*; nor does the *Obedience* thus paid to the *ſuperiour*, whether *Power*, or *Truth*, in whatever reſpect that *Superiority conſiſts* and is *conſider'd*, ſo much as *offend* againſt, much leſs *deny*, the *leſſer*, or *inferiour*.

Thus I perſuade myſelf, the ſecond Branch of this *Eſſay* appears made out, *viz.* That the *Remarker* has not *conſider'd* the *Author* ſo, as to *refute the principal and ſpecial Notion advanced in the Religion of Nature delineated*; — And if this be ſo, I conceive every *conſiderate Reader* may thence ſo eaſily clear to

to himſelf what the *Remarker* animadverts upon the *Author*'s Anſwers to ſeveral Objections, and thoſe ſeveral *Objections* themſelves; that I paſs them over without more Obſervations thereupon; and here thus cloſe this tranſient *Eſſay*.

THOUGHTS

Occaſion'd *by a Letter to the Rev. Dr.* C—— *added to a late Eſſay towards a Demonſtration of the Scripture Trinity; but by another Hand.*

THE great variety of Subjects, and the various Degrees of human Capacities, are ſuch, that in the ordinary courſe of Things, it cannot otherwiſe fall out, than that there muſt needs ariſe very different Sentiments among Men; which too are vaſtly multiply'd by the imperfect and limited Conceptions of the moſt exalted Genij, more eſpecially with Relationto Beings, and States ſuperiour to our own;— by the equivocal uſe of Words, which are ſo often miſtaken and miſ-apply'd, if not wreſted to a wrong Senſe and Purpoſe;— by the different Methods of Education and Cuſtoms, which, for the moſt Part are apt

apt to prepoſſeſs and infuſe a quite different turn of Thought; and which beſides can't but be greatly increas'd and heighten'd, by the too too frequent contention for *Victory*, more than *Truth*, viſible in a more eſpecial manner, when Perſons, as it were, reſolve to have the *laſt Word*, and criticiſe more upon an Opponent's Method, or Expreſſions, than the Argument itſelf; In ſuch Caſes, no wonder that Readers are puzzled, and ſo miſled; and that this ſhou'd prove a moſt manifeſt Obſtruction to *Truth*, as it's moreover endleſs to be ſtill writing Books, *of which* the *wiſe Man* long ſince inform'd *there was no End*, upon every miſ-apprehenſion of, or poſſible Exception, to the manner of treating a Subject, or enforcing an Argument, more than to the ſubject Matter, when probably a ſhort Converſation might ſooner adjuſt the objected Difficulties or Obſcurities, and ſet them in a clearer Light than whole Volumes. This induceth me here (not preſuming on any more immediate Conſideration of an additional *Letter* to a late *Eſſay* by *Philanthropus Londinenſis*, but *by another Hand*, from that diſtinguiſh'd Perſon to whom it is directed) to ſubjoin a few occaſional Notes on that Letter. Nor can I doubt but the Writer thereof will take my Attempt, how incompleat

compleat ſoever, in good part, and at leaſt as a mark of Good-will, himſelf having encourag'd it ſo far, as to declare, " He wou'd not only change his preſent " Opinion for a better; but heartily " thank the Perſon, that wou'd give him- " ſelf the Trouble to free him from his " Error, (if it be really ſuch) by a fair " and friendly Anſwer:—— Yet, whether I reply ſo fully to his Conviction or not, I'll promiſe however not to raiſe his *Prejudice*, or *Averſion*, by any *unfair*, or *unfriendly* Treatments;—— And ſo proceed to note only, that the Letter Writer's Error to me ſeems mainly to lie, in diſcuſſing the *Things of God*, after the manner, and in the Language, of the *Things of Men*. Thus Page 60; and likewiſe in the Inſtance of *Writing*, Page 63; as again in that of *Probabilities*, Page 65; he exhibits *his, or any other Perſon's, knowing a Propoſition to be true*, as the Ground or Reaſon *to conclude, that God's Fore-knowledge of any future Event makes it neceſſary*; i. e. in his ſenſe of *Neceſſity*, which does not admit *Contingency* with reſpect to *Men*, any more than *God*. And the ſame is his Uſe and Application of *immediate Perception by any Perſon of what really is*; more eſpecially, in the Miſ-conſtruction and Page 54.

Mis-application of the particular Terms, *Fore-knowledge*, *Contingency*, *Neceſſity*, and *Liberty*. *

Page 65. *Fore-knowledge*, whether referr'd to *God*, or *Man*, is, like divers Inſtances of Speech, an *improper way of ſpeaking*; and can only *be juſtified by the common Language of Men*——. As it's at any time referr'd to *God*, *Fore-knowledge* is no other than *perfect Knowledge*; or, after the manner as we may expreſs ourſelves, ſuch a Height of *Aſſurance*, as amounts to an *abſolute Certainty*; which implies only ſuch an *intrinſick Neceſſity*, that the Matter itſelf can't fall out otherwiſe;—— But how *God* thus *knows*, or, if you will, in the Language of Men, *fore-knows*, we may no more pretend to fathom, than can *Finite* comprehend *Infinity*. Thus in many Caſes, like as the *Sadduces* in that of the *Reſurrection*, we too commonly *err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the*

2 Matt. xxii. 29.

* Thus, in my Opinion, is the Term *Arbitrary*, very probably, by a well-meaning *offerer* of a late *previous Queſtion as neceſſary to be conſider'd*, &c. altogether incongruouſly apply'd to *the King of Heaven, all whoſe Works are Truth, and his Ways Judgment*, (*Daniel* iv. 37.) whereas himſelf judg'd it *neceſſary* to *explain* his own Meaning ſo, as to *diſcard* the very *import* of the Word; which therefore ſure, had better ne'er been introduc'd in that caſe, unleſs ſo as to *diſclaim* it totally at firſt. For as it's far better, not to *place a Stumbling-ſtone* in the *Highway*, than after placing it there, to give the then *needful warning* to eſcape it; ſo, methinks, *occaſions of Stumbling and Rocks of Offence, in Speculation*, are much better *not given* at all, than afterwards *remov'd* by *Explications*.

Power

Power of God: As again, in the case of the *Body*, what if we know not *with what Body shall the Dead come*; this renders not *a Resurrection* less certain, or affects its Reality, that we know only, *God giveth a Body, as it hath pleased him*: Whence I cannot but observe it as by far too assuming, to assign it as the real, and sole Reason of the *divine Being's*—— *Perceiving future contingent Existences*——, *Because these are necessarily connected with something which actually now is.*—— Next, as referr'd to *Men*, *Fore-knowledge* is not pretended, as (I doubt not) will be easily admitted, to be more than *probable Conjecture* at most; but this sort of *Fore-knowledge*, as far as the *Language of Men* allows its Use, must needs be totally excluded from *God*; or the very Notion of his Being is entirely destroy'd. And after all, neither *Fore-knowledge* nor *Knowledge*, whether in *God* or *Man*, does imply *Necessity*; I mean such a *Necessity*, as is commonly understood by *Fate*, whereby is intended an *external Necessity*, operating as an *efficient Cause*, whatever subject it's referr'd to;—— nor more, or other, than such a *Necessity* only, as *internally*, and in the *Nature and Reason of Things, is a real Foundation*;

1 Cor. xv. 35.

Page 61.

Page 58.

—— And *such as subsists tho' there be nothing in Nature*, i. e. *no externally* existing Being, or Cause, *that secures the happening of the Event.*—— Now that this makes any *Thing*, or *Proposition*, *necessarily certain*, is no more than to say after this manner in effect, that *when once a Proposition is true, it cannot possibly at the same Time be untrue*; or, that *what is certain, cannot be* at the same Time, and to the same Person, *uncertain*. Which in no degree affects *Liberty*, that consists in the proper Determination of *a free Agent* to this, or that; to *act*, or *not act*; according to the *Dictates of its own Understanding*. So that whatever degree of *Necessity* may be found in some Instances according to the Notion of those term'd *Fatalists*; *human Liberty*, *and a future State*, are nevertheless certain, and do even in some sort necessarily depend on the very *Being of God*, whose *Existence* is as *demonstrable*, as that any one Thing exists in Nature:—— Nor yet does the *Certainty*, or *Necessity* of any *Thing* or Being, depend upon, call it whether *Fore-knowledge*, or *Knowledge*; but the *Fore-knowledge*, or *Knowledge*, depends on the *Certainty*, or rather perhaps the *internal Necessity*, of that *Thing* or Being;

Page 56.

Page 63.

ing:— Neither does *Contingency* in any manner respect *God*, to whom all Things are, as we speak, *present* and *certain*; but can only with any Propriety of Speech be referr'd to Men: And thus only does it hold *true* with respect to *Men*, not *God*, that *every future contingent Event may, or may not happen.* It may be thought therefore somewhat *ridiculous* to put the Case as of *God's seeing the Stone A in the Place B twelve Minutes hence*; when 'tis not the *Instant*, as we are wont to measure Time, that is here consider'd, but the undoubted *Certainty* of the *Event* only.— And if any ask with *Nicodemus*, how can *these Things* be? I only answer, *God knoweth*; believing we are no further concern'd here, than to know, and act according to the present *Talents* intrusted to us, while *we see*, at best, *but as through a Glass darkly— And know but in part*, until *we shall know even as also we are known.*

Page 55. Page 61. John iii. 9. 1 Cor. xiii. 19.

I shall only subjoin upon the marginal Note, that as it appears to me not *immediately perceiv'd*, nor to have the *necessary Connection* requir'd with the more immediate subject of this *Letter*, I pass it over; the Solution where-

Page 65. Page 60, 61.

of

of is to be ſought, as I apprehend, rather from another *Topick*; and what was the very *Deſign* of inſerting it here, looks to me ſo *dark*, that I'le not ſo much as venture to gueſs it.

FINIS.

BOOKS *printed for* JOHN CLARK *and* RICHARD HETT.

I. AN Expoſition of the Old and New Teſtament: Wherein each Chapter is ſumm'd up in its Contents; the ſacred Text inſerted at large in diſtinct Paragraphs, each Paragraph reduc'd to its proper Heads; the Senſe given, and largely illuſtrated, with practical Remarks and Obſervations. By the late Reverend Mr. *Matthew Henry*. The ſecond Edit. In ſix Volumes in Folio.

II. One hundred and ninety Sermons, on the hundred and nineteenth *Pſalm*, preach'd by the late Reverend and Learned *Thomas Manton*, D. D. With a compleat Alphabetical Table. The ſecond Edition, very much corrected. To which is prefix'd, Memoirs of the Life and Character of the Author, by the Reverend Mr. *William Harris*.

III. A compleat Body of practical Divinity; being a new Improvement of the Aſſemblies Catechiſm: Wherein the Truths and Duties of Chriſtianity are apply'd to the Conſcience, in a moſt ſerious and pathetick Manner: Written with a Deſign to revive dying Religion, in the Family and Cloſet, the Church and the World. By the late Reverend *Thomas Doolittle*,

Doolittle, M. A. To which are prefix'd some Memoirs of the Author's Life; with his solemn form of Covenanting with God. Folio. Price 18*s.*

IV. Thirteen Sermons concerning the Doctrine of the Trinity. Preach'd at the Merchants-Lecture, at *Salter's-Hall.* Together with a Vindication of that celebrated Text, 1 *John* v. 7. from being spurious, and an Explication of it, upon the Supposition of its being genuine; in four Sermons, preach'd at the same Lecture, *Ann.* 1719, 1720. By the Reverend *Edmund Calamy*, D. D. 8vo. Price 5*s.*

V. Discourses on the Fall and Misery of Man, and on the Covenant of Grace. In two Parts. Part I. Discourse 1. Of the primitive State of Man. 2. Of the Fall of Man. 3. Of the Imputation of *Adam*'s Sin. 4. Of original Sin. 5. Of sinful Thoughts. Part II. Discourse 1. Of the Covenant between God the Father and Christ. 2. Of Christ, the Surety of the Covenant of Grace. 3. Of Christ the Testator of the Covenant of Grace. 4. Of Christ the Mediator of the Covenant of Grace. 5. of the Stability of the Covenant of Grace, and of the ample Provision made therein for the Salvation of Sinners. By the late Reverend *Richard Taylor*, A. M.

A

Philosophical Amusement

UPON THE

LANGUAGE

OF

BEASTS.

Written originally in French by Father *Bougeant*, a famous Jesuit; Now confined at *La Fleche* on Account of this Work.

LONDON:

Printed for T. Cooper, at the Globe in *Paternoster Row*. 1739. (Price One Shilling.)

Philoſophical Amuſement

UPON THE

Language of BEASTS.

HOW inſnaring you are, Madam, and how well you know the extent of your Power over me! I did but once drop a Word in one of our Philoſophical Converſations, that I was of Opinion that Beaſts ſpoke and very well underſtood each other. Any body but you would have look'd upon this as one of thoſe Expreſſions which we are apt ſometimes to throw out without Proofs, and with no other Deſign but that of inlivening the Converſation. But you know me very well, you ſay, and though the Propoſition looks very much like a piece of Pleaſantry, you are pleaſed to ſay that I did not advance it at Random: nay, you will needs have me treat of it ſeriouſly, and give you an account of the Reaſons that perſuaded me to it. Though I have the utmoſt Deſire to pleaſe you, I don't know whether I could in any other Circumſtance prevail upon myſelf to obey you. For you know I have hardly any Leiſure to beſtow upon amuſing Diſſertations. By good Fortune I am at laſt got into the Country. I have left in Town the very Memory of the unpleaſant Imployments which make you ſometimes pity me. Now methinks I am here the Sovereign of whole Nature: in a delightful Abode, among a Circle of Amuſements whoſe Variety removes Diſguſt, and which I

ſhare in common with a charming Set of Company. From this ſingle Circumſtance you eaſily will gueſs that I am at C***. Our Maſters in Voluptuouſneſs ſay, that a means to ſharpen the Edge of Pleaſures is now and then to interrupt the Chain of them by ſome trifling Imployment. What better Choice can I then make than to ſatisfy your Curioſity? Self-love, you ſee, is at the bottom of all we do, and it will be much leſs Merit than Pleaſure for me to obey your Commands. But we make Allowances to each other, and if you are but ſatisfied with my Performance, I have a Notion that you will eaſily forgive my not having therein altogether neglected my own Amuſement.

You then ask me whether I in good earneſt believe that Beaſts ſpeak? Why, Madam, I very ſeriouſly am of Opinion that Beaſts do ſpeak and underſtand each other every whit as well and ſometimes better than we do. Now is your Curioſity ſatisfied? Not a Jot. You will needs know my Reaſons for thinking ſo. If I was converſing with you, I would tell you that the Reaſon which perſuades me that Beaſts ſpeak, is, that Mr. R. ſpeaks: You would ſurely ſtrengthen this Argument by the Inſtance of Mrs. H*, and that Buffoonery perhaps would ſet us both o'laughing. But whoever writes muſt have a regard for his Readers. Nor ſhall I tell you that the Serpent had of old a long and coherent Converſation with *Eve*, and that *Balaam*'s Aſs ſpoke. It would be more needleſs ſtill here to alledge the Fable of the Horſes of *Achilles*. You would certainly reply, that of theſe Events ſome are Supernatural and the other Fabulous, and that they of courſe are no Argument in the Order of Nature. Now I underſtand you: I am to fetch the Proofs

of

of my Opinion from Nature itſelf. Well, but don't you at the ſame time expect from me any wonderful Diſcoveries. You perhaps will be aſtoniſhed to find that you already yourſelf believe every Circumſtance of what I think on this Matter; and that I ſhall do nothing but unfold your own Thoughts to you, and let you into the Nature of intricate Sentiments which you have not ſufficiently examined. But ſome Preliminaries muſt be previouſly eſtabliſhed, and I am afraid the Acceſſory will not be ſhorter than the main Subject; which is a capital Fault, and againſt the Rules of exact Compoſition. But what of that, provided the whole amuſes you! Have Beaſts any Underſtanding? If they have, they ſpeak. But how do they ſpeak? Theſe ſhall be the three Heads of this Diſſertation.

I.

Of the Underſtanding of BEASTS.

HAVE Brutes any Underſtanding? I am convinced you will not ſo much as heſitate upon an Anſwer to this Queſtion. *Deſcartes* ſhall in vain tell you that Beaſts are Machines: that all their Actions may be accounted for by the Laws of Mechaniſm: that before him, and even from the time of St. *Auſtin*, ſome Philoſophers have had ſomething like the ſame Notion. You have a Bitch which you love, and which you think yourſelf reciprocally loved by. Now I defy all the *Carteſians* in the World to perſuade you that your Bitch is a meer Machine. Pray conſider what a ridiculous Caſt this Opinion would give all of us who love Horſes, Dogs, and

Birds. Imagine to yourſelf a Man who ſhould love his Watch as we love a Dog, and careſs it becauſe he ſhould think himſelf dearly beloved by it, ſo as to think that when it points out Twelve or One o' Clock, it does it knowingly and out of Tenderneſs to him. Were *Deſcartes*'s Opinion true, ſuch would indeed be the Folly of all who believe that their Dogs have an Affection for them, and love them with Knowledge and what we call Sentiment.

I own that if the Syſtem of *Deſcartes* was ſupported by ſolid Proofs, the Conſequence would not be ſufficient to confute it: Men in this Caſe ſhould be pitied for being given over to ſo groſs an Illuſion. But Truth is for ever Truth let our ſelf-love ſuffer ever ſo much by it. By good luck the Opinion of this Philoſopher has no other Foundation than bare Poſſibilities. God, ſays he, was able to make meer Machines of Beaſts. He might have done it without any Impoſſibility. I can account for all their Actions by the Laws of Mechaniſm. Nay, there are even ſome of theſe Actions which ſeem to admit of no other Principle. *Ergo*, I have Reaſons to think that Beaſts are Machines. A very wrong way of Arguing as you ſee. For from matter of Fact to Poſſibility the Conſequence is certain; but from Poſſibility to matter of Fact the Conſequence is raſh, uncertain, and venturous. It is a meer Suppoſition, a Caſtle in the Air, which may ſerve for an Amuſement, but has no manner of Solidity in it.

Nay more. There is ſomething within us, which concurs with Reaſon to baniſh the *Carteſian* Syſtem from Society. It is not a bare Prejudice, but an inward Perſuaſion, a Sentiment whoſe Origin is this. Poſſibly the Men with whom I live, who ſpeak to me, who give me Anſwers, who argue

argue and act together with me, may be nothing but meer Machines. For I know that I am actually thinking and have within me a thinking and knowing Principle. But I am not equally informed of what paſſes within other Men, and it cannot be denied but that God has the Power of making ſuch Creatutes as ſhould have the Appearance only and Motions of Men, though they were at bottom nothing but Machines. However, notwithſtanding the Truth of this Principle, it would be altogether impoſſible for me (unleſs God ſhould expreſsly reveal it) to beat it into my Head, that the Men with whom I live are indeed nothing but Machines, made to aſſiſt or incumber, to pleaſe or torment me. And why ſo? It is becauſe when I ſee any one ſpeaking, reaſoning, and acting as I myſelf do, I know not what Sentiment within me joins with Reaſon and Common Senſe, to force me to believe that the Man whom I ſee has in him an active and knowing Principle altogether like my own. Now, Beaſts are in the ſame Caſe with regard to us. I ſee a Dog haſtening to me when I call him, careſs me when I ſtroke him, tremble and run away when I rate him, obey me when I command him, and give all the outward Signs of many different Sentiments; of Joy and Sadneſs, of Grief and Pain, of Fear and Deſire, of Paſſions, of Love and Hatred. I immediately conclude from thence, that a Dog has in him a Principle of Knowledge and Sentiment, be it what it will. Though I ſhould Uſe my utmoſt Endeavour, to beat it into my Head that he is a meer Machine, and though all the Philoſophers in the World ſhould attempt to convince me of it, I feel myſelf hurried away by an inward Conviction, and by I know not what prevailing Force

which

which perſuades me to the contrary: And this Sentiment it is, which for ever will contradict the *Carteſian* Opinion in the Minds of Men. It is likely therefore that this Philoſopher, whoſe Genius was ſo tranſcendent, eſpouſed a Syſtem ſo very oppoſite to our Notions out of meer Frolick, and for no other purpoſe but to contradict the *Peripatetics*, to whom he was a profeſſed Enemy, and whoſe Syſtem upon the Underſtanding of Beaſts in reality is not to be maintained.

Theſe Gentlemen who, according to the dark Principles of their unintelligible Philoſophy, aſſigned to Bodies a ſubſtantial and material Form, diſtinct however from Matter, and which was in them the Principle of all their Actions, would not doubtleſs refuſe to Beaſts a Form of this Kind. On the other Hand, as they allowed that Beaſts were indowed with Sentiment and Knowledge, and acted according to Knowledge and Sentiment; they fain would have attributed to them a ſpiritual Soul like that of Man: But this the Principles of Chriſtianity did not allow. And really if Beaſts had a ſpiritual Soul, that Soul ſhould then be immortal and free, it ſhould be capable of meriting or of doing amiſs, of Recompenſe or of Puniſhment: They ſhould have a Paradiſe and a Hell appointed for them; Beaſts ſhould be a Kind of Men, or Men a Kind of Beaſts; all which Conſequences are unwarrantable by the Principles of Religion. The *Peripatetics*, thus obliged to be contented with their ſubſtantial-material Form, to avoid one Inconvenience fell into another, being of courſe obliged to ſay that this ſubſtantial Form was in Beaſts the Principle of their Knowledge and Actions, the moſt abſurd Sentiment according to the eſtabliſh'd Principles of Philoſophy and Religion. For in the eſtabliſhed Philoſophy we know only two Subſtances;

ſtances; one thinking, having Sentiments, knowing, and reaſoning, which is Spirit: The other extended, diviſible, moveable, capable of occaſioning Sentiments and Knowledge by its Union with Spirit, but altogether incapable itſelf of knowing and having Sentiments, which is Matter. Here we perceive at one View all the Contradictions neceſſarily flowing from the Opinion of the *Peripatetics*. A ſubſtantial Form, which is neither Spirit nor Matter: Something which has a knowing Faculty and yet is no Spirit: A ſubſtantial-material Form, which is no Matter; in ſhort, material Sentiments and a material Knowledge. A very dangerous Principle! which might become a Weapon in the Hands of Unbelievers againſt the Spirituality of our Soul. Is it not a Wonder that ſo monſtrous an Opinion ſhould have ſo long kept its Ground in the Chriſtian Schools?

Some Philoſophers pretended to rectify it. Why, ſaid they, ſhould we acknowledge in the Univerſe only theſe two Subſtances, Spirit and Matter? Has not God been able to create a middle Subſtance, between one and the other, inferior to Spirit and ſuperior to Matter, incapable of reaſoning, but capable of Sentiment and Knowledge? One might indeed at firſt be apt to believe this, and you perhaps ſooner than any. But, Madam, have a Care if you pleaſe. This would at once replunge you into the Uncertainty of the *Carteſian* Sentiment, and the Darkneſs of the *Peripatetic* Opinion. For 1. This Syſtem is a meer Suppoſition, void of Proof and deſtitute of Foundation. 2. What Notion can we frame to ourſelves of a Subſtance which is neither Spirit nor Matter? With regard to us who know no other but theſe two Subſtances, a Middle one is a Chimæra, an *ens rationis*, which we have no Perception

tion nor any Notion of. And who knows but that which is a meer Chimæra with regard to us, is really so in Nature and in itself? If it is so in itself, God has not been able to create it, because he can make no *ens rationis*. Now who shall resolve so reasonable a Doubt?

An antient Author, whose Works are collated among those of the Fathers, *Firmianus Lactantius*, explained himself more frankly. He pretended that God had granted the Use of Reason to whatever breathes, but to Beasts for the Preservation of their Lives only, without any religious Duty; and to Men to enable them to acquire Immortality and an eternal Happiness, by the Practice of a religious Worship. What a Notion! To be sure *Firmianus* did not see, that supposing a reasonable and of course a spiritual Soul without any Duty of Religion, was undermining the Foundations of the Law of Nature and of all Religion, degrading the spiritual Soul, destroying the Immortality of its Nature, and bringing us down to the State of Beasts, in trying to advance these to our own.

You see I only touch upon Systems, for fear I should tire you by particular Arguments. However, this is all Philosophy teaches with regard to the Knowledge of Beasts. How narrow is the human Understanding, you will say, how short its Lights, how great its Obscurity! It is enough to fright one. We know we exist and think: We see Facts; we know the Existence of a thousand Things; but when we are asked how and why they are so; we then lose ourselves in an Abyss of frivolous Conjectures and false Suppositions: We confuse our own Brains with a thousand vain Arguments, which, far from enlightening our Minds, have generally no other effect than to

smother

ſmother that little Portion of Light which Common-ſenſe has imparted to us. We do not underſtand ourſelves, how then can we underſtand the Nature of Beaſts and of all without us?

Let me pray you to do one Thing. Go to the *Indies*, to *China* or *Japan*, and there you will find Philoſophers of the Heathen, Deiſt, or Atheiſt Kind, who will argue if not with greater Capacity, at leaſt with greater Freedom. One will tell you that God has created ſeveral Species of Spirits, ſome more perfect, ſuch as the good and bad *Genii* are; ſome leſs perfect, which are Men, and others much more imperfect ſtill, which are the Beaſts. Another will tell you, that the Diſtinction of the Spirit and Matter is chimerical and impoſſible to be demonſtrated; that he ſees no Manner of Inconveniency in thinking that there is but one Subſtance which you may call by what Name you pleaſe; that this Subſtance has in Beaſts as well as in Men an Organization, a Modification, a Motion, ſomething in ſhort which makes it think more or leſs perfectly: And theſe Gentlemen acknowledging neither the Principles of the Chriſtian Religion nor the Authority of the Church; you will be under the Neceſſity (in order to attack them in their Retrenchments) either to begin by making them Chriſtians, or to go back to metaphyſical Principles very difficult to be unravelled. But I hope you will ſpare yourſelf the Trouble of the Voyage, and chuſe, as I myſelf do, to ſtick cloſe to this greateſt of Principles, *viz.* All theſe Syſtems are contrary to the Chriſtian Religion; of courſe they are abſolutely falſe.

Be comforted, Madam, here is another Hypotheſis, which has nothing common with any of thoſe I juſt laid before you. It is a Syſtem in-

tirely new, which will divert you at leaſt by its Singularity, and which I ſhall here repeat to you in the very Words of the Author himſelf, whom I heard producing it a while ſince in Company, and with an Air of Gravity mixed with Buffoonry, which made it doubtful whether he was himſelf perfectly perſuaded of it.

Every Body, ſaid he, agrees that Beaſts have a knowing Faculty; they have then a Soul. But is that Soul Matter or Spirit? It muſt be one of the Two, and yet you dare affirm neither. You dare not advance that it is Matter, becauſe you muſt neceſſarily ſuppoſe Matter to be capable of thinking. Nor will you ſay that it is a Spirit; this Opinion bringing with it Conſequences contrary to the Principles of Religion. Well, ſaid he, I ſhall now reſolve all your Difficulties. Know then, that Beaſts have a ſpiritual Soul like ours, and that this Opinion, far from contradicting the Principles of Religion, is altogether agreeable to it as well as to Reaſon. You eaſily judge that this Introduction ingroſſed all our Attention. The whole Company ſmiled, perhaps maliciouſly, and our Impatience for knowing the new Syſtem occaſioned a profound Silence. The Author went on.

Reaſon, ſaid he, naturally inclines us to believe that Beaſts have a ſpiritual Soul; and the only Thing which oppoſes this Sentiment is, the Conſequences that might be inferred from it; and this, among others; that Men would differ from Beaſts only by the Degrees of *Plus* and *Minus*; which would demoliſh the very Foundations of all Religion. Therefore, added he, if I can elude all theſe Conſequences, if I can aſſign to Beaſts a ſpiritual Soul without ſtriking at the Doctrines of Religion; it is evident that my Syſtem

ſtem being moreover the moſt agreeable to Reaſon, is the only warrantable Hypotheſis. Now I can and ſhall do it with the greateſt eaſe imaginable, I even have Means by the ſame Method to explain many very obſcure Paſſages in the Holy Scripture, and to reſolve ſome very great Difficulties which are not well confuted. This we ſhall unfold in a more particular Manner.

Religion teaches us that the Devils, from the very Moment they had ſinned, were reprobate, and that they are doomed to burn forever in Hell. But the Church has not as yet determined whether they do actually indure the Torments to which they are condemned. It may then be thought that they do not as yet ſuffer them, and that the Execution of the Verdict brought againſt them, is reſerved for the Day of the final Judgment. It is otherwiſe with the Souls of Men; the Church having determined that our Souls are judged the very Inſtant of their Separation from the Body, and that the Sentence is immediately executed; ſo that thoſe who die in God's Diſpleaſure, are that very Inſtant plunged into the Flames of Hell. But the Church has made no ſuch Deciſion with regard to the Devils. 'Tis true, we very commonly fancy ſo, and a Multitude of People there are, into whoſe Minds it never came to call it in Queſtion. But this Opinion, on account of its being believed raſhly and without Examination (it being on the other Hand ſupported neither by Scripture nor by any other Deciſion) is not in the Church a Tradition to which one is obliged to ſubmit; and the more ſo becauſe my Sentiment is not altogether new, and I might mention ſome Authors who have given Hints of it; among others

an Eccleſiaſtical Writer, *Victor* Prieſt of *Antioch*, who has expreſsly publiſhed it in his Works.

Now, Madam, you muſt know, that while the Author was thus delivering himſelf, an Abbe and Doctor who was preſent, a Man of Wit indeed, but warm in Diſpute and prejudiced in Favour of his own Opinions, was muttering and grumbling to himſelf, with an Air of diſcontent which our Author eaſily diſcovered. What is the matter with you, Sir, ſaid he; you ſeem not to be pleaſed? No more I can be, replied the Doctor, for your Propoſition is downright Hereſy. This you are to prove replied the Author. Nothing in the World ſo eaſy ſaid the Doctor; and I ſhall do it from the Authority of the Scholaſtick Authors, and the Holy Fathers. You ſhan't, by all that's good! Said the Lady whoſe Houſe we were at; at leaſt you ſhan't do it now. We are all of us curious to know the new Syſtem; you muſt if you pleaſe hear it from Beginning to End, and afterwards you ſhall be at Liberty to diſpute as much as you pleaſe upon your Scholaſticks, and your Holy Fathers. The Lady was obeyed, and the other went on.

When I advance, ſaid he, that the Devils do not as yet ſuffer the Torments of Hell, if it was an arbitrary Suppoſition like the Mechaniſm of *Deſcartes*, or the middle Subſtance which ſome other Philoſophers have imagined; every one would have a right to reject my Suppoſition, and I ſhould perſuade no body into it. But I beg the Doctor to be pleaſed to hear the Proofs whereupon my Propoſition is ſupported. It is an Article of our Faith that the Devil tempts us in order to provoke us to Sin: That he lays Snares to make us fall: That he is for ever roving about us, as St. *Peter* has it, watching an Occaſion to devour

vour us. He fills our Minds with wicked Suggeſtions: He ſeizes upon Bodies, and when he has once made himſelf Maſter of them, he does not always betray his Preſence by Fits of Madneſs. He ſometimes Laughs, he Sings, and delights in puzzling the Miniſters of the Church who attempt to conjure him forth. He argues with the utmoſt Coolneſs, as when he tempted *Jeſus Chriſt* in the Deſart, and ſeduced *Eve* in the earthly Paradiſe. Now imagine to yourſelf ſome Body in Hell, ſuch as Scripture repreſents it, penetrated through his whole Subſtance, devoured and conſumed by a Fire, whoſe Violence is beyond every thing; and then conſider if a Man or a Spirit in that Condition can poſſibly be taken up with any other Thought than that of the horrid Torture he endures. If you tell me that he is tranſported with Fury, and that all his Moments are conſtantly filled by new Fits of Rage and Deſpair, I ſhall neceſſarily conceive it. But that he ſhould have leiſure enough to think of tempting and ſhifting with us, is altogether incomprehenſible, and we ſhould be obliged to conclude that the Devils do not tempt us, or that the Tortures of Hell are not ſo very great as they are repreſented; two Conſequences equally oppoſite to Faith. Let us then conclude, that the Devils do not as yet undergo their Torments.

What our Divines ſay that the Devils carry their Hell along with them every where, I know very well and confeſs, I even think it is not to be queſtioned. But let us explain ourſelves. That it may be truly ſaid that the Devils carry their Hell with them every where, is it neceſſary that they ſhould actually undergo the Tortures of it? No. It is enough that they be condemned to it by an irrevoable Decree, of which they every where

where carry with them the Shame and primary Effects, as I shall immediately explain. Would we not say of a Criminal whose Punishment should be deferred in order to make him lead a miserable and ignominious Life for a few Days, that he carries every where with him the Wheel he is to expire on? Thus it is that the Devils carry their Hell with them every where. Their Sentence is pronounced without any hopes of Mercy; they are condemned without Remorse, they every where carry the eternal Blemish of it; the horrid Thought never leaves them, and consequently they every where carry their Hell along with them, that is, the Idea of the Hell for them appointed. But we have a thousand Reasons to believe that they do not as yet suffer the real Tortures of it?

And why should we not believe it, if the Holy Scripture says it expressly. Let the Doctor himself judge of it. When *Jesus Christ* beforehand pronounced Sentence on the Reprobate, what are his Words? *Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting Fire*, prepared *for the Devil and his Angels.* Math. xxv. 41. He says not that the Devil and his Angels actually burn in that Fire. He only says, that that Fire is *prepared* and waits for them at the last Day, which shall be the beginning of their Torments. This agrees with the other Passage of the Gospel, in which the Devils driven out by *Jesus Christ* complain to him for the anguish he gives them in driving them out of the Bodies of the possessed. *Art thou come*, say they to him, *to torment us before the time?* If the Devils actually suffer the Tortures of Hell, what reasonable meaning can one assign for this Expression? The evil *Jesus Christ* did them in driving them out, was certainly too inconsiderable in comparison of

their

their Torments, to deserve their Complaints; But being not to suffer Hell-fire before the last Day, they were in the mean time not altogether insensible to Pains of a much less Degree, and they thought they had some Reasons to complain that *Jesus Christ* should torment them before the time appointed by Divine Justice. Here is something still more decisive, *viz.* what St. *Jude* says in his Epistle *v. 6.* that *God keeps them in everlasting Chains under profound darkness*, and reserves for the Judgment of the great Day *the Angels which kept not their first Estate.* The first Words of this Passage are evidently metaphorical, and by these *everlasting Chains* we are to understand the irrevocable Judgment God has passed upon these rebellious Spirits, and that the *profound Darkness* signifies the Abyss of Humiliation into which their Sin has plunged them. But the other Words of the Text are so very clear and precise, that no other reasonable Meaning can be given them, but that which agrees with my Opinion. I might perhaps take an additional Advantage of some other Texts of the Scripture; But I hope those I have just quoted are sufficient to convince any Man not given over to Prejudice.

I never shall tell you, Madam, what Tortures the Doctor suffered during this Exposition of the Holy Scripture. He once more would needs interrupt the Author, and pretended that these Passages might be interpreted in quite another Manner. But the Company a second time obliged him to hold his Tongue, and desired the Author at last to tell them what it was he pretended to infer from what he had been saying: For they did not as yet perceive what all this Preamble aimed at. What I pretend to infer, said he, is, that till Doom's-Day comes, God,

in

in order not to suffer so many Legions of reprobate Spirits to be of no use, has distributed them thro' the several Spaces of the World, to serve the Designs of his Providence, and make his Omnipotence to appear. Some continuing in their natural State, busy themselves in tempting Men, about seducing and tormenting them, either immediately as *Job*'s *Devil*, and those that lay hold of human Bodies, or by the Ministry of Sorcerers, and of Phantoms. These wicked Spirits are those whom the Scripture calls the *Powers of Darkness*, and the *Powers of the Air*, God, with the others, makes Millions of Beasts of all Kinds, which serve for the several Uses of Man, which fill the Universe, and cause the Wisdom and Omnipotence of the Creator to be admired. By that Means, added he, I easily conceive how on the one Hand the Devil's can tempt us, and on the other how Beasts can think, know, have Sentiments and a Spiritual Soul, without any way striking at the Doctrines of Religion. I am no longer surprized to see them have Dexterity, Fore-cast, Memory, and Judgment. I should rather have Occasion to wonder at their having no more of those Qualities, since their Soul very likely is more perfect than ours. But I discover the Reason of this. It is because in Beasts as well as in ourselves, the Operations of the Mind are dependent on the material Organs of the Machine to which it is united, and these Organs being grosser and less perfect in Beasts than in us, it follows that the Knowledge, the Thoughts, and the other Spiritual Operations of Beasts must of course be less perfect than ours; and if these proud Spirits know their own dismal State, what an Humiliation must it be to them, thus to see themselves reduced to the Condition of Beasts! But,

whether

whether they know it or no, so shameful a Degradation is still with regard to them that primary Effect of the Divine Vengeance I just mentioned. It is an anticipated Hell.

Here a very beautiful Lady, whom this Discourse put out of Humour, could not help interrupting the Author of the New System. Sir, said she with a good deal of Fire, it is of little Consequence to me whether the Devils be humbled or no, and actually suffer the Tortures of Hell; but I will never allow Beasts to be Devils. How! shall my little *Bitch* be a Devil that lies with me all Night and caresses me all Day? I never will grant you that. And I say the same of my *Parrot*, added a young Lady; it is a charming Creature; but if I was persuaded it was a little Devil, I am sure I should no longer indure it. I conceive, said the Author, how great your Aversion for this System must be, and I excuse it: But give yourself the trouble to reflect upon it, and you shall see that it is only the Result of a Prejudice which must be conquered by Reason. Do we love Beasts for their own sakes? No. As they are altogether Strangers to human Society, they can have no other Appointment but that of being useful and amusing. And what care we whether it be a Devil or some other Being that serves and amuses us? The Thought of it, far from shocking pleases me mightily. I with Gratitude admire the Goodness of the Creator, who gave me so many little Devils to serve and amuse me. If I am told that these poor Devils are doomed to suffer eternal Tortures, I admire God's Decrees; but I have no manner of share in this dreadful Sentence. I leave the Execution of it to the Sovereign Judge, and notwithstanding this I live with my little Devils as I do with a Mul-

titude of People of whom Religion informs me that a great number ſhall be damned. But the cure of a Prejudice is not to be effected in a Moment: It is done by Time and Reflexion. Give me leave then lightly to touch upon this Difficulty, in order to obſerve a very important thing to you.

Perſuaded as we are that Beaſts have Intelligence, have we not all of us a thouſand times pitied them for the exceſſive Evils, which the Majority of them are expoſed to, and in reality ſuffer? How unhappy is the Condition of Horſes, we are apt to ſay, ſeeing a Horſe whom an unmerciful Carman is murthering with Blows! How miſerable is a Dog that they are breaking for Hunting! How diſmal is the fate of Beaſts living in Woods! They are perpetually expoſed to the Injuries of the Weather, always ſeized with Apprehenſions of becoming the Prey of Hunters or of ſome wilder Animal; for ever obliged, after long Fatigue, to look out for ſome poor inſipid Food; often ſuffering cruel Hunger, and ſubject moreover to Illneſs and Death! If Men are ſubject to a multitude of Miſeries that overwhelm them, Religion acquaints us with the Reaſon of it, *viz.* their being born Sinners. But what Crimes can Beaſts have committed, by birth to be ſubjected to Evils ſo very cruel?

At theſe laſt Words our Doctor made ſo furious a Grimace, ſtriking his Hand on his Knee, that the Company could not help laughing. I ſee, Sir, ſaid the Author, addreſſing to him, what it is that offends you. You imagine that the Reflection I have been making, is contrary to what you call in Theology *the State of pure Nature*; but you are miſtaken. I acknowledge as well as you, that, independent of all Sin, God might have created Man (and much more the Beaſts)

ſubject to all the Miſeries which are the natural Conſequences of their Conſtitution. But the Evils we endure, are they in reality ſuch as they would have been in *the State of pure Nature?* No. You are obliged to acknowledge that they are much greater, and many Divines propoſe, even after St. *Auſtin*, this Exceſs of Miſery as a Proof of the Exiſtence of an original Sin. What are we then to think of the horrid Exceſſes of Miſery undergone by Beaſts: Miſeries indeed far greater than thoſe of Men? This is in any other Syſtem an incomprehenſible Myſtery; whereas nothing is more eaſy to be conceived from the Syſtem I propoſe. The rebellious Spirits deſerve a Puniſhment ſtill more rigorous, and happy is it for them that their Puniſhment is deferred. In a Word, God's Goodneſs is vindicated; Man himſelf is juſtified: For what Right can he have, without Neceſſity, and often in the way of meer Diverſion to take away the Life of Millions of Beaſts, if God had not authorized him ſo to do; and Beaſts being as ſenſible as ourſelves of Pain and Death, how could a juſt and merciful God have given Man that Priviledge, if they were not ſo many guilty Victims of the divine Vengeance?

But hear, continued he, ſomething ſtill more convincing, and of greater Conſequence. Beaſts by nature are extremely vicious. We know very well that they never Sin, becauſe they are not free; but this is the only Condition wanting to make them Sinners. The voracious Beaſts and Birds of Prey are cruel. Many Inſects of one and the ſame Species devour each other. *Cats* are perfidious and ungrateful. *Monkeys* are miſchievous. *Dogs* are envious. All Beaſts in general are jealous and revengeful to exceſs, not to mention many other Vices which we obſerve in them: and at

the ſame time that they are by Nature ſo very vicious, they have, ſay we, neither the Liberty nor any Helps to reſiſt the Biaſs that hurries them into ſo many bad Actions. They are, according to the Schools, neceſſitated to do Evil, to diſconcert the general Order, to commit whatever is in Nature moſt contrary to the Notion we have of natural Juſtice, and to the Principles of Virtue. What Monſters theſe, in a World originally created for Order and Juſtice to reign in! This is in good part what formerly perſuaded the *Manicheans*, that there were of neceſſity two Principles of things; one good, the other bad; and that Beaſts were not the Work of the good Principle. A monſtrous Error! But how then ſhall we believe that Beaſts came out of the Hands of the Creator, with Qualities ſo very ſtrange? If Man is ſo very wicked and corrupt, it is becauſe he has himſelf through Sin perverted the happy Nature God had given him at his Formation. Of two things then we muſt ſay one: either that God has taken delight in making Beaſts ſo vicious as they are, and in giving us in them Models of what is moſt ſhameful in the World; or that they have, like Man, original Sin, which has perverted their primitive Nature.

The firſt of theſe Propoſitions finds very difficult Acceſs to the Mind, and is an expreſs Contradiction of the Holy Scripture, which ſays, that whatever came out of God's Hands at the time of the Creation of the World *was good*, and even *very good*. For if Beaſts were at that time what they are now-a-Days, how could they be ſtiled *good*, and very good? What good can there be in a *Monkey*'s being ſo miſchievous, a *Dog* ſo full of Envy, and a *Cat* ſo perfidious? But then many Authors have pretended that Beaſts,

before

before Man's Fall, were different from what they now are, and that it was in order to punish Man, they were rendered so wicked: But this Opinion is a meer Supposition, of which there is not the least Foot-step in the Holy Scripture. It is a pitiful Subterfuge to elude a real Difficulty. This at most might be said of the Beasts with whom Man has a sort of Correspondence, but not at all of the Birds, Fishes, and Insects, which have no manner of Relation to him. We must then have recourse to the second Proposition, and say, that the Nature of Beasts has, like that of Man, been corrupted by some original Sin: Another Hypothesis void of Foundation, and equally inconsistent with Reason and Religion in all the Systems, which have been hitherto espoused concerning the Soul of Beasts. What Party are we to take? Why, admit of my System, and all is explained. The Souls of Beasts are refractory Spirits, which have made themselves guilty towards God. This Sin in Beasts is no original Sin. It is a personal Crime, which has corrupted and perverted their Nature in it's whole Substance. Hence all the Vices and Corruption we observe in them, though they can be no longer criminal, because God, by irrecoverably reprobating them, has at the same time divested them of their Liberty.

I am still to satisfy you, said the Author, upon two Questions which you will infallibly ask me; *viz.* How are the Devils united to the Bodies of Beasts, and what do they become at the Hour of Death? To answer the first Question, we should be let into the Mystery of the Union of our Soul and our Body; and this no Philosopher will be ever able to conceive. Let us then be contented with saying, that, as Man is a Soul and an organized Body united, so is each Beast a Devil

united

united to a Body organized; and that as Man has not two Souls, Beasts likewise have each but one Devil. This is so very true, that *Jesus Christ* having one day driven out many Devils, and these having asked his leave to enter into a Herd of *Swine* that fed near the Sea, he permitted it, and they entered into the *Swine* accordingly. But what happened? Each *Swine* having his own Devil already, there was a Battle, and the whole Herd threw themselves headlong into the Sea.

This Union once supposed, we ought not to be surprized at any thing in Beasts. They must have a Knowledge and a Sentiment like ours; and from what passes within us, they must be jealous, choleric, perfidious, ungrateful, and self-interested like ourselves. They must be either gay or sad according to Events or their present Disposition. They must have Love and Hatred, and Desire for multiplying their Species, an Affection for their Young, and a Care to bring them up: In a Word, they must do all what they do, and which seems incomprehensible to us when a spiritual Soul is not granted them. However, it may be proper to observe, that as the rebellious Spirits have deserved to be degraded in this Manner for having abused their Reason and Lights, *God* has been minded to humble them with regard to their very Reason, by making them depend on Organs so very gross, that it is infinitely inferior to that of Men. Thence it happens, that we now and then judge that Beasts do some acts of Reason; but we have great Reason to believe, that they never make many coherent and reflected Judgments like ourselves, because their Organs will not allow of Motions so very delicate. This constitutes *Automata*, which most commonly act only mechanically, though with Knowledge; and this is

to

to a Spirit the utmoſt Degree of Humiliation. It is not thus with their Senſations: For the rebellious ſinned not by their Senſes: They had none. Beſides, Senſes are always material Organs and groſs Interpreters. Let their Uſe be ever ſo perfect, it is always a Degree of Humiliation to a a Devil created to be a pure Spirit, and of courſe to know and perceive in a much more perfect Manner. For this Reaſon it was, that God has not given Beaſts Senſes of a coarſer kind than ours. The Spirits which animate them are ſufficiently puniſhed, by being made ſubject to material Senſes. It even ſeems that God, either to humble us alſo, or to cauſe the Variety of his Productions to be admired, has been pleaſed to give ſome Beaſts Organs and Senſations much nicer and more perfect than ours. For Inſtance, the Birds of Prey have ſo piercing an Eye, the Dog ſo exquiſite a Smell, the Spider ſo ſubtile a Feeling, that no Man can come up to them in theſe Points.

The extreme Littleneſs of an infinite Number of Beaſts (It is ſtill the Author that ſpeaks) might impoſe upon ſuch Perſons as have not ſufficiently reflected on the Nature of Things. How! will one ſay, is it poſſible to believe that a Devil can be lodged in a Fly, a Flea, or a Mite? But how! might not he be as well lodged there as in a Horſe or an Ox? A Spirit having abſolutely no Extenſion, in order to be united to a Body does not require that this Body be more or leſs extenſive. The very minuteſt Quantity of Matter is enough for him, provided it be organized: and there is none, tho' ever ſo ſmall, but what might be ſo. God might have made Man as little as the minuteſt Inſect; and if he had done it our Souls would not value themſelves the leſs, or think

think themſelves the leſs happily lodged on that account. The Reaſon is, becauſe there is no abſolute Magnitude in the World. A Flea in itſelf is neither large nor ſmall. It is ſmall only with regard to us who are infinitely larger, and it is large with regard to a Multitude of other Creatures which are a Million of Times minuter. All this proves, that Ignorance alone or ſome falſe Prejudices can make us ſet between Beaſts any Diſtinction or Preference founded on their large or little Size. It is not, therefore, more difficult to think that a Devil may be united to the Body of a Fly than to that of an Elephant; and to a Spirit it is indeed a Thing abſolutely indifferent.

As to the ſecond Queſtion, added the Author, concerning what becomes of the Devils after the Death of Beaſts, it is again very eaſy to be anſwered. *Pythagoras* taught formerly, and at this Day ſome *Indian* Philoſophers believe the *Metempſycoſis*; that is are of Opinion, that at the Moment of our Death our Souls paſs into the Body of a Man or a Beaſt, to begin a new Life again, and ſo ſucceſſively till the end of Ages. This Syſtem which is unwarrantable with regard to Men, and is beſides proſcribed by Religion, is admirably well ſuited to Beaſts in the Syſtem I have here propoſed, and claſhes neither with Religion nor with Reaſon. The Devils, by God appointed to be Beaſts, neceſſarily out-live their Bodies, and would ceaſe to anſwer their Deſtination, if at the Moment of the Deſtruction of their firſt Body they paſſed not immediately into another, to begin to live a-new under another Form. Thus ſuch or ſuch a Devil, after having been a Cat or a Goat, is forced to paſs into the Embryo of a Bird, a Fiſh, or a Butter-Fly, to animate them.

them. Happy thoſe who light upon a good Lodging, as many Birds, Horſes, and Dogs do; and woe to ſuch as become Beaſts of Burden, or the Hunter's Game. It is a kind of Lottery, in which the Devils very likely have not themſelves the Choice of their Lots.

It might be thought however, that they never change their Species, and that the Devil which had once been a Horſe, is always to be a Horſe again. But this Opinion would be liable to very great Difficulty. For as the Species of Beaſts oftentimes increaſe and diminiſh upon the Earth, it would thence follow, either that there would be ſometimes too few Devils to ſupply a certain Species, or ſometimes too many, ſo that ſome would remain in Relays and without Imployment, which is not likely; whereas by admitting a general Metempſycoſis, you prevent all Difficulties.

All Kinds of Beaſts moſt commonly produce a much greater Number of Eggs or Embryos than is neceſſary to perpetuate them in the ſame Number. Therefore the Devils, whom God has deſtined to animate them, never want Imployment or Lodging. For if any Species happens to fail or be conſiderably diminiſhed, they may paſs into the Eggs of another and multiply that. This is what ſometimes cauſes thoſe prodigious Clouds of Locuſts, and thoſe innumerable Swarms of Caterpillars, which lay waſte our Fields and Gardens. We look into Cold or Heat, Rains or Winds, for the Cauſe of theſe amazing Multiplications, and the true Reaſon is, that in the Year they come, or in the foregoing, an extraordinary Number of Deer, Birds or Fiſhes have periſhed with all their Eggs; ſo that the Devils which animated them have been obliged, ſuddenly, to get into the very firſt Species they found diſpoſed

to receive them, and which had as it were so many Houses to be let.

In short, concluded the Author, you see, that the more this System is searched into, the more you find in it some of these Characters of Probability which strike and persuade us. It is a Source of extraordinary Observations, which satisfies our Curiosity. I find the Foundations of it in Religion itself. Reason supplies me with the most likely Proof of it, and Prejudices can oppose to it none but frivolous Difficulties. Can a Man refuse his Approbation of a System so plausible and so well supported on every Side?

I know not, Madam, what You will think of a System so new and so very singular. But I must tell you that its very great Singularity was mighty agreeable to the whole Company; some took it meerly for a Piece of Wit and an ingenious Pleasantry; others look'd upon it as a System that deserved to be seriously believed. For my part, as you know I am a perfect *Pyrrhonian* in Point of Systems; I was contented with giving the Author the Praises, which good Breeding requires in a Case like this, without explaining myself farther. The Truth is that I knew and still know not what to think of it. For on the one hand I find that the System very well answers all Difficulties, and that it would be no easy Matter to prove it false. But on the other hand I don't see it built upon Foundations sufficiently solid to produce a real Persuasion. And as it besides concerns some Points of Religion, I think it would be a Rashness to espouse it without the tacit Consent at least of the Doctors. Our *Abbe* was not so Circumspect as I. He would needs return to the Charge. The Author let him speak long enough, and then was preparing

to

to give an Anſwer. On this Play was propoſed. The two Champions retired in a corner of the Room, to continue their Diſpute, and I could not hear their Arguments.

But I take notice that here is already much Writing, and not one Word mentioned of the principal Queſtion you made me upon the Language of Beaſts. Let us then make an End of this firſt Diſcuſſion, and reſume our Propoſitions. It is certain that Beaſts have an intelligent Faculty, be the Principle of it what it will. It is a Fact ſo generally confeſſed by all Men, that I did not ſo much go about proving it to you as I intended to amuſe you by expoſing the ſeveral Opinions. Let us therefore examine now whether they ſpeak or no.

II.

Of the Neceſſity of a Language between BEASTS.

FIRST, let us evidence the Poſſibility of it. In the common Uſe, what we call ſpeaking is making one's ſelf underſtood by a ſequel of Words articulated, whereby Men have agreed to expreſs ſuch an Idea or Sentiment; and the total Collection of theſe Words is what we call a Language, which is different among different Nations. If Beaſts ſpeak, they certainly do it not by means of a Language of this Kind. But it is impoſſible, without this Aſſiſtance, to make one's ſelf underſtood, and to ſpeak in reality? Of this we cannot poſſibly doubt. Angels ſpeak to each other, and yet have no Voice. Let us lay aſide

what is ſupernatural. When we are pleaſed, every thing in us ſpeaks. Do we not every Day ſpeak by certain Looks, by a Motion of the Head, a Geſture, nay! The leaſt Sign in the World? Imagine to yourſelf, Madam, a Nation of Dumb-People. Do you think they would not deliver their Minds to each other, and by Cries, Geſtures, Looks, and Poſtures, ſupply the Want of our Words and Phraſes? For my Part, I think they would live very well in a Society like ourſelves, and that after the firſt among them ſhould have with ſome Difficulty eſtabliſhed ſome ſenſible Signs and Expreſſions, they would eaſily teach them to their Children: That theſe would improve more and more in this way of expreſſing themſelves, and by degrees would form, not indeed a Tongue, but a very diſtinct Language, and as intelligible to them as our Dialects are to us. Of this we have ſuch amazing Inſtances, that it is impoſſible to call it in Queſtion; and I ſhall even maintain, that the ſame Idea being expreſſible many different ways, there might poſſibly be in ſuch a Language a Choice of Expreſſions, Energy, Eloquence, Simplicity, Metaphors, and perhaps even Affectation. No doubt but there would alſo be Obſcurity and Equivocations in it: But where are theſe not to be found? Let us then apply this Example to Beaſts. They have no Tongues; but why ſhould they not have a Speech? The thing evidently is poſſible: Let us now examine whether it is neceſſary.

All Beaſts, it muſt be owned, have a knowing Faculty: Nor do we ſee that the Author of Nature can have given them this Faculty, for any other Purpoſe that to inable them to provide for their Wants, their Preſervation, and whatever is fit for their Condition, and ſuitable to the peculiar

liar kind of Life he has appointed for them. Let us add to this Principle, that many Species of Beasts are made to live in Society at large, and the others either to live Male and Female in a kind of House-keeping, or in a kind of Family with their Young till they are brought up. A few Exceptions, which might be opposed to this general Law, are not to be accounted any thing. To begin now by mentioning the first Species only: What Use do we conceive Beasts might make their Understanding for the Preservation and Wellfare of their Society, and of course for their own peculiar Good resulting therefrom, if the Members of that Society have not among themselves a common Language perfectly known to every one of them? Let us resume the Example of a Nation of dumb People, and suppose that besides the want of Speech, Nature has even refused them all possible Means of communicating their Thoughts to one another: What use could they make of their Knowledge and Understanding? It is plain that being able neither to understand nor to be understood, they could neither afford nor receive any Help from the Society. Far from mutually assisting each other, they necessarily must be in a perpetual Opposition. The Distrust would be general. Injuries, Hatred, and Revenge, would break all Principles of Union between them, and they being soon changed into wild Beasts, would think of nothing but destroying each other. In a Word, no more Communication, no more Society.

It would be much the same thing with the Beasts which live in Society, if you suppose that they have not a Language among themselves to understand each other, be it what will, you can no longer conceive how their Society could subsist. Let us take the Beavers for an Instance. These

Animals

Animals, to be under Covert and Secure, live in ſmall Huts of Clay, which they build for themſelves with amazing Dexterity on the Border of a Lake, and ſet upon Piles. But they have found that, as they ſtood in need of each other's Help to build their Dwellings, they muſt of courſe live in Society. They then get thirty, forty, more or leſs together, and after they have pitched upon a Soil fit for their Habitation, and where they hope to live more conveniently and ſecure, they divide among themſelves the Works neceſſary for the Conſtruction of their Abodes. Some go and fetch the Wood: Others provide the Clay which ſome of them are commiſſioned to bring, and this by lying upon their Back with their Paws up, as we know they do, to make a ſort of Cart of their Body, which the others drag along to the Place where it is to be uſed. There one does the Part of a Maſon, another that of a Labourer, and a third that of an Architecture. A Tree is firſt cut at the Root, and falls into the Lake. This done, other Artificers work it: Some prepare the Piles, others drive them into the Ground, while others are forming the ſeveral Timbers neceſſary. All is done orderly and in perfect Concert. You would think you ſaw the *Tyrians* building the City of *Carthage*. The lazy or the froward are undoubtedly puniſhed. The Centries faithfully do their Duty. The Work is carried on to Perfection. It is the Admiration of Men themſelves; and then the little Corporation quietly injoying the Benefit of their Work, no longer have any other Thought, but that of living eaſy, and of multiplying their Species each in his little Family.

Does not ſo coherent and ſo well executed an Underſtanding evidently intimate the Neceſſity of a Lan-

a Language among these Animals, and their having a Speech whereby they mutually communicate their Thoughts to each other? Pray, Madam, consider what is said of the Tower of *Babel*. The Means God made use of to make that extravagant Project abortive (a sure and infallible Means indeed!) was the Confusion of their Languages. The Workmen having all on a sudden forgot the common Language which they spoke before, and being no longer able to understand each other, became incapable of acting in concert, and were obliged to give over their Enterprize. The same must happen to any Society whose Members shall not be able to understand one another. Bring thirty People together speaking each a different Language, and you will soon see Disorder and Confusion among them. What would then happen, if these thirty People could not speak at all, and had no Means left of delivering their Thoughts? Let us suppose the Beavers to be really in that Condition; what wou'd be the Consequence? I see in a Moment all the Society disordered; without Chief, without Subordination, without Counsel, without Concert. I see all the Works which require the Assistance of many Hands, necessarily abandoned. No more Centinels that watch for the public Safety: No dwelling in Common. Every one, as in the Tower of *Babel*, shall retire and live by himself, in short no more Society.

Cannot Instinct, some will say, supply the Want of a Language? Two Beavers meet and join together, because their Instinct inclines them towards forming a Society. A third, then a fourth, and many others successively come and increase the Company: The Society is formed. The same Instinct inclines them to go and fetch Wood and

Earth

Earth to build their Huts, juſt as Birds go and fetch what is neceſſary to build their Neſts. If they ſeem to divide the Work among them, it is becauſe ſome of them ſeeing the others bring the Earth, in their Turn go and fetch Wood; and likewiſe when they ſee part of them buſy about preparing the Mortar; they, not to remain idle, buſy themſelves in working the Wood. All this it ſeems requires no more than Eyes and Inſtinct. If you ſee Centinels placed upon the Avenues, it is becauſe in a Troop there is always ſome one more Timorous or Prudent than the reſt, who makes the Precautions he uſes for his own Safety ſerve for the Utility of others.

The Objection has ſomething ſpecious in it, but it muſt be examined to the Bottom. What is Inſtinct? It is a Sentiment void of Reflection, whoſe Principle is unknown; a blind Deſire, an undeliberate Biaſs, a mechanick Motion of our Soul, which prompts us to do a Thing without knowing any Reaſon why. This Sentiment, if there is ſuch a Thing, is commonly ſo intricate in Men, that it remains without Effect: Only it is thought to produce very ſingular Effects in ſome of them. It is wonderful in Beaſts, they ſay, and by it their moſt admirable Actions are explained. Nothing in reality is more convenient than this Inſtinct. But when will Men ceaſe to miſtake Words for Things? 1. What we call Inſtinct is ſomething very obſcure and unknown in itſelf. 2. What Proofs have we that Beaſts have more of this Inſtinct than Men? The Prejudices in this Point have been carried ſo far as to believe, that Inſtinct in Beaſts is preferable to Reaſon in Men. But upon what Foundation is human Reaſon thus degraded to do honour to the Inſtinct of Beaſts? 'Tis true, we ſee Birds making their Neſts with very

very great Induſtry. We ſee ſome Animals purge themſelves by means of certain Herbs which they find out. The Sparrows likewiſe purge themſelves and their Young with Spiders or other Inſects.

The Pidgeons and many Birds ſwallow Gravel to facilitate their Digeſtion. The Storks, they ſay, taught Man the Uſe of Cliſters. Theſe are ſome of the moſt wonderful Effects of the pretended Inſtinct of Beaſts. For we muſt not give Credit to many Fables that are ſet about concerning this Matter; and I ſee in all this nothing fit to be cried up. 3. But ſince we cannot refuſe Beaſts a knowing Faculty, why do we give them a needleſs Inſtinct? Why ſhould we attribute to this unknown Inſtinct what may be the ſimple Effect of their Underſtanding; and ſince it is really in conſequence of a Knowing Faculty that Man performs the ſame Operations, why ſhould not the ſame Principle alſo rule in Beaſts? Is not this what we call multiplying Beings without Neceſſity, and indeavouring to throw a Veil upon a Thing in itſelf plain and perſpicuous? For my part, I am perſuaded that what we believe Beaſts do by an Inſtinct peculiar to them, they like ourſelves do it in conſequence of their Knowledge, and with Knowledge. I am even apt to think that what we call Inſtinct is a meer *Ens Rationis*, a Name void of reality, a Remain of Peripatetic Philoſophy. But if Inſtinct muſt be admitted, I never will believe that Beaſts are better provided with it than Men, ſo long as no other Argument ſhall be brought to prove it than Facts which I can account for from ſimple Knowledge; and if that Inſtinct is not ſufficient to Man to guide him, it muſt of courſe be ſtill leſs ſufficient to Beaſts.

I then resume my Example and my Argument. If it is not by particular Instinct that Beavers make their little Settlements in so much Concert, they then do it in consequence of their Knowledge. Now I have proved by the Supposition of a whole Nation of People absolutely Dumb, that a knowing Faculty without a reciprocal Communication by means of a sensible and well-known Language, is not sufficient to maintain Society, or to execute any Undertaking that requires Union and Concert. Let us then conclude that, since Nature, which always acts with so much Wisdom, has made the Beavers to live in Society: she has given them all the Means necessary for that Purpose, and of course the Faculty of Speaking, let their Language be what it will; since it is impossible for any Society to subsist without this Help. And as Nature every where follows the same Rules, let us apply this Argument to the Bees, the Ants, and all Kinds of Beasts that live in Society; and by that Means a considerable Part of them must be indowed with the Faculty of Speech.

But can the same Thing be said of the Beasts which do not live in Society? Such are the major Part of the Quadrupeds, the Birds, the Fishes, the Reptiles, which are undeniably the greater Number. I don't know, Madam, whether you perceive the Consequence of the first Step I have just now ventured to make. For if there are any Beasts that speak, they must of necessity all of them speak. If Beavers and Parrots have a Language, the Oyster and Snail must have theirs also. I am, as it were, engaged in a dangerous Defilee, all the Avenues of which are guarded by the strongest Prejudices. But in the Land of Systems, as well as in others, the first Step is often the only difficult

difficult. I have proved, methinks, with Probability enough, that the Beasts living in Society must needs have a Language. I am next to extend the Proposition to all the other Species of Beasts.

And indeed, why should Nature have refused to Some of them a Privilege it has granted to the Rest? Nothing would be more contrary to the Uniformity she affects in all her Productions. I know that Nature, which is as Sparing in Superfluities as she is Prodigal in things Necessary, does nothing in vain. But it is not necessary that a Couple of Beasts joined to form a Household and a Family together, a Couple of Birds for instance, be able to understand and mutually to impart their Sentiments and Thoughts to each other? Bring together and associate two People absolutly Dumb, I defy the Union to subsist, if they have no Means left of agreeing about their Affairs, and of expressing their mutual Wants. Two Sparrows without any kind of Language, will lye under the same Impossibility of living together, and all the Inconveniences of the dumb Society I have mentioned, will be seen in their little Family. In a Word, the Necessity of a Language between a Husband and his Wife, to inable them to live together, is just the same as for a whole Society.

Nature, without any Impossibility, might have made some Animals to live in an absolute Solitude, and accordingly have given them both Sexes, to be able to multiply themselves as Plants do, without the Assistance of Copulation, and differently from Snails and Worms, which, though they have both Sexes, cannot use them any otherwise than by coupling. If you suppose that there are Beasts of this kind in the Universe, I shall readily con-

feſs that Nature, had ſhe indowed them with the Faculty of Speaking, would have given them a needleſs Talent. But wherever two Beaſts ſhall ſtand in an habitual Need of each other, and form among them a laſting Society, they of neceſſity muſt ſpeak to each other. How is it to be conceived, that two Sparrows in the Heat of their Luſt, or in the Cares attending the bringing up of their Family, have not a thouſand Things to ſay to each other? This would be the Place of inlivening our Subject by curious Particularities. But my Intention is not to make a philoſophical Work degenerate into Buffoonry. You ſee I inſiſt upon none but ſolid Arguments, and I ſay it is impoſſible in the Order of Nature, that a Sparrow who loves his Wife, has not, in order to perſuade her, a Language full of Expreſſion and Tenderneſs. He muſt ſcold her when ſhe plays the Coquet: He muſt menace the Sparks that come to cajole her: He muſt be able to underſtand her when ſhe calls him: He muſt, while ſhe is aſſiduouſly ſitting on her Brood, be able to provide Neceſſaries for her, and diſcern whether it is ſome Food ſhe asks for, or Feathers to repair her Neſt; for all which Things a Language is neceſſary.

Many Beaſts, one will ſay, have not a ſettled and permanent Houſhold like Birds: (For by the bye Birds are the Model of conjugal Conſtancy and Fidelity:) This I very well know, and their Number is even very great. Such are Dogs, Horſes, Deer, and almoſt all Quadrupeds, Fiſhes and Reptiles. But I ſhall always inſiſt upon a Principle granted and acknowledged as certain. Nature is too much like herſelf in Productions of one and the ſame Genus, to have put between Beaſts ſo eſſential a Difference or that of ſpeaking

or

or not ſpeaking at all would be. Upon this Principle it is, that though we hardly know the Seeds of Coral, of Muſhrooms, of Truffles, and of Fern, we are nevertheleſs perſuaded that theſe Plants proceed from Seeds; becauſe it is the Manner in which Nature produces all the reſt. Let us then conclude, that if Nature has given the Beaſts living in Society and in a Family the Faculty of Speaking; ſhe doubtleſs has beſtowed the ſame Advantage upon all the reſt. For we are not now upon one of thoſe accidental Differences which Nature loves to diverſify in the different Species of one Genus. There are not perhaps in the whole World two Faces perfectly alike; but yet all Men have a Face. There are among the ſeveral Species of Animals Differences ſtill greater. Some have Wings, others have Fins, others have Feet and Legs. The Serpents have none of theſe: But all Animals have the Faculty of moving and of tranſporting themſelves wherever they pleaſe according to their Wants. Among Animals there are ſome who ſee and hear more or leſs perfectly, but yet they all hear and ſee. It is the ſame thing with the Faculty of Speech. This Faculty perhaps is more perfect in the Beaſts which live in Society and form Families; But it being in ſome, we muſt believe it to be in all of them, but more or leſs perfect according to their reſpective Wants.

It is even obſervable, that the Animals who live neither in Society nor in a ſettled Family, yet have in each Species a Sort of Commerce and Society among themſelves. Such are the Quadrupeds, the Fiſhes, the Reptiles, the Birds themſelves independently of their Houſhold, as Starlings, Partridges, Ravens, Ducks, and Hens. Now, what Utility could Beaſts fetch from endeavouring

deavouring to live in Society one with another, if they did it not for mutual Aſſiſtance, and reciprocally to have the Benefit of their Knowledge, Diſcoveries, and of all the Helps they can afford each other; and how could they do ſo, if they underſtand not one another? All the Arguments I have already uſed to prove that the Beaſts which live in Society muſt have a Language, here again find their Place and their whole Energy. All the Difference muſt be only in the Degrees of *Plus* and *Minus*, and if we judge of this from Matters of Fact, probably there is no Difference at all.

The Wolves, for inſtance, hunt with very great Skill, and together contrive warlike Stratagems. A Man croſſing a Field ſaw a Wolf who ſeemed to be watching a Flock of Sheep. He informed the Shepherd of it, and adviſed him to cauſe this Animal to be purſued by his Dogs. I ſhan't be ſuch a Fool replied the Shepherd; The Wolf yonder is there only to divert my Attention, and another Wolf who is working on the other Side, only watches the Moment when I ſhall ſet my Dogs upon this, to ſnatch one of my Sheep from me. The Man who was going by, willing to be ſatisfied of the Fact, promiſed to pay for the Sheep, and the Thing happened juſt as the Shepherd had ſaid it would. Does not a Stratagem ſo well concerted evidently ſuppoſe, that the two Wolves had agreed together, one to ſhew and the other to hide himſelf? Now how is it poſſible to agree in this Manner without the Help of Speech?

A Sparrow finding a Neſt which a Swallow had juſt built ſtanding very convenient for him, poſſeſt himſelf of it. The Swallow ſeeing the Uſurper in her Houſe called for Help to expel him. A thouſand Swallows came full ſpeed and attacked

the

the Sparrow: But the Latter being covered on every Side, and presenting only his large Beak at the narrow Entrance of the Nest, was invulnerable and made the boldest of them who durst approach him to repent their Temerity. After a Quarter of an Hour's Combat all the Swallows disappeared. The Sparrow thought he had got the better, and the Spectators judged that the Swallows had abandoned the Undertaking. Not in the least. Immediately we saw them return to the Charge; and each of them having provided a little of that tempered Earth wherewith they make their Nests, they all at once fell upon the Sparrow, and inclosed him in the Nest, to perish there, since they could not drive him thence. Do you believe, Madam, that the Swallows have been able to hatch and concert this Design all of them together, without speaking to each other?

Wonders are recounted of the Monkies when they go o' Plundering. A Troop of Soldiers that goes o' Forraging in the Neighbourhood of the Enemy, cannot march in greater Order or with more Precaution. I could mention a thousand like Instances: But this would require a Volume; and I aim only at supporting my Argument. Men hitherto have always made use of these Examples to prove that Beasts have a knowing Faculty; and they have been in the right so to do, because it is really unconceiveable that Beasts can do such singular Actions without Knowledge. But we evidently have not sufficiently examined into the Case, and it being equally impossible for Beasts to do these Actions without Speaking, we are moreover obliged to conclude that they also speak to one another. Now, Madam, I would beg of you here to observe, that this is not an Opinion

or

or a Syſtem founded upon meer Conjectures or probable Explications, but an Argument ſupported by ſenſible and palpable Facts. I ſay ſenſible Matters of Fact, ſuch as theſe I have juſt alledged, and a thouſand the like in every Kind. Enter into a Wood where there are a Parcel of Jays. The firſt who ſees you gives the Alarm to the whole Troop, and the Noiſe continues till you are gone, or till your Preſence has made them fly off. Magpies, Blackbirds, and almoſt all the feathered Kinds do the ſame. Let a Cat but ſhew herſelf upon the top of a Houſe or in a Garden; the very firſt Sparrow that perceives her, exactly does what a Centinel who ſees the Enemy does among us. He by his Cries warns all his Companions, and ſeems to imitate the Noiſe of a Drum beating a March. See a Cock near his Hen, a Dove near the Female he is woeing, a Cat following his Mate, there is no end of their Diſcourſes.

Nor would there be any End of mine, if I were to leave no Particularity untouched, and yet I intend to ſet Bounds to this little Work. I ſhall add but one important Reflection, which in my Opinion is a kind of Demonſtration. We every Day ſpeak to Beaſts and they underſtand us very well. The Shepherd makes himſelf underſtood by his Sheep. The Cows underſtand all the Milk-maid ſays to them. We ſpeak to our Horſes, Dogs, and Birds, and they underſtand us. Beaſts in their turn ſpeak to us, and we underſtand them.

How much more muſt they make themſelves underſtood by their Like! For with regard to them we can have no other than a foreign Language; and if Nature has enabled them to underſtand a foreign Language, how can ſhe have refuſed them the Faculty of Underſtanding and

Speaking,

Speaking, a natural one. Your Bitch, for inſtance, has a great deal of Wit, you converſe with her all day long: You underſtand her, and ſhe underſtands you: But you may be ſure that when a Dog comes to careſs her, ſhe underſtands and is underſtood by him ſtill much better.

Confeſs then, Madam, that Beaſts ſpeak, and that it is fit to believe it, ſince Reaſon, the Laws of Nature, Matters of Fact, and Experience, all concur to prove it to a Degree of Evidence capable of fixing our Uncertainty in that Point. However, I don't know whether I have perſuaded you. For I never knew any thing ſo difficult in the World, as to perſuade any one of a Sentiment which he has not himſelf fetched from his own Lights; unleſs it flatters Self-love. But you will own at leaſt, that my Opinion is ſufficiently ſupported, to have a Place among the ſeveral Syſtems that fill up the Leiſure of Philoſophers. Another Confeſſion which I require of you, and which ſhall be infinitely more agreeable to me, is, that you cannot but be ſatisfied with my Complaiſance; and to leave you nothing to deſire on this Point, I ſhall here proceed and treat on the third and laſt Point remaining to be examined.

III.

Of the Language of Beasts.

Do you expect, Madam, that becauſe I am perſuaded that Beaſts ſpeak; I muſt explain their Language to you, and give you a Dictionary of it? I own the Thing appears very

difficult to me, and I am at no ſmall loſs how to begin. I ſhall go back to our Principle; and following the Order of the different Reflexions which this Subject ſhall ſuggeſt, I ſhall do all you can reaſonably require for the clearing of this Matter. But you are to expect none but general Obſervations; for Particularities would here degenerate into downright Buffoonry.

Why has Nature given Beaſts the Faculty of Speech? Why, to no other End but that they might expreſs their Deſires and Sentiments one to another, and by that Means ſupply their Wants and whatever is neceſſary for their Preſervation. I know that Language in general has ſtill another Intention, which is to expreſs Ideas, Knowledge, Reflexions, and Arguments. But whatever Syſtem we follow as to the Knowledge of Beaſts, even though it were my Syſtem of Devils which gives them a ſpiritual Soul capable of reaſoning; it it is certain that Nature indowed them with no other Knowledge but that which is uſeful and neceſſary for the Preſervation of the Species and of each Individual. Conſequently, no abſtract Ideas, no metaphyſical Reaſonings, no various Reſearches upon all the Objects which ſurround them, no other Science in ſhort but that of being in Health, of Self-preſervation, of avoiding whatever can hurt, and of procuring whatever can be beneficial to them. Therefore none of them was ever ſeen making Speeches in public, or diſputing about Cauſes and their Effects. They know no other than the animal Life.

From this Reflection flows another, *viz.* that at the ſame Time that Nature has confined the Knowledge of Beaſts within ſo narrow a Compaſs, ſhe of Neceſſity has alſo proportionably confined their Deſires, their Paſſions, and of courſe their Wants.

Wants. For it is our Desires that make our Wants, and Knowledge that gives birth to our Desires. To know that one may be happy and to wish to be so, is in the Heart of Man but one and the same Thing. Before he had sinned, his Eyes were shut to all worldly and sensible Goods. He had no Desire for them. Sin opened his Eyes, and to his Misfortune he coveted these Goods. Happy the wise Man who knows how to restrain his Desires within the Bounds prescribed by Religion and Reason. No more of your Morality, you will say, let us come to the Point.

Glory, Grandeur, Riches, Reputation, Pageantry, and Luxury, are Names unknown to Beasts, and which you will not find in the Dictionary of their Language. They can express nothing but their Desires, and these are limited purely to what is necessary for their Preservation. Hear a Dog speak. He never will complain that his Kennel is not gilt, or his Meat not offered him in a Silver Dish. He never will sue for the Priviledge of commanding all the Dogs in the House. All he will ask from you is a small Portion of Food to subsist on. If you menace him, he will endeavour to appease you. If you leave him alone, by his Cries he will express his Despair, and the Apprehension he is under of being abandoned for ever. If you take him with you o' walking, he will thank you with a thousand Expressions of Joy. If he sees any Object that frightens him, he will by his Motions and Barkings inform you of it. In short speak to him of eating, drinking, sleeping, running, fooling, of defending himself against his Enemy, and of defending you as his Protector and only Support, he will understand and answer you very well, because all this tends

to his Preſervation, for which alone Nature has given him the Faculty of Underſtanding, and that of making himſelf underſtood, that is of ſpeaking. But avoid treating with him about Philoſophy and Morality. It would be uſing a foreign Language, to all the Expreſſions of which he is an abſolute Stranger. His Knowledge and Wants do not reach ſo far; but bring a Bitch to him. They will ſoon get acquainted, and the Converſation begin. Nor are you to expect that he will loſe Time, in making Compliments to the Fair upon her Beauty, her Shape, Wit, Extraction and Youth. All theſe Advantages are to him ſo many unknown Ideas, which he can neither underſtand nor expreſs. The only Thing that moves him at that Inſtant is a Deſire of multiplying his Species, or at leaſt of uſing the proper Means for it. On this only Topick it is that the whole Converſation runs. But then it is Life and Fire itſelf. In an amorous Beaſt, every thing is as expreſſive as in the moſt paſſionate Man. His Geſtures, his Voice, his Motions, all in ſhort ſpeak his Paſſion.

This Principle ſupplies us with our firſt Obſervation upon the Language of Beaſts, *viz.* that it is very limited, ſince it does not extend beyond the Neceſſaries of Life. However, let us not impoſe upon ourſelves with regard to this Point. To take Things right, the Language of Beaſts appears ſo limited to us only with Relation to ours, which is perhaps too diffuſe. Limited as it is, it is ſufficient to Beaſts, and more would be of no ſervice to them. Were it not to be wiſhed, that ours, at leaſt in ſome reſpects, were leſs abundant and prolix? Men are naturally great Talkers and, if I dare ſay ſo, blab much. They never have Words enough to expreſs all they want to

ſay.

say. Not satisfied with simple Ideas, they love as it were to dissect them into Sub-divisions; they sometimes seem willing to anatomize an Idea or a Sentiment, as a Surgeon would do a Man's Head. So many Words must of course be newly coined: And what Words too! why, such as are void of meaning, obscure, equivocal, and fitter to breed Disputes than to instruct the Mind.

On the other Hand, how do Men abuse the Facility of speaking Nature has given them! How many Errors and Falshoods are the ordinary Topicks of our Conversations! How many Extravagances and Trifles, Slanderings and wicked Discourses! If Beasts should hear us converse, prate, lye, slander, and rave; would they have Reason to envy us the Use we make of Speech? They have not our Priviledges; but in recompense they have not our Failings. They speak little, but always to the purpose, and that knowingly. They always speak Truth, and never deceive, not even in point of Love. And is not this an Advantage they have over us? With regard to this, they are nearly in the same Case with the Peasants in our Countries, and the Negroes and Savages of *America*. I might even make Philosophers of them, and compare at least many of their Species with *Diogenes* living in a little Tub, content with bare Necessaries, avoiding the Commerce of Men, and never speaking but out of meer Necessity. Such is one of those great long wiskered and well-furred Cats, which you see quietly couching in a Corner, leisurely digesting his Food, sleeping at Discretion, sometimes taking the Diversion of hunting, and moreover injoying Life with Tranquility, without minding the Events which ruffle us, and without plaguing his Brains with a thousand needless Reflections, nor caring to impart his own Thoughts

to

to others. 'Tis true, the ſight of a She Cat will be ſufficient to diſconcert all his Philoſophy; but are our Philoſophers a whit wiſer on the like Occaſion?

Let us however ſtick cloſe to Truth. I intend neither to be ſeduced nor to dazzle my own Eyes by Arguments leſs ſolid than ſpecious. Beaſts in general ſpeak little. There are even ſome of ſo ſilent a Diſpoſition, that they won't drop four Words a Day. Such are among thoſe we know, Aſſes, Horſes, Oxen, Sheep, and the major Part of the Quadrupeds. The Reaſon is very plain. It is becauſe Nature has given theſe Animals only a Food ſo very ſlight and eaſy to be digeſted, that they are inceſſantly obliged to renew it, in order to prevent Hunger, and this takes up moſt of their Leiſure. But in return you muſt own, that there are Animals which ſpeak without the leaſt Intermiſſion. Such are among others the Birds. (and here I beg of you to obſerve that it is the Females who ſpeak the leaſt) As the Language of Birds is, as I may ſay, the beſt articulated, and the moſt ſenſible to us, let us take it for an Example. From it you ſhall be able to judge of the Language of the other Beaſts, by putting between them the Differences which are eaſily obſerved in each Species.

Birds Sing, they ſay: But this is a Miſtake. Birds do not Sing but ſpeak. What we take for Singing is no more than their natural Language. Do the Magpy, the Jay, the Raven, the Owl, and the Duck Sing? What makes us believe that they Sing is their tuneful Voice. Thus the *Hottentots* in *Africa* ſeem to cluck like Turkey-cocks tho' it be the natural Accent of their Language, and thus ſeveral Nations ſeem to us to ſing, when they indeed ſpeak. Birds, if you will, Sing in the

ſame

ſame Senſe; but they ſing not for ſinging's ſake as we fancy they do. Their Singing is always an intended Speech; and it is comical enough that there ſhould be thus in the World ſo numerous a Nation, which never ſpeak otherwiſe but tunably and muſically. But in ſhort, what do theſe Birds ſay? The Queſtion ſhould be propoſed to *Apollonius Tyanæus*, who boaſted of underſtanding their Language. As for me, who am no Diviner, I can give you no more than probable Conjectures.

Let us take for our Example the Magyy, which is ſo great a Chatterer. It is eaſy to perceive, that her Diſcourſes or Songs are varied. She ſometimes lowers or raiſes her Voice, ſometimes haſtens or ſlackens the Meaſure, and ſometimes lengthens or ſhortens her Chit-chat. And theſe evidently are ſo many different Sentences. Now following the Rule I have laid down, that the Knowledge, Deſires, Wants, and of Courſe the Expreſſions of Beaſts are confined to what is uſeful or neceſſary for their Preſervation, methinks nothing is more eaſy than at firſt, and in general to underſtand the meaning of theſe different Phraſes. Nor muſt you take this for Pleaſantry; it is downright Truth, or at leaſt what I thought came neareſt to it. For a Magpy having no Speech but what is uſeful or neceſſary to her, whenever ſhe ſpeaks do but obſerve what Circumſtance ſhe is in with regard to her Wants. Then reflect what you would ſay yourſelf in a like Situation, and this will be exactly the very thing ſhe ſays. For Inſtance, if ſhe ſpeaks, eating with a good Appetite, ſhe infallibly ſays at that time what you would ſay yourſelf on the like Occaſion: "That is very good; that does me good". If you offer her ſomething bad, ſhe immediately

ſays,

ſays, as you would yourſelf, " This does not " pleaſe me; this is not good for me". In a Word, ſuppoſe yourſelf to be in the ſeveral Circumſtances of one who cannot expreſs any thing but his Wants, and you will find in your own Diſcourſe the Interpretation of what a Magpy ſays in thoſe Circumſtances: " There is nothing more " to be had here. Let us go to ſome other " Place. Where are you o' going Mate? I am " going; follow me. Come quick, come in " haſte. Where are you? Here I am. Don't " you hear me? You eat all. I ſhall beat you. " Aye aye, you hurt me. Who is coming there? " I am afraid. Have a care, have a care. " Alarm, alarm! Let us hide ourſelves. Let us " fly away". You ſee I could ſwell this Dictionary with many the like Phraſes, eſpecially if I ſhould add to it all the Expreſſions ſuggeſted by Love, Jealouſy, Grief, and Joy. But is it not a great deal, that I have dared to give you a Specimen of it?

Now I mention Joy; give me leave here to make a ſhort Digreſſion. Do you know that our ancient Philoſophers pretended that Beaſts do not laugh, and that laughing is an eſſential Property of Man, excluſive of Brutes? But is not this again an ancient Miſtake, and is it not evident that Beaſts laugh very heartily after their own Manner, and every whit as well as Man himſelf? See a couple of young Puppies romping together in a Field, catching, playing Tricks, and frightening one another in jeſt. Can all this be done without Laughing? Is it eſſential to laughing, that it be done, as in Man, by a Motion of the Lips and Mouth, with a convulſive ſound of Voice? Laughing is no more than an Expreſſion of Joy, and that Expreſſion is neceſſarily different in the

different

different Species of Animals. Man laughs after his own Manner, and the Dog after his. No matter whether it is by a ſudden burſting of the Voice, or by a ſimple Motion of the Ears or the Tail, or by ſome other the like Expreſſion. It is ſtill laughing. What Party are you going to eſpouſe, Madam: Pray ſuſpend your Deciſion a Moment. I am of the Opinion of the ancient Philoſophers myſelf; and this for the following Reaſon. Laughing is an Expreſſion of Pleaſure and Joy. But all Pleaſure and Joy do not excite Laughter. The only Joy which makes us laugh, is that which is accompanied with Surpriſe, and which is excited in us at the unexpected ſight of ſome odd Mixture of two inconſiſtent Ideas or Things, as of a Magiſtrate dreſſed like a Harlequin, or of an aukward Fellow taking upon him the Man of Skill. This is ſo very true, that the ſame thing which makes us laugh in ordinary Occurrences, on ſome other Occaſions appears no longer comical to us. We laugh at a Man, who for his Diverſion or out of Vanity, trying to leap over a Ditch of Water, falls into the Middle of it. But let the ſame Accident happen to another running from an armed Enemy, far from laughing, we are very ſorry for it; therefore, to be capable of Laughter, we muſt be likewiſe capable of comparing two Ideas together, and of perceiving the Inconſiſtency that is between them. Now this is what Beaſts can never do, becauſe they have none but direct Notions. They have Sentiments of Satisfaction, Pleaſure and Joy; and the major Part expreſs them very diſtinctly; but they cannot have the Joy which proceeds from Reflection or Compariſon. Therefore Beaſts never laugh, and the ancient Philoſophers were in the right. Now again to our Birds.

It may be objected that Birds always repeat the ſame thing, and conſequently vary not their Phraſes as I pretend they do. To this I anſwer, that beſides the Differences of quickneſs and ſlowneſs, of high and low, of length and ſhortneſs, which it is eaſy to obſerve in the Language of Beaſts, there are very likely many others which we do not perceive, for want of underſtanding their Language, but which Birds among themſelves perceive very well. Can we diſtinguiſh their Phyſiognomy? We hardly ſuſpect that there is a Difference of Phyſiognomy among them. Nothing however is more certain, and they never miſtake it. I have ſeen a Swallow carrying Food to ſix or ſeven little ones ranged in a Row upon the Hand of a Dial. They changed their Places every Moment, and yet the Mother never miſtook in giving twice together Food to the ſame, but remembered every one of them. Let a Ewe in a Flock of a hundred Lambs hear her own bleat, ſhe immediately knows him again, and haſtens to him. Two Sparrows will know one another by their Voice among a thouſand. I might here alledge a hundred other like Facts, to prove that all Animals have, in their mutual Correſpondence, a Delicacy of Diſcernment, which is not within our reach, and which makes them obſerve Differences among themſelves which are altogether imperceptible to us. If then many Birds ſeem to us always to ſing the ſame Note, as the Sparrow, the Chaffinch, and the Canary-Bird; we muſt not thence conclude that they are ſaying the ſame thing for ever. Let us rather believe that it is occaſioned by the groſſneſs of our Organs of hearing, with regard to a Language which is quite ſtrange and unknown to us. When we ſay in French *Chaſſez ce* Mâtin, & *Je Suis arrivé ce* Matin:

Matin: We diſtinguiſh theſe two *Matins* by the Pronunciation; but their Difference is ſo very inſenſible to a Foreigner, that he can hardly perceive it. The *Chineſe* Language is full of Differences of this Kind, which Foreigners are at the greateſt Loſs to perceive or execute. I fancy that a Man born deaf, who ſhould for the firſt time hear People converſe, would (not knowing any thing of Vowels, Words, and Syllables) alſo believe that they repeat the ſame thing over and over. Such is the Judgment we paſs upon the Language of Birds.

However, I ſhall not over-do this Reflection, and pretend that a Nightingale in the Spring varies his Diſcourſe as much as he does his Notes, or that a Canary-bird in his Cage utters ſo many different Phraſes as he repeats his Tune over. No, I am on the contrary perſuaded that Birds are Chatterers, and love Repetitions. It is even neceſſary they ſhould be ſo; and the Reaſon is this. To ſay, *I love you*, we have a hundred ſynonymous Phraſes and different Expreſſions; and there is no Thought but what we can dreſs many different Ways. This is the Reſult of the ſuperiority of our Knowledge, and of the Multiplicity of our Ideas, and, as I may ſay, of the Pliancy and Extent of our Genius, which comprehends ſeveral objects at once, and perceives their reciprocal Relations. It is not thus with Beaſts. Nature has confined their Knowledge within Bounds ſo very narrow, that they can conſider but one ſingle Object at the ſame time; and as they always conſider it Simply and in the ſame Manner; they likewiſe have generally but one way of expreſſing their Knowledge and Sentiments. This Obſervation is of Importance to know the Language of Beaſts in a more perfect Manner. It

is not only confined, as I said, to the Objects belonging to their Preservation, but also limited in its own Nature, having commonly but one Expression for each Object; and this is the Cause of their frequent Repetitions. For as it is natural for Beasts always to insist upon the same Object till their Desire is fulfilled, or diverted by another more pressing, and as they have but one Way to explain themselves upon each Object; it is necessary that they should always repeat the same Expression, and that this Repetition should last as long as they are taken up with the same Thing. Thus a Dog barking in the Night on Account of some Noise he has heard, evidently repeats this Phrase over and over, "Have a care! "I hear a Noise which give me Uneasiness: Or, I "see some body I mistrust"; and he will not cease repeating it till his Apprehensions are over. Thus a Chaffinch for ever repeats to his Mate the same Expression of his Love and Tenderness, and will tell her the same Phrase twenty times over, "I love you, I love you", or something equivalent. But in other Circumstances, as for Instance, those of Anger and Jealousy, of Satisfaction and Grief, we see that both Dog and Chaffinch use many other different Phrases; or if we do not perceive the Differences of them, it is meerly the fault of our Organs, or the little Knowledge we have of their several Accents.

It is then true with regard to Birds whom we have taken for our Example, that most of them are great Repeaters. Nay, it is not enough to say *most of them*, for they are all in the same Case, and if the Nightingale seems to use fewer Repetitions, it is only because his Phrase is longer and the Difference of his Notes more perceptible. But it is nevertheless true that they have different Phrases,

for

for the different Sentiments they have a Mind to expreſs; and that this Repetition proceeds only from their inſiſting long upon the ſame Object on one hand, and from their having but one Expreſſion for each Object on the other. Is this a Fault in their Language? I don't deny it. But again, compare if you pleaſe this pretended Fault with the pretended Advantage of our Amplifications, Metaphors, Hyberboles, and intricate Phraſes, and you will ever find in Birds Simplicity and Truth, and in the human Language abundance of idle Words and rank Falſities.

At leaſt you cannot refuſe the Simplicity of their Language an Advantage which ours has not. For it is uniform, and with regard to each Species, at all Times and in all the Countries in the World, for ever the ſame: Whereas in the human Kind not only each Nation has its peculiar Language, but the Dialect of every People varies perpetually, and after a certain Time it is no longer what it was. A *Frenchman* of *Charlemaign*'s Time would no more underſtand us than we now underſtand a *Spaniard* or an *Engliſhman*. The Language of Beaſts and Birds is not ſubject to theſe troubleſome Variations. The Nightingales and Canary-Birds that now are, ſpeak exactly the ſame Language as their Species ſpoke before the Flood. Carry them to the *Indies* and *China*, they will not hear a foreign Language there; and the very Moment of their Arrival they will be able to converſe with their like without the Aſſiſtance of Interpreters. Is it not to be wiſhed that Men, as was ſometimes propoſed, would upon this Model eſtabliſh a general Language, that might be underſtood all over the Univerſe.

Ob-

Obſerve, Madam, that this Simplicity or Sterility in the Language of Beaſts, will appear ſtill leſs defective to you, if you conſider that its Imperfection is replaced by Miens, Geſtures, and Motions, which are a kind of Language very intelligible, and a Supplement of the Vocal Expreſſion. A Dog for Inſtance, has no vocal Expreſſion to ask Pardon when he finds you are angry with him; but what does he do? Why he humbles himſelf before you; he cringes at your Feet in the Poſture of a Supplicant. He has no Phraſe to ſay open me the Door; but he ſcratches at it, and thereby informs you of his wanting to come in or go out. Are not theſe ſpeaking Actions? Even ſo; ſince they make themſelves well underſtood. This would be the Place, as the vulgar Proverb ſays, to make a Commentary upon the Grimaces of Monkeys. For it is beyond all Queſtion, that if among theſe Grimaces there are ſome which are no more than meer Contorſions, there are on the other Hand ſome which are ſo many Expreſſions fully equivalent to Words and Phraſes.

But do I not take too much Advantage, by thus alledging on the one Hand the Example of Birds which are really great Talkers, and on the other Hand that of Dogs and Monkeys which are full of Geſticulation, while there are beſides theſe ſo many other Species of Beaſts, which have very few or even no vocal Expreſſions at all, and in which we moreover obſerve none of the above Geſtures or ſpeaking Actions? No; I intended not to diſſemble any thing. If I have propoſed theſe Examples, it is meerly becauſe thoſe Beaſts living amongſt us, we know them much better than the other Species, and becauſe we muſt always argue from the moſt ſenſible Examples,

in

in order to illuſtrate Facts that are leſs notorious. But what if I have alledged the Inſtance of Cats and Dogs? Nature is conſtantly uniform. This is an unqueſtionable Principle; and conſequently what eſſential Parts we obſerve in one ſingle Species of Beaſts, we are to ſuppoſe the ſame in all the reſt.

I own Fiſhes and Reptiles here oppoſe no ſmall Difficulty to our Prejudices. How is it to be conceived, that a Carp is not indeed the dumb Creature it is commonly thought to be, and what kind of Language can be imagined between two Palmer-worms or two Ants? The Birds ſing, the Dogs bark, the Wolves howl, the Stags bellow, the Horſes neigh, the Sheep bleat. But Fiſhes and crawling Inſects appear abſolutely dumb.

'Tis true, if there are a few Species of Beaſts whoſe Language is more ſenſible than that of the reſt, and upon which I may have ventured to form ſome probable Conjectures, it would be requiring too much of me to pretend that I ſhould explain the Language of Fiſhes and Reptiles in the ſame Manner. For they may very well be proved to have a Language, be it what it will, ſince all the other Species are indowed with one. But who will attempt to know and diſtinguiſh it? Part of them live in an Element forbidden us, and the others eſcape our Sight by their Smallneſs.

Let us, however, with great Care avoid giving ourſelves up too much to our own Prejudices. How do we know that Fiſhes have not as many and perhaps more vocal Expreſſions than the Birds themſelves? They all of them ſeem to have been formed nearly upon the ſame Model. Some fly, others ſwim; but flying and ſwimming is one and the ſame Thing; the Element alone is different. It is written in *Geneſis*, that God created

created at the ſame Time the Birds and Fiſhes from the Boſom of the Waters: Which ſerved ſome Monks as a Pretence to perſuade themſelves that on Fiſh-Days they might indifferently eat of both Kinds. Fiſhes are provided with five Senſes, which we obſerve in Birds and in all other Animals. Why ſhould not they have the Faculty of ſpeaking like the reſt? If we hear them neither ſpeak nor ſing, it is perhaps for want of a proper Organ to hear them. The Waters is full and thoroughly penetrated with Air which Fiſhes breathe. Why might they not with that Air and by means of a Spring equivalent to the Tongue and Throat, form Vibrations and Sound too nice indeed for our Ears, but which might be heard in every Species? Pray obſerve that the Ear of Man is extremely coarſe, and that this Coarſeneſs is the Reſult of a neceſſary Providence. For were our Ear ſenſible to the minuteſt Vibrations of the Air we live in, we ſhould be forever ſtunned with a thouſand confus'd Noiſes, which would never permit us to diſtinguiſhed any one of them. There are then certainly in the Air many Sounds which we do not hear. Such is the Noiſe of a Silk-worm that gnaws a Mulberry-Leaf. If he is alone, or if there are but few of them together, no body can hear them; but put a certain Number of them in a Cabinet, and then all theſe little Noiſes joined in Uniſon become mighty ſenſible to our Ears. How much more is it poſſible that there be in the Water Noiſes inſenſible to us, and that Fiſhes by that Means ſpeak without being audible to us. At leaſt I delight in thinking ſo, not to rob any Production in Nature of the Perfection which ſhe is uſed to give to all. Nor could I think without a kind of Philoſophical Melancholy, that ſhe had

had doomed to an eternal Silence innumerable Nations, which inhabit the Immenſity of the Seas and Rivers. Silence is the Portion of the Dead. Speaking inlivens the Living themſelves. You may laugh at this modern Notion as much as you pleaſe, and jeſt upon my ſpeaking Fiſh, as doubtleſs he was laugh'd at who firſt mentioned the Flying-fiſh; but take Care that the one be not as true as the other, and that there be not more Prejudice than Reaſon in your Jokes. For my Part, I find this Opinion agreeable to Reaſon and Probability; and it is a ſufficient Motive to me to eſpouſe it, till I am undeceived by ſtronger Arguments.

The Reptiles and Inſects are juſt in the ſame Caſe. There are many Kinds of Reptiles, which have very diſtinct vocal Expreſſions; ſuch as Serpents, Frogs, and Toads; and conſequently, arguing upon the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature, we are intitled to ſuppoſe an equivalent in the Reſt; not to mention ſupplemental Miens, Geſtures, and Looks. It is not quite ſo with the Inſects. There is no Species of them having, that we know of, vocal Expreſſion properly ſo called. For we know that the Cry of the Cricket, the Singing of the Graſs-hopper, the Noiſe of certain Butterflies, and the Humming of the Flies, is not what we call a vocal Sound, and that it is a Noiſe cauſed by the Trembling of a Membrane. But what of that? It cannot be doubted but that the Cry of the Cricket and Graſs-hopper ſerves them to call each other in order to meet, and very likely to converſe. It may be thought that the Humming of the Flies likewiſe ſerves them to know each other in every Society, either by the Uniformity and Uniſon of the Tone, or by imperceptible Differences not within our Reach;

which is equivalent to vocal Expreſſion, and is at the ſame time a Proof how Nature, always uniform as to what is general and eſſential, is at the ſame time ingenious in varying the Means and Particulars of her own Productions. Now, what Nature has done for ſome Inſects, ſhe certainly has done for all.

There is for inſtance a Kind of Spiders which have a very ſingular Method of teſtifying to each other their Deſire of being together. 'Tis true, I was only an Ear-Witneſs of this; but I have been well aſſured that they were Spiders which made the Noiſe I am going to mention. A Spider who wants Company, ſtrikes, with I know not what Inſtrument, againſt the Wall or Wood where ſhe has ſettled, nine or ten gentle Blows, nearly like the Vibrations of a Watch, but a little louder and quicker, after which ſhe ſtays for an Anſwer. If ſhe hears none, ſhe repeats the ſame by Intervals for about an Hour or two, reſuming this Exerciſe and reſting alternately Night and Day. After two or three Days, if ſhe hears nothing, ſhe changes her Habitation, till ſhe finds one that anſwers her. It is another Spider which anſwers her exactly in the ſame Manner, and as it were by Eccho. If the Latter likes the Propoſal, the Converſation grows briſker, and the Beating becomes more frequent. Give Attention to it, and you will find by the Noiſe that they gradually approach each other, and that the Beatings come at laſt ſo cloſe that they are confounded, after which you hear no more Noiſe. Very likely the reſt of the Converſation is whiſpered. I have ſometimes amuſed myſelf in making the Eccho of a Spider which I heard beating, and whoſe Noiſe I imitated. She anſwered me punctually. She even ſometimes attacked me,

and

and began the Converſation, and I have often given that Diverſion to ſeveral People, whom I told it was a familiar Spirit.

How many like Diſcoveries might we make upon Inſects, if our Organs were delicate enough to ſee and perceive their Miens and Motions, and to hear their Voices, or what ſerves them inſtead of Voices! I am indeed perſuaded, that we ſhould find in the Ants, Worms, Scarabeus's, Caterpillers, Palmer-worms, Mites, and in all the Inſects, Language deſigned for their Preſervation and the Supply of their Wants. And as there are certain Species of Inſects in which we obſerve greater Induſtry and Knowledge than in large Animals, it is probable that theſe Species have likewiſe a more perfect Language in proportion, always confined however to the Neceſſaries of Life.

I have ſeen ſome carrying their Conjectures much farther, and pretending that before Man ſinned Beaſts ſpoke very diſtinctly among themſelves, and pronounced a Language which Man perfectly underſtood, as they likewiſe underſtood the Language of a Man. He ſupported this Conjecture upon the Converſation which the Serpent had with Eve in Eden. If Beaſts at that time, ſays he, had had no other Language but what they have at preſent, what muſt have been Eve's Amazement to hear a Serpent ingaging in Converſation, and arguing coherently with her. Let us judge of this from the Amazement of *Balaam* when he heard his Aſs ſpeak. Struck with this Wonder, he acknowledged his Crime, and obeyed God's Command. Again, let us judge of this from the Effect which a like Event would have on us. If we ſhould all on a ſudden ſee a Dog ſit over againſt us, and come out with a rational and coherent Diſcourſe, in order to engage

us to commit ſome Crime, or even to perſuade us to ſomething in itſelf indifferent, what wou'd our ſurprize be! Our Hair would ſtand an End: We ſhould think we ſaw the Devil; and far from ſuffering ourſelves to be prevailed upon, we would reject ſuch Counſels with Horror, at leaſt we ſhould miſtruſt them, and in all haſte go and conſult with ſome-body. Nevertheleſs, Eve did nothing of all this. Eve, who was ſo virtuous and clear-ſighted, quickly liſtened to the artful Diſcourſe of the Serpent, diſputed with him, and at laſt ſuffered herſelf to be ſeduced. The Serpent, concluded this Perſon, and all the other Beaſts muſt needs then have ſpoken as Men do, and their not ſpeaking now in the ſame Manner, muſt needs be a Puniſhment inflicted upon them by God, for having ſerved as an Organ to the Devil, and contributed to the Sin of Man.

This Fancy made me laugh, and if it diverts you I have a good Mind to let you adopt it, and the more ſo becauſe *Plato*, in his Politicks, had of Beaſts an Opinion much like this; becauſe *Joſephus* in his Antiquities was of the ſame Mind, and (what is of much greater Weight) becauſe St. *Baſil* expreſsly ſays in his Homily concerning the earthly Paradiſe, of which he makes a very fine Deſcription, that it was peopled with Beaſts, *which underſtood each other, and ſpoke rationally.* Theſe are his very Words as far as I can remember; for I have not here a St. *Baſil* by me. But you would accuſe me perhaps of a Deſign to ſeduce you as the Serpent did Eve, if I ſhould neglect to tell you what is to be thought of this Opinion. It is but a frivolous Conjecture without any other Foundation except the ſecurity of Eve arguing with the Serpent. Now this Foundation is altogether ruinous. For Eve before her Sin knew not what Fear

Fear or Diſtruſt were. She undoubtedly ſaw that the Serpent was no more than the Organ of ſome ſuperior Power. This even raiſed her Curioſity, and the more becauſe, being born immortal and free from Pain, ſhe knew very well that ſhe had nothing to fear; and her Curioſity ſtill increaſing her Raſhneſs, ſhe made the fatal Trial of her own Frailty. You ſee that nothing but Truth will do with me. Give me leave however to take advantage of the abovementioned Text of St. *Baſil*, to ſupport my Opinion concerning the Language of Beaſts. For if they underſtood each other and ſpoke rationally in the terreſtrial Paradiſe, that is with Knowledge, to the purpoſe, and agreeably to their Wants, why ſhould they have loſt this Prerogative?

It is time for me to put an End to this ſmall Piece. I am ready to return to *Paris*, and I intend that it ſhall go thither before me; that you may have time enough to reflect on it, and acquaint me with your Opinion of it at my return. But ſhall I then conclude without giving you a particular Dictionary of the Language of Beaſts? That muſt be: For you are ſenſible that the thing is impoſſible. There would be as many different Dictionaries as there are different Species of Beaſts. 'Tis true each Dictionary would be very ſhort, but their Number would be infinite. To give you that of the feathered Kind I muſt be able to diſtinguiſh and prick down the Quarters and half Quarters of the Tones which their Language is compoſed of. I ſhould be able to liſten to all they ſay in very different Occurrences, and they are ſo very ſprightly and wild a Nation, that it is impoſſible to follow them.

The Canary-bird is the moſt familiar. Therefore you will be able with a little Attention to find

find out the Meaning of moſt of his Phraſes. When he finds that his Mate neglects to ſit on her Eggs, and is too long abſent from her Neſt, liſten to what he ſays, he will for certain tell her that Moment that he is uneaſy, that ſhe muſt haſten to her Brood, and that he will beat her if ſhe does not take to her Neſt immediately. When the Hen obliged to keep her young warm under her has not Time to go abroad, and the Cock drops ſome Food out of his Beak into hers, ſhe teſtifies her Satisfaction to him by the clapping of Wings, and by a little Cry different from all the others, which muſt neceſſarily ſignify, "I "am very glad: You do me Pleaſure." There are among others two Circumſtances, in which the Canary-birds, as well as the Nightingale, the Chaffinch, the Linnet, and all Birds ſpeak, or if you will, ſing more than ordinary. I mean when he calls and is courting a Female, and when ſhe is ſitting on her Eggs or on her Brood. Though his Phraſe in both theſe Circumſtances ſeems to be the ſame, it may be obſerved however, that beſides the Differences which we do not perceive, his ſinging in the firſt Caſe is more lively, more brisk, and attended with greater Fire. And what can it ſignify then, if not this, "Come "dear charming Female, who lookeſt for a Huſ- "band; I ſhall marry thee; we ſhall have a "Houſhold in common?" In the ſecond Caſe, the Canary-bird and the Nightingale ſay quite other Things. The Neceſſity of removing the Fears of their Females, which are too buſy to mind much their own Security, is what makes them ſing on this Occaſion. The Husband watches for his Mate pearched on a neighbouring Branch, whence he obſerves all what paſſes, to inform her of it in caſe any Cauſe of Apprehen-

ſion

ſion ſhould appear. If he ſhould ceaſe ſinging but a Moment, the uneaſy Female would quit her Neſt. She remains quietly there ſo long as he is ſinging; but it would be a Prejudice void of Probability to believe, that the Nightingale ſings meerly for ſinging's ſake, ſince Birds have no Notion of ſinging, or any Senſe of Harmony. But though we ſhould be under the Neceſſity of believing that he ſings, yet ſhould we ſtill ſuppoſe that he ſings Words, I mean that his Song ſignifies ſomething. And really, what can he intend to do then, if not to ſay to his Wife, "Be eaſy, "I watch for you; you have nothing to fear; "I ſhall give you Warning if any Thing hap- "pens amiſs." This is what Birds ſay and repeat all Day long on the like Occaſion. The Sparrow, more Laconick in his Style, ſays it in a very ſhort Phraſe, but which he is for ever repeating. The Phraſe of the Chaffinch is ſomething longer; that of the Canary-bird is longer ſtill; that of the Linnet is longer yet; and at laſt that of the Nightingale is the longeſt of all. For I look upon the whole Sequel of his ſinging as a ſingle Phraſe, which ſays no more than that of the Sparrow. Such is alſo the Diſcourſe of two Rival Cats mewing a Dialogue upon the Top of a Houſe. It is only a long Phraſe repeated, which expreſſes their Wrath and Jealouſy. Wherefore it is always followed by a Battle in Form, and by the Defeat of one of the two, ſo that one might compare them to the Heroes of *Homer*, who never failed to make long Speeches to each other before they came to Handy-cuffs.

I have inſenſibly made here a little Dictionary, which may, if you will, Madam, ſerve as a Key to explain as nearly as you can the Language of all Beaſts. Will you again have another very

plain

plain Method? This is it. The whole Language of Beasts amounts to expressing the Sentiment of their Passions, and all their Passions may be reduced to a very small Number, *viz.* Pleasure, Pain, Anger, Fear, Love, the Desire of eating, the Care of their Young. If then you intend to have the Dictionary of the Language of Beasts, observe them in the Circumstances of these different Passions, and as they commonly have but one Expression for each, you will soon compose your Dictionaries from the Model I have given you. Which done, you will of all these Dictionaries together compose a Polyglot which will contain all the different Languages of Beasts. For Instance, this Phrase, "I feel Pain;" you will render it at once in the Language of the Dog, the Cat, the Hog, the Magpy, the Black-bird, *&c.* The whole correctly pricked down in Sharps and Flats, and I give you my Word that this will produce a mighty comical Reading.

You see I am upon the merry Pin. And why not? But what will you say of my Sincerity? I shall here make you a Confession, that will reduce the whole Language to almost nothing. I mean that you must absolutely retrench from it whatever is called Phrase or grammatical Construction, not excepting the most Contracted. Would you for instance believe, that the most eloquent Nightingale cannot say in his Language, *I love, I am very glad, I feel Pleasure.* This however is perfectly true. Any Phrase into which there enters what you call Grammatically first, second, and third Person, *I, you, he, ye,* and any other the like Pronoun, together with what you call Nouns Collective, Relative, Comparative, &c. are all of them to be blotted out of the Dictionary of Beasts. The Reason of this is quite plain: For

all

all these Words express arbitrary and metaphysical Ideas, which Beasts can by no means have. They have none but direct Notions, absolutely confined to the present and material Object that strikes their Senses. Man, who is infinitely superior both in his Language and Ideas, cannot express his Mind without composing his Discourse of relative and personal Terms, that determine the Sense and Application of it. Even those who speak a Language worse, as a German who speaks broken English will tell you: *Me suffer Fever: You love the Wine.* In Beasts the Expression is still much inferior to this Jargon; and if I have represented their Discourses by Phrases composed after our own manner, it is because I could not render them otherwise: For in good Truth, Beasts in a Manner cannot express any thing more than the Name of the Passions they feel. They can have no other Expressions than those which correspond to the following, *viz.* Pain, Pleasure, Fear, Anger, *&c.*

I am sorry things are not more to the Honour of Beasts; but an Author must be just, and I never intended to ascribe any thing to them but what Nature thought proper to give them. You are not to think however, that all is lost. For to take things rightly, is it of any consequence that Beasts should pronounce a Phrase with distinction of Persons, composed after our own Manner, provided they be as well understood? Your Bitch, 'tis true, cannot say to you, *I love you*; but what she says in reality signifies that she does love you, and you understand her very well. What would she have and what can you desire more? Does it not come to the very same thing? Doubtless it does. Therefore, be not disheartened, Madam, and if you have any spare time, you are at Liberty to make no

account of the cavilling Distinction I have been just proposing, and accordingly to go seriously about making of your Dictionaries. How will you be charmed, when you are once arrived to the Point of being able to converse with the Birds, and of understanding all their domestick Secrets? You will no longer be seen any where but in Woods, and the World will perhaps accuse me of having deprived them of your agreeable Company.

I am, &c.

F I N I S.